Chad Bland v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2026 CanLII 8160

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18222/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Chad Bland Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Emily Morton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Chad Bland, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Tuesday, January 27, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Chad Bland, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Sunday, January 18, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Kevin Williams (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the respondent to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension

6I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

8Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

9The appellant testified at the hearing. His evidence was that he co-signed a loan for the vehicle with Ms. J. Goodman, who is the appellant’s friend, neighbour and co-worker. He testified he and Ms. Goodman decided the appellant would be the registered owner of the vehicle. His evidence was that Ms. Goodman had sole use of the vehicle and used it to drive herself to and from work and to attend to the needs of her family. The appellant did not use the vehicle, other than on the odd occasions to take the wheel when he and Ms. Goodman drove home together from their shared workplace.

10The appellant testified that on January 18, 2026 he received a phone call from Ms. Goodman who was in the vehicle while it was in the process of being impounded. He spoke to a police officer on the phone who explained to him the vehicle would be impounded, and explaining there was an appeal process. The appellant testified he learned for the first time on that phone call that Mr. Williams was driving the vehicle. He did not know Mr. Williams well, having only met him once briefly, and understood him to be a friend of Ms. Goodman’s. He did not know Mr. Williams would be driving the car on January 18, 2026. He had never had the opportunity to ask about the status of Mr. Williams’ driver’s licence, as he did not know Mr. Williams would drive the vehicle.

11With respect to whether he gave Ms. Goodman permission to let another person drive the vehicle, or whether the matter had ever been discussed, the appellant first testified that he did not recall having conversations with Ms. Goodman to that effect. Later in his evidence, following cross-examination, the appellant testified he remembered he had received a traffic ticket in the mail once with respect to the vehicle, and on that occasion discussed with Ms. Goodman that he did not want anyone other than her driving the vehicle.

12The appellant called Ms. Goodman as a witness at the hearing. Ms. Goodman testified she is the sole user of the vehicle, though she and the appellant decided after she and the appellant signed a co-loan for the vehicle, he would be the registered owner. Ms. Goodman testified she uses the vehicle regularly. She testified that shortly before January 18, 2026, she permitted Mr. Williams to drive the vehicle to pick her child up from school. She testified that he told her he had a driver’s licence. Her evidence was that she did not take any other steps to ascertain he had a licence that was not suspended, such as asking him whether that was the case, asking to see the physical driver’s licence card, or conducting any of the checks that are available to the public to confirm the status of a driver’s licence.

13Ms. Goodman testified she permitted Mr. Williams to drive the vehicle on January 18, 2026. The police pulled the vehicle over and Mr. Williams was arrested after a disagreement arose with the police about his driver’s licence. Ms. Goodman’s evidence is she believes they were initially pulled over on January 18, 2026 as Mr. Williams was not wearing a seatbelt. Ms. Goodman testified that she did not, before the January 18, 2026 outing where Mr. Williams drove the vehicle, take any steps to inquire into whether his driver’s licence was suspended. She testified that Mr. Williams had told her he had a driver’s licence, and that was the extent of her inquiry.

14The appellant filed a witness statement from Kevin Williams, the driver, which I made exhibit three at the hearing. The respondent objected to the admission of the statement as Mr. Williams was not available to be cross-examined, nor was the statement given under oath. I admitted the statement under s. 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, though I explained to the parties the statement may be given reduced or no weight as reliable and credible evidence, as Mr. Williams was not available to be cross-examined. The statement reads that Mr. Williams did not inform Ms. Goodman nor the registered owner of the vehicle that his driver’s licence was under suspension. The statement says that he had recently driven Ms. Goodman and her child which “allowed her to believe I’m good to drive.”

15Finally, the respondent led evidence of the driver’s driving record that established Mr. Williams driver’s licence was subject to a Criminal Code suspension on January 18, 2026. The appellant did not take issue with this evidence, nor was there any other evidence before me to suggest the driver’s licence was not suspended when the vehicle was detained to be impounded.

16After reviewing the witness’ testimony, I find that the appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension. I find the appellant is the registered owner of the vehicle and that Ms. Goodman, and not the appellant, used the vehicle regularly. I find that the appellant did not know that Mr. Williams was going to drive the vehicle on January 18, 2026. I find that the appellant therefore had no reason or no opportunity to make an inquiry into whether or not Mr. Williams’ driver’s licence was suspended when he drove the vehicle at the time it was detained to be impounded.

17I have considered the appellant’s evidence that he told Ms. Goodman, on one occasion, that he did not want her to let other people drive the vehicle. While I accept the appellant’s evidence, I note his evidence is not that he forbade Ms. Goodman from letting another person drive, but rather that he told her he did not want her to do this in the future. The appellant did not give evidence that he required Ms. Goodman to advise him of the identity of any other driver of the vehicle so that he could, for example, inquire into the status of that other individual’s driver’s licence.

18Applying these facts to the law, I find that the appellant did not take reasonable steps to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension. The driver at the time the impounded vehicle was detained was Mr. Williams, and the appellant had no idea whether or not Mr. Williams had a valid licence, nor did he take any steps to make such a determination. The appellant’s position, as I understand it, is that he satisfied his obligation to exercise due diligence by letting Ms. Goodman, who he understood to be a licenced driver, drive the vehicle.

19In this case, the appellant is asking the Tribunal to determine that due diligence under s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act is met in circumstances where the appellant, the registered owner of the vehicle, relinquished control of the vehicle to another person and thus loses control over who drives the vehicle. In my view, s. 50.2(3)(c) cannot be interpreted to include those circumstances. The section provides for an appeal where the owner uses due diligence as it pertains to the licence status of the intended driver of the vehicle. It does not contemplate an appeal where the owner exercises due diligence with respect to persons who do not have a valid licence, but whom the owner does not know will drive the vehicle. It also does not provide for an appeal where due diligence is exercised with respect to a person who is not driving at the time the vehicle is impounded.

20I find the ground of due diligence is intended to apply where the person driving at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded is an individual the owner permitted to drive the vehicle. It does not apply in the present factual circumstances, where the intended driver relinquishes control of the vehicle to another person unbeknownst to the driver, and with respect to whom the owner could not have exercised due diligence with respect to whether that driver’s licence is suspended or not.

21I appreciate the appellant views the factual situation that arose as something that was out of his control, and that his view is that he could not have exercised due diligence with respect to Mr. Williams’ licence as he did not know Ms. Goodman would permit Mr. Williams to drive. However, I must limit my analysis to the test set out in s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, which requires due diligence with respect to the driver. The test in this provision is straightforward, and the appellant has not met the burden that he exercised due diligence concerning Mr. Williams, the driver, even though he was not aware Mr. Williams would be driving the vehicle.

Conclusion

22I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

ORDER

23The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.