United Steelworkers of America v. Trim Trends Canada Limited
[1986] OLRB Rep. September 1312
1406-85-R United Steelworkers of America, Applicant, v. Trim Trends Canada Limited, Respondent, v. Group of Employees, Objectors
BEFORE: Ian C. Springate, Alternate Chairman, and Board Members R. J. Gallivan and W. F. Rutherford.
APPEARANCES: Keith Oleksiuk for the applicant; Walter Thornton for the respondent; Michael G. Horan for the objectors.
DECISION OF IAN C. SPRINGATE, ALTERNATE CHAIRMAN, AND BOARD MEMBER W. F. RUTHERFORD; September 24, 1986
This is an application for certification. The applicant filed evidence of membership on behalf of more than 55 per cent of the employees in the bargaining unit. There were also filed statements of desire in opposition to the application signed by a majority of employees in the unit. On March 20, 1986 a majority of this Board panel issued a decision concluding that the statements could not be accepted as a reliable indicator of the voluntary wishes of the union members who had signed them. Accordingly, the majority declined to exercise the Board's discretion under section 7(2) of the Labour Relations Act to direct the taking of a representation vote.
Following the release of the Board's decision of March 20, 1986 the matter came on for hearing before a differently constituted panel of the Board to inquire into certain allegations raised by the objectors. These allegations center around a claim that organizers for the union told employees that while they currently could join the union for one dollar it would later cost them ten dollars to do so. Having heard the representations of the parties, the other panel determined that it would be more appropriate to have the allegations heard by this panel. The matter was then rescheduled for hearing, at which time this panel of the Board heard the evidence and representations of the parties with respect to the allegations.
Section 1(1)(l) of the Labour Relations Act defines a "member" of a trade union for the purposes of the Act as including a person who has applied for membership in the union and "has aid to the trade union on his own behalf an amount of at least $1 in respect of initiation fees or monthly dues of the trade union". Many unions have a regular initiation fee higher than $1.00. ndeed some of the construction trade unions have initiation fees of hundreds of dollars. So as to assist in organizing employees, frequently during organizing campaigns unions do not require that employees pay the regular initiation fee, but only the one dollar required by the Act. This may result in a situation where an employee can become a member of a trade union for one dollar during an organizing campaign, but if he joins later he will be required to pay a higher amount. Many rade unions, however, have adopted a practice of allowing employees who did not join the union luring the organizing campaign a period of time after the union has been certified in which to join the union for a one dollar initiation fee. It is perhaps worth noting that there is no certainty that an 'employee will be required to join a certified trade union. Although the Act permits collective agreements to require union membership as a condition of employment, it only mandates that on he request of the trade union a collective agreement requires that all employees pay regular dues o the union. Such a provision would oblige a non-member of the union to pay regular monthly dues but not to join or pay an initiation fee to the union.
From time to time trade unions have made use of a lower initiation fee as an organizing device. This generally involves urging employees to join the union now for one dollar, rather than alter when they will be required to pay a much higher amount. The Board has indicated its concern about situations where this is done, particularly where employees may be left with the impression hat once the union is certified they will automatically have to join the union at the higher amount. The Board's concern is that employees may join the union during the initial organizing campaign lot because of any real desire to be represented by the union, but rather to avoid the risk of having o pay a higher initiation fee if the campaign is successful. The Board has made it clear that it does lot prohibit the lowering of the amount of an initiation fee for the purposes of an organizing campaign. What it requires is that union organizers not seek to mislead employees about the effect of he different initiation fees, and that employees who do not join the union during the organizing campaign be provided a reasonable opportunity to join for the lower fee after it has been determined that the union will be certified. This point was expressed as follows in the Haughton Graphics Limited case, [1983] OLRB Rep. Sept. 1464 at 1467:
The Board accordingly sent a clear signal that a "special" initiation fee to eliminate the financial impediment to organizing would continue to be acceptable; but not to the point where the same device may be held out as the threat of a "penalty" to those employees who would refrain from joining prior to the union becoming certified. The union, in other words, must not use this organizing tool in such a way as to cause the Board to doubt whether employees have joined the union of their own free choice, or simply as insurance to avoid the risk of being required to pay the full amount of the initiation fee if the union is successful. The proper question is whether the employees wish to become part of the trade union or not, and organizing campaigns ought to be won or lost on this basis. Any two-level system of initiation fees causes a problem for the Board so long as the higher level is made to apply before or immediately upon certification of the trade union. In order to prevent this organizing device from being a distorting factor in assessing employees' true wishes, the two-tiered system must allow all employees employed at the time of the organizing campaign a reasonable opportunity to join for the lower fee after it has been determined whether the union will be certified. This is recognized to be already the practice of at least certain of the trade unions in the province, and conformity to it by others would seem to be no more than the Act requires.
The constitution of the applicant trade union was not put in evidence. However, the constitution was referred to in the testimony of certain of the witnesses called by the union, most notably Mr. Everett Roberts. Mr. Roberts is employed as a mechanic by another company where he is the President of a Local of the United Steelworkers of America. At various times Mr. Roberts has taken a leave of absence from his regular employment and worked as a paid organizer for the United Steelworkers. According to Mr. Roberts, the union's constitution requires that employees joining the union after a first collective agreement has been signed pay an initiation fee of ten dollars. Mr. Roberts indicated that he understood that any time prior to the signing of a first agreement, employees joining the union need pay only one dollar.
Mr. Roberts described himself as the "chief organizer" in the campaign to get employees of the respondent to sign union cards. He was assisted by a number of other non-employees of the respondent who took time off their regular jobs to participate in the organizing campaign. Approximately ten employees of the respondent also served as "in-plant" organizers.
Partway through the campaign there arose an issue as to whether employees who did not join the union during the organizing campaign would later have to pay $10.00 to do so. The first reference in the evidence to a discussion about different initiation fees was on or about May 2, 1985, approximately three weeks into the campaign, when Mr. Roberts met with a group of employees at one of their homes. At the meeting one of the employees referred to the fact that the son of employee Mabel Yokom was considering joining a construction union and that it would cost him over $300.00 to join. Ms. Yokom testified that either she or another employee asked Mr. Roberts what it would cost to join his union to which he replied that it would be one dollar to join now, and that after the union got in it would be ten dollars. Mr. Roberts testified that what he said was that the fee was one dollar, but that the applicant's constitution provided that after a contract was signed, all new employees would pay a ten-dollar initiation fee. It is of some interest that the collective agreement administered by the Local of which Mr. Roberts is president does not require union membership as a condition of employment. Indeed, it was Mr. Roberts' testimony that he understood that while the payment of dues could be made compulsory, the same was not true for actual union membership.
The evidence indicates that at no point did Mr. Roberts try to use the ten-dollar as opposed to one-dollar initiation fee as a "selling" point to get employees to sign union cards. It is clear, however, that there was some discussion of the matter among employees, perhaps as a result of the discussion on May 2nd. Mr. Roberts became aware of the fact that the matter was being discussed by employees. Most of the other "outside" organizers joined the campaign in late July or early August 1985. Before they started, they met as a group with Mr. Roberts. At this meeting Mr. Roberts reviewed the campaign to date. Because he was aware that they might be asked questions about the differing initiation fees, Mr. Roberts raised the matter at the meeting. Mr. Roberts testified that he referred to the applicant's constitution, and indicated that while the organizers were to answer employee questions on the matter, they were not to use the ten-dollar initiation fee as an organizing device.
One of the employees visited by Mr. Roberts was Mrs. Chris Fluney. Mr. Roberts testified that Mrs. Fluney was one of the last employees visited because it was understood that she was opposed to the union. Mr. Roberts described to Mrs. Fluney certain benefits he claimed employees would receive if represented by the applicant. Mrs. Fluney, in turn, indicated that she did not wish to join the applicant, but that Mr. Roberts could call on her again after she had a chance to think about the matter. Mrs. Fluney testified that during the discussion she asked how the union was doing, to which Mr. Roberts replied that a majority of employees had signed up. Approximately one and a half weeks later, Mr. Roberts returned to see Mrs. Fluney. This time Mrs. Fluney's husband was also at home. During their discussion Mr. Fluney, and perhaps also Mrs. Fluney, asked what it would cost to join the union now or later. Mrs. Fluney indicated that the topic was raised because she had heard it being discussed at work. According to Mrs. Fluney, Mr. Roberts replied that it would be one dollar to join now and ten dollars later. Mr. Roberts testified that in response to the question, he explained that the only extra fee would be ten dollars for new members after a contract had been signed. He also stated that he explained that this was related to the union's constitution. When called by counsel for the objectors in reply, Mrs. Fluney again indicated that she recalled Mr. Roberts saying simply that it would be one dollar now and ten dollars later when the Union came in. Mrs. Fluney did not sign a union card.
One of Mr. Roberts' principal assistants during the organizing campaign was Mr. Steve Banks. Mr. Banks is employed by a company in Orillia where is the President of a Local of the United Steelworkers. Mr. Banks was among those organizers directed by Mr. Roberts not to use the ten-dollar initiation fee as an organizing device. Mr. Banks visited a number of employees, one of whom was Miss Nora Green. Mr. Banks met with Miss Green three times at her home. Miss Green testified that it was hard for her to recall her discussions with Mr. Banks since they occurred come time ago, and were not important to her. Miss Green stated that she recalled that at their first meeting, Mr. Banks advised her that it would cost her one dollar to join the union now, but twelve dollars when the union got in. Mr. Banks denied having discussed a twelve-dollar initiation fee. According to Mr. Banks, Miss Green asked him if there would be a special fee to join the union later, and he replied that after the union was certified and had negotiated a collective agreement, and someone then wanted to join the union, the initiation fee would be ten dollars. Given the clarity with which Mr. Banks gave his evidence, and Miss Green's indication that she had trouble recalling her discussion with Mr. Banks, we are prepared to accept Mr. Banks' version of the conversation, namely that Miss Green raised the issue of the cost to join the union later, and Mr. Banks indicated that after a collective agreement was negotiated it would cost ten dollars. Miss Green did not sign a union card.
Another individual who assisted with the organizing campaign was Miss Vivian Barrow. Miss Barrow is the President of an office and technical Local of the United Steelworkers in the Toronto area. Miss Barrow joined the organizing campaign after most of the other organizers. She was not present at the meeting where Mr. Roberts advised the organizers that they might be questioned about the higher initiation fee, and that if it were, they were to answer questions about it but not to use it as an organizing device. Miss Barrow signed as the collector on six of the union s membership cards. Among the employees visited by Miss Barrow was Mrs. Isobel Solomon. Miss Barrow visited Mrs. Solomon on three separate occasions. Miss Barrow and Mrs. Solomon appear to have gotten along well together and discussed a range of different topics. According to Mrs. Solomon, in their final meeting Miss Barrow indicated that the union was in and advised her that she might as well pay a dollar now, because she would have to pay ten dollars later. Mrs. Solomon directly referred to this aspect of her discussion with Miss Barrow twice. The first time, she said 'The last time (i.e. on her last visit) she (Miss Barrow) said I might as well give her the one dollar more because it would cost me ten dollars later". Subsequently, Mrs. Solomon stated, "She said it was going to cost me ten later so I might as well give her the one now". When being cross-examined, Mrs. Solomon was asked if she had asked Miss Barrow about the ten dollars. Mrs. Solomon replied that she did not think so, but that rather Miss Barrow "just told me". Mrs. Solomon did not sign a union card.
Miss Barrow testified that where she works, union membership and a ten-dollar initiation fee are conditions of employment. She also stated that it was her understanding that a one-dollar initiation fee in effect during an organizing campaign continues until the meeting where employees select a negotiating team. Subsequently she stated that she understood the one-dollar fee continued until the employer started deducting union dues. Miss Barrow testified that she advised Mrs. Solomon that the union campaign was going well, and the union was close to the point where it could apply to be certified. Miss Barrow denied discussing a ten-dollar initiation fee with Mrs. Solomon. Miss Barrow stated that she did not raise the one-dollar/ten-dollar difference, adding "I'm sure she (Mrs. Solomon) could have heard that from anybody, but she did not hear that from me". Both Mrs. Solomon and Miss Barrow came across as credible individuals. One of them, however, must be mistaken. On balance, we are prepared to accept the testimony of Mrs. Solomon. She appeared to have a good recollection of the details of her discussions with Miss Barrow. Further, unlike the other outside organizers, Miss Barrow did not have the advantage of Mr. Roberts' caution against referring to the different initiation fees as a way to try to get employees to join the union.
The only bargaining unit employee organizer whose conduct was put in issue was Ms. Mabel Yokom. Partway through the organizing campaign Ms. Yokom began to actively assist the union. She signed several employees into union membership. Ms. Yokom at times talked about the union with another employee, Mrs. Mary Fasciano, a known opponent of the union. Mrs. Fasciano testified that she knew Ms. Yokom to be a union supporter, but was unaware of Ms. Yokom's role in the organizing campaign. She stated that she had once seen Ms. Yokom with a single union card. Mrs. Fasciano testified that on one occasion when she and Ms. Yokom were discussing the union, Ms. Yokom indicated that if she joined the union now, it would cost her one dollar, and if the union came in it would cost her ten dollars. Later, when being cross-examined by union counsel, Mrs. Fasciano agreed with the proposition that at the time of Ms. Yokom's comments, Ms. Yokom was not asking her to join the union. Mrs. Fasciano added the comment that "she (Ms. Yokom) never asked me to sign a card or anything like that". It was Ms. Yokom's testimony that she never talked about the cost of joining the union with Mrs. Fasciano because she knew Mrs. Fasciano was opposed to the union. On balance, however, we believe that Ms. Yokom likely did make the comment in question to Mrs. Fasciano, but does not now recall having done so. Mrs. Fasciano never did join the union.
In determining this matter we see no difficulties with the membership evidence collected by Mr. Banks. The only evidence with respect to his conduct during the organizing campaign concerned Miss Green. As indicated above, we are satisfied that Miss Green asked Mr. Banks about the cost of joining the union later and he replied that after a collective agreement was negotiated it would cost ten dollars. There is nothing of concern in this response. We also have no difficulties related to the comment allegedly made by Ms. Yokom to Mrs. Fasciano. It is clear from Mrs. Fasciano's evidence that Ms. Yokom referred to the ten-dollar initiation fee in the course of a friendly discussion with someone she knew to be an active opponent of the union and was not part of an attempt to get Mrs. Fasciano to join the union. No employee came forward to indicate that while attempting to get them to join the union Ms. Yokom made any reference to a ten-dollar initiation fee.
The situation with respect to Mr. Roberts is somewhat more complex. It is clear on the evidence, that Mr. Roberts did not try to use the regular ten-dollar initiation fee as a "selling point" in the campaign, and indeed he instructed most of the other organizers not to use it in such a way. We found Mr. Roberts to be a credible witness. We have no doubt that it is his recollection that when asked by Ms. Yokom and Mrs. Fluney about the cost of later joining the union he said it would be ten dollars after a collective agreement was signed. However, Ms. Yokom and Mrs. Fluney both recalled Mr. Roberts' response as being simply one dollar now and ten dollars later, without an express indication that the "later" was after a collective agreement had been executed. Although the matter is far from clear, given the large number of employees Mr. Roberts probably talked to during the organizing campaign, and the possibility that he would not be able to accurately recall what he said to each one, we believe that Ms. Yokom and Mrs. Fluney's recollection of Mr. Roberts' comments were probably more accurate.
We thus have a situation where Mr. Roberts, the chief organizer in the union campaign, did not wish to use a two-tier initiation fee as an organizing tool, directed other organizers not to do so, and did not himself raise the issue with employees. He did not seek to mislead employees. However, when responding to a question raised by two employees, Mr. Roberts indicated that it would cost ten dollars to join the union later without specifying that "later" was after a collective agreement had been signed. There exists the reasonable possibility that Mr. Roberts may have responded in a like manner if the question was raised by other employees. This, in turn, raises a question as to whether the membership evidence collected by Mr. Roberts is unreliable because employees might reasonably have joined the union simply as insurance against the risk of having to pay the full initiation fee later if the union organizing campaign was successful. It is our view it does not. The nine-dollar difference between the applicant's regular ten- dollar initiation fee and the one-dollar fee during the organizing campaign was considerably less than in the other cases we were referred to. Further, it is clear that at no point did Mr. Roberts ever say or in any way indicate that it would be mandatory for employees who did not join the union during the organizing campaign to subsequently join the union at a ten-dollar initiation fee. In these circumstances, we feel it highly unlikely that any employee would have signed a union card because of the way Mr. Roberts responded to a question about initiation fees.
This then brings us to the situation of Miss Barrow. As indicated above, we are satisfied that on at least one occasion Miss Barrow herself raised the matter of the ten-dollar initiation fee. Further, she did it in a context that would have left the impression that if the employee did not pay a dollar now she would be required to pay ten dollars later. Given Miss Barrow's apparent attempt to actively use the nine-dollar differential as a sales tactic and to leave the impression that employees would be required to pay the higher amount if they did not join the applicant during its organizing campaign, we believe it prudent to disregard the six cards obtained by her. Having done so, however, the applicant's membership evidence still relates to more than fifty-five per cent of the employees in the bargaining unit.
The final issue is whether, as claimed by the objectors, the matters dealt with in this decision, as well as the statements of desire in opposition to the application, should together cause the Board to exercise its discretion to direct the taking of a representation vote. We believe not. Apart from concerns relating to the membership evidence collected by Miss Barrow, which membership evidence we have discounted, we do not believe that employees would likely have signed membership cards due to statements relating to the applicant's initiation fee structure. Setting aside the membership evidence collected by Miss Barrow, the applicant's membership evidence rates to more than fifty-five per cent of the employees in the bargaining unit. The evidence with respect to the petition did not satisfy us that as of the terminal date these employees had voluntarily changed their minds about being represented by the union. In the result, we are not prepared to exercise our discretion and direct the taking of a representation vote.
A certificate will issue to the applicant.
DECISION OF BOARD MEMBER R. J. GALLIVAN;
When the union made its application for certification more than a year ago, it filed membership evidence for 135 of the 232 employees in the bargaining unit, only seven more than the minimum required by the union to achieve its apparent goal of automatic certification without the necessity of having the extent of its real support tested through a secret ballot representation vote under section 7(2) of the Act. It is now agreed that six of those union membership cards sold by Ms. Barrow should be disregarded as having been tainted by the likelihood that she misled employees about the union's two-tier fee structure. The union's membership support is thus reduced to only one over the minimum. Nevertheless, by its decision not to order a vote, the majority is concluding that not even one of the remaining 129 cards obtained by any of the fifteen other union organizers could possibly be similarly tainted. Such a conclusion, in the face of numerous conflicts in testimony during the hearings before the Board, is neither credible nor logical, particularly when it is recalled that the majority of union organizers in this campaign were company, not professional union, employees and thus were far less experienced in the subtleties of labour law than Ms. Barrow, a union staff member for a year and the president of her own union local for six years. If the cards of such an experienced unionist are known to be tainted, the Board, to be objective, must surely conclude that on the balance of probabilities others are as well, and should resolve the doubt by ordering a vote.
And doubt there is. Indeed, the union's own chief organizer, E. Roberts, testified that virtually from the outset of his organizing campaign there were rumours throughout the plant about the union's two-tier fee structure. Other than a brief discussion with his outside organizers (who were a small minority of the collectors involved) about how to respond should any employee question the matter, he took no steps to counter the rumours or to clarify the confusion. He agreed under cross-examination that the $1.00/$10.00 fee structure could be interpreted as a threat by employees. Yet he apparently was satisfied to allow the threat to go unchallenged unless an employee specifically asked for clarification. One can conclude that so long as the confusion worked to the advantage of his campaign, he was content to allow employees to be misled. This sort of conduct by a union official has in the past led this Board to say (see Alex Henry & Son Ltd., [1977] OLRB Rep. May 288 at 290):
The Board's consistent policy in certification proceedings has been to require the highest standard of integrity on the part of union officers in the soliciting, gathering and presentation to the Board of documentary evidence in support of their application. Since that evidence remains confidential, is not subject to cross-examination and is the principal evidence on which the Board must rely in certification proceedings, it must be free of any cloud or taint. If, in view of the circumstances touching the soliciting and collecting of the membership evidence, the Board is left in doubt it may use its discretion to order a representation vote to resolve that doubt.
A union officer is under a duty to refrain from making false or misleading statements in the course of an organizing campaign. We find that the statement of Mr. Reilly, which might better be termed a half-statement, is blatantly, if not patently, misleading. His failure to explain his statement to the employees by omitting to say that the higher initiation fee would be forced on them only if the union could succeed in its application for certification, could thereafter successfully negotiate a union shop contract with the employer and would at that time be unable or unwilling to waive the higher initiation fee, leave this Board in some doubt as to whether employees for whom membership evidence was filed were in fact misled and therefore unable to fairly weigh the meaning of Mr. Reilly's statement as it might affect them. This raises some doubt as to whether the membership evidence filed is an expression of the true wishes of the employees.
There is no doubt in my mind, given the numerous conflicts in the evidence, that it is much more likely than not that a number of employees were misled by Mr. Roberts's failure to clarify the issue and therefore signed union cards either under the implied threat or through misunderstanding of the true facts.
I dissented from the March 20, 1986 decision by the majority to disregard a petition in opposition to the union signed by 118 of the 232 employees in the agreed bargaining unit, including 4 employees who previously had signed union membership cards. The majority had concluded, incorrectly in my view, that a letter to the editor of a local newspaper from each of two local area residents who opposed unionization of the plant, had unduly influenced employees to sign the petition. The letters had raised the possibility that unionism could reduce the company's competitiveness and, by implication, weaken employees' job security. Those two residents were well known in the community - one having been a school bus operator and the other an insurance agent - both previously had been politically active at the local community level for many years and had been instrumental in attracting the plant to Dundalk in 1968; one was seen visiting the plant on one occasion during the summer of 1985 but neither had any relationship with the company. Nevertheless the majority concluded:
Given these facts, a reasonable likelihood exists that employees who had become union members subsequently signed the statements of desire not out of a truly voluntary change of heart about being represented by a trade union, but rather due to a fear that unionization would result in a threat to their job security.
[emphasis added]
I continue to disagree that the two community residents had the degree of influence on employees alleged by the majority. But if the majority believes that the 118 employees who signed the petition could be so impressionable and so easily misled that they signed for fear of their jobs then, at least for the sake of consistency and fair treatment if nothing else, they should similarly conclude a reasonable likelihood exists that the employees were misled over the question of the union's two-tier fee structure.
At the very least the cards obtained by Ms. Yokom should be disregarded. In her testimony under cross-examination she said that she was aware of the fee issue but had not been instructed by the union on how to answer questions about a two-tier structure and that, at least in the case of employees she had identified as being opposed to the union, she would not have answered their questions on the subject in any case because she did not trust non-union supporters. (She was aware of who some of the latter were from the T-shirt incident covered by the Board's March 20, 1986 decision.) Ms. Yokom was responsible for obtaining five union cards. It is not an unreasonable inference to draw from her evidence that she could not or did not explain the fee structure to those she recruited into the union. Thus her cards should be disregarded. Doing so would require the Board to order a vote under section 7(2).
As mentioned by the majority, the allegations concerning the union's fee structure came hr hearing before a differently constituted panel of the Board. That other panel decided that it would be more appropriate to have those allegations heard by the same panel which had dealt with this petition. It came to that conclusion on the grounds that natural justice in the exercise of the Board's discretion to order a vote under section 7(2) of the Act required consideration of the total valuable evidence. In this case that evidence encompasses not only all the facts concerning the union’s two-tier fee structure but also all the evidence elicited concerning the petition. Having regard for the totality of this evidence, it is abundantly clear to me that it is impossible for this Board to determine from the evidence before it whether or not on the terminal date a majority of these employees wished to be represented by a union.
The purpose of section 7(2) of the Act is to allow a vote to be held when the union’s majority status is unclear or in doubt. Here, some of the employees first signed union membership cards almost eighteen months ago, that is, more than five months before the union made its application to the Board in September 1985. There has thus been long delay. In the normal course, the Board attempts to assess the degree of union support as of the terminal date, September 17, 1985 in this case, rather than the Board hearing date. It does so in order that any subsequent delay for whatever reason will not disadvantage the union. However, in this case, the delay has been caused as much by the illegal means employed by the union to obtain some of its membership cards as by the need to assess the validity of the petition. The need to avoid disadvantaging the union is thus considerably blunted. The Board should therefore be cognizant that now, a year later, it is highly likely, indeed inevitable, that many employees will have changed their minds either for or against the union. This makes it abhorrent to now impose a union upon them and, contrary to the intent of the Act, will ill serve the promotion of "harmonious relations" between employees and the company. It is well to remind ourselves that the Act also promotes "collective bargaining between employers and trade unions as the freely designated representative of employees" (emphasis added because that part is so often forgotten).
After this much delay, a union application with membership cards only one over the minimum, a petition with many names overlapping union membership, reaffirmation of union support by some who signed the petition, union membership cards tainted by threats or obtained by having misled employees, unresolved conflicts in evidence - the cumulative doubt about the union s majority status begs for resolution through the mechanism provided by the Act. It is difficult to envisage a situation where a vote would be more appropriate than here.