International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 793 v. Arlington Crane Service Limited, 1985 CanLII 1091

[1985] OLRB Rep. November 1547

1164-85-M International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 793, Applicant, v. Arlington Crane Service Limited, Respondent, v. Operating Engineers Employer Bargaining Agency, Intervener

BEFORE: Robert D. Howe, Vice-Chairman, and Board Members M. Fayrs and H. Kobryn.

APPEARANCES: Bernard Fishbein and E. A. Ford for the applicant; Morris Manning, Q. C. for the respondent; Bruce Binning and James Thomson for the intervener.

DECISION OF THE BOARD; November 28, 1985

1. The style of cause in this matter is amended to add "Operating Engineers Employer Bargaining Agency" as an intervener.

2. This is a referral of a grievance to the Board under section 124 of the Labour Rela­tions Act. The (Form 104) Referral which initiated these proceedings indicates that the matter referred to the Board for final and binding determination under that statutory provision is the applicant's "grievance dated March 6, 1985". That grievance, which was filed with the Board (as Exhibit 1) at the hearing of this matter, reads:

(see over)

GRIEVANCE FORM

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS

LOCAL 793

STYLE OF GRIEVANCE ~~ (a) EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCE~~

(b) UNION GRIEVANCE (Strike out (a) or (b) if not applicable)

Employer Bargaining Agency and its affiliate

EMPLOYER CONCERNED: Arlington Crane Service Limited

PROJECT SITE: Namasco, Heritage Road, Burlington

TYPE OF AGREEMENT Provincial Agreement

SECTION(S) OF AGREEMENT VIOLATED Master Portion, 2.2, 3.1(a), Schedule 'A Article 1.6

TIME PERIOD CONCERNED March 6, 1985 and continuing

THIS GRIEVANCE IS FILED ON BEHALF OF Local 793, I.U.O.E. on behalf of its members

THE NATURE OF THE GRIEVANCE IS AS FOLLOWS:

The company are employing other than a member of Local 793 I.U.O.E. in the capacity of a front end man contrary to the collective agreement.

The company failed to call this Union Hall for personnel as required.

REMEDY REQUESTED:

That the company only employ members of Local 793, I.U.O.E. for the classification of front end man. That the company pay the amount equal to 8 hours' pay plus vacation pay, Pension and Welfare, Training Fund and E.B.A. Fund for all days worked by other than a member of this local on a 65 ton Grove truck crane, Licence number AY7436.

ACTION TAKEN - OR COMPANY COMMENTS:

SIGNED BY COMPANY SIGNED BY (a) Employee (b) Union

“W. Pedder"

Date March 6, 1985

(Please make out in three copies)

3. At the commencement of the hearing of this matter on October 23, 1985, Mr. Manning advised the Board that on the previous day he had filed on behalf of the respondent (also referred to in this decision as "Arlington"), and Dorothy Foran, an appli­cation for judicial review, requesting the Divisional Court to quash a summons which had been served on Dorothy Foran by the applicant (also referred to in this decision as "Local 793"), and to prohibit the Board from hearing this referral, on the ground that various (unspecified) powers of the Board are of no force and effect in view of The Constitution Act, 1982. Since Mr. Manning chose not to elaborate on the basis of his clients' constitutional chal­lenge to the Board's jurisdiction, we are not in a position to rule upon the validity of that challenge.

4. After hearing and recessing to consider the submissions of the parties concerning the issue of whether these proceedings should be adjourned pending disposition of that appli­cation for judicial review, the Board made the following unanimous oral ruling, which is her­eby confirmed:

Counsel for the respondent has requested that these proceedings under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act be adjourned pending disposition by Divisional Court of an application for judicial review which was filed yesterday on behalf of the respondent. Counsel advised the Board that the respondent is seeking by means of that application to have the Court quash a Board summons which has been served by the applicant on Dor­othy Foran in respect of these proceedings, and to have the Board pro­hibited from hearing the referral on constitutional grounds which he has not delineated before the Board and does not intend to argue in this forum. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the Board should proceed with the hearing of this matter which has already been delayed by an adjournment to which he consented as a matter of courtesy to counsel for the respondent, for whom the initial date scheduled for hearing this mat­ter was inconvenient. Counsel for the Operating Engineers Employer Bargaining Agency took no position on the issue of whether these pro­ceedings should be adjourned.

The courts have made it clear that the Board, as master of its own pro­cedure, is entitled to proceed with the hearing of a matter notwithstand­ing a pending or anticipated application for judicial review: see, for example, Cedarvale Tree Services Ltd. v. Labourers' International Union of North America, Local 183 (1971), 71 CLLC 14,087 (Ont. C.A.). It is also clear that the Ontario Legislature, in enacting section 124, intended to have construction industry grievance referrals under that provision dealt with expeditiously by the Board: see in this regard section 124(2), which provides that the Board "shall appoint a date for and hold a hearing within fourteen days after receipt of the referral". The fact that the griev­ance in question, which is dated March 6, 1985, was referred to the Board on August 8, 1985, does not eliminate the desirability of an expe­ditious adjudication of the grievance on its merits. In this regard, we note that it is not unusual or undesirable for a party to attempt to settle or resolve a grievance under various grievance procedure steps or by other informal means before referring it to the Board. The adjournment to which counsel for the applicant agreed in order to convenience counsel for the respondent also does not, in our view, provide a valid basis for further adjourning these proceedings for an indefinite period of time pending final disposition of the respondent's application for judicial review.

Accordingly, having regard to all of the circumstances, including the nature of the grievance which pertains to an alleged failure by the respondent to hire through the applicant's "hiring hail", we have decided to deny the respondent's request for an adjournment and to proceed with the hearing of this matter.

5. After the Board made that ruling, counsel for the applicant stated that he would require the attendance of the persons who had been summoned to the hearing, including Dor­othy Foran. Notwithstanding that statement, Dorothy Foran left the hearing room without being released by the Board from the summons which had been duly served on her by the applicant, and did not return. Following her departure, Mr. Manning advised the Board that he was withdrawing from the proceedings in his capacity as counsel for the respondent and counsel for Dorothy Foran, but that he would be remaining as counsel to the witness Michael Panter, who had also been summoned to the hearing by the applicant. In response to a query by Mr. Binning as to whether or not Mr. Manning would be challenging the validity of the Prov­incial Agreement in these proceedings, Mr. Manning indicated that he was remaining at the hearing only as counsel to Mr. Panter in order to protect his rights as a witness, and that he would not be making any submissions concerning any collective agreement or the Board's jurisdiction. On the basis of that information, Mr. Binning advised the Board that the Oper­ating Engineers Bargaining Agency would be withdrawing from the hearing as it had only intervened in the proceedings for the purpose of protecting the validity of the Provincial Agreement.

6. The Board then proceeded to hear the evidence of Ernest A. Ford, the applicant's Labour Relations Manager; William Pedder, who has been employed by Local 793 as a Busi­ness Agent since 1978; Michael Panter, the aforementioned witness summoned by the appli­cant; and Glenn McLeod, who has been Local 793's Hamilton Area Supervisor for the past seven years. The Board also granted the applicant leave to recall Mr. Pedder in view of certain testimony by Mr. Panter which could not reasonably have been anticipated by the applicant. In addition to that oral evidence, the Board also received documentary evidence consisting of the aforementioned grievance, the Provincial Agreement, lists of members of the Crane Rental Association of Canada, lists of (unlicensed) members of the applicant, a clearance issued by the applicant to Mr. Panter on April 24, 1984, and an affidavit of service in respect of the aforementioned summons which was served on Dorothy Foran by the applicant.

7. It is clear from the evidence that the respondent is, and was at all material times, bound by the May 1, 1984 to April 30, 1986 Provincial Collective Agreement between the Operating Engineers Employer Bargaining Agency (referred to in that agreement as the "Employer") and the Operating Engineers Employee Bargaining Agency (referred to in that agreement as the "Union"), which collective agreement is referred to in this decision as the "Provincial Agreement", for ease of reference. Articles 2, 3, and 26 of the Provincial Agree­ment provide, in part, as follows:

ARTICLE 2 - RECOGNITION

2.1 The Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees of the Employer for whom the Union has bargaining rights within the Province of Ontario engaged in work covered by the schedules and classifications set out in this agreement, and any additional classifications as may be agreed to by the parties.

2.2 The onsite operation, repair, maintenance and servicing of all equipment listed in this agreement shall be performed by a member of the Union including the assembly and dismantling of equipment operated by members of the Union and coming within the jurisdiction of the Union, boom, boom sections and counter-weight installation and removal and any other requirements necessary to put equipment into production or preparation for removal from operations. When Ironworkers are available on site they may be used to assist in the installation and removal of boom, boom sections and counterweight components. Additional assistance by other than Union members for the installation or removal of boom, boom sections and counterweight components shall only be used upon agreement with the Union.

ARTICLE 3 - UNION SECURITY

3.1 a) The Employer shall first call the Union Office whenever personnel are required. If the Union cannot supply such personnel within 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays, the Employer may secure such personnel from any other source. The Employer may recall former regular employees through the Union office who have been absent from the Employer up to six (6) months.

b) Regular employees shall be defined as employees who have been on the Employer's payroll for six (6) consecutive months or more.

3.2 All personnel hired shall be required to have a clearance card issued by the Union before they start to work, unless other arrangements are made with the Union dispatcher. Such clearance card will not be unreasonably withheld.

3.3 Employees working under this Agreement shall be members of the Union in good standing, or make application to become members of the Union within seven days of hiring or be replaced upon written request by the Union.

ARTICLE 26 - MANNING OF EQUIPMENT

26. 1 a) The parties agree that the following formula will be used for the purpose of manning certain equipment set out in the classifications I and 2 of the attached Schedules, save and except Schedules "C" and "0's.

b) It is further agreed that this formula shall apply to each Employer on any one job.

c) The following shall be manned by one (1) operator and one (I) apprentice, oiler or oiler driver,

i) All conventional truck mounted cranes with a manufacturers rating of 25 tons capacity and over.

iii) All truck mounted hydraulic cranes with a manufacturers rating of 35 tons capacity and over.

8. "Hiring hall" provisions similar to that found in Article 3.1 of the Provincial Agreement are quite common in collective agreements in the construction industry. The significance of the hiring hall in that industry was described by the Board as follows in Joe Portiss, [1983] OLRB Rep. July 1160:

9. The hiring hall is a significant component in the administration of employment in the construction industry. Before the advent of unionism employment in the construction industry was not methodical, often being governed at the whim of employers and their personnel agents. Without the hiring hail employees, notably in the construction industry and the maritime industries~ were too frequently the victims of abuse and arbitrary treatment at the hands of employers. (See, generally Hearings On Hiring Halls In The Maritime Industry, Sub-Committee On Labour Management Relations Of Senate Committee On Labour and Public Welfare, 81st Cong. (2d) ses. 100-01 (1950) and Bastress, Application of a Constitutionally Based Duty of Fair Representation to Union Hiring Halls [19821 West Virginia Law Review 31). If they are operated fairly hiring halls provide an equitable and efficient means to distribute jobs, particularly in industries where jobs are temporary and manpower needs fluctuate. In these situations the union is well suited to act as an employment agency.

10. The hiring hall offers advantages to both employees and employers. It saves the employee from the need to canvass numbers of employers in an often fruitless search for work, acting as a clearing house in which available jobs and available workers can be matched. Particularly in periods of high unemployment it also provides the worker with a rational and objective system for the more equitable distribution of work among all employees rather than to the privileged few. The employer gains to the extent that the hiring hall relieves him of the need to screen and recruit employees with adequate qualifications for short term jobs. The employer avoids the administrative cost he would otherwise bear as well as incidental costs which he might have to incur to retain a crew of workers through slow periods to insure available manpower in busier times. A well run hiring hall will give the employer a ready pool of labour from which he can draw on short notice with little or no administrative cost. Moreover, to the extent that the hiring hall dispatches the same members to different kinds of jobs for different employers ... it may engender a work force with greater experience and sophistication, which will also benefit the employer.

11. Schedule "A" to the Provincial Agreement covers and applies to various employers engaged in the crane and equipment rental business in Ontario, including the respondent. "Oiler" is one of the classifications referred to in Schedule "A". That term, which the evidence indicates is used interchangeably in the industry with "front end man", refers to a person who drives the "front end" of a truck mounted crane when it is being moved from place to place (as opposed to the "operator", who operates the crane once it is in position).

12. Mr. Pedder, whom we found to be a candid and credible witness, testified that in the course of performing his functions as a Business Agent for Local 793 on March 6, 1985, he encountered Michael Panter at approximately 2:30 p.m. at the Namasco project on Heritage Road, where an addition was being built onto a factory. At the time of this encounter, Mr. Panter was standing approximately fifty feet away from a sixty-five ton Grove truck crane which had the name "Arlington" on its boom. After Mr. Panter had identified himself, Mr. Pedder asked him if he was the "front end man" on that crane. Mr. Panter replied in the affirmative, and told Mr. Pedder that he worked for Arlington on his days off from school. Mr. Pedder also asked Mr. Panter if Mr. Pedder's brother Ron was still working for Arlington, to which Mr. Pedder replied, "Yes, he is still working in the shop." (Shop employees are not covered by Schedule "A".)

13. Mr. Panter told the Board that he was in school on March 6, 1985 and was not on the aforementioned site. However, we prefer the evidence of Mr. Pedder concerning that matter and, accordingly, find as a fact that Mr. Panter was employed by the respondent as an oiler on the site in question on March 6, 1985. In making that finding of fact, we have taken into account the fact that Mr. Pedder made contemporaneous notes of his encounter with Mr. Panter. Mr. Panter, on the other hand, was testifying without the benefit of notes or records. When asked by applicant's counsel if he had any records of when he "front ended" for Arlington, Mr. Panter replied, " I don't carry my own records." In assessing Mr. Panter's credibility and the weight to be given to his evidence, we have also considered his demeanour while testifying and his reluctance to answer questions posed by applicant's counsel. Mr. Panter's barely audible responses to Mr. Fishbein's initial questions provide an example of that reluctance:

Counsel: Have you front ended for Arlington since March 6, 1985?

Witness: Yes.

Counsel: Where and when?

Witness: Does it matter?

Counsel: Yes.

Witness: I don't understand the question.

Mr. Panter's testimony concerning a Local 793 clearance card is also indicative of the unreliability of his memory with respect to dates. Mr. Panter initially testified that he had a Union clearance card from Local 793 for the period from April of 1985 to September of 1985. When applicant's counsel asked him if he was "sure it was in 1985", Mr. Panter said "Yes". However, after Mr. Panter had been excluded from the hearing room for a few moments at the request of counsel for the applicant, who wished to address the Board concerning the propriety of putting the witness on notice that the applicant intended to call evidence to contradict his assertion that he had been issued a clearance card in 1985, the following exchange occurred between Mr. Fishbein and Mr. Panter when the latter resumed his testimony:

Counsel: You said you had a clearance card from April of 1985 to September of 1985?

Witness: Yeah, but it was 1984.

Counsel: You had no clearance card for 1985?

Witness: No.

Counsel: When you were working in the summer of 1985, were you working without a clearance card?

Witness: Yes.

The evidence of Mr. McLeod establishes that although Mr. Panter was issued a clearance card for the period from April 24, 1984 to August 31, 1984, he did not apply for or obtain a clearance card for any period in 1985.

12. Although Mr. Panter was unable to provide the Board with the precise dates on which he worked for Arlington as an oiler during 1985, he acknowledged that he had been employed by the respondent in that classification from June of 1985 to the date of the hearing; it was his evidence that during that period he did not work every day, but sometimes worked five days a week and other times worked seven days a week. The precise dates would, of course, be ascertainable from payroll records or other documents of the type which Dorothy Foran was directed by the aforementioned summons to bring with her and produce at the hearing of this matter. However, counsel for the applicant elected not to seek enforcement of that summons at this stage of the proceedings, in recognition of the fact that production of such records could await the quantification stage of the proceedings in the event that the grievance succeeded and the parties were unable to agree on the quantum of compensation payable.

13. It is clear from the totality of the evidence that the respondent did not call the applicant's office when it required an oiler on March 6, 1985 and during the period from July 1, 1985 to October 23, 1985. It is also clear that if the respondent had called the applicant's office as it was obligated to do under Article 3.1 of the Provincial Agreement, the applicant would have been able to supply one or more oilers within forty-eight hours, as Local 793 had at all material times a number of unemployed members who were capable of working as oilers. Instead of doing so, the respondent, in contravention of Article 3 of the Provincial Agreement, employed Michael Panter, who was not referred to the job by the applicant and who did not (at any time material to the instant case) have a clearance card issued by the applicant. (The evidence also establishes that Mr. Panter is not a member of Local 793, and has never applied to become a member of Local 793.)

14. In addition to a declaration that the respondent has contravened the Provincial Agreement and a compensation order in respect of that continuing breach, the applicant seeks a compliance order. In support of that request, counsel for the applicant noted that this is not the first case in which the respondent has been found by the Board to be in contravention of the union security clause in the Provincial Agreement or its predecessors. Counsel referred the Board to several previous section 124 cases between the parties, including an unreported decision dated June 21, 1982 (in Board File No. 0338-82-M) in which another panel of the Board found that the respondent had violated Article 3.1 of the 1980-82 Provincial Agreement (which is identical to Article 3.1 of the 1984-86 Provincial Agreement, as quoted above) by hiring an individual as a trainee without first seeking a referral from the applicant; and an unreported decision dated March 25, 1983 (in Board File Nos. 2222-82-M and 2509-82-M) in which another panel of the Board found that the respondent had violated Article 3.1 of the 1982-84 Provincial Agreement (which is also identical to Article 3.1 of the 1984-86 Provincial Agreement) by employing an operator who, although he was a member in good standing of Local 793, was not hired by the respondent through Local 793's office. That decision also found that the respondent had contravened Article 3.4 of the applicable Provincial Agreement by using an owner-operator who did not have a collective agreement with the applicant. (An application for reconsideration of that decision was dismissed by that panel of the Board in an unreported decision dated May 4, 1983.) In subsequent unreported decisions dated June 24, 1983 and September 19, 1983, that panel of the Board, which in accordance with the Board's usual procedure in such matters had remained seized of the referral, directed the respondent to pay to the applicant damages totalling $23,175.76 in lost wages and benefits for the work which would have been performed under the collective agreement but for the respondent's contravention of the union security clause.

15. In an unreported decision dated March 5, 1984 (in Board File No. 1959-83-M), yet another panel of the Board found the respondent to have contravened Article 3.4 of the 1982-84 Provincial Agreement. In considering the appropriate remedy to be granted in such circumstances, the Board wrote as follows in paragraph 11 of that decision:

The instant referral involves a substantial and continuing violation of the provisions of article 3.4. Moreover, the instant referral is similar to the referrals in Board File Nos. 2222-82-M and 2509-82-M, where the Board granted damages to the applicant. In our view, the applicant is entitled to be afforded a measure of protection against this ongoing conduct by the respondent. In Re Samuel Cooper & Co. Ltd. and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union et al. (1973), 1973 CanLII 461 (ON HCJDC), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 501, the Divisional Court upheld the power of an arbitrator to make affirmative directions, in the nature of mandatory injunctions, as are necessary to effect compliance with a collective agreement. At pages 505-6, Lacourciere, J. stated:

We are all satisfied on the record that the arbitrator correctly concluded after hearing evidence that any and all conditions precedent to the hearing of the grievance had been satisfied, that art. 32(b) was directory. The only course open to him to bring in a final and binding settlement by arbitration of the differences between the parties involved the making of affirmative directions. With respect to the arbitrator's power to take such affirmative action, this Court has been referred to the language of s. 37(1) of the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, which reads:

37(1) Every collective agreement shall provide for the final and binding settlement by arbitration, without stoppage of work, of all differences between the parties arising from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged violation of the agreement, including any questions as to whether a matter is arbitrable.

We have also been referred to the following cases: Re Amalgamated Electric Corp. and United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Lacal 514 (1950), 2 L.A.C. 597; Beswick v. Beswick, [19671 2 All E.R. 1197; Hodder v. Turvey (1873), 20 Gr. 63; Re Ruppert, 34 Labour Cases para. 71,243. It appears that the special tribunals created by unions and employers, and directed by statute to bring about final and binding settlement of all differences, ought to have the necessary powers to achieve such results.

The majority award in the Amalgamated Electric Corp. case was given in May, 1950, by Bora Laskin and C. L. Dubin (now Laskin, I., and Dubin, JA.) as members of a board of arbitration, whose authority to award compensation was challenged because of the difficulty in the enforcement. The following comments made in the majority award at p. 602 are equally applicable here:

As a matter of principle, and in the light of the terms of the Agreement, this Board is of the opinion that its power to make a binding decision involves powers to direct such affirmative action as would remedy the breach declared to exist. A declaration or finding divorced from a direction for its implementation does not, in this Board's view, meet the requirements of a binding decision. A decision is binding when it requires the doing or not doing of something by the defaulting party, related to the default of which it is guilty and intended as a remedy for such default. In so far as a declaration carries no obligation of compliance in relation to the specific case, it cannot be a binding decision.

In our opinion, the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was sufficiently wide to encompass a full range of remedy, unless expressly limited by the Labour Relations Act or the terms of the collective agreement. I can find no such limitation and the wording of s. 37(1) of the Act is such that the arbitrator was correct in this particular case in making the orders provided.

Section 44(1) [formerly section 37(1)] of the Labour Relations Act remains unchanged. Moreover, section 124(1) also provides:

Notwithstanding the grievance and arbitration provisions of a collective agreement or deemed to be included in a collective agreement under section 44, a party to a collective agreement between an employer or employers' organization and a trade union or council of trade unions may refer a grievance concerning the interpretation, application administration or alleged violation of the agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable, to the Board for final and binding determination.

In addition, article 7 of the provincial collective agreement provides that decisions of the board of arbitration or a majority of such board shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.

16. Similar reasoning applies to the present case, which involves a further continuing breach of the union security clause contained in the Provincial Agreement. Accordingly, the Board's determination in this matter will include an order directing the respondent to cease and desist from violating the union security clause, directing it to first call the applicant's office whenever personnel are required to perform work covered by the Provincial Agreement or Schedule "A" thereto, and directing the respondent not to secure such personnel from any other source unless the applicant cannot supply such personnel within forty-eight hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays).

17. The appropriate remedy in the instant case also includes an award of compensation framed in accordance with the principles referred to in Re Blouin Drywall Contractors Ltd. and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 2486, (1975), 1975 CanLII 707 (ON CA), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 199 (Ont. C.A.), leave of appeal to the S.C.C. refused November 17, 1975. (See also Reimer Overhead Doors Ltd., [1984] OLRB Rep. Oct. 1493; Re McKenna Brothers Ltd. and Plumbers Union, Local 527 (1975), 1975 CanLII 2128 (ON LA), 10 L.A.C. (2d) 273; and paragraph 5 of the Board's aforementioned decision dated June 24, 1983 (in File Nos. 2222-82-M and 2509-82-M).) Those principles recognize that an employer's breach of a union security clause of the type contained in Article 3 of the Provincial Agreement deprives union members of wages and benefits which would have been paid to them (or to the union on their behalf) if the employer had complied with its obligation to call the union office whenever personnel covered by the agreement were required. Accordingly, the appropriate way to (insofar as is possible) place the injured parties in the position they would have been in if the Provincial Agreement had not been violated is to direct the respondent to pay to the applicant in trust (for distribution to its member or members who were wrongfully denied an opportunity to work for the respondent, and to the applicable plans) the wages, vacation pay, benefit plan payments, pension plan payments, and other remittances which should have been paid by the respondent in respect of the work which it used Mr. Panter to perform, in contravention of the Provincial Agreement.

18. For the foregoing reasons, the Board, pursuant to section 124 of the Labour Relations Act, hereby makes the following determination:

(1) The respondent has violated Article 3 of the (1984-1986) Provincial Collective Agreement between the Operating Engineers Bargaining Agency and the Operating Engineers Employee Bargaining Agency (the "Provincial Agreement"), by employing Michael Panter as an oiler on March 6,1985, and during the period from July 1, 1985 to the date of this determination;

(2) the respondent shall forthwith pay to the applicant in trust (for distribution to its member or members who, as a result of the respondent's contravention of Article 3 of the Provincial Agreement, were wrongfully denied an opportunity to work for the respondent as oilers, and to the applicable plans) the wages, vacation pay, benefit plan payments, pension plan payments, and other remittances which should have been paid by the respondent in respect of that work; and

(3) the respondent shall cease and desist from violating Article 3 of the Provincial Agreement, and shall first call the applicant's office whenever personnel are required to perform work covered by the Provincial Agreement or Schedule "X' thereto, and shall not secure such personnel from any other source unless the applicant cannot supply such personnel within forty-eight hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays).

19. The Board will remain seized of this matter in the event that a dispute arises concerning the implementation or quantification of the Board's order. (For an exposition of the policy reasons for which the Board, as master of its own procedures, has generally adopted this procedure, which affords the parties an opportunity to agree upon the amount to be paid in cases in which the Board awards compensation, see Holiday Juice Ltd., [1984] OLRB Rep. Oct. 1449, at paragraph 31.)