Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18219/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Carol Earl

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Jeffery Campbell

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Carol Earl, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: 01/30/2026

OVERVIEW

1Carol Earl, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Friday, January 16, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, M.T. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the vehicle was stolen at the time of the impoundment.

ISSUES

3The issue to be determined is:

1. Whether the motor vehicle that is impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded, under s. 50.1(3)(a) of the Act.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

The vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded under s. 50.1(3)(a) of the Act.

5The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) presented evidence that the vehicle was stopped by police while it was being driven by M.T. whose licence was suspended due to a prescribed Criminal Code conviction. I am therefore satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.

6The appellant testified that, early in December, she brought the vehicle to the driver’s home in order for him to do repairs. The appellant was desiring to have the vehicle ready to be sold and asked the driver, who was a mechanic that had worked on her vehicles in the past, to prepare the vehicle for a ‘safety’. She testified that it did not occur to her (and would not occur to her) to ask a mechanic if he or she had a valid driver’s licence.

7After leaving the vehicle (with the keys) with the driver, the appellant was away for a few weeks. She testified that, upon returning, she contacted the driver numerous times via telephone and email asking for the truck to be returned. At times, the driver would respond, telling her that he is waiting for parts or still working on the vehicle, but at other times he would simply not respond. She testified that she continuously told him to return the vehicle.

8With respect to the vehicle being stolen, the appellant testified that she did not have the driver charged with theft but did tell the officer who contacted her about the impoundment that the driver did not have the right to drive the vehicle other than test driving. She testified that the driver deprived her of the use of the vehicle for a month.

9Further, the appellant testified that she believes that the driver was using the vehicle for his personal use. She points to the Notice to Registrar which states that the vehicle was seized to be impounded on Twenty Road in Hamilton, Ontario which, depending on where on Twenty Road, is a 15 to 20 minute drive from the driver’s workplace. She testified that the officer who she spoke with later advised her that there was garbage and beer cans in the vehicle at the time it was impounded. This leads her to assume that he was using the vehicle for personal use which she did not give him permission to do.

10The Registrar submits that the appellant voluntarily gave the driver the keys, expected that the driver would drive the vehicle for test purposes or to transport the vehicle to have the vehicle painted (as the appellant testified that he told her he would have done). Further, the Registrar submits that the appellant did not have the driver charged with theft.

11The Registrar further submits that, despite the location of the impoundment, or the statement of the officer that there was garbage and beer cans in the vehicle, there is no evidence that the driver was using the vehicle for a purpose other than use for the purpose of doing the work on the vehicle that the appellant authorized him to do. Subsequent to those submissions, it is the Registrar’s position the vehicle was not stolen.

12The word “stolen” is not defined in the Act.

13The Divisional Court in Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.), (“Marshall”) has provided the following definition of “stolen” in the impoundment context. In that case, the Court stated that a vehicle is “stolen” within the meaning of the Act:

… when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily.

14In impoundment cases, the burden is on the appellant to prove that the vehicle was stolen. The proof must be established on a balance of probabilities.

15In this case, I accept the appellant’s testimony that she continuously told the driver that she wanted him to return the vehicle. Despite those requests, the driver either replied that he was not finished with the repairs or he failed to respond to her requests altogether.

16Given all of the above, I find on a balance of probabilities that the driver was using the appellant’s vehicle beyond the consent to drive it for test driving or transporting for repair purposes. The driver’s failure to return the vehicle despite the appellant’s demands that he does so leads me to believe that he intentionally deprived the appellant of the use of her vehicle at least on a temporary basis. In the context of this case, this depriving amounts to the driver having stolen the vehicle. I find this consistent with the definition of stolen highlighted by the court in Marshall. The vehicle should therefore be released.

ORDER

17The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.