Marcel Fortin v. Bedard Girard Ontario et al., 1981 CanLII 823

2710-80-U Marcel Fortin, Complainant, v. Bedard Girard Ontario, Division of B C Checo International Limited and Millwright Local 1425, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Respondents

BEFORE: R. D. Howe, Vice-Chairman, and Board Members C. A. Ballentine and E. J. Brady.

APPEARANCES: Marcel Fortin for the applicant; Edward Than for the respondent.

DECISION OF R.D. HOWE, VICE-CHAIRMAN AND BOARD MEMBER E.J. BRADY; October 2, 1981

1. This is a complaint under section 89 of the Labour Relations Act in which the complainant alleges that he has been dealt with contrary to the provisions of section 66(a). 68. 80(l)(d) and 80(2)(a) of the Act.

2. Although the complaint as filed names only the Company as respondent in this matter, it also names "Millwright Local 1425" (hereinafter referred to as the "Union") as a trade union that may be affected by the complaint. Accordingly, the Union was duly notified of these proceedings. In view of the fact that the complaint contains allegations of violations of the Act by the Union, the Board directed at the hearing of this matter on September 9, 1981, that the Union be added as a respondent to this complaint, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Board's Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, the style of cause of this matter is amended as to add "Millwright Local 1425, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America" as a respondent.

3. Since no one appeared on behalf of the respondent Company at the commencement of the hearing of this matter on September 9, 1981, the hearing was recessed until 10:00 a.m. as a matter of courtesy in view of the possibility that the Company representative might have been delayed. However, since no one had appeared on behalf of the Company by 10:00 a.m. that day, the Board proceeded to hear the complaint.

4. By decision dated August 4, 1981, the Board, differently constituted, dismissed this complaint because no one had appeared for the complainant at the hearing on July 29, 1981. In a telegram dated August 17, 1981, the complainant requested that the Board reconsider that decision since he had not received notice of the July 29, 1981 hearing. At the September 9, 1981 hearing of this matter, the complainant testified that he did not receive notice of the July 29, 1981 hearing until after the date of that hearing due to the mail strike. Accordingly, at the September 9, 1981 hearing the Board, pursuant to section 95(1) of the Act, reconsidered and revoked its previous decision in this matter, and proceeded to hear the evidence and representations of the complainant and the Union with respect to the complaint.

5. The complainant testified before the Board concerning the events which gave rise to this complaint. We found him to be an honest and reliable witness whose candid testimony was uncontradicted by any other evidence. Mr. Ryan, who represented the Union at the hearing of this matter, elected not to cross-examine Mr. Fortin and told the Board that his (Mr. Fortin's) evidence was "pretty correct". Since the complainant did not allege or prove facts that would constitute a breach of section 80(l)(d) or section 80(2)(a) of the Act, this decision will deal only with the alleged violations of sections 66(a) and 68.

6. The complainant commenced employment with the Company in July of 1980 at the "Denison Mine Project". Approximately three weeks later he came to be of the view that the Company was unfairly distributing overtime and that it was not offering him his fair share of overtime hours. (Article 5(g) of the Collective Agreement that was binding on the parties to this complaint at all material times provides, in part, as follows: "All overtime shall be divided as equally as possible amongst all employees.") When Mr. Fortin complained to his foreman about the unfair distribution of overtime and told him that he wanted to see a steward about it, the foreman refused to permit him to do so. He further testified: "All of the foremen got on my back for the next few days, aggravating me. They'd check on me every fifteen minutes — made sure I stayed on the site because they knew I wanted to see a steward." The complainant, who wanted to file a grievance concerning distribution of overtime, discussed the matter with Union steward Bill Frolic, Business Agent Dave Stewart and an assistant steward. Each of them attempted to discourage him from grieving the matter. Indeed, it was the complainant's uncontradicated evidence that Mr. Stewart's response to him was: "Do your job and keep your mouth shut. Don't be a shit-disturber."

7. After the complainant continued for two weeks to "push hard" for a grievance to be filed, Mr. Stewart prepared a written grievance but refused to divulge its contents to the complainant and continued to attempt to persuade him to drop the matter. The complainant, who was becoming increasingly discouraged by the Union's lack of action, telephoned Edward Ryan, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Millwright District Council of Ontario, and told him of his disappointment with the Union. He also told Mr. Ryan: "I probably stand a pretty good chance of losing my job over the overtime grievance." Although Mr. Ryan testified before the Board, he was unable to recall that telephone conversation. Thus, there is no evidence of what, if any, steps Mr. Ryan took as a result of the call to investigate Mr. Fortin's complaint and ensure that the local officials of the Union were representing him in a manner that was not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.

8. In an attempt to have Mr. Stewart "commit himself [to the grievance] in front of the members", the complainant asked Mr. Stewart to "read the grievance out loud" at a Union meeting in Sudbury. The complainant's uncontradicated evidence concerning Mr. Stewart's response was: "He said: 'Do you want to read the fuckin' thing or do you want me to read it.' He said this in front of the membership just to embarrass me. He got very angry."

9. After that meeting, Mr. Stewart filed the following grievance:

"This Millwright Local Union 1425 Sudbury hereby register [sic] this grievance against Bedard Gerard Ont. Ltd. Whereas on August 9-10, 1980 the Company used Permit Millwrights to work overtime while Millwright Members of Local 1425 were not given the opportunity to work. [sic]

A list of all the Permit Millwrights was submitted to the company on July 31, 1980 signed by myself and it was my understanding in the dis­cussions with Cleo Charron that members of L.U. 1425 will be given the first chance to work overtime.

Article 2A and 2H of the Collective Agreement was violated by the Company.

The Union is claiming wages in the amount of 8 hours double time for Saturday August 9, 1980 and 8 hours double time for Sunday August 10, 1980 for the enclosed list of Millwright members of L.U. 1425 32 hours at $12.88 per hour $410.16 10% Vac. pay $41.01 total: $451.17 for each member listed.

Marcel Fortin 420-823-643

Denis Soper 417-030-459

Patrick Valliquette 425-004-058.

The Union is requesting all monies to be sent to the Union Office by registered mail at 266 Hemlock Street, Sudbury, Ontario."

11. The wording of that grievance was not satisfactory to the complainant in that it was limited to one weekend (August 9 and 10) even though he had complained to Mr. Stewart that more than one overtime weekend was involved. Moreover, the grievance made no reference to Article 5(g) (quoted above) which requires that all overtime "be divided as equally as possible amongst all employees"; it was the Company's alleged failure to comply with that obligation that was the gist of Mr. Fortin's complaint.

12. On August 12, 1980, the complainant suffered a minor shoulder injury at work while "turning a drive" on a mill. Later that day he was examined by a physician who certified that he was fit to resume work on August 13, 1980, but suggested that he be placed on light duty for three days (from August 13 to 15). When the complainant brought that medical certificate to the Company, he stated that if there was no light work, he would go on Workmen's Compensation. Management's response was: "No, no. We'd rather you work than collect Compensation." Accordingly, the complainant returned to work on August 13th. Near the middle of the shift on August 14th, the complainant's foreman took the complainant's work partner aside and asked him to work overtime, but offered no overtime to the complainant. It was the complainant's uncontradicated evidence that this had occurred several times before and that the foreman did it "just to aggravate [him]". The complainant then told the foreman that his shoulder was bothering him and that he was going to take the rest of the week off. When the foreman asked if he would be back on Monday (August 18th) the complainant replied in the affirmative.

13. On the following day (August 15, 1980) the complainant received the following telegram from the Company:

"Please be advise [sic] that your services are not required any longer on Denison Mines job as Millwright for BG Checo. Your dues, if any, will be forwarded to your home, shortly.

E. Patrie General Foreman BG Checo (Bedard Girard Ontario)"

14. The reason for discharge specified by the Company on the complainant's (Unemployment Insurance) Record of Employment was "Lack of Production". The following document dated August 14, 1980 was also mailed to the complainant by the Company:

"REASON FOR BEING FIRED

TITRE M. FORTIN

420-823-643

Refused to work. He said he wanted to see the stewart. [sic] Reason, he said his foreman, Gilles Boucher told an apprentice how he wanted the job done.

August 12/80, left for 1 hour. Did not inform his foreman. John Lagace, his foreman warned him not to leave work area without seeing him.

August 14/80. Left work area again for 1¼ hour without asking his foreman, John McCormack. When he asked what he was doing, said he was looking for a shop stewart. [sic] Also said he asked his foreman for permission to leave work area. Foreman was not informed.

(Signed) E. Patry"

15. After being discharged the complainant called Mr. Stewart and asked him what the procedure was for filing a discharge grievance. Mr. Stewart told the complainant that he had to write up his own grievance and give a copy of it to him. Accordingly, the complainant prepared the following grievance on August 23, 1980 and gave it to Mr. Stewart:

"I am forwarding a grievance against B. G. Checo Denison Project Elliot Lake Ont.

On Aug. 15, 1980, I was fired without just cause. Contrary to Collective Agreement Article 9-F'.

Also reason given by Cheeco [sic] on record of employment Ser. #924589L (lack of production) Cannot apply as I was on light duty at the time of my firing . . . by telegram. [sic]

Request investigation, as well as back pay, including weekend overtime, pay lost as direct result of firing.

(signed) Marcel Fortin"

(Article 9(f) provides: "No employee shall be dismissed or laid off except during his working

hours.")

16. A month later, Mr. Stewart filed the following grievance dated September 23, 1980:

"This Millwright Local Union 1425 hereby register's [sic] this grievance against Bedard Gerard Ontario.

WHEREAS: Marcel Fortin, S.I.N. 420 823 643, worked for your company as a millwright on the Denison Mine project.

A telex was sent to Mr. Fortin on August 15, 1980 informing him that his services were no longer required by your company and signed by Eugene Patry, General Foreman. This is in violation of Article 9 of the Collective Agreement.

The Union claims waiting time for Mr. Fortin for August 15, 18, 19, 20 and 21, 1980, five days at eight hours per day 40 hours at $12.80 per hour $512.00 plus 10% vacation pay, $51.20 for a total of $563.20.

According to Mr. Fortin, he was on light duty, due to an injury while working on the job. His record of Employment, dated August 14, 1980 states that he was fired for lack of production.

The Union takes the position that due to Mr. Fortin's being on light duty, he was fired without just cause and that the statement on his record of employment should be corrected."

The Union provided the Board with no explanation whatsoever concerning the one month delay in filing the complainant's discharge grievance.

17. On October 10, 1980, the Company replied to the grievance as follows:

"Mr. Fortin was dismissed from his job due to a lack of production, this was the reason stated on his separation certificate and is backed up by a signed statement from his General Foreman and Foreman. [sic] We have attached a copy of this statement.

We would request at this time a copy of proof of delivery of Mr. Fortin's separation papers and cheque.

Further consideration to this claim will not be made until such proof is received.

Yours very truly,

BEDARD GIRARD ONTARIO

Div of BG Checo International Ltd.

(signed) Harry Budden

Office Manager".

On that same day, the Company also answered the overtime grievance in a letter that states:

"On August 9th and 10th of 1980, we requested that all men who were willing to work, could work, We were only able to obtain 27 men who would work.

The night shift which had been running all week long was to terminate on the evening of the 9th and all men working on the night shift could start work again on the day shift on Sunday morning. This crew of men included some card men.

During this period of time we did not refuse any men. If the men did not work the days of the 9th and 10th, it was of their own choice.

Taking all these facts into consideration we are refusing this grievance as presented."

18. It was the complainant's evidence that "everything in the answer is false". Although the evidence is somewhat unclear on this point, it appears that the overtime grievance was then further discussed with the Company (at what appears to have been the second step of the three step grievance procedure) without success. The complainant was provided with very little information concerning the processing of his grievances, despite the fact that he "called the Business Agent at least once a week to ask where [the grievances] stood." When the complainant became aware that the grievances had not succeeded and that the Union had decided to take no further action with respect to them, he again called Mr. Ryan to complain about the lack of representation that he was receiving from the Union. After contacting Mr. Stewart and reviewing the matter, Mr. Ryan sent to Mr. Fortin the following letter dated February 19, 1981:

"Dear Sir & Brother:

As per our telephone conversation, I have investigated your grievance against B G. Checo International Limited and find that the Local Union did comply with the procedure.

However, on checking the correspondence from Local Union 1425 and the reply from the Company, I feel that the Union is not in a position to take any further action and the matter is closed.

Please contact me by mail if you have any further queries.

The complainant then prepared and filed the instant complaint with the Board, with the assistance of a member of the Executive of Local 1425. After being served with the complaint, the Union attempted to settle it with the assistance of Labour Relations Officer Norman Harper. By letter dated April 3, 1981, Mr. Ryan advised the complainant as follows:

"This is to advise that I met with Representatives of the Association of Millwrighting Contractors of Ontario on Thursday, April 2nd, 1981, and they have agreed to deal with your complaint against B. G. Checo Inter­national Limited on Tuesday, April 28th, 1981.

I have contacted Mr. Norman Harper of the Ontario Labour Relations Board and he agreed that this would be the best approach. He further agrees with my suggestion that you adjourn your grievance at the Board sine die.

Trusting that in the interest of the Brotherhood you will agree with my suggestion so that the matter can be resolved. [sic]

Mr. Harper has indicated that you call him at 416-965-5912 for any further advice on this matter.

Upon receipt of this correspondence, would you please contact me by calling collect at 416-789-0621 and advising me of your decision."

The complainant subsequently agreed to the approach advocated by Mr. Ryan. In his testimony before the Board, Mr. Ryan provided no explanation for the Union's striking shift from "not [being] in a position to take any further action" on the matter, which was said in his letter of February 19, 1981 to be "closed", to being in a position to refer the grievances to another step in the grievance procedure. It appears from the evidence that the only new circumstance which existed was the fact that Mr. Fortin had filed this complaint with the Board.

19. "Step Three" is the final step in the grievance procedure. It is described as follows in Article 11 of the Collective Agreement:

"STEP THREE:

"If the matter is not settled in Step Two the complaining party shall refer the written complaint forthwith to the Labour-Management Relations Committee of the Association and the Council. Both parties shall be entitled to have representatives at the meetings of this Committee to present their side of the matter.

The Committee shall consist of three (3) members from the Association and three (3) members from the Council. No member directly involved in the grievance shall sit on the Committee.

If the Labour-Management Relations Committee fails to resolve the matter to the satisfaction of both parties within a period of two (2) weeks from the time the written complaint was received by the Committee, or such further period as may be agreed upon between the parties, this step shall be deemed to have been complied with."

20. The April 28th "grievance meeting" was attended by three representatives of the Association of Millwrighting Contractors of Ontario (which is one of the parties to the Collective Agreement binding upon the parties to this application) and three representatives of the Company. Also in attendance were three representatives of the Millwright District Council of Ontario (Mr. Ryan and the business agents of two other Millwright locals) and Mr. Stewart, who represented Local 1425. The complainant appeared before the Committee and stated his position, including his allegation that he was discharged for grieving the overtime distribution. However, Mr. Ryan, who was one of the six Committee members who voted unanimously that the grievances be denied, appears not to have given any consideration to that allegation. Instead, he based his decision on the fact that there was no provision for "light duty" in the Collective Agreement. From Mr. Ryan's testimony it is clear that his approach to the grievances was to assume that whatever the Company said was correct. For example, when asked by Board Member Brady if a statement contained in the minutes of that grievance meeting ("the Company stated that the Millwright Shop Steward was advised of the number of millwrights that would be required to work and he was responsible to ensure that the overtime was distributed equally") was correct, Mr. Ryan stated: "I have to assume that if the Company said it, it was correct." Similarly, in the face of a vehement denial by the complainant of its veracity, Mr. Ryan accepted without question a statement by the Company that a mistake by a physician had resulted in a "light duty" medical report being issued in respect of the complainant when it should (allegedly) have been issued in respect of another employee. Having regard to all of the circumstances, we infer that the approach adopted by the other Council members on the Committee was similar to that of Mr. Ryan.

21. By letter dated June 22, 1981, Mr. Ryan advised the complainant that the Labour Management Committee had denied his overtime and discharge grievances as the Committee had found that the Company was not in violation of the Collective Agreement. The complainant's testimony concerning his reaction to that letter was:

"After getting that discouraging result, I called Mr. Ryan. He suggested that I drop the matter because it would cost the Union a lot of money to proceed, etc., etc. I said I wouldn't drop it."

22. Mr. Ryan was the only witness who testified on behalf of the Union. Although he was able to provide the Board with some information concerning the step three grievance meeting, he was unable to give any evidence concerning the events which gave rise to the grievances or the way in which the grievances were handled by the officials of Millwright Local 1425. His testimony in this regard was: "I don't know what happened in Sudbury. I just became involved at the Council level." He also told the Board: "When I hear more about it, maybe there is something to it. That's the Local Union's problem."

23. There is no evidence before the Board that the Union gave any consideration to referring either or both of the complainant's grievances to arbitration under the Collective Agreement or under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act. There is also no evidence that the Union gave any consideration to filing a complaint with the Board that Mr. Fortin was discharged for causing a grievance to be filed with respect to distribution of overtime.

24. Mr. Ryan stated that the complainant's full loss as a result of his discharge was only one week's wages because "there's all that the claim was for [in the grievance]" and because the complainant was called to work at another construction site a week later. However, the evidence clearly indicates that the complainant requested the Union to grieve for full compensation for all lost pay resulting from his discharge (including weekend overtime). Moreover, it was the uncontradicted evidence of the complainant that when he was called in to work at another site following his discharge, he only had two days' work, after which he was "off for three or four months". The evidence indicates that the Dennison Mine project (from which the complainant was discharged by the Company) "finished around October of 1980".

25. Section 68 of the Act provides:

"68. A trade union or council of trade unions, so long as it continues to be entitled to represent employees in a bargaining unit, shall not act in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith in the representa­tion of any of the employees in the unit, whether or not members of the trade union or of any constituent union of the council of trade unions, as the case may be.

In I.T.E. Industries Limited, [1980] OLRB Rep. July 1001, the Board described the scope and effect of section 68 as follows:

"17 ……

The Labour Relations Act constitutes the trade union as the employees' exclusive bargaining agent. Within the framework of collective bar­gaining an employee must depend upon the union to represent him, and cannot bargain individually to establish his terms and conditions of employment. However, the trade union's right to represent employees 15 not unfettered, and its exclusive bargaining agency carries with it a commensurate responsibility: the union must represent each employee in the bargaining unit, in a manner that is neither 'arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.' By enacting section 60 the Legislature has sought to temper the union's authority and prevent abuses which might arise if the authority was entirely unreviewable.

18. Bad faith, malice, discrimination, or subjective ill will are clearly proscribed and readily ascertainable; the real difficulty is to determine when a union's conduct may be properly regarded as "arbitrary" bearing in mind that the union's affairs may be conducted by laymen with limited formal education, or elected officials who may have been chosen for qualities other than their legal training or understanding of par­liamentary procedure. While the Legislature undoubtedly sought to protect the employee from an abuse of the union's authority, I do not think it was intended that every miscalculation, honest mistake, or error in judgment would constitute a breach of a public statute. The standard to which a union must adhere was described in Ford Motor Company Limited, [1973] OLRB Rep. Oct. 519 as follows (at paragraph 40):

'40. In deciding whether a union has violated the Act the standards to be applied are important. We recognize that union affairs are conducted for the most part by laymen. In some situations there are experienced full time officials of a trade union who conduct the union affairs; in other situations, the union affairs are conducted by employees in their spare time, while in yet other situations employees may be given a limited amount of paid time by their employers to engage in trade union matters. This Board does not decide cases on the basis of whether a mistake may have been made or whether there was negligence, nor is the standard based on what this Board might have done in a particular situation after having the leisure and time to reflect upon the merits. Rather, the standard must consider the persons who are performing the collective bargaining functions, the norms of the industrial community and the measures and solutions that have gained acceptance within that community; see Fisher v. Pemberton et al. 1969 CanLII 726 (BC SC), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 521 at p. 546.'

Similar views were expressed in Re: Ontario Hydro Employees' Union — CUPE Local 1000 and Walter Prinesdomu, [1975] OLRB Rep. May 444, at p. 462 ff. in a long passage which canvassed the intended meaning of the word 'arbitrary'.

'In using the word arbitrary both the United States Supreme Court and the Legislature of this Province must have envisaged the duty constituting more than the simple castigation of subjective ill-will in that any other interpretation would render the use of this word superfluous. Thus, a well known rule of both statutory and con­tractual construction militates against the respondent's particular submissions in this regard. But where does this path lead? Some insight is gained from the Vaca case wherein Mr. Justice White juxtaposed the word arbitrary with the word 'perfunctory' and observed that a trade union, 'in a non arbitrary manner [must] make decisions as to the merits of particular grievances'. It could be said that this description of the duty requires the exclusive bar­gaining agent to put 'its mind' to the merits of a grievance and attempt to engage in a process of rational decision-making that cannot be branded as implausible or capricious.

26. This approach gives the word arbitrary some independent meaning beyond subjective ill-will, but, at the same time, it lacks any precise parameters and thus is extremely difficult to apply. More­over, attempts at a more precise adumbration have to reconcile the apparent consensus that it is necessary to distinguish arbitrariness (whatever it means) from mere errors in judgment, mistakes, negligence and unbecoming laxness. ...

On the other hand we do not believe, at least at this time, that all mistakes and careless conduct by trade union officials fall outside the scope of section 60. It may be difficult to elaborate the precise meaning of arbitrary representation in advance but, as noted above, the very use of the word suggests that some regulation of the quality of decision-making was intended. Accordingly at least flagrant errors in processing grievances-errors consistent with a 'not caring' attitude must be inconsistent with the duty of fair representation. An approach to a grievance may be wrong or a provision inadver­tently overlooked and section 60 has no application. The duty is not designed to remedy these kinds of errors. But when the im­portance of the grievance is taken into account and the experience and identity of the decision-maker ascertained the Board may decide that a course of conduct is so implausible, so summary or so reckless to be unworthy of protection. Such circumstances cannot and should not be distinguished from a blind refusal to consider the complaint. However, each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts and it is clear that the duty is not going to be a fertile field for the individual adversely affected by less flagrant conduct.'

19. It is clear that in order to establish a breach of section 60, a complainant must do more than demonstrate an honest mistake or even negligence. The union must have committed a 'flagrant error' consistent with a 'non caring attitude', or have acted in a manner that is 'implausible' or 'so reckless as to be unworthy of protection'. In other words, the trade union's conduct must be so unreasonable, capricious, or grossly negligent, that the Board can conclude that the union simply did not give sufficient consideration to the individual employee's concerns. Honest mistakes or innocent misunderstandings are clearly beyond these parameters and do not attract liability."

20. On the evidence before it, the Board has no hesitation in finding that the respondent Union acted arbitrarily in the representation of the complainant, contrary to section 68 of the Act. Viewed in totality, Business Agent Dave Stewart's initial refusal to file an overtime grievance on behalf of the complainant whom he told to "keep [his] mouth shut …..”. preparation of an overtime grievance that did not properly reflect the complainant's concerns, refusal to divulge the contents of the overtime grievance to the complainant, hostile reaction to the complainant's request that he "read the [overtime] grievance out loud" at a union meeting, repeated attempts to dissuade the complainant from pursuing his overtime grievance, unexplained one month delay in filing the complainant's discharge grievance, failure to file a discharge grievance that reflected the totality of Mr. Fortin's claim and failure to keep the complainant informed of the progress of his grievances despite repeated requests by the complainant, demonstrate a capricious, non-caring attitude which violates section 68 of the Act. That attitude is also evident on the part of Mr. Ryan who informed the complainant that the Union was "not in a position to take any further action" concerning his grievances, even though the grievances had not yet been referred to the third step of the grievance procedure. That referring the grievances to the third step was an available and appropriate procedure is aptly demonstrated by the fact that precisely that was done after Mr. Fortin prodded the Union into action by filing this complaint. However, even at the third step the only Union official who testified at the hearing acted arbitrarily by accepting without question the representations of the Company, notwithstanding the complainant's vehement denial of their veracity and notwithstanding the apparent lack of any real investigation by local Union officials into the actual circumstances which gave rise to the grievance in question. Moreover, as indicated above, there is no evidence that Union officials gave any consideration to referring either or both of the complainant's grievances to arbitration, or gave any consideration to filing a complaint with this Board that Mr. Fortin was discharged for causing a grievance to be filed with respect to distribution of overtime. Non-arbitrary handling of grievances requires greater consideration of an individual employee's concerns, particularly where one of those concerns is that the employee was discharged for filing a grievance, an instrument of justice in the workplace which is one of the major goals of the trade union movement. The potentially harsh economic consequences of a discharge and its potential adverse effect upon a worker's future employment prospects underline the relatively great importance of a discharge grievance to a grievor such as the complainant in the present case, and the need for serious and informed consideration to be given to the drafting and processing of such grievances, and to the decision of whether or not to refer such grievances to arbitration.

21. For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that the respondent Union breached section 68 of the Act.

22. As noted above, the complainant has alleged not only that the respondent Union breached section 68 of the Act, but also that the respondent Company breached section 66(a) of the Act. That provision reads as follows:

"68. No employer, employer's organization or person acting on behalf of an employer or an employers' organization,

(a) shall refuse to employ or to continue to employ a person, or discriminate against a person in regard to employment or any term or condition of employment because the person was or is a member of a trade union or was or is exercising any other rights under this Act~

29. Also relevant to this aspect of the case is section 89 which provides in part as follows:

"89.-(4) Where a labour relations officer is unable to effect a settlement of the matter complained of or where the Board in its discretion con­siders it advisable to dispense with an inquiry by a labour relations officer, the Board may inquire into the complaint of a contravention of this Act ..

(5) On an inquiry by the Board into a complaint under subsection 4 that a person has been refused employment, discharged, dis­criminated against, threatened, coerced, intimidated or otherwise dealt with contrary to this Act as to his employment, opportunity for employment or conditions of employment, the burden of proof that any employer or employers' organization did not act contrary to this Act lies upon the employer or employers' organization."

30. The complainant alleged in his complaint and testified at the hearing that he was discharged by the Company for filing a grievance concerning unfair distribution of overtime. In his submissions before the Board, he contended that grieving an alleged violation of a collective agreement is a "right" under the Act.

31. A similar issue recently arose before the Board under the analogous provisions of The Colleges Collective Bargaining Act (the "C. C.B. Act") in The Fanshawe College of Applied Arts and Technology, [1980] OLRB Rep. Oct. 1392. In that case it was alleged that an employee of the College had been discharged contrary to section 76 of the C. C. B. Act for initiating action under the grievance procedure of the collective agreement between the complainant trade union and the College. The respondent in that case took the position that the complaint should be dismissed because even if the grievor were to prove that his action in filing a grievance contributed to his termination, such action did not constitute the exercise of a right under the C. C.B. Act. Section 76(2)(a) of that legislation provides:

"76-(2) — The Council, an employer or any person acting on behalf of an employer shall not,

(a) refuse to employ or to continue to employ or discriminate against a person with regard to employment or any term or condition of employment because the person is exercising any right under this Act or is or is not a member of an employee organization~

It is evident that section 76(2)(a) is substantially similar in all material respects to section 66(a) of the Labour Relations Act. Moreover, section 66 of the C. C. B. A ct, which provides that "[e] very person is free to join an employee organization of his own choice and to participate in its lawful activities", is virtually identical to section 3 of the Labour Relations Act, which provides:

"3. Every person is free to join a trade union of his own choice and to participate in its lawful activities."

The Board held in the Fanshawe College case that "the right to ensure compliance with a collective agreement under procedures [such as the grievance procedure contained in the applicable collective agreement] is a fundamental 'lawful activity' of a trade union within the meaning of section 66 [of the C. C.B. Act] . . ." and, therefore, ruled "that the allegations of the complainant, if proven, would constitute a violation of section 76(2)(a) of The Colleges Collective Bargaining Act." The Board is similarly of the view that filing a grievance, or causing a grievance to be filed, is a fundamental "lawful activity" of a trade union in which a person such as the complainant herein is free to participate by virtue of section 3 of the Labour Relations Act. We are further of the view that the refusal by an employer to continue to employ a person for engaging in such activity constitutes a breach of section 66(a) of the Act.

32. Since the discharge that forms the basis of the alleged breach of section 66(a) is the same discharge that is the subject matter of the grievance dated September 23, 1981 (as set forth above), it is appropriate for the Board to consider whether it ought to defer to arbitration rather than adjudicate the complaint in the present proceedings.

33. The procedure which the Board has generally adopted in dealing with cases that allege a breach of section 68 is summarized in the following passage from Massey-Ferguson Industries Limited and Massey Ferguson Limited, [1977] OLRB Rep. Apr. 216, at paragraph 22:

"Where the Board determines that a trade union has violated its statutory duty of fair representation by failing to take an employee's grievance to arbitration, and where it further determines that arbitration is the appropriate remedy in the circumstances, ... the Board will exercise its remedial authority under section 79 of the Act to make an order directing the union to arbitrate the grievance with whatever modifications of the collective agreement appear necessary to ensure that a fair and expedi­tious arbitration on the merits of the grievance takes place. If the union's denial of fair representation has aggravated the complainant's financial loss, the Board will also at that time, make an order for damages, ap­portioning liability as between the trade union and the employer in the event that the grievance succeeds at arbitration, together with whatever further orders that contingent order for damages may necessitate."

As noted in that case, the procedure is designed to avoid unduly protracted section 68 hearings and the need for the employer to come forward with evidence to defend its actions in respect of the alleged contractual violation before a violation of section 68 has been made out. It has been the Board's experience that the procedure in question has functioned effectively. Accordingly, the Board does not intend to deviate from it in section 89 complaints based upon alleged violations of section 68. However, the allegations in the present complaint are not confined to section 68; the complainant also alleges that the respondent Company breached section 66(a) of the Act by discharging him for filing a grievance, a complaint that is within the purview of the Board's unfair labour practice proceedings. Nevertheless, since the discharge to which the section 66(a) allegation pertains has also been made the subject of one of the grievances to which the section 68 allegations pertain, it is necessary for the Board to determine if adjudication by the Board under section 89 of the Act, or deferral to arbitration, is the appropriate response to this hybrid complaint.

34. The labour relations policy considerations which underlie the "discretionary balance" on deferral questions are discussed in depth in Valdi Inc., [1980] OLRB Rep. Aug. 1254:

"DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION

4. The issue of whether or not the Board should defer to grievance arbitration arises when an alternative remedy exists under a collective agreement which is available to the grievor or complainant. Although the complainant has chosen to seek its remedy before the Ontario Labour Relations Board, the Board has a discretion under section 79 to refuse to inquire into a complaint and the existence of an equivalent remedy under a collective agreement has, in the past, been a basis on which the Board's discretion has been exercised. In other words, the Board is not obligated to inquire into every complaint brought under section 79 and its refusal to so inquire cannot, therefore, be characterized as an improper refusal to exercise its jurisdiction. See Regina v. Ontario Labour Relations Board exparte T. R. W. Electric Components Ltd. (1969), 1969 CanLII 233 (ON HCJ), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 669. On the other hand, it is the Ontario Labour Relations Board that is charged with the responsibility for administering The Labour Relations Act and the important rights it confers on employers and employees. This respon­sibility is a public duty and a policy of deferral to a more private process where the adjudicators are paid and selected by the parties to a collective bargaining agreement must find its justification within the four corners of The Labour Relations Act to be consistent with that public interest. To many, this justification is not readily apparent. See Bilkin, Are Arbitrators QualWied to Decide Unfair Labor Practice Cases? (1973), 24 Lab. L.J. 818; Simon-Rose, Deferral Under Collyer by the NLRBof Section 8(a)(3) Cases (1976), 27 Lab. L. J. 201; Newman, NLRB Deferral to Arbitration in Unfair Labor Practices (1973), 26 N.Y.U. Conf. on Lab. 37; and Comment, Deferral to Labor Arbitration (1975), 27 Hastings L. J. 403. Why, it can be asked, should the Board everdefertoa private arbitration where a question concerning the application of The Labour Relations Act arises? Arbitrators are expert on the language of collective agreements and do not, as a group, have the expertise in labour board statutory issues that the Board has necessarily acquired through a long, intimate and specialized experience with its statute. The involvement of arbitrators in statutory issues may well result in a lack of uniformity over the meaning of important provisions of The Labour Relations Act or encourage direct judicial construction of an extrinsic statute on an application for judicial review. See McLeod v. Egan, [1975] I S.C.R. 517. In contrast, the Ontario Labour Relations Board is an ongoing administrative agency whose jurisdiction is provided for in the context of a privative clause. It, therefore, is able to achieve a uniform interpretation of the statutory provisions it considers. Indeed, the Board's experience in such matters provides the very justification for the statute's privative clause. There is also the possibility that the deferral of tough statutory questions to grievance arbitration will encourage lengthy, costly, complicated and legalistic hearings in that forum. This result would undermine the very features of grievance arbitration that underlie the policy of The Labour Relations Act requiring its insertion in every collective bargaining agreement. In fact, today, in contrast to Ontario Labour Relations Board proceedings, there is considerable doubt that grievance arbitration is sufficiently expeditious and inexpen­sive. Finally, there may be important procedural and remedial differences between the Ontario Labour Relations Board and grievance arbitration in any particular case and, where this may be the case, a deferral to grievance arbitration could deprive a complainant of important statutory rights. For example, if a matter did not involve discipline or discharge, a complainant would not have the benefit in grievance arbitration of the reverse legal onus provided for under section 79 of The Labour Relations Act nor would he have access to the Board's expansive remedial powers provided for by this same section. Surely these factors are relevant to any decision by this Board to defer to another forum. And, it is against these considerations that some might ask the more fundamental question of what business does the Ontario Labour Relations Board have in the "sub­contracting" of any public authority to private tribunals?

5. The answer to this question depends upon the fact that the statute creating the Labour Relations Board is the same statute that requires grievance arbitration of all disputes over the interpretation, application and administration of a collective agreement. On a review of The Labour Relations Act, it is difficult to conclude that grievance arbitration is simply a private process and that it is any less important than the Ontario Labour Relations Board in fostering industrial peace and facilitating co­operation between employees and employers. See Weiler, Reconcilable Differences, New Directions in Canadian Labour Law, (1980), chapter 3. Viewed in this light, a policy aimed at integrating their responsibilities and dealing with concurrent jurisdiction problems is not as troublesome as it is in those situations where grievance arbitration shoulders a responsibility under a different or extrinsic statute. For example, in the latter situation the United States Supreme Court has said there should be a trial de novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 even though the precise issue of racial discrimination has been submitted to final and binding grievance arbitration. See Alexander v. Gardiner-Denver(1974), 415 U.S. 36. But see also the NLRB's distinction in Electronic Repro­duction Service Corp. (1974), 87 LRRM 1211 at 1218. Some perspective can be gained on the issue by looking at it from grievance arbitration's viewpoint and asking whether the express statutory policy of encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining would be effectuated if this Board was to police all collective agreements to decide if disputes over the meaning of these documents also constituted a violation of The Labour Relations Act? We think not. Moreover, the complete absence of a deferral doctrine means that parties would face the prospect of in­curring the expenditure of time, money and their patience in two pro­ceedings — a prospect unlikely to contribute to a healthy collective bargaining relationship. In addition, there is no longer any doubt that labour arbitrators have the jurisdiction and duty to consider public statutes that bear on the questions brought before them (unless the statute specifically provides otherwise) and there is considerable evidence that the arbitrators active in Ontario are not strangers to the provisions of The Labour Relations Act and the underlying policies. See McLeodv. Egan, supra, and, for example, arbitration cases considering whether a collective agreement exists in light of the provisions of The Labour Relations Act. Automatic Screw Machine Co., Automotive Hardware Ltd. (1970), 1970 CanLII 1634 (ON LA), 21 L.A.C. 255 (Shime); Loblaw Groceterias Co. Ltd. (1972), 1972 CanLII 1980 (ON LA), 24 L.A.C. 369 (Shime). But see Canada Labour Code R.S.C. 1970 c. L-l as amended, s. 54. Grievance arbitration is an institution centered on achieving industrial self-government and has played a vital role in reducing industrial strife. See Arthurs, 'Developing Industrial Citizen­ship: A Challenge for Canada's Second Century' (1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 786; Cox, 'Reflections on Labor Arbitration' (1959), 72 Harv L. Rev. 1482; Adams, 'Grievance Arbitration and Judicial Review in North America' (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall L. J. 443; Weiler, 'The Role of the Labor Arbitrator; Alternate Versions' (1969), 19 U. Tor. L. J. 16. Moreover, recent legislative change has sought to insure that arbitration remains a relatively inexpensive and expeditious process and the courts now evidence a willingness to defer to arbitral decisions save in the most exceptional circumstances. See The Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1979, 5. 0. 1979, c. 32. And see generally: Douglas Aircraft Co. of Canada Ltd. v. McConnell et al. (1979), 1979 CanLII 51 (SCC), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.); Heustis v. New Brunswick Electric Power Commission (1979), 1979 CanLII 26 (SCC), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 622 (S.C.C.); Association of Radio & Television Employees of Canada (CUPE-CLC) v. Canadian Broadcasting Ltd. (1973). 1973 CanLII 182 (SCC), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); Bell Canada v. Office and Professional Employees Inter­national Union, Local 131 (1973), 1973 CanLII 18 (SCC), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 561 (S.C.C.). When deferral is looked at in this light, it becomes less self-evident that a policy of giving full play to a process of dispute resolution manned and ad­ministered by the parties is inconsistent with the Board's broad statutory mandate aimed at encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining. This is particularly the case if the Board's mandate is viewed not so much in terms of a proprietary interest in its unfair labour practice jurisdiction, but rather in the realization that the purpose of that jurisdic­tion is to contribute to labour relations stability and harmony. Ac­cordingly, the arguments for and against a policy of deferral to grievance arbitration rely upon significant but conflicting values and this conflict in values, unsurprisingly — has established a 'discretionary balance' on deferral questions. The Board will defer but deferral, either before or after arbitration is in no way automatic."

As noted in Valdi, the Board generally defers to arbitration when the resolution of the contractual issue is congruent with the resolution of the statutory unfair labour practice issue, since in such circumstances, the Board "is able to take the view that the matter is primarily a contractual or factual difference between the parties." However, the Board has been unwilling to defer to arbitration where key provisions of the Labour Relations Act require elaboration and application, where the respondent's conduct constitutes a total repudiation of the collective bargaining process, where arbitration may be unavailable to the complainant and where arbitral remedies may be inadequate.

35. Having regard to all of the circumstances, the Board is of the view that this is an appropriate case in which to defer to arbitration (under section 124 of the Act) the question of the propriety of the complainant's discharge. The traditional remedies granted by arbitrators to redress an employee who has been discharged without just cause appear to be quite adequate in this case; a "posting order" would be of little or no benefit to the bargaining unit employees who may have been collaterally affected by the alleged unfair labour practice since the project in question has ceased to exist. Thus, the employees who may have been aware of the complainant's discharge will have either ceased to be employed by the Company or been transferred to other projects. Moreover, one of the bases upon which the complainant challenges his discharge, namely, that the discharge is invalid because the complainant was not dismissed "during his working hours" as required by Article 9(f) of the Collective Agreement, is clearly a matter of contractual interpretation and not a matter that can be properly considered by the Board under section 89 of the Act, in deciding an unfair labour practice complaint founded upon section 66(a) of the Act. Although the violation of the Act which the Company is alleged to have committed is a serious matter, it does not constitute a total repudiation of the collective bargaining process. Any need which may have existed for elaboration of the applicability of section 66(a) to an employee who utilizes the grievance procedure contained in a collective agreement has been at least partially satisfied by the discussion of that issue contained in this decision and in the Board's decision in the Fanshawe College case (supra). The absence of any evidence and submissions on behalf of the respondent Company concerning the circumstances surrounding the discharge has left the Board without any means to realistically assess the propriety of the Company's actions. If the Board were to assert jurisdiction over this aspect of the complaint, it would be forced to decide the case against the respondent Company not on the basis of cogent and compelling evidence, but rather on the basis of section 89(5) of the Act by which a charge such as the one made by the complainant against the Company in respect of his discharge must be taken as proved when an employer against whom such allegation is made under section 89 of the Act fails to adduce any evidence to rebut the charge against it (see Windsor Airline Limousine Services Limited, [1980] OLRB Rep. Feb. 272, at paragraph 71; and I.C.B. Warehousing Division of Alar­Anson, [1976] OLRB Rep. Oct. 621). Although an employer who elects not to appear before the Board to answer such a complaint generally does so at its own peril, the Board's general practice (in section 89 complaints involving allegations under section 68) of declining to arbitrate a discharge or other grievance so as to obviate the need for an employer to present before the Board its full defence to the grievance, raises some doubt concerning the fairness of strictly applying that approach in the present case. Although as noted in Valdi Inc. (supra, at paragraph 12) there is some question whether an arbitrator selected by or imposed upon the parties would unhesitatingly apply "the taint" theory that provides the basis of the Board's approach to situations in which an employee's union activity was but one reason of many for the employees' dismissal (see Westinghouse Canada Ltd., [1980] OLRB Rep. Apr. 577; Barrie Examiner, [1975] OLRB Rep. Oct. 745; and Fielding Lumber, [1975] OLRB Rep. Sept. 665), the possibility of a different approach being applied to the adjudication of the complainant's discharge grievance can be minimized by directing that the grievance be referred to the Board for final and binding determination under section 124 of the Act, which, in any event, provides a more expeditious and less costly forum than the arbitration procedures contained in the Collective Agreement.

36. The determination of an appropriate remedy in this case has presented the Board with some difficulty. As noted in Massey Ferguson (supra), section 68 does not confer upon a successful complainant an automatic right to have his grievance arbitrated; where a union fails to take a grievance to arbitration and it is not obvious that arbitration is necessary, the Board may direct the union to reprocess the grievance from the point at which fair representation was denied. However, it appears from the evidence before us in the present case that the complainant has been repeatedly denied proper representation by the Union's perfunctory treatment of his legitimate concerns, beginning with the initial refusal to file an overtime grievance on behalf of the complainant and continuing to the Union's arbitrary treatment of his grievar sat the third step of the grievance procedure, which step was itself only resorted to under the essure of this complaint.

37. Having regard to all of the circumstances, the Board has reluctantly concluded that a Board order that the Union reprocess the complainant's grievances and give due consideration to the desirability of referring them to arbitration would not likely provide the complainant with an effective remedy. The Union's apparent view that the complainant's grievances are not worthy of serious consideration has solidified over the past twelve months. Moreover, there is nothing in the evidence that suggests that the Company would be willing to re-evaluate or modify its consistent denial of the grievances. Thus, the prejudice of further delays that would be occasioned by remitting the grievances into the ordinary stream of the grievance procedure contained in the Collective Agreement would not be counter-balanced by the prospect of settlement of the grievances short of arbitration. Thus, the Board is of the view that a remedy analogous to that awarded by the Board in Leonard Murphy, [1977] OLRB Rep. March 146, is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. In that case the Board directed the union and the employer to forthwith arbitrate certain grievances notwithstanding the provisions of the applicable collective agreement. It also ordered the union to engage counsel, jointly chosen by the grievors and the union, to represent the union in the arbitration of the grievances in question, and made a contingent award of damages against the union, in recognition of the fact that "it is only in the event that the grievances are ultimately successful at arbitration that the grievors will have suffered financially from the union's violation" of section 68 (see also Consumers Glass Company Limited, [1979] OLRB Rep. Sept. 861, and The Corporation of the Township of Hastings, [1979] OLRB Rep. Nov. 1072).

38. Since the respondent Union's arbitrary representation of the complainant has resulted in grievances being filed that do not fully and properly reflect Mr. Fortin's complaints against the Company, the order will direct that the grievances be duly amended with the assistance of counsel and refiled with the Company as amended, notwithstanding the provisions of the Collective Agreement. If the parties are unable to resolve the amended grievances in a manner that is satisfactory to the complainant, then-the Union is to refer the amended grievances to the Board for final and binding determination under section 124 of the Act.

39. The Board therefore orders, notwithstanding the provisions of any collective agreement binding upon the parties hereto,

(i) that the respondent Union forthwith engage counsel, jointly chosen by the respondent Union and the complainant, to revise the com­plainant's overtime grievance dated August 12, 1980 and the complainant's discharge grievance dated September 23, 1980, 50 as to properly and fully reflect the complainant's allegations and concerns;

(ii) that the respondent Union forthwith deliver the amended grievances to the respondent Company;

(iii) that unless within seven days after delivery to the respondent Company the amended grievances are settled in writing in a manner that is satisfactory to the complainant, the respondent Union and the respondent Company, the respondent Union shall cause the aforementioned counsel to refer the amended grievances to the Board for final and binding determination under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act and shall continue to engage the afore­mentioned counsel to represent the respondent Union in the section 124 proceedings;

(iv) that the respondent Union post forthwith copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix", duly signed by a representative of the respondent Union, in conspicuous places at its place of business in Sudbury, Ontario; keep the notices posted for 60 consecutive working days; and take reasonable steps to insure that the said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material;

(v) that the respondent Union, at its own expense, mail a copy of the attached notice marked "Appendix", duly signed by a representative of the respondent Union, to all bargaining unit employees repre­sented by the respondent Union.

40. In the event that a settlement by the parties hereto or a determination by the Board under section 1 12a determines that compensation is due to the complainant, this Board will remain seized of this complaint and will entertain representations with respect to the amount of compensation, if any, which is to be borne by the respondent Union. The Board will also remain seized of this complaint to resolve any matter arising out of the interpretation of its order.

DECISION OF BOARD MEMBER C. A. BALLENTINE;

1. I concur in the decision of the Board, however, I do have a reluctance in not finding that the Company has violated section 66(a) of the Act.

2. The concern I have is that both Mr. Stewart, the Business Agent of Local 1425, and the Company treated Mr. Fortin's complaint to the Board with contempt by not appearing at the hearing. It is my belief that they considered the grievance to have been finalized at the "Step Three" Labour Management Relations Committee meeting held on April 28, 1981. They chose not to attend before the Board at their own peril, and the respondent Union has suffered the consequences.

3. A union in the construction industry should be aware that if a grievor is not satisfied after the grievance steps of the Collective Agreement have been exhausted, section 124 of the Act is still available to the union as an expeditious forum for adjudication of the grievance. In view of the serious consequences of a dismissal from employment, a union must give earnest consideration to referring a discharge grievance to the Board for final and binding determination under section 124 which provides, in part, as follows:

"(I) Notwithstanding the grievance and arbitration provisions in a collective agreement or deemed to be included in a collective agreement under section 44, a party to a collective agreement between an employer or employers' organization and a trade union or council of trade unions may refer a grievance concerning the interpretation, application, ad­ministration or alleged violation of the agreement, including any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable, to the Board for final and binding determination.

(2) A referral under subsection 1 may be made in writing in the prescribed form by a party at any time after delivery of the written grie­vance to the other party, and the Board shall appoint a date for and hold a hearing within fourteen days after receipt of the referral and may appoint a labour relations officer to confer with the parties and en­deavour to effect a settlement before the hearing."

4. Although I am concerned that the respondent Company, which chose not to appear before this Board to answer the complaint against it, has not been found to be in violation of the Act at this stage, I accept the rationale of the decision in directing the Union to pursue the grievance of Mr. Fortin as prescribed by the order of the Board.

Appendix

The Labour Relations Act

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the Ontario Labour Relations Board

WE, MILLWRIGHT LOCAL 1425, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, HAVE ISSUED THIS NOTICE IN -COMPLIANCE WITH AN ORDER OF THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS SOARD ISSUED AFTER A HEARING IN WHICH WE PARTICIPATED. THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD FOUND THAT WE VIOLATED THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT AND HAS ORDERED US TO INFORM ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT OF THEIR RIGHTS.

THE ACT GIVES INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES THESE RIGHTS:

To BE REPRESENTED BY A TRADE UNION AND TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS LAWFUL ACITIVTIES, TO BE REPRESENTED BY A TRADE UNION IN A WAY THAT IS NOT ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY OR IN BAD FAITH, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE MEMBERS OF THAT TRADE UNION,

WE ASSURE ALL EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED BY MILLWRIGHT LOCAL 1425, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA THAT:

WE WILL NOT DO ANYTHING THAT INTERFERES WITH THESE RIGHTS.

WE WILL NOT ENGAGE IN ANY CONDUCT THAT IS ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY OR IN BAD FAITH IN THE REPRESENTATION OF ANY MEMBER OR EMPLOYEE.

WE WILL COMPLY WITH ALL ORDERS OF THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD,

WE WILL FORTHWITH ENGAGE COUNSEL, JOINTLY CHOSEN BY MILLWRIGHT LOCAL N25 AND MARCEL FORTIN, TO REVISE MR. FORTIN'S OVERTIME GRIEVANCE DATED AUGUST 12, 1980, AND DISCHARGE GRIEVANCE DATED SEPTEMBER 23, 1980, 50 AS TO PROPERLY AND FULLY REFLECT MR. FORTIN’S ALLEGATIONS AND CONCERNS. AND WILL FORTHWITH DELIVER THE AMENDED GRIEVANCES TO BEDARD GIRARD ONTARIO, DIVISION OF B 0 CHECO INTER­NATIONAL LIMITED. UNLESS WITHIN SEVEN DAYS AFTER DELIVERY TO THE COMPANY THE AMENDED GRIEVANCES ARE SETTLED IN WRITING IN A MANNER THAT IS SATISFACTORY TO MR. .FORTIN, MILLWRIGHT LOCAL 1425 AND THE COMPANY. WE WILL CAUSE THE AFOREMENTIONED COUNSEL TO REFER THE AMENDED GRIEVANCES TO THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD FOR FINAL AND BINDING DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 112A CF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT AND WILL CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE AFOREMENTIONED CCUNSEL TO REPRESENT MILLWRIGHT LCCAL 1q25 IN THE SECTION 112A PROCEEDINGS,

WE WILL PAY SUCH COMPENSATION TO MR. FORTIN AS MAY BE ORDERED BY THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD.

MILLWRIGHT LOCAL 1425, UNITED BROTHERHOOD

OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA

PER: __________________________________________

OCTOBER 2. 1981

This is an official notice of the Board and must not be removed or defaced.

This notice must remain posted for 80 consecutive working days.

DATED this day of , 19 .