[1984] OLRB Rep. December 1737
0322-83-U John (Jack) James, Complainant, v. Labourers' International Union of North America, and its Locals 493 and 527, Respondents, v. O. J. Pipelines Ltd., Intervener
BEFORE: N. B. Satterfield, Vice-Chairman.
DECISION OF THE BOARD; December 17, 1984
[1]. A letter from the complainant John James dated June 18, 1984 has been received by the Board. The letter, which is set out later in the decision, appears to be a request for reconsideration of a decision in this matter which issued March 16, 1984. That decision dismissed a complaint that the respondents had violated sections 68 and 69 of the Labour Relations Act. It was dismissed because the complaint failed to disclose prima facie a violation of either section by any of the respondents. The decision was rendered orally at a hearing into the complaint after the Board had withheld consent to James to amend the complaint to include the allegation that the respondent Local 493 had failed to pursue a grievance. The decision which issued March 16th confirmed the oral decision.
[2]. James filed another complaint on March 27, 1984 (Board File No. 3085-83-U) which came on for hearing by the Board, differently constituted, on May 14, 1984. The respondents and the intervener herein were named as respondents to the complaint. A decision of the Board which issued June 4th, 1984 described the complaint as a carbon copy of the first (instant) one, ..... involving the same parties and arising out of exactly the same facts.". It found that the dismissal of the original complaint was a complete bar to the second complaint and dismissed it. That decision concluded with the following paragraph:
- The only avenue now open to the complainant is to apply for reconsideration of the earlier decision. An application for reconsideration is assigned to the panel that issued the original decision. But such a request will not be granted unless the applicant brings forward evidence that was not available at the time of the original hearing or advances arguments that could not reasonably have been made at that stage. A request for reconsideration should be addressed to the Registrar and should fully describe the evidence and argument upon which the applicant relies. The Board may dispose of such an application on the basis of the written application without convening a hearing.
[3]. James' letter followed upon the issuing of that decision. The text of his letter is set out below:
I am applying for reconsideration of the earlier decision of case file #308 5-83-U on the grounds that I did not receive the letter from the Board, of February 23/84 and I notified Rene Brixhe who in turn notified Mr. Satterfield of same. Also no mention is given to the fact that it was the fault of the Registrar for the time elapse and he failed to notify the International Labourers Union twice, once for June 13/83 and then again in Dec. 22/83. Further take note that it was brought up that Local 493 was not in the original complaint because I was given to understand they were proceeding on a grievance on my behalf later to find out it was a farce as the grievance went to the Pipeline Contractors Assoc. of which 0. J. Pipelines were not members and my Local 493 knew this at the time. No. (2) of the oral decision concerning Local 527 "the number of men out of work" has no bearing on the steward who was appointed to the completion of the job, enclosed documents of referral letter for this point. Enclosed also is pre-job conference report and copy of the grievance letter.
Why was the fact a barr [sic] is commonly placed after a boards [sic] decision was not mentioned in the original decision and why was the hearing scheduled a second time if the case was the same one?
How the tribunal could justify this dismissal is beyond the scope of reasons.
[4]. The Board, as constituted herein, treated James' letter as a request for reconsideration of its March 16th decision in the instant case and referred copies of it to the respondent and intervener for comments. The texts of their responses and James' reply to them are as follows:
(1) Text of reply dated July 3, 1984 from the solicitors for the intervener:
We are in receipt of the Applicant's Request for Reconsideration dated June 18th, 1984 and have the following comments to make in respect thereto.
We would first indicate that we take it to be settled that a Request for Reconsideration of a Board decision will not be granted unless new evidence is brought forward which was not available to the Applicant at the time of the original hearing or unless arguments are put forward that could not reasonably have been made at the time of the original hearing. This position is made clear in the concluding paragraph of the Board's decision in this case dated June 4th, 1984.
In our submission, the Application for Reconsideration that has been made by the Complainant is not based upon any new evidence not available to the Complainant at the time of the original hearing, nor are any arguments advanced that could not or have not been made at an earlier stage in these proceedings.
The Complainant has simply repeated again the same arguments that he has already made in respect of this matter. Once again, reliance is placed on the alleged failure to receive the Registrar's letter of February 23rd, 1984 requesting further particulars in this matter. It would appear that this is done by the Complainant to once again explain why it is that no reference was made in the original complaint to any failure on the part of Local 493 to process a grievance filed on the complaint's behalf. Once again, reliance is placed on the letter of January 20th, 1982 appointing the Complainant as Steward on the job site and the pre-job conference report in this regard in respect of the Complainant's position and the alleged violation of Section 69 of the Act by Local 527.
In short, the same submissions that were made by the Complainant at the hearing on March 7, 1984 have been repeated in the Application for Reconsideration. No new evidence nor new submissions that were not available at the time of the March 7th hearing have been put forward.
We would again remind the Board that the complaint was originally filed and particularized in May of 1983. The Complainant was then invited to clarify his position at the first day of hearing in this matter which took place on June 13th, 1983. A second hearing was then held on January 3 1st, 1984. A third day of hearing was then held on March 7, 1984. As a result, even if the Complainant did not receive the request for particulars dated February 22, 1984 as he has alleged, he has had more than ample opportunity to clarify and explain the full nature and extent of his claim. Notwithstanding this, it was not until March 7, 1984 that any kind of clarification and particularization was attempted by the Complainant.
In these circumstances, and in light of the clear requirements that have been set if any Application for Reconsideration is to be granted, we would respectfully submit that the Application in this case should be refused. All of which is respectfully submitted.
(2) Text of the reply dated July 9, 1984 from the solicitors for the respondents:
We are solicitors for the Labourers' International Union of North America ("the International" and its Local 493 ("Local 493") and 527 ("Local 527").
We acknowledge receipt of a copy of a letter addressed to you dated June 18, 1984 from Mr. John Jack James ("James"), wherein James has applied for reconsideration of the Board's decision in OLRB File 3085-83-U ("the Second Decision"). The Second Decision was made following the dismissal of Mr. James' first Application in Board File 0322-83-U ("the First Decision").
We are uncertain, from the wording of James' Letter, whether he wishes reconsideration of the First or the Second Decision. In any event, on behalf of our clients, we are instructed to oppose the Application for Reconsideration and ask that the Board deny the said Application in respect of both the First and the Second Decision.
The application does not advance any new arguments, nor does James submit that he wishes to adduce evidence which was not available to him at the time of either hearing.
Mr. James raises the following matters in his Application for Reconsideration, which we deal with below:
(a) He did not receive a copy of our letter from the Board dated February 23, 1984 requiring him to file particulars of his allegations against Local 493;
(b) Local 493 was not named in the original Complaint because James was given to understand that the Local was proceeding on a grievance on his behalf;
(c) With respect to Local 527 and "the number of men out of work", this has no bearing on James, who was a steward and was appointed until the completion of the job.
I. The letter for Particulars dated February 23, 1984
The first Complaint, which is dated May 10, 1983, did not list the International and Local 493 as parties. James sought to add these parties at the hearing on January 31, 1984, but filed no allegations against them. A request for particulars was made by our firm, which was forwarded by the Board to James, by letter dated February 23, 1984 (see First Decision, paras. 8(2) and (3)). James now claims that he did not receive this letter from the Board.
The First Decision, at para. 7 thereof, indicates that counsel for the Respondent Local Unions moved that the Board dismiss the Complaints on two grounds, including the Complaint being so deficient in particulars with respect to both Locals, but especially regarding Local 493, that the Respondents could not tell what case they would have to meet. In respect of such motion, the Board found, at para. 8 of the First Decision, that:
"The Board heard the full submissions of the parties on the Motion". (emphasis added)
James' failure to provide particulars and respond to our request for particulars was a major issue before the Board on the Motion. James was given a full opportunity to reply to the argument made by Local 493 that he had not raised any allegations against it or provided any particulars of such allegations. At no time did James advise the Board, despite extensive discussion in the hearing room with respect to the matter of particulars, that he had failed to receive any notice with respect to providing particulars. We further point out that in his second Application dated March 27, 1984, James makes no attempt to explain that he failed to receive any notice with respect to particulars in the first application.
We further draw the Board's attention to Section 11 3(1) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, which provides:
"For the purposes of this Act and of any proceedings taken under it, any notice or communication sent through Her Majesty's mail shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have been received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail."
At the hearing before the Board on March 7, 1984, James made no mention of his failure to receive the request for particulars, nor did he prove that he had not received the request, although such request for particulars was a major issue in the Motion before the Board.
II. Local 493 was not in the Original Complaint because they were proceeding on a Grievance
The reasons for the exclusion or inclusion of Local 493 from James' Complaint are not relevant to the determination of the Board. In any event, James chose to add Local 493 as a party in January of 1984, but made no allegations at that time and did not mention the matter of a grievance filed on his behalf until the hearing of March 7, 1984.
III. Allegations against Local 527 regarding Failure to Refer James
In the First Decision, the Board found, at para. 8(7), that:
"With respect to the allegation that Local 527 violated Section 69 of the Act by not referring James to the pipeline job, the Complaint, as filed, accepts that Local 527 refused to refer James because the Local. . .'had hundreds of members out of work'. The statement was not disputed by James and, in itself, the statement is a complete defence against the allegation."
The Board, in the Second Decision, at para. 3, found that:
"The original panel dealt with the Section 69 Complaint on its merits and decided that there had been no violation. Although the Board is not strictly bound by the common law notion of res judicata, the practice is not to allow a complainant to relitigate a matter which has been dismissed on its merits."
(See Second Decision at para. 3.)
There was no evidence before the Board that Local 527 breached any duty under Section 69 of the Act in respect of James, nor has James presented any new evidence to that effect in his request of reconsideration.
IV. Applicable Legal Principles on Reconsideration
The Board has set out its policy on reconsideration in Canadian Union of General Employees [1975] OLRB Rep. (April) 320, where the Board stated at p. 324:
"Generally, the Board will not reconsider a decision unless a party proposes to adduce new evidence which could not previously have been obtained by reasonable diligence and the new evidence is such that, if adduced, it would be practically conclusive or a party wishes to make representation or objections not already considered by the Board that he had no opportunity to raise previously. (International Nickel Co. of Canada Ltd. [1963] OLRB Rep. 234,64 CLLC para. 15, 493 (Ont. H.C.); Detroit River Construction Case (1962) CLLC para. 16,260). Both legs of this principle depend upon the applicant having been diligent and therefore having had no opportunity to draw the Board's attention to the object of its concern."
The Board in the Canadian Union of General Employees case elaborated on the rationale for such a principle at p. 325, as follows:
"One of the principal purposes of an administrative agency is to process the matters that come before it with expedition and economy. These values can only be achieved if there is finality to the Board's decision in the vast majority of cases."
More recently, in Auto Jobbers Warehouse Ltd. [1982] OLRB Rep. (May) 649, the Board denied reconsideration where an employer sought to "repair deficiencies" in its initial case, where it was not represented by legal counsel. The Board held, at p. 649:
"Although the respondent was represented by counsel at the hearing into the request for reconsideration, it was not represented by counsel when Miss Beattie's complaint was heard on its merits. In support of the request for reconsideration, counsel submitted that during the initial hearing the Board had not been appraised of the true facts relevant to the proceedings, and accordingly, the respondent now desired to put certain additional evidence before the Board. Counsel submitted that the Board should entertain this additional evidence in that the respondent had not felt a need to retain counsel prior to the initial hearing primarily because of its belief that it could rely on the report of the inspector. We are unable to accept this submission. The parties were advised that the initial hearing was for the purpose of hearing the evidence and representations of the parties with respect to the complaint. Further, it is not contended that the evidence the respondent now seeks to call was not available to it at the time of the initial hearing. Prior to the initial hearing, the respondent apparently did an assessment of the merits of the complaint and, on the basis of that assessment, decided not to retain counsel. In our view it is not open for the respondent to now seek to have the matter relitigated this time with the assistance of counsel. We do not believe that the Board's reconsideration power was intended to be exercised for the purpose of permitting a party to repair the deficiencies of its case. Indeed, if such were the practice, proceedings before the Board would be interminable and decisions inconclusive." (emphasis added)
V. Conclusion
It is the submission of the International and Locals 493 and 527 that there must be an end to this litigation. James has raised nothing in his letter for reconsideration that was not otherwise available to him at the time of the initial Board hearing or could not have been obtained by reasonable diligence. Reconsideration is not for the purpose of repairing deficiencies in James' initial case.
As indicated in the Second Decision, a request for reconsideration will not be granted unless the Applicant brings forward evidence that was not available at the time of the original hearing, or advances arguments that could not reasonably have been made at that stage. The Board further requires that James fully describe the evidence and argument upon which he relies. James has not presented any evidence or put forward any arguments that were not reasonably available to him during the Board hearing of March 7, 1984.
For these reasons, the Respondents respectfully request that the Application for Reconsideration be denied without a hearing.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
(3) Text of James' undated letter received by the Board July 24, 1984:
In reply to Koskie and Minsky submission that there is nothing new to the original complaint is of course in error.
I take note that all the precedents put forward by the solicitors are not by any means applicable to my particular case. Further the solicitors mention that all mail be taken for granted as received; however the Board was made aware that the letter was not received.
In the complainant's view the Board has no option but to rule in favour of the same. As pertaining to the time lapse, the sine die was without prejudice and all other delays are not the fault of the complainant but the Board's.
At my request the Ombudsman is just waiting for a final ruling which if not in my favour it will be activated by him into a look into the whole case.
If in view of the two legal binding documents that are irrefutable I cannot attain from the board a just settlement then the board itself is unable or unwilling to complete its function and should be disbanded. It is the intention of the complainant to take this case to any and all forms available to him including members of parliament, the premier of the province and the press. Surely in a country such as Canada justice will prevail.
[5]. James bases his request for reconsideration on the following grounds:
(1) a claim that he did not receive the Board's letter dated February 23rd, 1984 forwarding a request for particulars from the solicitors for Locals 493 and 527.
(2) The failure of the Board's decision to identify as a cause of delay the Board's failure to serve notice on the respondent Labourers' International Union of North America respecting the hearings held on June 13th, 1983 and January 31, 1984.
(3) The original complaint did not name Local 493 because James was under the impression at the time the complaint was filed that Local 493 was pursuing a grievance on his behalf.
(4) The number of men in Local 527 out of work has no bearing on him because he was a steward and was appointed until the completion of the project.
[6]. It is useful to set out the sequence of events from the filing of the first complaint through to James' request for reconsideration before dealing with the request itself.
[7]. The instant complaint was filed May 10th, 1983. It names as respondents the persons Nello Scipioni and Bernie Carrozzi and the Labourers' International Union of North America, which will hereinafter be referred to as the International.
[8]. At the making of the complaint, Scipioni and Carrozzi were officers of Local 527 of the International. Paragraph 4 of the complaint names them as the persons who, on behalf of the respondents or on their own behalf, had dealt with James on or about January 17th, 1983, contrary to section 68 and 69 of the Act by having:
"Refused to employ the complainant contrary to section 69 of the Labour Relations Act. Wherein the complainant was employed as a steward for O. J. Pipelines from Jan. 18/82 up to and including November 26/82 in accordance with the pre-job conferance [sic] report of Jan. 19/82 and in accordance with the letter dated of Jan. 20/8 2, the Respondent has refused to recall me on the work involved in the completion of the project."
[9]. Hearings into the complaint were held on June 13th, 1983, January 31, 1984 and March 7th, 1984. A hearing had been scheduled for July 19th, 1983 but was adjourned sine die at James' request made without prejudice and with the consent of the parties.
[10]. At the hearing on June 13th, 1983, James was asked by the Board to clarify his complaint. During his explanation he outlined 11 points which he acknowledged could be summarized into two issues. These were:
(1) His lay-off on November 26th, 1982 from the O. J. Pipeline project was contrary to the provisions of the Labourers pipeline collective agreement because he was a steward and the agreement required that he be kept on the job until all other employees were laid off.
(2) He was not recalled by O. J. Pipelines to the project in the spring of 1983 when it started up again and Local 527 had refused to refer him to the project when he requested that they do so.
When clarifying his complaint James made no reference to having asked Local 493, or anyone, to file a grievance on his behalf with respect to either the lay-off or the failure of 0. J. Pipelines to recall him to the project. The hearing was adjourned on consent of the parties, in part because of the need to have the International served with notice of the complaint. It had not been served with notice of the complaint or notice of the hearing.
[11]. On or about December 15th, 1983, James asked the Board to bring on for hearing the proceedings which had been adjourned at his request. A hearing was scheduled for January 31st, 1984. The Board did not serve notice of the hearing on the International and it did not attend and was not represented at the hearing. The hearing was adjourned on the consent of the parties until March 7th, 1984. Prior to the adjournment, counsel for Scipioni and Carrozzi requested the Board to amend the complaint by deleting Scipioni and Carrozzi as respondents since sections 68 and 69 of the Act contemplate complaints against trade unions and not against individual persons. On consent of the parties, the complaint was amended by substituting as respondents Locals 493 and 527 of the International for the persons Scipioni and Carrozzi. At the time, James made no request to amend the complaint with respect to the particular facts alleged to constitute the violations of sections 68 and 69.
[12]. When the complaint came back on for hearing on March 7th, counsel for Locals 493 and 527 moved to have the complaint dismissed without a hearing on two grounds:
(1) that the complaint fails to disclose a prima facie case against either Local 493 or 527; and
(2) the complaint is so deficient in particulars in respect to both locals, but especially respecting Local 493, that the respondents could not tell what case they would have to meet.
During consideration of the motion, James requested leave to amend the complaint to include the allegation that Local 493 has violated section 68 of the Act by failing to pursue a grievance on his behalf respecting 0. J. Pipelines' failure to recall him to work in the spring of 1984. The Board refused to amend the complaint and, for the reasons given orally in the hearing and confirmed in the Board's decision which issued March 16th, 1984 ruled that the complaint failed prima facie to disclose a violation of either section 68 or 69 by the International, Local 493 or Local 527.
[13]. The Board's jurisdiction to reconsider its own decisions is found in section 106(1) of the Act which sets out the scope of the Board's decision-making powers in these terms:
The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to exercise the powers conferred upon it by or under this Act and to determine all questions of fact or law that arise in any matter before it, and the action or decision of the Board thereon is final and conclusive for all purposes, but nevertheless the Board may at any time, if it considers it advisable to do so, reconsider any decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling made by it and vary or revoke any such decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling.
The principles which guide the Board in the exercise of its reconsideration powers are described in the following terms in its decision in K-Mart Canada Limited (Peterborough), [1981] OLRB Rep. Feb. 185:
- To avoid abuse of the reconsideration provision and bring some finality to its adjudicated decisions the Board has adopted principles not unlike those of the courts. The Board will not normally accede to a request to reconsider unless the party requesting reconsideration intends to adduce new evidence which was not previously available to them by the exercise of due diligence, and then only where such additional evidence, if proved, would be likely to make a substantial difference to the outcome of the case. Reconsideration is therefore generally restricted to allowing a party to adduce evidence or make representations which it did not have a previous opportunity to raise. The Board may also consider such factors as the motives for the request for reconsideration in light of a party's conduct, and the resulting prejudice to another party if the case is reopened. (See, generally, International Nickel Company of Canada, 63 CLLC 16,284; The Detroit River Construction Limited, 63 CLLC ¶ 16,260; National Steel Car Corporation Limited, [1966] OLRB Rep. Apr. 55; Canadian Union of General Employees, [1975] OLRB Rep. Apr. 320; York University, [1976] OLRB Rep. Apr. 187 affirmed, sub. nom. Jordan v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, York University Avenue Faculty Association, York University, 78 CLLC ¶ 14,132. (Ont. Div. Ct.).
[14]. The Detroit River decision referred to in the quotation from K-Mart, supra, sets out the rationale behind the Board's perception that there is, as it said in K-Mart, supra, a need to ..... bring some finality to its adjudicated decisions
..... While depending upon the circumstances of the case and the applicable principles of natural justice, the Board ought not to be as strict or as technical as a Court, it must nevertheless, in our view, recognize the necessity for and apply some principle of finality to its decision. It stands to reason that when a party has gone through the ordeal, expense and inconvenience of a hearing and obtained a decision in his favour, that he should not be deprived of the benefit of that decision except for good cause.... If it were otherwise, the door would be open in any given case to ceaseless and never-ending hearings each serving as a prelude to the next ad infinitum and no one could ever safely rely on any decision as finally settling the rights of the parties."
The Board's decision in Journal Publishing Company of Ottawa Ltd., [1977] OLRB Rep. Sept. 549, at paragraph 6 cited two main reasons for the requirement of finality:
The first reason is to protect the interests of those who have relied upon the Board's decision. The reliance interest is perhaps most important in those cases where the Board's decision has the effect of conferring or withdrawing bargaining rights. In such cases, where representation rights are in issue, the need for certainty and finality becomes obvious. A second reson [sic], and perhaps no less important, is to protect the integrity of the Board's own processes. These processes must be protected from the parties who, under the guise of reconsideration, are merely seeking to repair, or reargue, a lost case.
[15]. The passage quoted from the Board's K-Mart decision, supra, notes that, while reconsideration is usually restricted to allowing a party to adduce evidence or make representations which it did not have a chance to raise previously, ..... [the] Board may also consider such factors as the motives for the request for reconsideration in light of a party's conduct, and the resulting prejudice to another party if the case is reopened." Thus the usual grounds for reconsideration are not the only grounds and in its decision in John Entwhistle Construction Ltd., [1979] OLRB Rep. Nov. 1096, the Board observed that it is important not to follow the usual grounds inflexibly:
These are general standards which the Board has developed as guidelines and which are useful not just to guide the Board in making its decision, but also to allow parties who may be affected by the Board's decisions some degree of certainty of what to expect from the Board. While it is important for the purpose of certainty that these standards generally be adhered to, it is equally important that they not be followed inflexibly."
[16]. Those principles apply equally to the instant case even though James' complaint was dismissed on a preliminary motion without hearing evidence. The Board's decisions respecting the exercise of its discretion under section 106(1) of the Act to reconsider its own decisions make it clear that, in the vast majority of cases coming before the Board, the parties are entitled to expect the Board's disposition of the case to be final insofar as its own processes are concerned. The exceptions, in the words of the Board in its K-Mart decision, supra, are when:
the party requesting the reconsideration intends to adduce new evidence which was not previously available to them by the exercise of due diligence, and then only where such additional evidence, if proved, would be likely to make a substantial difference to the outcome of the case.";
and, in Canadian Union of General Employees, [1975] OLRB Rep. April 320:
..... when the party wishes to make representations or objections that he had no opportunity to raise previously."
As those decisions also point out, both elements depend upon the party seeking reconsideration having been diligent. The Board has also observed that its power to reconsider its own decisions was not intended to be exercised so as to permit a party to repair deficiencies in its case. See Auto Jobbers Warehouse Ltd., [1982] OLRB Rep. May 649. That observation is consistent with the second reason cited by the Board in the Journal Publishing decision, supra, for the requirement of finality in the Board's decisions.
[17]. James' letter requesting reconsideration raises nothing which he did not have an opportunity to include in his submissions on the motion to dismiss his complaint. For the most part the letter reiterates his submissions on the motion. One exception is his assertion that he did not receive the Registrar's letters of February 23, 1984, forwarding the request for particulars from the solicitors for Locals 493 and 527. James made no claim in the hearing that he had not received the request for particulars in spite of the fact his failure to respond to the request was an explicit ground of the motion to dismiss. The appropriate time for him to have made the claim was during his response to the motion to dismiss his complaint. Had it been raised then, the Board would have had the opportunity to hear and weigh his testimony under oath and the submissions of the parties as to whether, pursuant to section 113(1) of the Act, James should be deemed to have received the Board's letter. The claim loses credibility being made as a ground for requesting reconsideration of a decision rendered orally in a hearing in which James participated fully.
[18]. His claim that Local 493 was not named in the original complaint because he understood it was processing a grievance on his behalf is largely irrelevant. His initial complaint was filed May 10, 1983. It should have been obvious to him then, if he had not received any response from the Local about the grievance, that its failure to pursue it should be made part of the complaint. If it was not obvious then, it should have become obvious over time. There was nothing to prevent him requesting leave to amend the complaint at any time prior to the March 7th, 1984, hearing.
[19]. It is not uncommon for complaints under section 68 and 69 of the Act to be filed without legal assistance and for the complainants to appear before the Board without legal counsel. For that reason it is often necessary for the Board to accept a measure of vagueness in complaints alleging violation of those sections. A fair reading of the Board's decisions dealing with such complaints show that it has not been unduly technical with them in that respect. See for example Caravelle Foods, [1983] OLRB Rep. June 875 and the decisions refered to therein. The problem with James' complaint was not simply that it was deficient in particularity, it did not identify in any way the alleged failure of Local 493 to pursue a grievance for him, the very omission which he claims was at the heart of his complaint that Local 493 had failed in its section 68 duty of fair representation. It was not until the motion to dismiss his complaint was made that he sought to amend it to include that allegation, a request made approximately 10 months after the complaint was filed. As the Board observed in its oral ruling on March 7th, James is an experienced steward. The Board is not being unduly technical to expect that he would have made direct, clear reference in his complaint to Local 493's alleged failure. As it was, he did not link the Local to his original complaint in any manner, not even by naming an officer or other agent of the Local as a respondent. While it was procedurally incorrect, he saw fit to name officers of Local 527.
[20]. Now, having failed to satisfy the Board on March 7th, 1984 why his complaint as filed on May 10, 1983, made no reference to Local 493's alleged failure to pursue James' grievance, he is seeking by means of the request for reconsideration to re-argue his request to amend the complaint to add that allegation. He had the opportunity to make full submissions at the time of the motion. His letter requesting reconsideration contains nothing which, on March 7th, he could not have argued in support of his request to amend the complaint or defend the motion to dismiss. In brief, the usual grounds set out in the authorities referred to above for granting reconsideration are not present. Nor does his letter identify any special factors which would persuade the Board to re-open his complaint.
[21]. In these circumstances, the Board declines to reconsider and vary or revoke its decision which issued March 7th, 1984.