1125-80-R; 1275-80-U; 1276-80-U; 2055-80-U International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Complainant/Applicant, v. Newport Sports­wear Limited, Respondent

BEFORE: Pamela C. Picher, Vice-Chairman and Board Members J. A. Ronson and W. F. Rutherford.

APPEARANCES: Beth Symes for the complainant/applicant and W J. McNaughton for the respondent.

DECISION OF THE BOARD; July 7, 1981

[1]. By a decision dated January 6, 1981 the Board certified the applicant union as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees in the respondent's office. In addition to the union's application for certification and its request that the Board, if necessary, exercise its discretion under section 7a of the Act (file no. 1125-80-R), the union filed two complaints under section 79 of the Act (file nos. 1275-80-U and 2055-80-U) and an application for consent to prosecute the respondent under section 90 of the Act (file no. 1276-80-U). Pursuant to an order of the Board these matters were consolidated. As set out in its decision dated January 6, 1981, the Board certified the applicant on the basis of its membership strength alone. It was not therefore necessary to consider the exercise of its discretion under section 7a of the Act. Following certification, the Board heard evidence and argument relating to the two section 79 complaints and the application for consent to prosecute.

[2]. In the first section 79 complaint (file no. 1275-80-U) the union alleges that Ms. Jane Walker, an office employee, was discharged by the respondent employer contrary to the Act. In its second complaint (file no. 2055-80-U) the union contends that Ms. Hilda Rampersaud was also dealt with by the respondent contrary to the Act by being presented with the choice of either transferring from her position in the office bargaining unit back to the factory, where she had previously worked, or leaving the employ of the respondent.

[3]. At the time of the application for certification there were seven employees in the office bargaining unit. It is common knowledge that at the outset the union had 100% of the employees as members. Support fell, however, when five of the employees who continued to be members signed a petition in opposition to the application for certification. Subsequently two of those five employees signed counter petitions or re-affirmations of union support. Following evidence and submissions from the parties the Board found, on October 24, 1980, that the re-affirmations were voluntary expressions of the views of their signatories. The Board then determined that the union enjoyed sufficient support among the employees in the bargaining unit to be certified without either the taking of a representation vote or the exercise of its discretion under section 7a of the Act. The union alleges, however, that it lost a significant portion of the unanimous support for certification among the employees in the bargaining unit through the employer's intimidating conduct which, the union argues, included the sudden relocation of two bargaining unit employees and initially culminated with the discharge of Jane Walker. The union contends that some months later the employer again violated the Act through what the union characterizes as Hilda Rampersaud's forced resignation or effective discharge. It is a remedy for these alleged breaches of the Act that the union brings this matter before the Board.

[4]. As set out in the Board's decision dated March 24, 1981, Mr. E. Waxinan, the president of the respondent, fell ill in November of 1980. His illness occurred after these proceedings had started but before he had had an opportunity to testify to the matters raised in the section 79 complaints. Because of the serious nature of his illness and the prediction that he might not be able to testify for over a year, the Board proceeded in his absence. Notwithstanding these circumstances the Board has been able to determine the issues, however, because evidence was given by two other members of management: Mr. Jerry Starr, the vice-president of the company and general production manager and Ms. Mary Goldberg, the controller and office manager. Either or both of these persons, or at least one of the objecting employees, was present at all material events. The Board has declined to place any weight on a conversation which took place solely between Waxman and Walker the day before she was fired because the Board was at the disadvantage of having heard only the grievor's version of the conversation.

[5]. It is apparent on the evidence that the respondent's management was upset by the office employees' application for certification. The notice of the application for certification arrived at the respondent's offices on Monday, September 8, 1980. Soon thereafter Starr and Goldberg met with Waxman in his office. As the plant employees had already been unionized, management's first reaction to the notice was that there had been some mistake. Starr testified that when he realized that the application related to the office employees he was "slightly dismayed". He said he thought the office employees were happy and felt that the application meant that they weren't. He acknowledged that he viewed the application as a personal affront and was generally displeased. On cross-examination Starr stated that Waxman had mentioned to him a few times that he was upset about the application. Goldberg testified that "when [they] calmed down a bit," after receiving the notice of the application, they called Janice Ford, one of the office employees in the bargaining unit, into Waxman's office. Ford and another employee in the unit, John Jamison, appeared throughout these proceedings as objecting employees. It is common ground that when Ford was called into the office Waxman said, "What is this about the union". He then asked her if she had joined the union. Before she responded to the question, however, Starr advised her that she did not have to answer.

[6]. Pursuant to discussions with Starr and Waxman, Goldberg held a meeting of the office employees the following day to emphasize to them the confidentiality of payroll information. Goldberg testified that she did not want the names and addresses of factory employees who did not want to join the union to be released to the union through the office employees, now seeking representation by the same union.

[7]. Thursday, September 11th was a Jewish holiday and Starr, Waxinan and Goldberg were out of the office. When Waxman returned on Friday, September 12th he convened a meeting of the office employees. Among other matters, he expressed dismay over what he presumed had been union meetings held among the employees while he and his colleagues were out of the office the previous day. There is little dispute on the evidence that prior to the union's application for certification the respondent's office was a congenial place to work. It is undisputed that regularly, though not continuously, the office employees discussed non-working matters during the course of the day. They composed, for example, a comical newsletter that was both typed and distributed on company time. On the Jewish holiday in question, the office was not particularly busy and it was acknowledged by employees testifying on behalf of the union that from time to time conversations relating to non-working matters occurred between a few of the employees. They each stated, though, that the amount of personal discussion that day was about the same as any other day. What was unusual from the employees' point of view was the fact that Mr. Jim Lambrakis, a member of management in a related company located in the same building, walked through the office six or seven times when he might normally do so once or twice. Starr testified that because he, Waxman and Goldberg were away Lambrakis had been placed in charge. Walker, however, testified that whenever Starr, Waxman and Goldberg had previously been away for Jewish holidays, Janice Ford had been put in charge. On one of Lambrakis's trips through the office he saw Walker and Sandra Dent, another employee in the unit, talking. When he asked if they were having a union meeting, the replied they were not and he left.

[8]. Early Friday morning Lambrakis told Starr that he had to break up a couple of meetings in the general office on the Jewish holiday. Starr stated that while he was not alarmed by the fact that the employees had had meetings, he and Waxinan felt that just in case union activity was being pursued on company time, the employees should be told to confine union activity to non-company time.

[9]. Later that morning, therefore, Waxinan held a meeting of the office employees. One aspect of the first section 79 complaint arises directly out of this meeting. Walker testified that when she arrived at work that day Janice Ford told her that Waxman was furious about meetings that had taken place in the office the day before. There is little conflict in the testimony about what Waxman said at this meeting. The Board concludes on the evidence that he stated that he had always been a fair employer, that he was not against unions but that things would be different. He stated that the company was a place of work and that no union meetings were to take place on the premises. He then pointed to Walker and, according to Walker, said "You, you are going downstairs." After that he turned to John Jamison one of the objectors. According to Jamison, Waxman said that he would be going to the shipping department because they could not use him in the office at that time. Jamiscin was initially upset at being sent to shipping. He testified that his concerns were alleviated though when he subsequently spoke to Waxman about the situation. Waxman explained to him that his move was temporary, that he would be working in shipping for the month of September and that when things got easier in shipping he would go back to the office. He in fact returned to the office on October 8th, 1980, presumably, therefore, because the pace in the shipping department had by that time eased off. Further reference will be made to Jamison's return to the office in dealing with the second section 79 complaint.

[10]. The union contends that moving the work stations of both Jamison and Walker were designed to break the back of the union's drive by intimidating the employees and physically breaking up or separating the group of office employees which had, until this time, uniformly supported the union.

[11]. Counsel for the company argued, know the other hand, that relocating Jamison and Walker was a business decision motivated neither in whole nor in part by anti-union animus. Counsel asserted that Jamison was moved from the office to shipping because at that time, in September, the company was at the height of its fall shipping season and the office was not particularly busy. An additional factor requiring Jamison's temporary move to shipping, according to counsel for the company, was the fact that Hilda Rampersaud, the grievor in the second section 79 complaint, was frequently absent from work during September, a time when the company required the shipping department to be operating at full capacity. With respect to Ms. Walker, Starr testified that the purpose of Walker's relocation to the second floor was to increase job efficiency by placing her payroll office near the factory employees. He stated that the company's plan pre-dated the union's application and had been, for some time, to move payroll down to the second floor as soon as the air conditioning was in operation on that floor. This occurred sometime in the first half of September though no one could say precisely when.

[12]. Walker handled the payroll for the factory employees. To fulfill her function she required daily access to the personnel files. She was routinely required, for example, to effect changes in addresses, names, wage rates and deal with OHIP matters. The evidence demonstrates that if factory employees had problems with their pay cheques they would speak with Walker directly. Similarly, they would speak with Walker to make required changes in the information recorded in their personnel files. Walker also spent time doing job costing work which did not involve access to the personnel files.

[13]. The Board accepts on the evidence that the company's plans to move the factory payroll office down to the second floor were in place prior to the application for certification. Within two weeks after Walker was hired on May 1, 1980 Goldberg informed her that she would be moving to the second floor because it would be more convenient for her to be closer to the factory workers. Sometimes later Walker asked Goldberg when the move would in fact take place and was told, "When Starr gets himself organized.". Similarly, Maria DaSilva, another employee in the bargaining unit, testified that she had heard people talk about the payroll person moving downstairs to the second floor even before Walker came, though nothing had ever been done about it.

[14]. Pursuant to Waxinan's instructions and immediately following the Friday morning meeting Walker, with Starr's help, moved to the second floor. In the course of moving Starr gave her specific instructions as to the way she was to carry out her job from that point onwards. The Board accepts on the evidence Walker's uncontradicted testimony that Starr, among other directions, advised her that she was to no longer respond to landlord credit inquiries and that any further such calls would go to Janice Ford. A satisfactory business reason for this change in Walker's duties is not apparent on the evidence. It is common ground that Starr further instructed Walker that the personnel files were to remain on the third floor. He directed her to save up all matters relating to the files and go to the third floor to obtain access to them only once a day. While it is clear that from the time of her move she was only allowed to go to the third floor to use the personnel files once a day, there is a conflict in the testimony as to whether the one time was to be at the end of the day or, instead, whenever she deemed it most convenient. Starr testified that he instructed her to come up at the end of her daily routine and that he told Waxinan that it was to be once a day at the end of the day. Walker testified that Starr's instructions did not specify the time of the day. While it is not necessary to resolve this issue of incredibility, we note that Starr's account of this instructions tends to raise more questions about the employer's motivation than Walker's. The adequacy of Walker's job performance was undisputed. If the aim of moving her to the second floor was to increase efficiency the objective would be more readily achieved, in the Board's opinion, given the varied nature of Walker's functions, if Walker could herself determine, during the course of the day, the most expeditious time to exercise her single access to the personnel files.

[15]. No matter what the time of day, if any, was in fact specified, it is readily apparent that Walker's access to the personnel files was being curtailed. Starr acknowledged that Walker's duties required her to have daily access to the personnel files. According to Walker, Starr explained that her access to the files was being limited because they contained confidential information. This is consistent with the meeting that Goldberg held with the employees the day following the company's receipt of the notice of the application for certifi­cation during which she stressed the confidentiality of the office jobs. According to Walker she noted in particular the confidentiality of Walker's job (she had information about the factory employees) and Jamison's job (he dealt with the payroll). It is undisputed that prior to this the employees had not been instructed that their jobs were confidential. Walker testified that Starr explained that the procedure being established limiting her access to the files would be for her protection so that she wouldn't be compromised if information got out. When asked about this comment at the hearing, Starr stated that Walker may have taken his remark out of context, indicating that what he was trying to say was that she should keep union business completely separate from company business. Starr further instructed Walker that she should save all matters relating to such things as mistakes on time sheets to the end of the day and, at that point, take them up with the supervisor rather than with the factory employees themselves as she had often done in the past. The Board has some difficulty understanding this instruction in view of Starr's other testimony that the aim of Walker's move downstairs was to increase Walker's efficiency by having her closer to the factory employees. According to Walker, Starr gave her the even more general instruction that she shouldn't talk to factory employees anymore unless it was absolutely necessary for her job.

[16]. Starr acknowledged that he and Walker discussed the union during this conversation and that he expressed to Walker his opinion that it was unusual for a union to organize office employees in addition to the plant employees. He further acknowledged that he told Walker that they would rather give the employees directly any additional monies that it would cost the company to have the union than to have the union itself. He emphasized though that he also told Walker that the choice was theirs to make.

[17]. It is clear on the evidence that Walker was the leader among the employees in bringing the union into the company. It was Walker's husband, for example, who suggested which union the employees should approach; it was he who contacted the union and set up the initial meeting. Maria DaSilva testified that Walker was the ring leader and the strongest union supporter among them. When Starr was asked on cross-examination at what point in time he had concluded that Walker was the instigator of the union activity, he responded, "It grew on me; it became obvious that Jane was instrumental in getting this thing organized.".

[18]. In the Board's view significant doubt is cast on the alleged business motives for relocating Walker and Jamison by the fact that these moves were not discussed with either Starr or Goldberg prior to the meeting on Friday when Waxman announced them to the employees. At one point in his testimony Starr stated that he and Waxman discussed most matters affecting the company. Apart from Waxman telling the employees that there were to be no more union meetings on company time, however, Starr acknowledged that he was not, on the morning of September 12th, aware of any other changes in the office that would be taking place or would be announced at Friday's meeting. Similarly, Goldberg, the office manager, testified that she did not learn about Walker's move until she returned to work the following Monday. She agreed that the matter had not been discussed with her previously. While it had always been understood that at some point the payroll clerk would move downstairs, Goldberg testified that she had not been informed prior to the move that Walker's move was imminent. Similarly, with Jamison's move, both Starr and Goldberg indicated that Waxman had not discussed it with them before the meeting with the employees on Friday. Goldberg testified that she was somewhat upset by the move because she anticipated that it would cause a disruption in the office. She testified that when she learned about it she told Waxman that it would be okay if it was for only a few weeks. She emphasized that she wanted him back the minute he was finished with his work in the shipping department. Goldberg's reaction to Jamison's move raises doubts about the validity of the initial reason Waxman gave for moving Jamison. Both Jamison, who appeared on behalf of the objectors and Walker testified that Waxman stated at the meeting that Jamison was going to shipping because they couldn't use him in the office. It is obvious from Goldberg's testimony that there was a need for Jamison in the office.

[19]. Moving employees from one floor to another and from one department to another is not an every day event at the respondent's company. If the moves had been motivated purely by business concerns the Board would have expected that these moves would have been discussed at least with the office manager prior to being instituted. Furthermore, the Board concludes on the evidence that given the restrictions that were placed on Walker's access to the factory employees, the personnel files and her movement from the second to the third floor, the efficiency of her job performance did not in fact increase with her move to the second floor. It is of further interest that since Walker's dismissal in September, her job has been performed by Janice Ford on the third floor. Viewing these considerations together with Starr's testimony as to Waxinan's reaction to the union's application and management's sudden concern about the confidentiality of Walker's and Jamison's jobs as expressed in Goldberg's meeting, the Board concludes that Waxman's relocation of two out of seven of the office employees was designed to disrupt the union campaign, intimate employees and separate its strongest member from the other employees. While management may have intended to at some point move the payroll office back down to the second floor, the Board is satisfied that the sudden implementation of that idea on Friday, September 12th was motivated solely by anti-union animus contrary to sections 56, 58 and 61 of the Act.

[20]. Walker's relocation to the second floor took place on Friday, September 12th. It was on the following Monday, September 15th, that a petition in opposition to the union was circulated. It is clear on the evidence that with the circulation of the petition the previously unified group of union supporters disintegrated. The friendly atmosphere in the office disappeared and relationships between various employees became strained.

[21]. The following day, Tuesday, September 16, Walker was fired. The events which immediately preceded her discharge are outlined below in some detail as they are relied on by counsel for the respondent as the explanation for Walker's discharge. A dispute arose among the employees regarding who would manage the reception desk during the lunch hour on Tuesday, September 16th. Goldberg testified that she was upset about the tension in the office and decided to call a meeting of the employees. The meeting was attended by four employees (Sandra Dent, Janice Ford, Donna Alsop, Jane Walker) and Mary Goldberg. There is little conflict in the evidence as to what transpired prior to Waxman's entrance. Walker gave the following account which the Board accepts. Goldberg began the meeting by stating that she did not like the atmosphere in the office and the open warfare that had developed between management and the employees as well as between the employees themselves. Goldberg said that she was upset that the employees had gone behind their backs instead of coming to management. Walker interjected that according to the law management does not have the right to be involved, a comment which apparently upset Goldberg. Goldberg then stated that Jamison had felt harrassed by the union, noting that a person from the union had followed him home. Walker, in contradiction, replied that the individual from the union had been invited to Jamison's house. The subject of the meeting then turned back to the unpleasant atmosphere in the office. As an example Goldberg brought up the problem that had triggered their meeting. She said that Sandra Dent had been "bitchy" with Janice Ford because Janice had not wanted the union and added that Dent had called Ford a traitor. At this point in the meeting Sandra Dent broke down in tears saying she couldn't take anymore. She declared she was quitting and walked out crying. Walker testified that in support of Dent she said, "There's another example of harassment". It is clear on the evidence that Goldberg was somewhat upset that Walker would label the incident one of harassment and tried to explain to Walker the nature of the problem that had arisen over covering the reception desk for the lunch hour.

[22]. At this point Waxman, who apparently had been listening at the door for a while, walked in asking Goldberg why she was explaining the receptionist's job to Walker when it had nothing to do with her. Goldberg testified that she replied that she thought an explanation was in order. According to Goldberg, Waxman then told Walker to go downstairs and not to come up for any reason not even to use the toilet. It is clear on the evidence of both Walker and Goldberg that when Walker replied that the union would hear about this, Waxman became sarcastic and mocking. He said, "Ah, the union, I hope the union doesn't take me to court; I hope they don't send me to prison or have me hanged". Walker replied, "I do". She explained that her comment was intended to indicate that she hoped the union would take action, knowing full well that he would not be sent to prison or hanged. Waxman replied, "Ah, you want me to be sent to jail. Did everyone hear that?". It is common to the testimony of both Goldberg and Walker that Waxinan then said to Walker, "You've been nothing but trouble since you came here". Walker replied that they had merely been trying to exercise their rights. At that point Waxman ordered Walker to go back to work. As she was leaving he added that she was not to show her face on the third floor without the explicit knowledge and consent of management. Goldberg testified that this was the first time she had been made aware of these instructions concerning the limitation on Walker's access to the third floor. She commented in her evidence that while she thought there would be problems with these instructions she presumed they would work it out.

[23]. During this exchange both Waxinan and Walker were angry and speaking in raised voices. Walker testified that as she was waiting for the elevator she heard Waxman screaming in Goldberg's office, "Do you have any problems, Donna?" "Do you have any problems, Janice?" to which she heard no response. Goldberg confirmed that he was yelling and could be heard all over the office. Goldberg commented that Donna was terrified but that Janice, who knew Waxinan better, was not. There is some contradiction in the evidence as to what was said next. According to Goldberg, Waxman said, referring to Walker, "That little piss pot thinks she runs the office but she can't tell me what to do." Walker, on the other hand, testified that Waxman, in addition, threatened to beak her legs. According to Walker, Waxman said, "That piss pot thinks she runs the office. Well she doesn't, I do. If I could get that piss pot on the floor I'd break both her legs". Walker told the Board that upon hearing that threat she went back to the office to let Waxman know she had heard what he said and to tell him that the union would also hear about it. According to Walker, Waxman then went wild. She said that she had never seen anyone so angry. Both Goldberg and Walker testified that Waxman then walked towards Walker repeatedly pointing his finger at her and yelling that she was fired. Walker testified that he said, "You insubordinate piss pot. You're fired and don't show your face in here again".

[24]. The union argues that Waxman discharged Walker because of her active role in supporting and promoting the union. Counsel for the company, on the other hand, contends that Waxman discharged Walker because she was insubordinate. Company counsel argued that Walker began the union campaign expecting an adverse reaction from management and by her own aggression guaranteed that something adverse happened. Counsel was critical of Walker for arguing and pursuing matters in discussion with management. If Walker had not done this, according to counsel for the company, confrontation would have been avoided and Walker would not have been discharged. During the meeting in Goldberg's office on September 16th, just prior to Walker's discharge, for example, counsel for the company suggests that there were numerous points at which Walker's responses unnecessarily exacerbated the situation. He notes that when Goldberg stated that she was disappointed that the employees had gone behind management's back instead of coming to them with their complaints, it was unnecessarily aggressive to "set the record straight" and inform Goldberg that it was none of management's business. When Sandra Dent left Goldberg's office crying, counsel argues, Walker's comment that that was another example of harassment served only to heighten the tension between herself and management. Concerning her argument with Waxman, counsel asserts that everything would have ended without Walker being fired if she had not gone back into the office, upon hearing Waxman refer to her as a "piss pot" or, if Walker's evidence is to be accepted, without responding to his threat to break her legs. In short counsel asks the Board to conclude that Walker was fired for her confrontation tactics and not for her union activity.

[25]. On the evidence presented, however, the Board cannot agree. In arguing with Walker just prior to discharging her, Waxman told Walker that she had been nothing but trouble since she came. Starr and Goldberg each testified, however, that they had no complaints with Walker's work or her general conduct in the office. Having carefully reviewed the evidence the Board is satisfied that the "trouble" referred to in Waxman's statement was Walker's leading role in bringing in and promoting the union. In the Board's assessment Waxman's obvious antagonism towards Walker would not reasonably have emanated from and cannot be explained by the circumstances of the meeting alone. Starr testified that he was well aware that Walker was the person mainly responsible for bringing in the union. As he expressed it, that awareness "grew on him". The Board concludes on the evidence that Waxinan was also well aware of Walker's leading role. Waxman was enraged by Walker's pronouncement on two separate occasions at the meeting that the union would hear about the way the company was treating her. It is apparent to the Board that Waxman was deeply angered by the introduction of an element into the office (the union) that would challenge his authority, and tagged Walker as the one responsible. Consistent with the Board's conclusion is Waxman's statement, "That little piss pot thinks she runs the office but she can't tell me what to do." Further supporting the Board's conclusion is the unreasonableness of Waxman's instructions to Walker, soon after he entered the meeting and before they started shouting at one another. He told her not to come up to the third floor for any reason, not even to use the toilets. The Board does not accept that Waxman was motivated in making this comment by Walker's alleged insubordination. At this point in the meeting she had not even spoken to Waxinan and Goldberg had just told Waxinan that she felt an explanation to Walker was in order. Additionally, it is difficult to find a business justification for this instruction as it was admitted by all that she had to use the personnel files on the third floor at least once a day.

[26]. The situation before the Board is readily distinguishable from the circumstances in W.C. Wood, [1979] OLRB Rep. Dec. 1296 where the Board concluded that the grievor was discharged for confrontation tactics rather than union activity. While Walker was not reluctant to express her views or challenge what she perceived to be a misstatement of fact by management, the Board cannot conclude on the evidence that she engaged in concerted confrontation tactics or that her discharge was motivated by her alleged insubordination. The Board is fully satisfied that her discharge was predominately prompted by Waxman's anti-union animus in violation of The Labour Relations Act.

[27]. We turn then to the second complaint filed under section 79 of the Act relating to Ms. Hilda Rampersaud, an employee in the office bargaining unit who worked in the shipping room typing invoices. During the last week of October or first week of November of 1980, Waxman presented Rampersaud with the choice of either returning to a job in the factory, where she had been prior to moving into the office, or leaving the respondent's employ. Rampersaud declined to go back into the plant. Pursuant to the choice, therefore, she left. The union argues that the employer acted with anti-union animus in violation of The Labour Relations Act in presenting her with what it characterized as a choice between demotion and discharge. The employer, on the other hand, contends that the employer was motivated solely by business concerns. It is clear on the evidence that Rampersaud was away from work, due to the ill health of her infant child, for numerous days at the end of September and beginning of October. While it was readily acknowledged that, in general, the employer has a generous sick leave policy, counsel for the employer argued that the company could not tolerate Rampersaud's absences from work in the shipping room and sought, therefore, to move her to a place where her absences would not have such an adverse impact on the employer's business. Counsel maintains that during the period of her absences the company was in the midst of a very heavy shipping season and needed, on a daily basis, its full complement of shipping employees.

[28]. In support of its position, the union points to the fact that Rampersaud was one of two employees to sign re-affirmations of union support. The union argues that it was only after the Board held on October 24, 1980 that the two re-affirmations were voluntary that the employer took action against Rampersaud.

[29]. Early in the course of the Board's proceedings considerable concerns were raised in the hearing by the objecting employees about the identity of the persons who had signed the two re-affirmations of union support. The employee objectors to the application stated that they had spoken to the employees involved and that a sufficient number had denied signing re­affirmations that it was impossible for the overlap to be sufficient to cause the petition to become numerically irrelevant. The objectors wanted to call the employees as witnesses to testify that they had not signed re-affirmations.

[30]. Because of the questions raised by the objectors at the Board's first hearing the Board, between hearings, conducted its own investigation to verify the accuracy of the signatures on the re-affirmations. When questions persisted at the second hearing it became obvious to the Board that one of the persons who had signed a re-affirmation of union support was concealing that fact from fellow employees. The Board takes every precaution to insure that the names of people who sign re-affirmations as well as petitions and membership cards are not revealed unnecessarily. Therefore, instead of calling the employees who had signed the petition to testify as requested by the objectors, the Board proposed that the Board in private, examine each employee to ascertain whether he or she had signed the re-affirmation. The parties, and in particular the objectors, agreed that they would be satisfied with the results of the Board's private inquiry, an inquiry which again confirmed the documents before the Board.

[31]. Immediately thereafter on Friday, October 24, 1980, the Board announced to the parties that the inquiry had confirmed the information in the documents received by the Board. The Board further announced that it had concluded on the evidence presented that the re-affirmations were voluntary and that, therefore, given the degree of overlap between the re­affirmations and the petition, the petition was not numerically relevant to the application because the union had at the relevant times 100% of the employees as members and the continued support for certification from more than 55% of the employees in the unit. According to the testimony of Goldberg it was in the next week that Waxrnan met with Rampersaud and presented her with the choice of going back to the factory or leaving her employment.

[32]. The union submits that the coincidence in the timing between the presentation of Waxinan's choice to Rampersaud and the Board's inquiry relating to the re-affirmations and its related announcements undermines the credibility of the business explanation put forth by the company to justify Rampersaud's termination.

[33]. The end of September marks the company's fall shipping deadline. As a result, according to the testimony of both Starr and Goldberg, August, September and the first week of October are heavy shipping periods. John Jamison, who had previously worked in shipping and, as set out above, was sent there by Waxman's direction at the September 12th meeting, testified that while September is the busiest time in the shipping department, things slow down in October and November. Consistent with his testimony is the fact that he was returned to the office from the shipping department on October 8, 1980. The Board concludes on the evidence of Starr, Goldberg and Jamison that the shipping department did in fact slow down after the first week in October of 1980.

[34]. Goldberg testified that Rampersaud's baby was ill at the end of September and beginning of October. She further stated that Dennis Grady, the head shipper and a member of management, kept complaining that because of Rampersaud's absences he was having to do the invoice typing. According to Goldberg he insisted that they needed someone to do the invoicing who would not be absent.

[35]. The Board has no doubt that Rampersaud's absences at the end of September and beginning of October were disruptive to the company occurring, as they did, during a peak shipping season. To further conclude that it was her absenteeism that motivated Waxman weeks later, at the end of October, to present her with the choice between leaving her employment or going back to the factory is more difficult. On management's own evidence as well as that on an objecting employee, the Board has already concluded that the shipping department had slowed down after the first week in October.

[36]. According to Goldberg, invoice typing has always been a problem with the company. Jamison testified that he helped Rampersaud with the invoice typing while he was there from September 12th to October 8th. If Rampersaud's absences during this period were causing such a problem for the company, the question is raised as to why Jamison would have been moved back to the office on October 8, 1980 instead of being maintained in shipping for a while longer. No adequate explanation was provided to the Board to explain this apparent inconsistency.

[37]. The evidence before the Board is that Rampersaud's absences were caused by her baby's illness rather than a recurring problem with her own health and that these absences occurred during the end of September and first week of October. Goldberg testified that her knowledge of the situation was second hand and that she had no record of the specific number of days Rampersaud was absent. According to Goldberg, Mr. Grady, the head shipper, was the person who would know what happened in the shipping department on a day to day basis. While Grady was the person who complained about Rampersaud's absences as well as the person who could best testify as to the problem her absences were causing the employer and the specific period(s) of time that Rampersaud was away from work, Grady did not testify. In the absence of any explanation the Board views adversely the fact that Grady was not called to give what would have been the best evidence of these events. Relying on the evidence that was presented, the Board can only conclude that Rampersaud's absences, save for one day on or about November 3, 1980, did not extend beyond the first week in October.

[38]. Maria DaSilva testified that between the first Board hearing on September 26, 1980 and the day she left her employment with the respondent on October 3, 1980 she overheard Starr and Waxinan talking by the elevator while she was sitting at the reception desk. She told the Board that she heard them talking about who had signed the counter petition or re­affirmations of union support. According to DaSilva one person thought Rampersaud had signed and the other thought it was Jamison.

[39]. Starr denied that he engaged in such speculation. He acknowledged, however, both that he had heard that two people had signed counter petitions and that Waxman may have said, "Who do you think signed it?" to which he might have said, "I don't know." Goldberg testified that after the first two hearings (September 26 and October 15) Waxman, Starr and she wondered which person among those who had signed the petition against the union was lying about signing the counter petition. She stated that they couldn't understand why someone would be lying.

[40]. While Rampersaud was allegedly removed from the shipping department because the department could not absorb a period of absenteeism from the person who does invoice typing, the evidence suggests that no one was hired specifically to replace her. Starr testified that he had no idea who had in fact replaced Rampersaud. Regarding the current situation Starr stated that to the best of his knowledge Grady, the head shipper, does the invoicing with others helping out. Grady did not testify as to what steps were taken by the company after Rampersaud's departure to insure that the problem created by Rampersaud's absences would not recur. Goldberg stated that an in-house sales person who had been hired about that time helps relieve Grady. From the evidence that was presented, the Board can only conclude that after Rampersaud's departure the company has managed its invoicing in much the same manner as it did when Rampersaud was absent from work.

[41]. Starr stated that he and Waxinan discuss most decisions. He acknowledged, however, that beyond asking him whether he had room for Rampersaud in the factory, Waxman did not discuss with him the choice he was going to present her.

[42]. In the Board's opinion the company has not given a credible business explanation for why Waxman gave Rampersaud the choice of going back into the factory or leaving the company. The company has not shown that the shipping department was busy when Rampersaud was actually given her choice. In fact the weight of evidence is that the shipping department had slowed down after the first week in October. As well the evidence presented indicates that Rampersaud was not absent after the first week in October with the exception of one isolated day on November 3, 1980. Goldberg could not recall whether Rampersaud asked for the day off on November 3rd before or after Goldberg, pursuant to Waxman's instructions, had informed her that her last day of work would be November 7, 1980. On the totality of the evidence it is apparent that the November 3rd absence played no part in the company's decisions relating to Rampersaud.

[43]. Coupling these considerations with the timing of the presentation of the choice to Rampersaud, the Board can only conclude that Waxinan was motivated by anti-union animus contrary to the Act. In the Board's opinion the respondent's actions with respect to Rampersaud constitute a force resignation tantamount to discharge in violation of sections 56 and 58 of the Act. We note that the fact that two re-affirmations of union support were signed does not detract from the Board's conclusion. The other person who signed the re-affirmation was no longer in the employ of the company at the relevant time.

[44]. For the reasons set out above, therefore, the Board concludes that the respondent acted contrary to sections 56, 58 and 61 of the Act both when on September 12. 1980 it relocated the work stations of both Walker and Jamison and when on September 16, 1980 it discharged Walker. The Board further concludes that the respondent acted contrary to sections 56 and 58 of the Act when in late October or early November of 1980 it presented Rampersaud with a choice that forced her resignation and may best be characterized as an effective dismissal.

[45]. By way of remedy for these violations the union makes numerous requests:

(a) that Walker and Rampersaud be reinstated to the positions they held on the day of discharge and, for Walker, at the location where she was performing that job on September 21, 1980, namely the third floor rather than the second,

(b) that Walker and Rampersaud be fully compensated for wages and benefits lost,

(c) that they be awarded interest on the wage portion,

(d) that Walker receive specific compensation of approximately $7,500.00 for humiliation and loss of dignity. Supporting this claim counsel for the union relies particularly on the decision of the Ontario High Court in Pilon and Peugot [1980] O.R. (2d) 711 as well as the Board's decision in K-Mart Canada Limited (Peterborough), [1981] OLRB Rep. Jan. 60,

(e) that to assist the union to rebuild the strength and momentum it lost through the employer's unfair labour practices and interference with its organizing drive the Board order,

i) that the respondent post copies of the Board's order,

ii) that, due to the small size of the bargaining unit and work location of the employees therein, the respondent send copies of the notice to the home of all employees in the bargaining unit,

iii) that the respondent supply the union with a list of names and addresses of the person now in the bargaining unit,

iv) that the union be permitted to hold a meeting on the company's premises and during company time,

v) that the union be given reasonable access to the company's bulletin board,

vi) that the union be compensated for the added effort it must make to rebuilt its support in the bargaining unit, specifically, that the employer pay the union 30 days wages for a union representative to cover this added organizing expense.

[46]. The purpose of the Board's remedial power under section 79(4) of the Act is to compensate parties and persons by placing them, as nearly as possible, in the position they would have been in had the Act not been violated. Consistent with this principle and the Board's well established jurisprudence the Board orders that both Walker and Rampersaud be reinstated forthwith into the positions they held at the time of their dismissal. In view of the Board's finding that the respondent's decision to relocate Walker to the second floor was made in violation of the Act, the Board further orders that Walker resume her duties on the third floor where she had been working prior to the violation. The Board does not seek to restrain the bona fide operation of the respondent's business but rather to remedy the unfair labour practice which occurred on September 12, 1980 when Walker was moved to the second floor and away from the other employees in the bargaining unit. It may be that at some future date the employer may decide for bona fide business reasons that Walker's job should be performed at a different location. Under what circumstances such a move would be appropriate in the future, however, is not in issue at this time.

[47]. Additionally, the Board orders that both Walker and Rampelrsaud be fully compensated for wages and benefits lost together with interest calculated pursuant to the principles set out in the Board's decision in Hallowell House, [1980] OLRB Rep. Jan. 35.

[48]. Relying on the Ontario Divisional Court's decision in Pilon and Pen got, supra, and the Board decision in K-Mart Canada, supra, the union requested that Walker be compensated for what it characterized as an assault on her dignity. In Pilon and Peugot the plaintiff was awarded $7,500.00 for the mental distress, anxiety, vexation and frustration caused by the company's breach of contract and wrongful dismissal. Numerous factors readily distinguish the situation before the Board from the circumstances in that case. In Peugot the employee had seventeen years of service and had been told by the employer that he would have life time security in his employment. Walker, on the other hand, had less than one year's service and had been given no assurances about the duration of her employment. Additionally, in Peugot, evidence was presented establishing that the plaintiff’s doctor, ten days after his discharge, diagnosed in the plaintiff an acute anxiety state. A year later the plaintiff was still suffering from chest pain, insomnia and sweating as a result of the dismissal. No medical evidence was presented in the instant matter to indicate what effect the discharge had on Walker. To all appearances, though, Walker is a person of particularly strong mental and emotional fiber. There was no suggestion in the evidence that she was suffering from any anxiety beyond the natural distress, which must not be underestimated, that accompanies any wrongful dismissal. Given these and other factual distinctions between the two cases the Board does not find support in the Peugot decision for the union's claim for compensation.

[49]. In K-Mart, supra, the Board ordered that two employees be compensated in the amount of $500.00 for the employer's assault on their dignity. Subsequently, however, the Board decided not to implement this part of its decision [1981] OLRB Rep. Feb. 185. As the union has consented to an order of the Divisional Court staying the payment of the compensation pending judicial review, the immediate remedial impact of the order was removed. The Board, therefore, revoked that aspect of its decision pending further submissions of the parties. As the issue had not been fully argued before the Board in K-Mart, the Board noted that prior to making a further decision on the matter it would welcome submissions on the limits of its jurisdiction in this area.

[50]. The reasoning supporting the Board's original decision remains instructive. The Board emphasized that an award of that nature would be made in the most extraordinary circumstances. At p. 87 of its determination the Board explained the foundation of its decision.

Compensation for unfair labour practice involving an assault on an employee's dignity must be assessed carefully, and will be awarded only in the most extraordinary of cases. There are numbers of instances where an employee who is the victim of an unfair labour practice may incidentally suffer a loss of dignity or self-esteem. An employee who is discharged for organizing a union may suffer emotional stress as a result of his unemployment. In that instance, however, it is the discharge itself that is the violation of The Labour Relations Act. The remedy should be tailored to the wrong. The breach of that employee's right not to be so discharged can be remedied by his reinstatement with full compensation for all wages and benefits lost.

Different considerations apply when, as in this case, a calculated offence to the dignity of the individual is the very means by which an unfair labour practice is achieved. If the Act is truly to provide protection from that kind of abuse and, for the reasons explored above, a declaration, a cease and desist order, a posting or apology will not be appropriate to redress the wrong done, a remedial order must include the possibility of monetary compensation. Where an employer has subjected employees to public indignity as a deliberate means of furthering its unlawful purpose and the Board concludes that no other remedy will adequately redress that particular unfair labour practice, it may deem it appropriate to order the compensation of the victimized employees to remedy the infringement of their rights under The Labour Relations Act. We are satisfied that this is such a case. The Board's remedy in this case, therefore, will include payment of compensation to Miss Kelly O'Connor and Mrs. Beverley Clark for humiliation and harassment to which they are subjected by K-Mart of Canada Limited. An incidental effect of such compensation will also be to counter the impact of the surveillance on other employees. In terms that the employees can readily understand, the two employees concerned will be compensated and be seen to be compensated by this Board in a way that should enhance the effect of the Board's posting order. All of the employees should know that such abuses will not go uncorrected. While such compensation is not easy to quantify, an elaboration of the Board's principles in this regard should await the experience of further cases, we are satisfied that in the circumstances of this case the sum of $550 to each of Miss O'Connor and Mrs. Clark is an appropriate amount of compensation.

Unlike the circumstances in K-Mart, the respondent's "assault" on Walker's dignity was not the very means by which the employer's unfair labour practices were achieved; it was instead a by-product. Unfortunately it is not unusual for an employee who is discharged for organizing a union to be subject to a loss of self-esteem or dignity either by the loss of employment itself or by the process through which the discharge has been carried out. However, where the Board concludes that it is the discharge itself that constitutes the unfair labour practice and not the means by which it was carried out, reinstatement with full compensation will normally remedy the violation of the Act as it affects the individual. In K-Mart, the employees in question were not discharged from their employment, and could not therefore be made whole by an order for reinstatement.

[51]. In this case the Board is satisfied that the wrong done to Walker can be adequately redressed by an order of reinstatement with full compensation. The Board's remedial powers under section 79(4) are not designed to punish an employer who has violated the Act. As well the Board, in designing its remedy must be mindful of the process. The parties in the instant case are beginning their bargaining relationship. The settlement of these unfair labour practice complaints marks an important step in the commencement of a relationship that will demand maturity and good will from everyone involved. The Board is of the view that in this case it would only serve to hinder the development of the relationship to order compensation for loss bf dignity in addition to Walker's reinstatement with full compensation.

[52]. The rest of the union's claim for relief is directed at restoring strength to the union. It is evident that the employer's unfair labour practices broke the union's momentum and weakened its strength. When the union filed its application for certification it had 100% support from among the employees in the bargaining unit. Of the original seven employees, two quit their employment within a month of the union's application. It is apparent on the evidence that the tension in the office resulting from the employer's violations of the Act was largely responsible for the departure of these employees. Of the remaining five, two were dismissed in violation of the Act and two others appeared throughout the hearing as employee objectors. On the day the employer received the application for certification, one of the objectors was brought into the office where Waxman asked what she knew about the union and inquired as to whether she had joined. The other objector was relocated by the respondent in what the Board has concluded was a violation of the Act. Ms. Alsop, the final employee who was in the bargaining unit on the day the application was made, was not untouched by the employer's inappropriate reaction to the union. Just after Waxman sent Walker away from Coldberg's office on September 16, 1980 and just prior to Walker's return and subsequent firing, Waxman screamed at Alsop demanding whether she had any problems. Goldberg testified that Alsop didn't answer and appeared to be terrified.

[53]. In these circumstances the Board is satisfied that part of the remedy for the employer's violations of the Act, specifically its interference with the employees' selection of the trade union contrary to section 56 and 58 of the Act, must be directed at restoring the union to its original strength amongst employees. The Board's normal posting order is manifestly appropriate as a means of dispelling the fears of employees who were witness to the employers' unfair labour practices. The posting is designed to assure them that they will not suffer relocation, intimidation or discharge at the hands of the employer because of their association with the union. In Valdi Inc., [1980] OLRB Rep. Aug. 1254 the Board at p. 1269 made the following comment on the need for and objective of what has become the Board's standard posting order:

However, the impact of unfair labour practices are seldom confined to an economic impact. For example, the isolated dismissal of an employee in the midst of or at the outset of an organizing campaign is like to have a significant "chilling effect" on other employees who witness the incident and understand its origin. The dismissal of a fellow employee for union activity conveys a strong warning to other employees and can bring a stop to an ongoing drive in its tracks. The mere reinstatement of the employee directly affected, with backpay some time later, may do little to assure his or her fellow employees that the employer is prepared to live within the requirements of the statute and that effective remedies exist for those occasions where he will not. . . . One of the unique remedies developed by labour relations agencies to respond to the psychological impact of unfair labour practices requires the offender, whether employer or union, to communicate to employees affected by an unfair labour practice that it has been found guilty of violating statutory labour laws and that it will henceforth conform to their requirements. . . .

Making employees aware of the fact that an errant employer or trade union cannot violate the Act and that the employee has meaningful legal rights is vital to the success of The Labour Relations Act. Admittedly, the effect of the posting requirement often will be difficult to evaluate but this is no reason for inaction. Surely, for example, the fear for job security will be lessened with the realization that someone more authoritative than the employer has a voice in determining what he can do to those who support a trade union and that someone more powerful than a trade union will protect those who lawfully oppose it. Even a belated notice is better than none, if it helps to dispel any fears, confusion or ill-will created by a situation which has been equitably resolved.

[54]. In the circumstances of this case the Board has determined that the posting order alone is insufficient to place the union in the position it would have been in had the employer not violated the Act. The Board has reached this conclusion on the basis of the cumulative effect of the following: the small size of the bargaining unit, the fact that the employees witnessed both the employer's wrongful relocation of two employees and the intimidating discharge of Walker, the occurrence of a further unfair labour practice months after the initial notification of the application for certification and, finally, the broad chilling effect that these unfair labour practices actually had on the union's campaign. To more fully reassure the employees that their association with the union will not bring reprisals from their employer, the Board directs the respondent to send the posting order to the home of each employee in the bargaining unit and to enable the union to hold a meeting of the employees in the bargaining unit on the company's premises, on company time. As well the union will be given reasonable access to the company's bulletin board to communicate with the employees during the process of negotiating for their first collective agreement. The Board further orders that the employer supply the union with the names and addresses of all employees who are presently in the bargaining unit.

[55]. The anticipated effectiveness of these remedies together with the Board's order reinstating Walker and Rampersaud with full compensation satisfies the Board that it would exceed the bounds of appropriate compensation to further order, as requested by the union, that a union representative be compensated for one month's wages for additional organizing expenses. In support of its request for a month's wages for a union representative, counsel for the union pointed to the decision of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board in Delta Optimist and Ernest Bexley and Vancouver — New Westminster Newspaper Guild, Local 115 [1980] 2 Can LRBR 227. In that case, however the Board was responding to unfair labour practices which had occurred after the Board certified the applicant and after the initial alleged unfair labour practices accompanying the union's organizational drive had been settled. It would appear from the decision that the union's problem in Delta had developed far beyond the situation confronting the union in this case. Additionally, with a remedy such as this it is difficult to quantify the added union expenses directly attributable to the employer's unfair labour practices. While in the right case this may not be an insurmountable problem (see for example the Board's decision in Radio Shack, supra,) the Board is satisfied that in the circumstances of this case it would be inappropriate to make such an order.

[56]. We turn then to the final matter, the union's application for consent to prosecute. The granting of consent to prosecute is a matter within the discretion of the Board. Even when a violation of the Act has been established, as in this case, or when there is prima facie evidence of a violation, the Board will decline to grant its consent to prosecute unless it is satisfied that to do so will further the labour relations interests of the parties or generally advance the interests of collective bargaining. (See Arthur G. McKee and Company Canada Limited, [1976] OLRB Rep. Oct. 637 and the cases cited therein; Fleck Manufacturing Company, [1978] OLRB Rep. July 615; Cuddy Food Products Limited, [1979] OLRB Rep. Jan. 24 and Cameron Packaging Inc., [1979] OLRB Rep. July 614.) In Cuddy Food Products the Board found that the employer had violated the Act by discharging three employees. The Board refused to grant consent to prosecute, however, because it did not feel that such "extreme recourse [was] necessary to advance the relationships of the parties or to protect the interests of the collective bargaining generally in the province". At p. 27 the Board explained its rationale as follows:

In this case the parties are new to their relationship and it is fair to say that the birth of that relationship has not been smooth. An initial application for certification was dismissed for a want of integrity in the membership evidence filed (Board file 0466-78-R, October 4, 1978). On a subsequent application a certificate was granted in proceedings marked with considerable resistance by the employer (Board file I 164-78-R, November 15. 1978). These and other section 79 complaints were filed with the Board. It is hoped that the disposition of the section 79 complaints will clear the air and allow the parties to put the past behind them and move forward to a positive bargaining relationship. It would be premature at this time to conclude that the remedies under section 79 of the Act are not sufficient to re-orient the parties in their future dealing with each other. A criminal prosecution would only risk further deterioration of their bargaining relationship at a time when they should be exploring more positive avenues of understanding. The request for the Board's consent to institute a prosecution is therefore denied.

[57]. The Board takes a similar view of the situation in this case. The parties are in the infancy of their collective bargaining relationship as it relates to this bargaining unit. The union has been certified and the parties are bargaining for their first collective agreement. While the establishment of their relationship has been accompanied by difficulties, the Board has confidence in the effectiveness of the remedies it has already granted. To clear the path for a criminal prosecution at this point would do little to foster mutual respect and promote a positive attitude between the parties. If problems arise in the course of bargaining avenues of recourse are available. The Board, however, will not anticipate such problems.

[58]. The request for the Board's consent to institute a prosecute is denied.

[59]. To summarize the Board orders that,

(i) Jane Walker and Hilda Rampersaud be reinstated forthwith into the positions they held at the time of their dismissal.

(ii) Jane Walker resume her duties on the third floor where she had been working prior to her relocation,

(iii) Jane Walker and Hilda Rampersaud be fully compensated for wages and benefits lost,

(iv) Jane Walker and Hilda Rampersaud receive interest on the wage portion of the compensation order,

(v) the employer post copies of the attached notice marked, "Appendix" after being duly signed by the respondent's representa­tive, in conspicuous places on its premises where it is likely to come to the attention of the employees including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted; that the notices be kept posted; that the notices be kept posted for sixty consecutive working days; that reasonable steps be taken by the respondent to insure that the said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; that reasonable physical access to the premises be given by the respondent to a representative of the complainant so that the complainant can satisfy itself that this posting requirement is being complied with,

(vi) the employer, at its own expenses, mail a copy of the posting order to the home address of each employee in the bargaining unit,

(vii) the respondent permit, forthwith, at least two representatives of the union to meet with the employees in the bargaining unit, on company premises, during working hours for at least one hour,

(viii) the union be given reasonable access to the company's bulletin board to communicate with employees about union affairs at least during the process of negotiating for their first collective agreement or for a period of one year from the date hereof whichever occurs first, and

(ix) the employer supply the union with the names and addresses of the employees presently in the bargaining unit.

DECISION OF BOARD MEMBER JAMES A. RONSON;

1. I agree with the findings of fact in the award of Vice-Chairman P. Picher, but have the following comments with respect to the relief sought by and granted to the union.

2. To my mind the concept of general damages as enunciated in the Peugot case and applied by this Board in the K-Mart case, supra, serves no useful purpose from a labour relations viewpoint. To become involved in every case with an assessment of the facts to see if such damages are warranted and then attempting to quantify the harm in money terms, would move the Board out of the specific legal area in which lies its expertise and into areas of law where another forum is best suited to deal with the alleged harm.

3. Lastly, I do not feel the union should be given access to the company's bulletin board for the posting of union notices. This remedy pre-supposes that the company will bargain in bad faith for a collective agreement and is not consistent with the remedial intent of restoring the union to its original strength at the outset of negotiations.

Appendix

The Labour Relations Act

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the Ontario Labour Relations Board

WE HAVE ISSUED THIS NOTICE IN COMPLIANCE WITH AN ORDER OF ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD ISSUED AFTER A HEARING IN WHICH BOTH THE COMPANY AND THE UNION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE. THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD FOUND THAT WE VIOLATED THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS ACT AND HAS ORDERED US TO INFORM OUR EMPLOYEES OF THEIR RIGHTS.

THE ACT GIVES ALL EMPLOYEES THESE RIGHTS:

TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES;

TO FORM, JOIN OR HELP UNIONS TO BARGAIN AS A GROUP, THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING;

TO ACT TOGETHER FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING;

TO REFUSE TO DO ANY AND ALL OF THESE THINGS.

WE ASSURE ALL OF OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:

WE WILL NOT DO ANYTHING THAT INTERFERES WITH THESE RIGHTS.

WE WILL NOT RELOCATE THE WORK STATIONS OF ANY EMPLOYEES BECAUSE THEY HAVE CHOSEN THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES GARMENT WORKERS' UNION AS THEIR BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE,

WE WILL NOT DISCHARGE ANY EMPLOYEE BECAUSE HE OR SHE HAS SELECTED THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES' CARMENT WORKERS' UNION AS HIS OR HER BARGAINING AGENT.

WE WILL NOT PRESENT ANY EMPLOYEE WITH A CHOICE THAT WOULD FORCE THAT EMPLOYEE TO EITHER QUIT HIS OR HER EMPLOYMENT OR MOVE TO THE FACTORY BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS CHOSEN TO REREPRESENTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS'

WE WILL OFFER, FORTHWITH, TO REINSTATE JANE WALKER AND HILDA P~AMPERSAUD TO THE POSITIONS THEY HAD AT THE TIME OF THEIR DISMISSALS.

WE WILL FULLY COMPENSATE JANE WALKER AND HILDA RAMPERSAUD FOR WAGES AND BENEFITS LOST, INCLUDING INTEREST.

WE WILL PERMIT TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES'OARMENT WORKERS' LINION TO MEET WITH THE EMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT WITHOUT LOSS OF PAY, ON COMPANY PREMISES AND DURING WORKING HOURS,

WE WILL P50/IDE THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION WITH REASONABLE ACCESS TO THE EMPLOYEE NOTICE BOARD AS ORDERED BY THE BOARD,

WE WILL SUPPLY THE UNION WITH NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT ON THE DATE THEREOF.

WE WILL BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH WITH THE UNION AND MAKE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO MAKE A COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT.

NEWPORT SPORTSWEAR LIMITED

PER: AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

This is an official notice of the Board and must not be removed or defaced.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive working days.

DATED this 7TH day of JULY . 1981