Teamsters Union Local 938 v. Barouh Eaton (Canada) Ltd.
[1988] OLRB Rep. June 549
2275-87-U Teamsters Union Local 938, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Complainant v. Barouh Eaton (Canada) Ltd. and Ron Gibbons, Respondents
BEFORE: K. G. O'Neil, Vice-Chair, and Board Members G. O. Shamanski and J. Sarra.
APPEARANCES: Frank Luce and Sam Schouten for the complainant; C. E. Humphrey, R. Gibbons and S. Chester for the respondents.
DECISION OF K. G. O'NEIL AND J. SARRA; June 6, 1988, as amended June 20, 1988
This is a complaint under section 89 of the Labour Relations Act in which the complainant (also referred to in this decision as the "union") alleges that the respondent (also referred to in this decision as the "company") dealt with it and certain of its members contrary to sections 3, 15, 64, 66, 67, 70, 71(a) and 73 of the Labour Relations Act.
The company is a distributor and, prior to the events related below, was also a manufacturer of various kinds of office products, predominantly ribbons for use in typewriters, calculators and other types of printers. The respondent Ron Gibbons is its Operations Manager. The substance of the complaint relates to events surrounding bargaining and a strike for a second collective agreement.
The parties entered into a first collective agreement which expired on July 29, 1987. Bargaining for the second collective agreement commenced on July 3, 1987. An application for conciliation was filed after that meeting. A meeting with the parties and a conciliation officer was held on August 21, 1987. A "no board" report issued on or about September 1, 1987. On September 18, 1987 the parties met with a mediator.
An agreement not having been reached, the union conducted a strike vote on September 25, 1987 and a legal strike commenced October 5, 1987. Unsuccessful mediation took place on November 9, 1987 and the strike was still in progress as of the date of hearing of this complaint.
The first of the actions complained of by the union involves a letter in the following form which was sent by the company to each of the employees in the bargaining unit covered by the expired collective agreement (approximately sixty-five to seventy people) on September 18th:
The company and the union have been trying to make an agreement. The company and the union met on September 18. They did not make an agreement. The company did make a final offer to the union. We think the offer is fair. The offer is all the company can afford. The union is going to hold a meeting to vote on the company's offer. You should go to the meeting to vote. We hope you will vote to accept the offer.
If the offer is accepted your hourly rate will be $7425 effective July 30, 1987.
In the second year of the agreement your wage will be $7.775 per hour.
In the third year of the agreement your wage will be $8.125 per hour.
We have offered as much as we can. Please attend the union meeting and vote for the offer.
These letters were translated into a Filipino dialect and Punjabi for workers with those first languages.
- The next activities complained of consist of the sending of two sets of letters on November 10, 1987, the day after the unsuccessful mediation. The sixteen most senior employees received the following letter:
As you may know the company and the union met on November 9, 1987. The meeting was with a mediator from the Ontario Ministry of Labour. The meeting was called to try and make an agreement. Unfortunately no agreement was reached.
At the meeting the company told the union some things we think you should know. As a result of the strike the company has lost business. We have had to review our business. We have realized that no matter what happens we have to change our business. Part of this change will mean that we do not need as many employees as in the past. We believe we will only need about 16 employees.
Based on your length of service you are among the 16 employees we feel we can continue to employ. We are prepared to have you return to work immediately and will immediately increase your pay by 35~ per hour. If you wish to return to work immediately please contact me.
We still hope that we can reach a settlement with the union so that employees like yourself can return to work under a new contract. However, even if an agreement cannot be reached with the union at this time you have the right to return to work whenever you wish.
The remainder of the bargaining unit received a letter which was identical up to and including the sentence, "Part of this change will mean that we do not need as many employees as in the past." In addition, this letter ended with the following two paragraphs:
We think that it is fair that we advise you that because of our reduced need for employees we will be terminating your employment effective November 11, 1987. If we later find we need more employees or some of those retained quit, then we will offer you re-employment based on your length of service, i.e. longer service employees first.
We regret that we are forced to make this decision but feel we have no choice. We believe it is fair you know we will be unable to re-employ you so you can make plans for your future.
These letters were all in English and were handed to people who were on the picket line or mailed to those who were not.
- Further, the union complains that in January 1988 the employer advertised in the following format:
OPENINGS
in Light Assembly
Full time and part time. Positions ideal for students, housewives, anyone entering the work force for the first time or just returning to work. Positions also ideal for anyone who is looking to supplement the family income, including retired or semi-retired people. Knowledge of English is not required. No experience necessary. Hourly salary. Call:
678-1800
The union takes the position that the onus on the employer to justify its conduct pursuant to section 89(5) was not satisfied and that the conduct set out above amounts to a series of unfair labour practices. The company takes the position that the notices complained of were truthful and were to allow employees to come to a decision about what they should do. It maintains that it would have been improper not to inform the employees of the matters contained in those notices and that the discontinuation of the manufacturing operation was for valid business reasons.
The company called its Operations Manager, Ron Gibbons, to explain the actions complained of by the union. Mr. Gibbons explained that originally the company had been a distributor only. It had gradually gotten into manufacturing approximately fifty per cent of the units that it sold. He said that as the years went by the manufacturing equipment used was becoming more and more outdated.
The bargaining unit covered by the expired collective agreement in this case had originally consisted of a hundred and twenty employees. This number was declining due to a high turnover and the fact that it was, in the words of Mr. Gibbons, "quite impossible to hire people at the labour rate we could afford". The number of employees in the bargaining unit immediately prior to the strike had been sixty-five to seventy people, depending on whether certain people on leave were included. All but six or seven of the employees, who were involved in shipping, were involved directly in the manufacturing process. The process was "labour intensive", using no automated or semi-automated equipment in the plant.
The letter sent in September was sent to each individual employee with the wage rate that they would be making in the various years of the anticipated collective agreement, based on the increases that the company had offered to the union, being increases of .35 an hour for workers whose previous wage had been at the minimum wage and .40 an hour for those whose previous wage had been above the minimum wage in each of three years.
The company has not manufactured since the strike began. It has carried on business as
a distributor. It has been obtaining product to distribute from both pre-existing sources and new
ones that have been discovered since the beginning of the strike.
At the mediation meeting on November 9, 1987, which was the first meeting between the parties since the beginning of the strike, the company representatives informed the union that the operation was to be restructured due to a considerable loss in volume of sales. They informed the union that they had decided to operate only as a distributor because the costs of manufacturing with their antiquated equipment were too high. They told the union that they were able to employ fifteen or sixteen people to work in the warehouse, boxing and packaging the products that they would distribute. The company offered to apply its last offer, the one on which the September letters was based, to the sixteen employees returning and to give others a right of recall for three months. Recall would be according to seniority. The parties were not able to reach an agreement on that proposal.
Shortly after the strike it had become apparent to members of management that they could buy the product from suppliers more cheaply than the company could manufacture it. Although they were aware of this in a general way before the strike, they were not fully aware of the extent to which it was true until they were forced to find out because they were not able to manufacture the product during the strike.
The offer of employment to sixteen individuals was based on an assessment of the number of people the company would require to bring in the product, repackage it, check it off and put on the local product identification. Mr. Gibbons testified that the reason the employees were sent letters was that management felt that the workers should know what the circumstances were. A direct letter would advise them, rather than "leaving them to walk the picket line not knowing". As to the sixteen, they wanted them to be back at work in the warehouse. The letters had virtually no impact; no one returned to work as a result. The thirty-five cent an hour increase was a reference to the last offer made to the union.
Prior to sending the letter, Mr. Gibbons had made inquiries of the Unemployment Insurance Commission. He had been advised that the employees would be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits if they were dismissed rather than left on strike. He sent separation certificates, on which he indicated that the reason for termination was restructuring of the company.
Since advising the union on November 9th of its intent to discontinue manufacturing, the company has shipped sixty per cent of its manufacturing equipment to the United States for sale. The older equipment has been disconnected. Some of it will be disposed of as waste metal. Part of the plant has been leased as a warehouse to a company that prints forms and was in need of storage space. Management intends to lease more of the plant for warehouse space as that tenant requires it. The company is using the remainder of the plant as a warehouse for its own product.
As to the allegations about the advertising in January, Mr. Gibbons testified that the company advertised in Brampton, in Mississauga, at Manpower, and in Filipino, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese newspapers. It was advertising to fill the positions that had been offered to, and not taken up by, the sixteen workers with the highest seniority in the plant. Mr. Gibbons said that the reason the company advertised in January rather than offering to rehire the people who had been terminated was that they had already been told the company would take them back if they wanted to cross the line. Mr. Gibbons made this clear to various employees who approached him in person or by phone and told him that they wanted to return to work but that the union had warned them not to return to work. He said he did not approach individual employees. None of the employees actually asked to come back to work.
Mr. Gibbons testified that there had been a gradually deteriorating situation shown in the company's financial statements for months leading up to the strike. Faced with the loss of business during the strike, he said that the company had to do something different in order to survive. Management made the decision to restructure about one week before the mediation meeting, on approximately November 3rd, at a management meeting attended by the president, the purchasing agent, and the operations manager, with input from the accountant.
The company is owned by a New York parent. The Canadian managerial group made a recommendation to New York to restructure in the manner described above and the New York parent accepted that recommendation and made the final decision that the restructuring would take place. Mr. Gibbons described the decision as inevitable. When asked if the restructuring would have happened whether the strike had taken place or not, he replied that he had not been aware of all the information prior to the strike. The inevitability only became apparent during the strike. With the company's inability to supply itself, it did not take long to establish the facts and form the conclusion that a restructuring was necessary. Between October 5th and November 3rd, the company obtained new suppliers from Ireland, Puerto Rico, Korea and Japan, as well as additional U.S. sources for the product, all of which could supply product at a price lower than the cost at which the company could manufacture it at the Mississauga plant in question.
Mr. Gibbons testified that the strike had no real bearing on the decision to restructure in the sense that the decision would have had to be made anyway. The only context in which they discussed the strike when they were making the decision to restructure was that they could not service the market from their own supply because of the strike. The business further deteriorated after the thirty per cent decline that had happened between October 5th and November 3rd. Mr. Gibbons said that although the company could have stayed in the manufacturing business if it had signed the old collective agreement he did not think that it would have remained in business for long.
Prior to the beginning of the strike, the company had advertised space for lease in the plant and had entertained inquiries about it. Given that negotiations were not going well, the company wanted access to potential tenants if needed, but since they did not know what the outcome of negotiations would be, nothing had been arranged. The union's complaint does not put this action in issue, although it was dealt with in Mr. Gibbons' evidence.
Mr. Schouten, the union's business agent, outlined the sequence of events leading up to the strike. He confirmed that the company had told the union on November 9th that they were scaling down to sixteen people because they could not compete on account of their obsolete machinery and a "multitude of company reasons". The union responded that if the company was only going to have sixteen to eighteen people return that it should offer the workers a dollar an hour more over each of the three years in the contemplated three-year term, and recall rights for the others for twenty-four months, together with improvements on language issues. This was not accepted by the company. Mr. Schouten testified that he did not believe the company's reasons for scaling down. No evidence other than Mr. Schouten's was presented by the union.
We will take each of the union's complaints in order. Firstly, the union complains of a violation of section 3 which provides that "every person is free to join a trade union of his own choice and to participate in its lawful activities". This was not specifically pursued in argument.
The union alleges failure to bargain in good faith because the company communicated individually with employees during the course of bargaining in the manner set out above. This goes hand in hand with the union's allegation that the company breached section 67 by bargaining with a person other than the trade union. The issue in this regard is whether communications with the individual employees constituted an attempt to bargain directly with the employees. See, for example, A. N. Shaw Restoration Limited, [1978] OLRB Rep. May 393.
Starting with the September 18 letters, the Board does not find them to violate the duty to bargain in good faith, or the duty to bargain only with the certified bargaining agent, although the advice about how to vote is close to the line. The letters make no offer to bargain. Moreover, they refer the individual employees to the process of voting conducted by their union and expressly note that the company made the offer to the union. In determining whether or not an employer's communications to its employees can legitimately be characterized as an attempt to bargain directly with them, the Board examines not only the nature of the particular communications complained of, but also the particular bargaining context in which those communications occur. Of particular importance is the timing of the communications, i.e. whether they occur early in the negotiations or late: The Citizen, [1979] OLRB Rep. March 177. In that case, the employer had engaged in much more extensive and explicit communication with individual employees than took place in the instant case. The Board found in the circumstances of that case and in light of the history of bargaining between the parties, that those communications did not amount to bargaining directly with employees and were not violations of either the duty to bargain in good faith or the exclusivity of the bargaining agent. This was because they were in the nature of an explanation of the employer's position, did not disparage the union's proposals or its bargaining committee, and fell within the protection afforded to employers under what was then section 56 (now section 64). Similarly, we are of the view that the facts before us do not establish that the company violated section 15 or section 67 by issuing the September 18 letters. They explained the employer's offer and urged acceptance at a late stage in bargaining, when the parties were at impasse.
By the time of the November letters, the bargaining context had changed considerably. The members of the bargaining unit had voted to strike rather than accept the employer's last offer, and had been on strike for five weeks. The situation was considerably more delicate than in September. Although in some respects the letters are similar to those of September in that they are truthful and restate the employer's last offer, and express a preference for a contract, there are additional elements in the November letters which lead us to the conclusion that the November letters cross the line of acceptable employer communication, and constitute violations of sections 15 and 67. Attempts by employers to directly negotiate with employees violate not only section 67 but also the duty to bargain in good faith where the employer's activity works to undermine the viability of the bargaining agent. The Board has said in Globe Spring and Cushion, supra:
A very important function of the bargaining duty contained in that provision
[section 15] is reinforcement of an employer's obligation to recognize a trade union selected by employees as their bargaining agent. Attempts by an employer to bargain directly with his employees undermine that obligation and, therefore are antithetical to good faith collective bargaining and the duty to make every reasonable effort to make a collective agreement.
Although the terms and conditions of employment were not offered for discussion with individual employees as in Rexwood Products Limited, [1987] OLRB Rep. Feb. 267 or Globe Spring and Cushion, [1982] OLRB Rep. Sept. 1303, the invitation in the letters to the more senior employees to contact the employer personally circumvents the union and is an attempt to elicit an individual response from the employees to the employer's last proposal. The employer already knew the collective response to the proposal by way of the strike vote and the mediation meeting the day before. We are of the view that the November letters constitute an attempt to deal directly with individual employees rather than the union on an issue central to the bargaining dispute, i.e. at what wage the workers would return. When seen in the context of the announcement of the serious curtailment of the employer's business and the discharge of a majority of the bargaining unit the communication is not protected by section 64. The bargaining context was no longer remotely similar to that in which the Board allowed the more extensive communication in the Ottawa Citizen, supra.
- The facts which establish the violations found above also establish a violation of section
64, in this case, in that the November letters circumvented the union in its representation of its members. This interferes with its ability to represent its members in a collective way at the bargaining table by undermining its authority as the exclusive bargaining agent.
The union also alleges violations of sections 66 and 70 are established on the facts of the letters, the discharges and the advertising for replacement workers in January, 1988. It is important at this juncture to note the effect of section 77 of the Act which permits the discontinuance for cause of the employer's manufacturing operation. As discussed in Westinghouse Canada Limited, [1980] OLRB Rep. Apr. 577, the cause referred to in this section is cause free from anti-union animus. Where such cause exists, even in the midst of a strike, the closure will be permitted. See Webster and Horsfall, [1969] OLRB Rep. Sept. 780 and Academy of Medicine, [1977] OLRB Rep. Dec. 783. On the other hand, however, the termination of a substantial part of a bargaining unit during a lawful strike is an extraordinary action, which, in the absence of a clear and convincing explanation, may well constitute a serious unfair labour practice.
Where anti-union animus is alleged, it is now well settled that the employer is required to establish that the reasons given for the action complained of are the only ones and that they are not tainted by anti-union animus. (Barrie Examiner, [1975] OLRB Rep. Oct. 745). Much has been said in the Board's jurisprudence about the necessity of determining the issue of animus by means of inference and in light of the "reverse onus" imposed by section 89(5) of the Act where there is no admission or incriminating evidence from the respondent. As pointed out in A.A.S. Telecommunications, [1976] OLRB Rep. Dec. 751, paragraph 14:
The existence of the reverse burden of proof, however, does not mean that the determination of employer motive has now become an easy task for the Board. The Board is still faced with the problem of assessing the evidence presented to it and drawing inferences from that evidence. There are many cases in which employers come forward with plausible explanations of their conduct from which it can be inferred that an employer's conduct is not in contravention of the Act. As a tactical matter, in these cases the complainant must introduce evidence to rebut that inference since, in the absence of any evidence from the complainant, the Board would conclude that the employer has met the burden imposed on it by section 79(4a). The result is that, in most cases, the Board has presented to it evidence from both the employer and the complainant. This evidence must then be assessed and inferences must be drawn. Such factors as the existence of a pattern of anti-union activity on the part of the employer, the employer's knowledge of the existence of union activity and of the employee's involvement in that activity, the manner in which the employee was discharged, and the credibility of the witnesses must all be considered. The Board's responsibility to assess the evidence, therefore, is one that cannot be avoided by seeking refuge in the reverse burden.
In the present case, the employer offered a plausible explanation of its action in closing its manufacturing section. Cross-examination of Mr. Gibbons' evidence left the employer's explanation intact. The union called no evidence which cast doubt on the explanation. The only evidence that even tended in that direction was the business agent's statement that he did not believe the employer's reasons for shutting down.
There is no evidence before us of any mistake or inaccuracy or lack of frankness with the Board on the part of the company as to the economic, business-related reasons for the closure of the manufacturing portion of the business. The fact that it had at one time been just a distributor and was reverting to that state, lends some credence to its position. So does the fact that the company offered to re-employ members of the bargaining unit and made an offer that it was willing to incorporate into a collective agreement that would cover those individuals. There was no allegation that the nature of the offer was a failure to bargain in good faith or an unfair labour practice in itself. It is clear from the evidence that union activities were not taken into account in selecting who was to be retained and who was to be let go. Indeed, there was no attempt by the union to disprove the evidence of the employer that the decision to keep the sixteen was made on bona fide business grounds and that the selection of who would fill the positions was made on the basis of seniority. We are left with no evidence to found the inference of the existence of anti-union animus in the discontinuance of the manufacturing operations urged on us by the union.
The timing of the discharges immediately after mediation is a factor which lends force to the union's allegations. However, there is nothing in the evidence that dislodges the testimony of Mr. Gibbons that the decision had been taken before that time. In these circumstances, timing does not justify an inference contrary to the credible and basically unchallenged evidence of the employer that the change was motivated solely by bonafide business reasons.
It was argued that if the employer was not engaged in activity tainted by anti-union animus, it should have offered the jobs in succession to the remainder of the bargaining unit when the sixteen original people did not take up the work rather than advertise for new workers, or that it should merely have laid the employees off without termination of their employment status. The difference between discharge and lay-off under the first collective agreement between the parties was that the collective agreement gave an employee the right, on increase or decrease of the work force, for six months after lay-off, to have seniority determine recall if "skill, competence, efficiency and qualifications [were] equal in the Company's discretion". The employer explains the discharges as the implementation of the decision to close the manufacturing operation which it intended to be permanent. The union takes the position that this amounts to "no answer" to the question as to why it was necessary to discharge rather than lay off. We are not persuaded that these facts support the inference that there was anti-union animus in the face of the company's offer to apply an amended collective agreement to any returning employee and the offer in the letters of discharge to re-employ if the need arose in the future.
Nor are we persuaded that the January advertisement itself represents a violation of the Act. It is not illegal to advertise for replacement workers. Although the union doubted that the employer was advertising just the non-manufacturing jobs, it brought no evidence to this effect and thus we have no reason to disregard Mr. Gibbons' evidence on the point. Between the time of the November letters and the January advertisement, the union had complained that individually offering its striking members work was a violation of the Act. We cannot give effect to the argument that three months later, not doing that is an unfair labour practice. The union evidently originally also had in mind an allegation that the advertisement, by not advertising in the Punjabi newspapers, had discriminated against certain Punjabi union members. However, this was not set out or particularized in the complaint. The Board declined, pursuant to Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure, to hear evidence on that allegation. No request to amend the complaint or particulars was made. The Board is left with no allegation of misconduct against the Punjabi group before it, as we held orally at the hearing when the employer objected to the introduction of such evidence in the absence of reference to the allegation in the complaint or particulars.
The remaining allegations under sections 71(a) and 73 are not necessary to deal with as there was no additional activity complained of to ground these portions of the complaint and they were not pursued in argument.
The complaint is allowed in reference to the November letters, but is dismissed in all other respects. To remedy the contravention found above, the Board, pursuant to section 89(4) of the Act, hereby directs that the respondent:
cease attempting to bargain with individual employees and meet with the union and negotiate in good faith on all outstanding issues;
refrain from any future interference with the trade union's right to represent its members; and
cause copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix" as supplied by the Board to be signed by its president and posted in a conspicuous place on the premises where the remaining jobs are being performed where they are likely to come to the attention of bargaining unit employees and keep such notices posted for sixty working days and take all reasonable steps to ensure that the notice is not altered or defaced or covered by other material;
notify all persons who were members of the bargaining unit on November 9, 1987 of the outcome of this decision by mailing a copy of the attached notice, after being signed by the President, to each of them, and forthwith provide the union with a list of the names and addresses of all of the employees to whom it has been sent within three weeks of this decision. Such notification is to be translated in the same manner as the September 18 letters sent by the company to the employees.
- The Board remains seized to resolve any dispute regarding the implementation of the Board's directions.
DECISION OF BOARD MEMBER G. O. SHAMANSKI; June 6, 1988
I dissent.
The complainant alleges in this case that the respondent contravened sections 3, 15, 64,
66, 70, 71(a) and 73 of the Labour Relations Act.
- Having heard the evidence adduced at this hearing by the parties, I am totally persuaded that:
i) The company did not interfere with employees' rights to join a union re: section 3.
ii) The parties had bargained for a new collective agreement and had gone through the mechanics of conciliation and mediation and had fully complied with section 15 of the Act.
iii) The company did not interfere with the union and complied with the provision of section 64 of the Act.
iv) There was no interference by the company with respect to the employees' rights. The company did not contravene any part of section 66.
v) The company did not lock out its employees. The union and its members rejected the terms for a new collective agreement and voted to strike.
vi) There was no evidence put forth by the union that would in any way substantiate a violation of section 71(a).
vii) During the strike the company changed its operation and went out of the manufacturing business and became a distribution centre.
Prior to implementing this major change the company advised the union and its striking members of the change and the reasons for such change. The company further advised the union and its members of the ramifications which would flow from the change of operation.
The union's evidence substantiates the business agent W. Schuton did not believe the company was scaling down its work force. This being so it was obvious that the union would not convey this not so pleasant news of reality to its members.
In conclusion, I must highlight the fact that the company did negotiate with the union in good faith and tried in vain to consummate a settlement that they could live with.
Under section 64 of the Act an employer is afforded certain rights, i.e. to communicate its views, so long as it does not use coercion, intimidation, threats, and promises of undue influence to employees.
There was no evidence presented that would substantiate that the company did use coercion, intimidation, threats, promises of undue influence.
The two newsletters to employees were in my opinion a legitimate method to communicate with its employees and convey to them an accurate unadulterated realistic scenario of the company's stay alive positive and how some of them would fit into this scenario.
I would have therefore dismissed the union's complaint with respect to this matter.
Appendix
Labour Relations Act
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the Ontario Labour Relations Board
WE HAVE POSTED THIS NOTICE IN COMPLIANCE WITH AN ORDER OF THE ONTARIO LABOUR BELATIONS BOARD ISSUED AFTER A HEARING ARISING OUT OF THE BARGAINING BETWEEN US AND THE UNION FOR A SECOND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT. THE ONTARIO LABOUR BELATIONS BOARD FOUND THAT HE VIOLATED THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT BY GOING AROUND THE UNION AND SENDING THE LETTERS WE SENT ON NOVEMBER 10, 1987.
THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT GIVES ALL EMPLOYEES THESE RIGHTS:
TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES;
TO FORM, JOIN AND PARTICIPATE IN THE LAWFUL ACTIVITIES OF A TRADE
UNION;
TO ACT TOGETHER FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING;
TO REFUSE TO DO ANY OR ALL OF THESE THINGS
WE ASSURE ALL OF OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:
WE WILL NOT DO ANYTHING TO INTERFERE WITH THESE RIGHTS;
WE WILL MEET WITH AND BARGAIN WITH THEM IN GOOD FAITH ON ALL
OUTSTANDING ISSUES;
WE WILL MAIL AT OUR OWN EXPENSE A COPY OF THIS NOTICE TO THE RESIDENCE OF EACH BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYED BY UB ON NOVEMBER 9, 1987 AND WILL PROVIDE THE UNION WITH A LIST OF THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL OF THE EMPLOYEES TO WHOM THAT MATERIAL HAS BEEN SENT WITHIN THREE WEEKS OF THE DATE OF THE DECISION.
BAROUN EATON (CANADA) LTD.
PER: _________________________
PRESIDENT
This is an official notice of the Board and must not be removed or defaced.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive working days.
DATED THIS 6th day of June 1988