Christian Labour Association of Canada v. Carroll Electric (1982) Limited, 1983 CanLII 780

Ontario Labour Relations Board

File No.: 2161-82-M Date: 1983-12-23

Re: Christian Labour Association of Canada, Applicant, v. Carroll Electric (1982) Limited, Respondent, v. Derek Murr, Employee

Before: R. D. Howe, Vice-Chairman, and Board Members I. M. Stamp and E. G. Theobald.

Appearances: W R. Herridge, Hank Beekhius and Paul Dodds for the applicant; Richard Nixon and George Takach for the respondent; no one appearing for the employee.

DECISION OF THE BOARD; December 23. 1983

1. In a decision dated August 17. 1983 (now reported at [19831 OLRB Rep. Aug. 1282) in respect of this matter, the Board made the following order (in paragraph 33):

To remedy the numerous breaches of the collective agreement described in this decision, the Board hereby directs that the respondent forthwith:

(1) pay to the applicant the sum of $948.50, being the total amount of union dues which should have been deducted from the wages of the following grievors and remitted to the applicant pursuant to Article 6 of the collective agreement: Beverley Long ($181.40), Gerald Smith ($181.00), Derek Murr ($181.00), Jim Gable ($130.00), Ed Hill ($104.00), Terry Pottelberg ($87.90), and Gary Shackleton ($83.20); (the amounts specified for each grievor have been deducted by the Board from the amount of damages which would otherwise have been payable to them by the respondent pursuant to subparagraph (2) of this order);

(2) pay to the following grievors the amounts specified, being the difference between the wages which they were paid by the respondent for work performed during the period in question, and the wages to which they were entitled under the collective agreement (less the amounts set forth in subparag.raph (1) of this order, which amounts have been deducted by the Board from the damages which would otherwise have been payable to those grievors):

Beverley Long $ 92.13

Gerald Smith $1,980.76

Derek Murr $1,947.15

Jim Gable $1,573.75

Ed Hill $1,172.00

Terry Pottelberg $1,297.67

Gary Shackleton $ 698.90;

(3) pay to the following grievors the amounts specified, being the expenses incurred by them as a result of the respondent's failure to provide the “Major Medical Plan” benefits and OHIP. coverage to which they were entitled under Article 12 of the collective agreement:

Gerald Smith $320.38

Ed Hill $ 61.48

Elwood Chapman $262.1 I

Earl Prouse $344.44

Terry Smith $162.00;

(4) pay to each of the grievors who have not yet received full vacation pay for 1982 pursuant to Article 9, the balance payable to them under that Article on the basis of the gross earnings to which they were entitled under the collective agreement, based upon their respective seniority dates as set forth in the seniority list marked as "Exhibit #1" in these proceedings;

(5) pay to each of the following grievors the sum of $15.00, being the amount which each of them was entitled to receive at the end of 1982 for personal tool insurance, pursuant to Article 14.02 of the collective agreement: Beverley Long, Earl Chapman, Earl Prouse, Terry Smith, Gerald Smith, Derek Murr, Dale Woolley, Dan Murray, Jim Gable, Ed Hill, and Terry Pottelberg;

(6) pay to the following grievors the amounts specified, being the holiday pay which they were entitled to receive for Thanksgiving Day, pursuant to Article 10 of the collective agreement:

Earl Prouse $104.00

Terry Smith $104.00

Gary Shackleton $ 78.00;

(7) pay to the following grievors all wages, vacation pay, and other amounts (less union dues and benefit premiums that would have been deducted by the respondent pursuant to the collective agreement, and less the following amounts which they earned through their reasonable efforts to mitigate their respective losses: Elwood Chapman - $225, Earl Prouse -$1 , 100, and Terry Smith - $350) which they would have received pursuant to the collective agreement by working the following number of (regular, non-overtime) hours, which the Board finds that they would have worked if the respondent had not breached Articles 2.03, 11, and 18.02 of the collective agreement:

Fiwood Chapman 640 hours

Earl Prouse 1,080 hours

Terry Smith 580 hours

(8) pay interest on the compensation ordered by the Board, said interest to be calculated by analogy to the formula described in Practice Note No. 13 dated September 8, 1980.

2. As indicated in paragraph 34 of that decision, the Board specifically remained seized of this matter in the event that any dispute arose concerning the interpretation or implementation of that order. Moreover, the Board has the power, under section 106(1) of the Labour Relations Act, to reconsider at any time any decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling made by it, and to vary or revoke any such decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling.

3. At the request of the applicant, a further hearing was scheduled to be held on December 6, 1983 in respect of this matter. Having regard to the notice of hearing and the correspondence from the applicant and its counsel which was forwarded to counsel for the employer prior to the hearing, we are satisfied that counsel for the employer knew, or should have known, that the matters to be dealt with at that hearing included the quantification and finalization of the aforementioned order, and the applicant's request that the style of cause of this application be amended to read "Carroll Electric (1982) Limited and J. B. Carroll Electric Limited", to reflect the fact that in a decision dated August 2, 1983 in Board File No. 1216-82-R (reported in [19831 OLRB Rep. Aug. 1275), another panel of the Board declared those two companies to be one employer for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act.

4. In its decision dated August 2, 1983, that other panel of the Board wrote, in part, as follows:

1. This matter arises pursuant to applications under sections 1(4) and 63 of the Labour Relations Act. By decision dated December 20, 1982, the Board decided that the evidence before it allowed the Board to conclude that there had been a sale of a business pursuant to section 63(2). The Board concluded that it was unnecessary in the circumstances to make any findings in connection with the section 1(4) application. The Board indicated it would remain seized if there was any difficulty implementing its decision.

2. On May 26, 1983 the applicant [Christian Labour Association of Canada] wrote to the Board requesting three orders, namely:

(1) to consider and determine the applicant's application under section 1(4) for a declaration that the two respondents [Carroll Electric (1982) Limited ("Carroll Electric") and J. B. Carroll Electric Limited ("JBC")J should be treated as constituting one employer for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act from and after September 20th, 1982.

(2) In connection with the foregoing, to order both respondents to adduce evidence in accordance with the duty imposed by section 1(5) concerning all matters occurring up to the date of the hearing which are relevant to the issues raised by the applicant's application.

(3) In connection with the foregoing, to rely on evidence heard in hearings herein November 1st, 1982 and to hear fresh evidence on matters which were discovered or occurred after that hearing. The nature of that evidence is described in the body of this letter.

The balance of this letter was devoted to setting out the facts and circumstances which caused the applicant to make these requests.

3. The Board convened a hearing on June 27, 1983, to consider the matters raised in the applicant's letter. At the outset of the hearing the Board, by unanimous ruling, announced to the parties the following:

(1) During the original proceedings the application under section 1(4) was seen as an alternate if section 63 was not found; there was no argument that both ought to be applied.

(2) There was sufficient evidence before the Board at the close of the original proceedings to conclude that section 1(4) could be applied.

(3) The parties were therefore to address their evidence and argument as to why the Board ought to exercise its discretion and grant the section 1(4) application at this point in time.

4. The Board will not set out all of the evidence from the previous day’s hearing because the repetition is unnecessary. There is no dispute that at the time of the Board's decision of December 20, 1982. there was a collective agreement between the applicant and J. B. Carroll Electric Limited (hereinafter "JBC") which was due to expire March 31, 1983. After the decision was released, grievances were lodged pursuant to section 124 of the Act by the applicant on January 12th, 13th and 14th (Board File No. 2161‑82‑M) wherein it was alleged that Carroll Electric (1982) Ltd. (hereinafter "Carroll Electric"), the company to whom the business of JBC was sold, was not observing the provisions of the collective agreement. Six hearing days were necessary for these grievances, the last of which was May 18, 1983. As of June 27, 1983, the date of our hearing, no decision had been rendered....

5. The applicant argued that we should exercise our discretion under section 1(4) because there has been a continuing refusal by Carroll Electric to abide by the collective agreement, as part of a continuing pattern of conduct by the Carrolls to rid themselves of the union. This is shown by the issues which were ultimately on the bargaining table, i.e., union security and grievance procedure, not wages. Any steps which the applicant could take by way of bad faith bargaining charges or section 124 applications would be futile because the two companies have arranged their affairs so that Carroll Electric is essentially a shell company. Section 1(4) is the best remedy in the circumstances because the real assets of Carroll Electric will be exposed.

6. The respondent, JBC, argued that section 1(4) is not a "curative section". Grievances have been filed under the collective agreement and those grievances did not involve JBC. It was never a party and should not have an order impacting on it where it had no opportunity to make representations. The applicant could have brought its section 124 against JBC but did not. It should not be allowed to use section 1(4) to cure this procedural defect. The respondent also claimed that the applicant has delayed resurrecting its section 1(4) so long as to have deprived itself of its benefit. The letter of May 26, 1983 came 7 months after the release of the Board's decision and some 8 months after the conclusion of the hearing. The respondent JBC argues that if the applicant is having problems negotiating with Carroll Electric or any other difficulties which may amount to a contravention of the Act, it should apply under section 89, not by way of section 1(4). Finally, the respondent argued it would be grossly unfair of the Board to continue this hearing on the basis of evidence already submitted.

7. The applicant in reply indicated that the only real argument against the imposition of section 1(4) at this stage is the impact it would have vis-a-vis the section 124 application. However, this is not sound because J. B. Carroll knew up until release of the Board's decision that it was potentially exposed in any grievances and it could have protected its interests by encouraging Carroll Electric to conduct its affairs in accordance with the collective agreement. The section 124 proceedings were occasioned by Carroll Electric's attempt to avoid the collective agreement. It was the original reason for the creation of Carroll Electric in September of 1982. The applicant questioned whether the formal presence of JBC at the section 124 proceedings would have changed them in any way. Also, having participated in creating Carroll Electric (in all the ways described in evidence from the previous days' hearings), JBC cannot now complain it should have been at the section 124 proceedings. The prejudice the respondent JBC asserts is "prejudice in the air" because the respondent was unable to describe the exact nature of the prejudice. The prejudice never existed because JBC and Carroll Electric were always one company according to the tests under section 1(4). With respect to the delay, the applicant claims it was simply giving the respondent Carroll Electric the benefit of the doubt, believing it was better to try to bargain a collective agreement and resolve differences without further litigation.

8. Section 1(4) provides:

Where, in the opinion of the Board, associated or related activities or businesses are carried on, whether or not simultaneously, by or through more than one corporation, individual, firm, syndicate or association or any combination thereof, under common control or direction, the Board may, upon the application of any person, trade union or council of trade unions concerned, treat the corporations, individuals, firms, syndicates or associations or any combination thereof as constituting one employer for the purposes of this Act and grant such relief, by way of declaration or otherwise, as it may deem appropriate.

This section is different in emphasis from section 63 but their purposes are essentially the same, i.e., to preserve established bargaining rights and collective agreement(s). If the criteria for the application of section 63 are met, the Board has no discretion to refuse to make the declaration that a sale has occurred. The difference in section 1(4) is that the granting of an order pursuant to it is within the discretion of the Board (see Radio Shack, [1979] OLRB Rep. July 689). The question before us is whether this discretion ought to be exercised in the circumstances of the present case.

11. One of the factors which influences the Board's discretion is whether there has been anti-union animus (see Acto Builders (Eastern) Limited, [1972] OLRB Rep. June 465). To this extent section 1(4) is "curative". One of the factors which causes the Board to refuse to exercise its discretion under section 1(4) is proof that the applicant has unreasonably delayed in bringing its application (see Farquhar Construction Ltd., [1978] OLRB Rep. Oct. 914; Elwell & Sons., [1978] OLRB Rep. June 535).

12. Having regard to all the evidence and the submissions of the parties, we have decided that our discretion ought to be exercised in favour of granting the declaration requested. We are convinced that the motives which we have found in our previous decision to have lain behind the creation of Carroll Electric have caused the two companies to arrange their affairs in such as way as to avoid fulfilling the obligations under the collective agreement.... [The Board's review of the facts has been omit­ted.] For all these reasons we have concluded that the two respondents have arranged their affairs so that any liability which Carroll Electric incurs in its alleged avoidance of its collective agreement responsibilities will be unrecoverable because it is essentially, through special arrangements with JBC, an assetless company.

13. We have determined that at all material times there has been, and continues to be, a scheme of avoidance of collective bargaining duties and responsibilities which even extends to intentionally creating and maintaining a leasing arrangment which allows Carroll Electric to be virtually without assets against which the union could move.

14. For all these reasons we have determined that our discretion ought to be exercised in favour of declaring that JBC and Carroll Electric are associated or related companies within the meaning of section 1(4). We do not consider that JBC had been prejudiced in this declaration being made at this time. Except in unusual cases where the Board considers it appropriate to expressly limit the normal operation of a section 1(4) declaration, such declaration is effective as of the date the employer commenced operating the related business (see Norfolk Hospital Association, 77 CLLC ¶14,094 (Div. Ct.), and Roy Brandon Construction, [1981] OLRB Rep. Feb. 219). We also do not think that the applicant has been guilty of sleeping on its rights. Prompt application was made in September and the applicant cannot be faulted for having the confidence, after the Board's decision of December 20, 1982, that the situation between itself and the respondents would be thereby rectified. The Board had the similar confidence in issuing a decision which only dealt with part of what the applicant requested. It appears that there is need for a section 1(4) declaration after all and, under the circumstances, we find it appropriate to grant it. Accordingly, the Board hereby declares that the respondents, Carroll Electric (1982) Limited and J. B. Carroll Electric Limited are, and have been since the inception of Carroll Electric (1982) Limited, one employer for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act.

5. In view of that decision, we find there to be no merit in Mr. Nixon's submission (which he advised us that he was raising in his capacity as a "friend of the Board") that the Board is without jurisdiction to consider the applicant's requested amendment to the style of cause, because J. B. Carroll Electric Limited has not received notice of these proceedings. The effect of that declaration under section 1(4) of the Act is that Carroll Electric (1982) Limited and J. B. Carroll Electric Limited are, and have been since the inception of Carroll Electric (1982) Limited (in September of 1982), one employer for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act. Thus, as a matter of law, notice (in respect of proceedings under the Labour Relations Act) to Carroll Electric (1982) Limited is also notice to J. B. Carroll Electric (1982) Limited since they are one employer for the purposes of the Act. Moreover, notice to J. B. Carroll Electric Limited is unnecessary since we are not called upon to determine in these proceedings whether the assets of J. B. Carroll Electric Limited should be available to satisfy the Board's order in this case. That decision has already been made by the other panel in its aforementioned decision dated August 2, 1983, which decision was issued following a hearing at which both Carroll Electric (1982) Limited and J. B. Carroll Electric Limited were represented by counsel. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to permit that issue to be relitigated in the present proceedings.

6. The reason for the requested amendment to the style of cause is set forth as follows in a letter dated October 7, 1983 from Mr. Herridge (counsel for the applicant) to the Board, a copy of which letter was provided to Mr. Nixon (counsel for the employer) well in advance of the December 6th hearing:

On August 31st, 1983, we wrote to the Board in this matter requesting that the Board amend its decision herein dated August 2nd, 1983, by amending the style of cause to add J. B. Carroll Electric Limited as a named Respondent and by amending subparagraph (6) of paragraph 33 of the decision to delete the name Gary Shackleton and substitute the name Milt Smith.

We are in receipt of a copy of Mr. Nixon's letter of September 20th, commenting on our request. We note Mr. Nixon does not take exception to the amendment of subparagraph (6) of paragraph 33 of the decision. We will confine our comments to his objection to the amendment to the style of cause.

Mr. Nixon says he can see no reason why the style of cause in this matter should be amended. We submit the reason for the amendment is readily apparent. The Board's decision of August 2nd, 1983 in Board File No. 1216-83-R determined that J. B. Carroll Electric Limited and Carroll Electric (1982) Limited were to be treated as one employer for the purposes of the. Act with effect from the date Carroll Electric (1982) Limited came into existence. This decision had the effect of making J. B. Carroll Electric Limited liable to satisfy the award released by the Board in this matter on August 17th, 1983. This particular consequence was foremost among the matters argued before the Board in the hearings which led to the decision of August 2nd, 1983, Board File No. 1216-82-R, as is reflected in that decision itself.

As you know, by letter dated September 22nd, 1983, our client has requested that the panel seized of this matter reconvene to determine certain issues which that panel left to the parties to resolve. That request was made necessary by the fact that the Carroll Electric companies have refused to engage in any discussion of the issues left to the parties by the Board decision of August 17th. Furthermore, there has been no payment of or on account of any of the amounts expressly awarded against Carroll Electric (1982) by that decision. It is apparent to us that the concerns which led to our reconsideration request in Board File No. 1216-82-R remain valid, and that no effective enforcement of the Board's decision will be possible without registration of all relevant Board awards with the Supreme Court of Ontario for enforcement against both Carroll Electric companies.

Once the appropriate Board decisions are filed with the Court, we would be seeking the appropriate Writs of Execution against the assets, both of Carroll Electric (1982) Limited and J. B. Carroll Electric Limited. We would anticipate some difficulty obtaining such Writs of Execution if the style of cause on the decision in this matter did not expressly name J. B. Carroll Electric Limited. We expect the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Ontario might take the view that his function is limited to the registration and enforcement of decisions, and does not extend to interpreting the interplay between two or more Board decisions, which he might feel would more appropriately be the function of the Board.

We submit that the interconnection of these decisions will be clear to the Board beyond any doubt. We are further of the view that the amendments sought should be granted ex debito justitiae, and this is no less so merely because the Respondents state they are unable to perceive the reason for the amendment. As that is the only reason given for their objection, we urge the Board to order that the amendment be made immediately.

In the event the Board considers that any hearing is necessary to resolve this issue, we would ask that this matter be dealt with by the panel seized of this matter when it reconvenes to deal with the issues left outstanding by the last decision. In the circumstances, we would respectfully request that the hearing of all those outstanding issues be expedited.

7. Although we agree with counsel for the applicant that the Registrar of the Supreme Court should not be expected to interpret the interplay of two or more rather complex Board decisions, we are not persuaded that it is necessary to amend the style of cause in these proceedings in order to meet the legitimate concern raised in that letter and in counsel for the applicant's oral submissions before the Board on December 6, 1983. As indicated above, we agree with counsel for the applicant that, as a matter of law, J. B. Carroll Electric Limited and Carroll Electric (1982) Limited are, and have been since September of 1982, one employer for purposes of the Labour Relations Act and that, accordingly, the assets of both companies are susceptible to legal process for the purpose of satisfying the Board's order in these proceedings (once the order has been filed in the office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Ontario and entered in the same way as a judgment or order of that court). However, rather than amending the style in this matter, we find it appropriate to merely vary the form of the order somewhat to reflect the Board's aforementioned section 1(4) declaration, and to eliminate the administrative difficulties that might otherwise be encountered by the applicant in seeking to enforce that order against both corporations.

8. Prior to the commencement of the hearing of this matter on December 6, 1983, the representatives of the parties met and agreed (in writing) that the following are the amounts payable pursuant to the Board’s order in this matter:

9. Union Dues $ 948.50

10. Wage Difference 8,762.26

11. Major Medical 906.81

12. Vacation Pay 2,855.68

13. Tool Allowance 165.00

14. Thanksgiving holiday 286.00

15. Elwood Chapman 8,095.00 Earl Prouse 12,940.00 Terry Smith 7 ,190.00 42,149.25 Interest to March 11/83 1,264.48 $43,413.73

(That agreement concerning quantum of damages was made without prejudice to the application for judicial review of the Board's August 17, 1983 decision in this matter, which has been filed by the employer.) The parties are also in agreement that subparagraph 6 of paragraph 33 of the Board's order should be amended to substitute "Milt Smith" for "Gary Shackieton".

9. As indicated above, the parties have agreed that the interest payable to March 11, 1983 in respect of this matter is $1,264.48. With respect to the interest payable after that date, counsel for the employer contended that the applicable interest rate should be the Bank of Canada interest rate as it exists from time to time. In support of his position that the interest rate payable in respect of a Board order should vary from month to month with the Bank of Canada rate, Mr. Nixon noted that interest rates have fallen since the complaint was filed, and submitted that failure to take such decreases into account in determining the interest payable would provide the applicant (and the grievors) with a "windfall". He also suggested that the Board's Practice Note No. 13 is ambiguous concerning the applicable rate since it refers (in paragraph 4) not only to the “monthly prime rate”, but also to the “Bank of Canada interest rate”.

10. Counsel for the applicant, on the other hand, submitted that it is clear from paragraph 3 of Practice Note No. 13 that the "appropriate annual interest rate normally applied is the prime rate as determined and published by the Bank of Canada in the Bank of Canada Review for the month in which the complaint [or application] was filed with the Board". Although he agreed that a reduction in the applicable interest rate is appropriate in the circumstances of this case, he contended that it would be undesirable for the Board to tie the interest rate payable to the prime rate as it exists from time to time as that would make the calculation of interest unduly complex. It was his position that substantial justice would be done if the Board fixed the rate payable from March 11, 1983 at 11 %.

11. The present application was filed with the Board on January 19, 1983. Under the approach generally applied by the Board in awarding interest, as set forth in Practice Note No. 13, the interest rate payable on the Board's award would be 12%, which is the "prime rate" for January of 1983, as determined and published by the Bank of Canada in the Bank of Canada Review. It is clear from Practice Note No. 13, read as a whole, and from the Board's decision in Hallowell House Limited, [1980] OLRB Rep. Jan. 35, that the applicable interest rate is not (as suggested by counsel for the employer) the rate which the Bank of Canada charges on its loans to chartered banks, but rather the "prime rate", which is referred to in the Bank of Canada Review as "chartered banks rate on prime business loans". The Board's use of the "prime rate" parallels the approach adopted by the courts pursuant to section 36 of the Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 223, as am., which provides, in part, as follows:

36 (1) In this section, "prime rate" means the lowest rate of interest quoted by chartered banks to the most credit-worthy borrowers for prime business loans, as determined and published by the Bank of Canada.

Under that provision, unless a judge disallows interest, fixes a higher or lower interest rate, or allows interest for another period, a person entitled to a judgment for the payment of money is entitled to claim and have included in the judgment an award of interest at the prime rate existing for the month preceding the month in which the action was commenced, from the date the cause of action arose (where judgment is given upon a liquidated claim), or from the date the person entitled gave notice in writing of his claim (where judgment is given upon an unliquidated claim) to the date of judgment. Under section 37 of that Act, a judgment bears interest from the time of giving judgment, at the prime rate for the month preceding the month in which the judgment was given (unless otherwise ordered).

12. We are in agreement with Mr. Herridge's submission that the formula for the calculation proposed by Mr. Nixon should not be adopted by this Board. As noted by the Board in Hallowell House Limited, supra, at paragraph 31:

The method of calculation appropriate for this Board must be easily understood and readily administered. Laymen regularly appear before the Board either representing themselves or appearing as agents for complainants. The beneficial effect of the Board's interest award would diminish greatly if recipients had to seek legal [or accounting] advice to properly calculate the interest.

The formula advocated by Mr. Nixon is, in our view, too complex to be workable. It is also inconsistent with the approach generally applied by the Ontario courts (as described above). The formula set forth in Practice Note No. 13 has been adopted by the Board because it provides "ease of calculation, flexibility and basic accuracy" (see paragraph 33 of the Hallowell decision). In some circumstances it may, of course, be appropriate to modify that approach somewhat. For example, while halving the wage portion of an award is appropriate in calculating the interest payable on the wage portion of an award, in order to reflect the fact that the total wage loss experienced by an employee does not occur all at once, but rather accumulates with each pay period following the discharge (or failure to recall the employee), such division is not appropriate in respect of amounts which do not accrue over time (such as the Thanksgiving Day holiday pay referred to in paragraph 6 of the Board's order of Au­gust 17, 1983 in this matter).

13. As is apparent from reading Practice Note No. 13 and the Hallowell decision which preceded it, the Board's focus in respect of the interest calculation has generally been on interest prior to the date of the Board's award. For the reasons set forth above, in the absence of compelling circumstances such as a dramatic change in the prime rate, the Board will generally direct (by reference to Practice Note No. 13) that the applicable rate of interest is "the prime rate as determined and published by the Bank of Canada in the Bank of Canada Review for the month in which the complaint [or application] was filed with the Board". If any of the parties to a proceeding before the Board are of the view that special circumstances exist which make it appropriate to depart from that approach, they should specifically address that issue during their closing arguments before the Board renders its decision. (No such submissions were made when this case was argued on its merits in May of 1983.)

14. Board decisions do not generally address the matter of post-decision interest since the Board assumes that, for the most part, respondents will duly comply with Board orders forthwith. In the event that a respondent (such as the employer in the present case) does not do so, then section 124(3) of the Labour Relations Act (by specifically making section 44(11) of the Act applicable to section 124 referrals) and section 89(6) (to the extent that it is applicable to the present proceedings) provide for a copy of the Board's decision (exclusive of the reasons therefor) to be filed in the office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court whereupon it "shall be entered in the same way as a judgment or order of that court and is enforceable as such". Once a Board decision has been entered as a judgment by the Supreme Court, it presumably will bear interest at the prime rate for the month preceding the month in which it was so entered, by virtue of section 37 of the Judicature Act. (See also in this regard Rule 548 of the Rules of Practice made pursuant to that Act.) If section 36 and Rule 548 do not apply to such decision, then the interest rate which will continue to apply (pursuant to the Board's order) will be the prime rate for the month in which the complaint was filed with the Board (unless otherwise indicated by the Board in its order).

15. The prime rate for the month in which the present complaint was filed (that is, Jan­uary of 1983) was 12%. The prime rate declined to 11.5% in February and remained at 11.5% in March. In April of 1983 it fell to 11 % and has remained unchanged at that level to and including November of 1983 (which is the most recent monthly "prime rate" available to the Board at the time of this decision). It is open to serious question whether a drop of 1% in the prime rate between the date of filing of a complaint or application, and the date on which the Board begins to hear the merits of the application (or complaint) would prompt the Board to depart from its usual practice with respect to interest. However, it is unnecessary to express a final view concerning that matter in the present case in view of the fact that, as indicated above, it is applicant's position that substantial justice will be done in this case if the Board fixes the interest rate payable from March 11, 1983 at 11% (which is the lowest rate that would be applicable even if the Board were to adopt the approach advocated by counsel for the employer). Accordingly, the Board's revised order in respect of this matter will direct payment of interest at the rate of 11% from March 11, 1983 to the date of payment.

16. For the foregoing reasons, the Board hereby directs that the employer, which by virtue of the declaration contained in the Board's decision dated August 2, 1983 in File No. 1216-82-R consists of Carroll Electric (1982) Limited and J. B. Carroll Electric Limited, forthwith:

(1) pay to the applicant the sum of $948.50, being the total amount of union dues which should have been deducted from the wages of the following grievors and remitted to the applicant pursuant to Article 6 of the collective agreement: Beverley Long ($181.40), Gerald Smith ($181.00), Derek Murr ($181.00), Jim Gable ($130.00), Ed Hill ($104.00), Terry Pottelberg ($87.90), and Gary Shackleton ($83.20); (the amounts specified for each grievor have been deducted by the Board from the amount of damages which would otherwise have been payable to them by the employer pursuant to subparagraph (2) of this order);

(2) pay to the following grievors the amounts specified, being the difference between the wages which they were paid by the employer for work performed during the period in question, and the wages to which they were entitled under the collective agreement (less the amounts set forth in subparagraph (1) of this order, which amounts have been deducted by the Board from the damages which would otherwise have been payable to those grievors):

Beverley Long $ 92.13

Gerald Smith $1,980.76

Derek Murr $1,947.15

Jim Gable $1,573.75

Ed Hill $1,172.00

Terry Pottelberg $1,297.67

Gary Shackleton $ 698.80;

(3) pay to the following grievors the amounts specified, being the expenses incurred by them as a result of the employer's failure to provide the "Major Medical Plan" benefits and O.H.I.P. coverage to which they were entitled under Article 12 of the collective agreement:

Gerald Smith $320.38

Ed Hill $ 61.48

Elwood Chapman $262.11

Earl Prouse $344.44

Terry Smith $162.00;

(4) pay to the applicant, for distribution to the applicable grievors, the sum of $2,855.68, being the balance of vacation pay for 1982 payable to the grievors pursuant to Article 9 of the collective agreement;

(5) pay to each of the following grievors the sum of $15.00, being the amount which each of them was entitled to receive at the end of 1982 for personal tool insurance, pursuant to Article 14.02 of the collective agreement: Beverley Long, Earl Chapman, Earl Prouse, Terry Smith, Gerald Smith, Derek Murr, Dale Woolley, Dan Murray, Jim Gable, Ed Hill, and Terry Pottelberg;

(6) pay to the following grievors the amounts specified, being the holiday pay which they were entitled to receive for Thanksgiving Day, pursuant to Article 10 of the collective agreement:

Earl Prouse $104.00

Terry Smith $104.00

Milt Smith $ 78.00;

(7) pay to the following grievors the amounts specified, being the wages, vacation pay, and other amounts (less union dues and benefit premiums that would have been deducted by the employer pursuant to the collective agreement, and less the following amounts which they earned through their reasonable efforts to mitigate their respective losses: Elwood Chapman - $225, Earl Prouse - $1,100, and Terry Smith - $350) which they would have received pursuant to the collective agreement by working the following number of (regular, non-overtime) hours, which the Board finds that they would have worked if the employer had not breached Articles 2.03, 11, and 18.02 of the collective agreement: Elwood Chapman - 640 hours, Earl Prouse - 1,080 hours; and Terry Smith - 580 hours:

Elwood Chapman $ 8,095.00

Earl Prouse $12,940.00

Terry Smith $ 7,190.00;

(8) pay to the applicant for distribution to itself and to the applicable grievors, interest in the amount of $1,264.48, being the interest payable on the compensation awarded by this order to March 11, 1983; and

(9) pay to the applicant for distribution to itself and to the applicable grievors, interest on the compensation awarded by this order, at the rate of 11% per annum, from March 11, 1983 to the date of payment.