Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18142/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Hannah Hindmarsh

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Hannah Hindmarsh, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Friday, January 23, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Hannah Hindmarsh, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Tuesday, December 23, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Luther Shipley (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”), made under the Act.

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

There are alternatives to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant testified that she is a single mom, she is not employed, and she resides with her 17-month-old son and mother. She testified that she is the only person in her household who has a driver’s licence, and her mother does not own a vehicle.

14The appellant testified that she is required to take her son to his father’s residence about three times a week as per court order, and he resides about 20 minutes away. The father of her son is unwilling to pick him up, and the responsibility remains hers. She testified that public transportation is not available outside of Owen Sound and is not an option. Instead, since the impoundment, she has at times, utilized her grandparents’ vehicle or her uncle has driven them. She testified only one visitation has been missed when her uncle was unable to attend her residence due to bad winter weather and road conditions.

15The appellant testified that her uncle resides with her grandparents, and he uses their vehicle to attend his workplace. She testified that she has to coordinate with her uncle for use of the vehicle. She testified that there are no other family members or friends that can assist her.

16The appellant testified that her uncle has been picking up anything her household needs and dropping it off to her residence, including prescriptions. She testified that she has also taken public transportation to the pharmacy as it is not too far from her residence. She testified that she could also walk to the pharmacy. In addition, she has walked to the grocery store, and it took her about 30 minutes. She has also walked to the local food bank for diapers and formula, and her uncle drove her there on one occasion.

17The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, her son had two medical appointments one of which included an appointment for her mom with the same medical practitioner. On one occasion her grandfather drove them to and from the appointment, and on another occasion, her uncle drove them. There is no evidence before me to indicate that any medical appointments have been missed.

18The appellant’s mother also attends programming at the M’wikwedong Centre and has missed some programming but has been able to attend twice when she obtained a ride from a fellow participant. Her son has also missed some programs at the M’wikwedong Centre. The appellant believes her son would struggle to sit still on the bus and it would be difficult and inconvenient.

19The appellant testified her son was sick a few weeks ago and she used a taxi to attend the hospital as her grandparents were asleep and could not drive them.

20The appellant testified, that since the impoundment, she has cancelled two of her own personal appointments including with victim’s services and with a domestic violence counsellor. She is waiting for the release of the vehicle before she reschedules the appointments. However, she acknowledged that public transportation is an option as both locations were within Owen Sound.

21I find that the appellant has used alternative means of transportation since the impoundment. I note that the appellant testified that, since her vehicle was impounded, she has walked, taken public transportation, taken taxis, borrowed her grandparents’ vehicle, her grandfather has driven her, and her uncle has driven her on multiple occasions. The evidence before me suggests that the appellant has been able to meet her and her family’s necessities through the use of reasonable means of alternative transportation including the use of her grandparents’ vehicle and with the assistance of her grandfather and uncle.

22The appellant has missed one visitation with the father of her son and that appears to be due to the winter weather conditions, otherwise she has been attending as per the court order.

23In addition, there is also no evidence before me to suggest that public transportation is not an option for the appellant to attend her own personal appointments, to attend the pharmacy and grocery store. Her mother has also been able to attend some of her programming.

24I acknowledge the appellant’s testimony that she has been experiencing inconvenience and has had to borrow her grandparents’ vehicle and get rides from her grandfather and uncle, and that public transportation is difficult in the cold weather. However, I note the Tribunal may not consider inconvenience when determining whether the appellant has proven exceptional hardship.

25I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

26Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

27For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion

28I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

29The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.