[1981] OLRB Rep. February 145

2040-80-U United Steelworkers of America, Complainant, v. Fotomat Canada Limited, Respondent.

BEFORE: George W. Adams, Chairman and Board Members F. W. Murray and W. F. Rutherford

APPEARANCES: James Hayes and William Mills for the complainant; and John P. Sanderson, Q.C., Heather J. Laing and Steven J. McCormack for the respondent.

DECISION OF THE BOARD; February 13, 1981

1. This is a complaint filed under section 79 of The Labour Relations Act alleging violations of sections 14, 66, 58 and 61.

2. The complainant pleads and relies upon all essential facts and legal conclusions contained in the Board's decisions dated October 24, 1980 and November 20, 1980. In the former decision the Board found, inter alia, that the respondent had failed to bargain in good faith and make all reasonable efforts to enter into a collective agreement. The respondent was directed, in part, to resubmit to the complainant an offer of settlement first made to the trade union on February 25, 1980 which the Board found to have been unlawfully withdrawn in the month of June 1980. The respondent was also directed to reinstate all striking employees who wished to make unconditional applications for employment by December 1, 1980.

3. Essentially, this complaint arises in the context of these two directions and their implementation. One aspect relates to the propriety of the subsequent collective bargaining between the parties. The other component of the complaint pertains to allegations of mistreatment of returning employees who had been on strike but returned to work under the Board's October 24, 1980 order. The parties agreed to deal with the collective bargaining aspect of the complaint first and seek a decision from the Board with respect to those discrete allegations. The Board accommodated that agreement.

4. On November 25, 1980 the complainant and respondent met and the respondent retabled its offer of February 25, 1980 reproduced in the Board's earlier decision of October 25, 1980. The complainant responded by taking the position that the recognition clause pertained to all sixteen bargaining units other than Warden Avenue; by making proposals for Articles 3.01, 6 and 7.07; and by proposing numerous conditions of employment for the Warden Avenue location. The respondent requested time to consider this response and another meeting was arranged for December 3, 1980. By letter dated November 28, 1980, the complainant varied its November 25, 1980 position by accepting the respondent's language for Articles 3.01 and 7.07 and requested the minimum statutory union security provision for Article 6. By telegram of the same date, the respondent expressed the view that the complainant had, in effect, rejected its offer of November 25, 1980 but indicated its intention to meet on December 3, 1980.

5. On December 3, 1980, the respondent, through its spokesman Mr. Frederick R. Von Veh, tabled a new offer styled as a "complete and inclusive package proposal to the Union". The offer consisted of four parts. The first part dealt with the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto area; the second with some fourteen locations outside Metropolitan Toronto; the third part pertained to Warden Avenue (Maintenance and Route Drivers); and the fourth part, which is the subject matter of this aspect of the complaint, proposed a procedure by which all employees would be permitted the opportunity to "signify acceptance or rejection of the within respective offers." Part IV, in its entirety, provided:

IV In view of the lengthy negotiations between the parties and the lengthy strike which has taken place, the Company requests that the United Steelworkers of America and the Company make a joint request to the Minister of Labour, pursuant to Section 34(d) of The Labour Relations Act directing that a vote of employees of each of the bargaining units specified in 1, 11, and Ill above (that is, 16 bargaining units) be held at a time agreed to between the parties wherein respective employees can signify acceptance or rejection of the within respective offers. The voters' lists for each of the bargaining units are to be agreed to between the parties and in so doing the parties shall have regard to Section 63(4a) of The Labour Relations Act, as amended, and the accepted principles of jurisprudence governing who is entitled to vote in such circumstances. The vote herein specified is to be conducted and supervised by the Ministry of Labour.

6. The complainant trade union, through its representative Mr. William Mills, purported to accept the respondent's offer in all respects except for Part IV. With respect to that part, the complainant took the position that it had the legal authority to negotiate and accept a collective bargaining agreement on behalf of all the employees to whom the respondent's offer would apply. Mr. Mills, on cross-examination, admitted that the complainant's usual practice was to hold a ratification vote of affected employees but he stressed that this was a most unusual situation. There had been a long strike; the respondent had replaced strikers with individuals who were likely to "vote the contract down", lacking any loyalty to the complainant; and over fifty employees of the original one hundred and thirty in the bargaining units had remained on strike for a very substantial period only returning to work under the Board's October 24th order. Mr. Mills also testified that he consulted with his negotiating committee of employees who concurred in the approach which Mills subsequently adopted. He also consulted with his immediate superiors and with legal counsel. Mills testified that the reference to ratification under the heading "Term" in Part III of the respondent's document was complied with, in his view, when he accepted on behalf of the complainant trade union. There is no dispute that the complainant's constitution does not require ratification by either its members or affected employees and that Mills had the status of a duly authorized representation of the complainant at the time he purported to accept the respondent's offer.

7. Mr. Frederick Von Veh testified on behalf of the respondent and attempted to explain Part IV of the respondent's proposal. He testified that the strike had been long and that there had been a substantial turnover of employees. He testified that the respondent had received telephone calls from employees indicating that they were not being kept apprised of "what was going on." Accordingly, in order for the respondent to be "satisfied that the employees [knew] what had been negotiated" and so that they could "intelligently see what had been done", a form of ratification vote to enable the employees to express their wishes was proposed. He testified that a joint application to the Minister of Labour was required "to enhance the possibility of having the application [pursuant to section 34d] granted" and to add "an aura of propriety to what was being requested." When Mills advised the respondent's representatives that ratification was not necessary and that he was prepared to sign a collective agreement, Mr. Von Veh observed that "[Mills] did not have to live with our employees" and continued to insist on Part IV.

8. By letter dated December 9, 1980, Mr. Mills reaffirmed the complainant's position in writing (in part):

This letter is to advise you that the Union is of the view that agreement has been reached for all certified bargaining units and that the Company is obligated to sign a document incorporating that agreement. Our office is in the process of preparing contracts for signature and we hope to deliver them to you in the next few days.

The respondent replied by letter dated December 11, 1980 and at page 3, over the signature of Mr. Von Veh, wrote:

Bearing in mind the aforementioned, we wish to again reiterate the position of our client as conveyed to you on, December 3, 1980. Part IV of the Company's proposal deals with ratification (and indeed this is reflected elsewhere in the Company's proposal). Your union may wish to accept Parts I, II and III of the Company's proposal, however, ratification is a necessary and required prerequisite to the proper execution of the Collective Agreements in question.

In view of the fact that an all inclusive proposal was tabled, and further in view of the fact that an essential ingredient of collective bargaining, namely, the ratification of what has been agreed to by the parties has not been addressed by your Union, we wish to advise that our client does not concur with what is contained in paragraph 4 of your letter to us dated December 9, 1980.

Three collective agreements purporting to set out the agreement of the parties, save for Part IV of the respondent's proposed memorandum of settlement, were sent to Mr. Von Veh for signature and he replied that it was not his client's intention to execute the collective agreements "at this time."

9. On behalf of the complainant, Mr. Hayes made a number of submissions. First he submitted that Part IV was proposed by the respondent as a patent attempt to illicit a rejection of the offer by the complainant and therefore violated sections 14 and 58. He argued that this was particularly the case given the earlier relationship between the parties before the Board. It was his submission that clear and compelling evidence was needed to establish the bona fides of the respondent and to rebut the prima facie bad faith nature of the proposal. Secondly, he submitted that while the issue of ratification could be discussed by parties in collective bargaining, no party could take the issue of the other party's method of contract ratification to impasse. ln this respect the Board was referred to Carpenters Employer Bargaining Agency, [1978] 2 Can. LRBR 501; Toronto Star, [1979] OLRB Rep. Aug. 811; and Cybermedix Limited, [1981] OLRB Rep. Jan. 13. A third but related submission was that neither section 34d nor section 34e contemplated a final offer vote where the parties were already in agreement, i.e. where the trade union was willing to accept the employer's last offer. It was submitted that section 34d (at the discretion of the Minister of Labour) and section 34e (at the discretion of the employer) each contemplate an impasse between the collective bargaining parties. Referring to the Board's decision in Wilson Automotive (Belleville) Ltd., [1980] OLRB Rep. Sept. 1337; partial dissent [1980] OLRB Rep. Oct. 1574, Mr. Hayes argued that, in an attempt to prevent or shorten industrial conflict, these two provisions provide a system for direct access to bargaining unit employees. He contended that the provisions were exceptional when viewed against the scheme of the Act and that they ought to be strictly construed. The fourth and last substantive submission of the complainant was that Part IV clearly violated sections 56 and 14 of The Labour Relations Act in that it interfered with the internal administration of the trade union. It was submitted that section 60 and the bargaining rights termination provisions of the statute provided a complete scheme of protection and relief for employees concerned about the responsiveness of a trade union. It was submitted that the respondent's professed interest in employee awareness of the negotiations constituted a bald attempt to circumvent or reach around the legally designated bargaining agent and to deal directly with bargaining unit employees contrary to sections 14 and 56. In support of this contention the Board was referred to Darlington Veneer Company Inc. (1955), 113 NLRB 1101, upheld (1956), 38 LRRM 2575 (CA-4); Hochens Market(1965), 155 NLRB 729, upheld (1967) 64 LRRM 2647 (CA-6); M & M Oldsmobile Inc. (1967), 65 LRRM 2149 (CA-7); American Seating Co. (1970), 73 LRRM 2996 (CA-5); Pioneer Broadcasting Company (1973), 82 LRRM 1809; Schill Steel Products Inc. (1973), 83 LRRM 2386 (CA-5); Cheese Barn Inc. (1976) 222 NLRB 418; upheld (1977), 95 LRRM 3096 (CA-9); and Barry Co. (1979), 101 LRRM 1017. With respect to the issue of remedy, the complainant requested: (i) a declaration that the Act had been violated; (ii) a direction that the respondent cease and desist in such violations; (iii) a direction that the respondent forthwith execute collective agreements incorporating all matters previously agreed to for all certified bargaining units; (iv) damages with interest as appropriate payable to all bargaining unit employees arising from the loss of opportunity to negotiate a collective agreement from October 24, 1980 until the date the respondent executes the collective agreements; (v) a direction that the respondent post a Board notice in the usual form and that the notice be mailed to each member of the bargaining unit; (vi) a direction that the respondent provide the complainant with reasonable access to all working locations to post union notices for the purpose of communicating with employees for the life of the collective agreement, and (vii) a direction that the respondent provide the complainant forthwith with a list of names, addresses and telephone numbers of all bargaining unit employees and to keep the list updated monthly for the life of the collective agreement. With respect to the requested direction that the respondent execute collective agreements, we were referred to the Board's decision in Canada Cement Lafarge, [1980] OLRB Rep. Nov. 1583 and the cases cited therein.

10. Mr. Sanderson submitted that the respondent was not seeking to control the complainant's internal ratification procedures, but instead was invoking a provision of The Labour Relations Act. He submitted that section 34d provided a discretion in the Minister of Labour and that the respondent was entitled to request him to exercise it. He contended that the respondent had complied with the Board's earlier order but that, without some form of ratification process, neither the complainant nor the respondent would ever know the true wishes of the employees. Mr. Sanderson stressed the disruptive consequences of imposing a collective agreement regardless of the wishes of the employees. He pointed out that the complainant could have proposed alternative ratification procedures but declined to do so. He submitted that the respondent may have been acting in an overly prudent manner or to maximize its own self-interest, but there was no evidence to suggest bad faith. Mr. Sanderson submitted that the respondent's insistence on the application of section 34d was no different than if the complainant trade union had insisted on binding arbitration pursuant to section 34c of The Labour Relations Act. It was argued that the respondent employer was simply motivated by its concern for the reaction of its employees should a collective agreement be consummated without their involvement. On the issue of remedy, Mr. Sanderson contended that a direction to the respondent to execute collective agreements was strikingly at odds with section 63(4a) of The Labour Relations Act - a section aimed at full bargaining unit participation where ratification votes are held.

11. Having reviewed the evidence and the able submissions of counsel, we find the conduct of the respondent employer is in clear violation of sections 14, 56 and 58 of The Labour Relations Act and that the complainant, in the circumstances, is entitled to the relief requested.

12. A trade union certified by the Ontario Labour Relations Board is the exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees in the bargaining unit. The employer is obligated to deal with the certified bargaining agent and that bargaining agent alone. See Darlington Veneer Company Inc., supra, and J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB (1944), 321 U.S. 332. The unique and important nature of a trade union's collective bargaining status as bargaining agent was recently reviewed by this Board in Wilson Automotive (Belleville) Ltd., supra, where the majority wrote:

13. Under The Labour Relations Act an employer makes his contract with the union and not with the employees. It is common to refer to a union as a "bargaining agent". A union is however, much more than a mere agent when it comes to negotiating and administering a collective agreement. A union has an independent legal existence which the employer is bound to respect. This critical distinction was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mc Gavin Toastmaster Ltd. v. Ainscough (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d)l. Here at p. 6, Laskin C.J.C. adopted the following language of Judson J. in Syndicat Catholique des Employés the Magasins de Québec, Inc. v. Compagnie Paquet Ltée (1959), 1959 CanLII 51 (SCC), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346 at 355;

The union contracts not as agent or mandatory but as an independent contracting party and the contract it makes with the employer binds the employer to regulate his master and servant relations according to the agreed terms.

19. By refusing to accept the union's execution of the collective agreement and insisting on a ratification vote among all of the employees the respondent has in fact refused to recognize the union as the body with the exclusive authority to make a collective agreement. By this failure to recognize the union the employer has violated the most fundamental aspect of its duty to bargain in good faith set out in section 14 of the Act. (DeVilbiss (Canada) Ltd., [1976] OLRB Rep. Mar. 49.)

20. Part IV of the respondent's proposal is a clear attempt to reach around the exclusive bargaining agent and deal directly with bargaining unit employees. This is its obvious effect. Such conduct violates sections 14, 56 and 58 of The Labour Relations Act. As the United States Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Borg- Warner Corp. (1958), 356 U.S. 342,42 LRRM 2034 at 2037 (per Barton J.), this type of proposal "substantially modifies the collective bargaining system provided for in the statute by weakening the independence of the 'representative' chosen by the employees. It enables the employer, in effect, to deal with it’s with its employees rather than with statutory representative."

21. The fact that the proposal was framed in terms of section 34d of The Labour Relations Act is of no assistance to the respondent. The clear wording of that provisions and its underlying purpose demonstrates that it has no application to the circumstances in which the respondent found itself. At the time the proposal was made a strike or lockout was not in progress (striking employees having returned to work) and, in any event, the respondent continued to insist on Part IV even after the exclusive bargaining representative had given its concurrence to all of the substantive collective bargaining provisions proposed by the respondent. Section 34d and its more recent counterpart section 34e are designed to test the wishes of employees where an impasse or conflict is being prolonged by the refusal of a bargaining agent to accept the last offer of an employer. A similar point was made at paragraph 11 in dealing with section 34e in the recent Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. case, supra:

In our view, the section is designed to reduce industrial conflict in at least two ways. If a bargaining representative is not accurately reflecting the wishes of the represented employees, the impasse is not justified and a vote to accept the employer's last offer ends further unnecessary conflict. On the other hand, if the employer is reluctant to alter his position because he erroneously believes the bargaining agent to be out of touch with its constituency, a vote to reject the last offer will convey that real movement is required to overcome the bargaining impasse. Hopefully, employers will react to this latter purpose, instead of "digging in" for a longer strike.

In our view, the respondent is no more entitled to the benefit of section 34d, than was the respondent employer in Wilson Automotive (Belleville) Ltd., supra, entitled to make an application under section 34e in the circumstances of that case. All of the reasoning in that case applies with equal force to the facts at hand. Moreover, it is well accepted that a statutory provision cannot be relied upon as a defense to bad faith or improper conduct contrary to sections 14, 56 and 58. See Radio Shack, [1979] OLRB Rep. Dec. 1220 at 1251, upheld at 80 CLLC 11 14,017, (Ont. Div. Ct.).

Having regard to all of the surrounding conduct of the respondent and particularly the findings of fact and legal conclusions in the two earlier decisions of the Board, We are satisfied that Part IV of the respondent's offer of December 3, 1980 was improperly calculated to cause the complainant trade union to reject the offer or to provide an opportunity for bargaining unit employees to reject the said offer. See paragraph 18, infra.

15. If the respondent was entitled to rely on this tactic, it would be able to profit from all of the delay caused by its earlier unlawful conduct in refusing to recognize the complainant trade union as the certified bargaining agent of Fotomat employees. At this point in time and having regard to all of the surrounding circumstances, we find it difficult to accept the respondent's claimed concern for a greater involvement of its employees in the collective bargaining process. From this perspective, the following observations of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (New Orleans) in NLRB v. Schill Steel Products Inc., supra, at 2389-90 are entirely apposite:

We note that here, as is often the case in labor cases, the employer argues valiantly for the right of the "rank and file" to be protected against the imposition of a union they did not want. Counsel for the company eloquently argues that purposes of the Act are frustrated when a union is imposed on employees against their will. What this pious statement overlooks is that there once was indeed a fair representation election in this bargaining unit and that the union was selected by a majority of the employees. It further overlooks the numerous unfair labor practices which the employer engaged in to bring illegal pressure on employees to reject the union. It overlooks the unlawful refusal of the employer to bargain with the employees chosen by the very method of selection that it now claims would have been frustrated had it not risen up on January 17, 1966, to challenge the union's representative status. While such representations are not at all novel arguments by employers before this court, the overnight transformation to real concern for the "free choice" of the employees by the employers who make these arguments in such cases never ceases to amaze us. Had this concern which manifested itself in January of 1966 been present after the election of August, 1962, we have no doubt that the tremendous expense involved in this lengthy proceeding could have been avoided. Finally, as noted, we do not feel the company was justified in its new-found doubt or that there will be ''imposition of an unwanted union."

16. We also find that the ratification proposal is not a proper subject of collective bargaining negotiations and the respondent's insistence on this aspect of its proposal contravened sections 56 and 14. Employee ratification is an internal trade union affair. There is no statutory requirement that such procedures be adopted, although the good sense lying behind the concept of ratification has been commented on by this Board in the past and is well understood in the industrial relations community. See George Magold et al, [1975] OLRB Rep. Oct. 758. See also Hochens Market, supra, and Barry Co., supra. A trade union that "keeps its employees in the dark" runs the risk of having its conduct challenged under section 60 of The Labour Relations Act and being the subject of an application for the termination of bargaining rights.

17. The Act therefore provides a complete code of rights directly to employees to deal with an unresponsive bargaining agent. An employer has no role to play in such matters and, indeed, is expressly prohibited from having any material involvement. See sections 12, 40 and 56. Moreover, on the evidence before us, the respondent's conduct does not support its professed concern for the awareness of its employees. While we have no direct evidence of the existence or actual number of telephone calls from employees alleged to have been received by the respondent, the respondent took no steps (other than in its contract proposal) to apprise the complainant of its concern in this area or to inform employees itself. There is nothing in The Labour Relations Act that prevents proper communications between an employer and its employees in the course of bargaining. See Fruehauf Trailer Company of Canada Ltd., [1975] OLRB Rep. Jan. 77. Moreover, given the substantial employee turnover; the hiring of strike replacements; and the respondent's earlier unlawful conduct, it would be surprising if communications between the complainant trade union and many bargaining unit employees were not somewhat strained and incomplete. In our view, any lack of communication is a problem directly contributed to by the respondent's earlier refusal to recognize the complainant and bargain in good faith has compounded the problem and now justifies many of the directions the complainant requests in this area.

18. Finally, we find that the respondent's purpose in proposing Part IV was to provide the bargaining unit employees with an opportunity to reject or accept the complainant trade union and not the proposed contract. It is simply non-sensical for an employer to request such a procedure when the bargaining agent has already expressed its intention to accept the contract. What is the more likely reason for insisting on employee ratification in such circumstances? Is the employer genuinely concerned that the contract is not sufficiently attractive or "rich" to be acceptable to the employees? For example, if the contract was rejected after an employer's insistence on a ratification vote, would that employer seriously intend to substantially improve the rejected offer? Clearly, it is within the unilateral power of an employer to improve his offer any time he wishes without need for a ratification vote. In our view, the much more probable reason for an employer (and this respondent) to insist on a ratification vote of employees even after the bargaining agent has agreed to the offer on their behalf, is to provide an opportunity to the employees to reject their bargaining agent and undermine the very basis to collective bargaining. The respondent failed to adduce any compelling evidence to rebut this inference of anti-union intent. From this perspective, the contract proposal clearly violated sections 14, 56 and 58.

19. Having regard to all of these findings, we conclude that Part IV of the respondent's offer of December 3, 1980 was unlawful and is to be severed from the rest of its offer of that date. We further find that the complainant trade union accepted all lawful aspects of the offer and that the respondent and complainant entered into a legally binding and enforceable memorandum of agreement on December 3, 1980. In the circumstance, the complainant is entitled to a direction that the respondent execute the collective agreements which arise from the said agreement. This is not a case of the Labour Board imposing collective agreements on the parties which the Labour Board has fashioned. We have declined to grant such a remedy in the past and our reasons need not be reviewed here. See Radio Shack, [1979] OLRB Rep. Dec. 1220. Rather, this is a case where the parties themselves have arrived at an agreement when all lawful elements of their conduct are considered. A remedy ensuring that they honour this consensus is clearly consistent with the scheme of the Act and necessary to maintain its integrity. See Municipality of Casimer, Jenning and Appleby, [1978] OLRB Rep. June 507; Selinger Wood Limited et al, [1980] OLRB Rep. Nov. 1688; and Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd., [1980] OLRB Rep. Nov. 1583.

20. Accordingly, having regard to all of the above, the Board issues the following remedy:

a) The Board declares that the respondent has violated sections 14, 56 and 58 of The Labour Relations Act.

b) The Board directs that the respondent cease and desist from further violations of The Labour Relations Act.

c) The Board directs that the respondent forthwith execute collective agreements incorporating all matters agreed to on December 3, 1980 for all certified bargaining units.

d) The Board directs the Respondent to pay to all bargaining unit employees all monetary losses arising from the loss of opportunity to negotiate a collective agreement together with interest from November 25, 1980 until the date that the respondent executes the aforesaid collective agreements.

e) The Board direct the respondent to post copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix" after being duly signed by the respondent's representative in conspicuous places at its places of business where bargaining unit employees are employed and to keep these notices posted for 60 consecutive days. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent to ensure that the said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Reasonable physical access to all such premises shall be given by the respondent to two representatives of the complainant to satisfy itself that this posting requirement has been and is being complied with.

f) The respondent is directed, at its own expense, to mail a copy of the attached notice marked "Appendix" after being duly signed by the respondent's representative, to the residence of each employee in the said bargaining units forthwith.

g) The respondent is directed forthwith to provide the complainant with a list of names and addresses of all the employees employed in all bargaining units represented by the complainant and to keep this list updated for the duration of the collective agreements entered into. The request is justified under section 14 as essential bargaining unit information to permit the complainant to communicate with all employees it represents in the most reasonable and complete manner. In addition, the employer's misconduct in this case is likely to have inhibited other forms of communication that might have been available to the complainant.

h) The respondent is directed to provide the complainant for the duration of one year from the receipt of this decision with reasonable access to all employee notice boards (if any) located at all bargaining unit locations for the posting of union notices, bulletins and other union business literature in order that the employees may have free and ready access to information in the workplace from the complainant concerning all aspects of collective representation and collective bargaining negotiations.

CONCURRING DECISION OF F. W. MURRAY:

1. 1 concur in the decision reached by the majority. I wish to merely add the observation that, in my view, the employer in Wilson Automotive Belleville Ltd., [1980] OLRB Rep. Sept. 1337; partial dissent, [1980] OLRB Rep. Oct. 1574, had real justification in asking for a ratification vote among the employees in the bargaining unit.

Appendix

The Labour Relations Act

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the Ontario Labour Relations Board

We have issued this notice in compliance with an Order of the Ontario Labour Relations Board issued after a hearing in which both the Company and the Union had the opportunity to present evidence. The Ontario Labour Relations Board found that we violated the Ontario Labour Relations Act and has ordered us to inform our employees of their rights.

The Act gives all employees these rights:

To organize themselves;

To form, join or help unions to bargain as a group, through a

representative of their own choosing;

To act together for collective bargaining;

To refuse to do any and all of these things.

We assure all of our employees that:

WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with the United Steelworkers of America as the certified bargaining agent representative of our employees.

WE WILL execute collective agreements with the United Steelworkers of America incorporating all matters agreed to on December 3, 1980 for all certified bargaining units as directed by the Board.

WE WILL make whole all bargaining unit employees who suffered losses by reason of our failure to bargain in good faith as found and directed by the Board.

WE WILL comply with all other directions of the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

FOTOMAT CANADA LIMITED

per: (Authorized Representative)

This is an official notice of the Board and must not be removed or defaced.

DATED this 13th day of February . 1981.