PPG Industries Canada Ltd. London Merchandizing Branch v. Energy and Chemical Workers Union
[1986] OLRB Rep. January 143
1993-85-M PPG Industries Canada Ltd. London Merchandizing Branch, Employer, v. Energy and Chemical Workers Union, Trade Union
BEFORE: Judge R. S. Abella, Chairman, and Board Members F. C. Burnet, P. O'Keeffe.
APPEARANCES: Martin J. Addario, R. J. Straub, and W. W. Mercer for the Applicant; Daniel Ublanslcy and Bryan Van Rassel for the Trade Union.
DECISION OF THE BOARD; January 31, 1986
1This is a reference pursuant to section 107 of the Labour Relations Act in which the Minister seeks the opinion of the Board on a question of his authority to appoint a conciliation officer in the circumstances of this case.
2After three meetings in May and June of 1985, the parties signed a memorandum of agreement dated June 6, 1985. On June 10, 1985, the memorandum was shown to and approved by a majority of the members of the bargaining unit. There is no dispute between the parties that a collective agreement was entered into; rather, it is the position of the union that since both parties erred in their understanding of the amount of the cost of living allowance (COLA) yielded by the 1981 Consumer Price Index, there was a common mistake which should release the parties from their obligation to be bound by the agreement.
3During negotiations, both parties mistakenly assumed that the employees were entitled to a 10 per hour increase based on the COLA clause contained in the previous collective agreement. That clause was tied to the 1981 Consumer Price Index. Neither party was aware that an accurate calculation under that clause would in fact entitle the employees to 21 per hour.
4In the newly negotiated agreement, both parties agreed to an hourly wage increase of 3.5% annually. The 10 COLA increase was specifically referred to as follows:
The ten cents (10) cost-of-living allowance generated under the previous agreement has been folded in and is included in the above rates.
5The evidence of Bryan Van Rassel, the union negotiator, whom we found to be an entirely credible witness, was that some weeks after the agreement was concluded, he reviewed the application of the COLA clause and advised the company that in his opinion, there had been a miscalculation of the effect of the COLA clause and that the employees were entitled to further monetary payments. The company agreed that under the wording of the previous agreement, there had in fact been an error and accordingly the employees were paid the additional amounts owed to them under that agreement. The company did not agree, however, that similar amounts were also owed to employees under the new agreement. Both parties acknowledged that if they had known that the COLA fold-in was 21 rather than the agreed upon 10, they would not have settled for the wage rates agreed upon in the Memorandum of Agreement.
6The issue before the Board is whether this common mistake about the correct value of the COLA fold-in renders the collective agreement null and void. There is no suggestion that there was any fraud, misrepresentation or mala fides by either party. Each could easily have ascertained the correct value of the COLA fold-in and bargained accordingly. What the union agreed to and the bargaining unit ratified was specific and unequivocal. The increased hourly wage and the 10 fold-in were directly referred to in the agreement and accepted by both parties. No question of ambiguity arises, nor is this a question of detrimental reliance or of one party unfairly benefitting from the misunderstanding of the other, all of which could be addressed pursuant to the arbitration provisions of the collective agreement. In this case, both parties directed their minds specifically to stipulated amounts and agreed to them. Having done so, it is not now open to one of the parties to suggest that if they had been aware then of what they ought to have known and could easily have ascertained, they would not have entered into the agreement.
7The Board in previous decisions has dealt with the unique nature of collective agreements and the inapplicability of many areas of contract or common law to the law of collective bargaining under the Labour Relations Act. Common law doctrines are apposite only to the extent that they do not conflict with the statutory parameters and underlying principles of labour relations reflected in that legislation. The doctrine of common mistake, for example, like the doctrine of mutual mistake, where it does not go to the root of the agreement, does not operate to vitiate a collective agreement. See: Sperry Vickers Division Sperry Inc. Canada [1983] OLRB Rep. July 1208, Universal Handling Equipment Company Limited, [1979] OLRB Rep. April 356; Re Puretex Knitting Co. Ltd. and Canadian Textile & Chemical Union, Local S60 (1975), 1975 CanLII 2156 (ON LA), 8 L.A.C. (2d) 371 (Dunn); and Re Hamilton Medical Laboratories and County Medical Laboratory and Ontario Public Service Employees' Union (1983) 1983 CanLII 4875 (ON LA), 10 L.A.C. (3d) 106 (Springate).
8In the circumstances of this case, the parties entered into an agreement which falls within the purview of the s. 1 (l)(e) definition of "collective agreement". There is no basis for finding that the common mistake vitiates this agreement and we therefore find that there has been, and continues to be, a binding collective agreement in effect between the parties at all material times. We are therefore of the opinion that the Minister has no authority to appoint a conciliation officer in this case.