Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18221/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Robert Spooner

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR: Jeffery Campbell

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Robert Spooner, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: 01/30/2026

OVERVIEW

1Robert Spooner, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Wednesday, December 17, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, the appellant’s son T.S. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while their driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1) of the Act. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional harship.

3On January 19, 2026, the appellant also filed with the Tribunal and served on the respondent a Notice of Motion requesting an extension of time for filing the Notice of Appeal.

ISSUES

4The issue to be determined is:

1. Should the appeal deadline be extended to allow the appeal to be filed and heard by the Tribunal?

2. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

RESULT

5For the reasons set out below the motion to extend the time for filing is denied. The appeal is dismissed.

MOTION TO eXTEND

6I find that, on balance, the justice of the case does not favour the granting an extension of time to file an appeal.

7According to the Regulation, an appeal of a long-term impoundment is required to be filed within 15 days after the day the vehicle was detained.

8In the appellant’s case, the vehicle was impounded on December 17, 2025. The appeal deadline was January 1, 2025, and the appellant filed its appeal on January 19, 2026, 18 days after the limitation period ended.

9Pursuant to section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, the Tribunal may extend the deadline if the Tribunal is satisfied there are “reasonable grounds” for doing so. The onus is on the appellant to establish that there are reasonable grounds for granting the extension.

10Determining whether there are reasonable grounds for an extension is not an exact formula. Pursuant to the Divisional Court decision in Manuel v. Registrar, Motor Vehicles Dealers Act 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492 (Div. Ct.), the Tribunal must consider the following factors in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to grant an extension of time:

a. The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

b. The length of the delay;

c. Prejudice to the other party; and

d. The merits of the appeal.

11The analysis requires a balancing of these factors applied to the specific facts of each case. No one factor takes precedence over the others. The overriding consideration is whether the “justice of the case” requires that an extension be granted.

12Taking all of these factors into account, I conclude that the justice of the case does not require an extension of the appeal deadline.

Bona Fide Intention to Appeal within the Appeal Period

13I find that the appellant did not have a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period.

14The appellant testified that he lives in Blue Mountain, Ontario. On December 14, 2026 he stayed overnight in Toronto and left the next day for a vacation in the Dominican Republic where he stayed until his return on January 12, 2026.

15In the meanwhile, on December 17th, the vehicle was impounded in Collingwood, Ontario. He was unaware of the impoundment until his return from vacation. On January 19, 2026, he appealed to the Tribunal after receiving information on how to do so from a court clerk.

16The Registrar submits that, as the appellant was unaware of the impoundment until January 12th, he had no intention of appealing within the appeal period.

17I agree with the Registrar. While the appellant was diligent in appealing the impoundment once he was aware, he did not have an intention to appeal within the appeal period. [italics mine]

Length of the Delay

18As stated, the length of the delay was 18 days. I find this to be significant.

Prejudice to the Other Party

19The respondent submitted that the prejudice to the Registrar would be added cost of the impoundment, should the appellant be successful in its appeal.

20I agree that the prejudice of the late perfecting of the appeal is prejudicial to the Registrar, as, should the appellant be successful, the added cost of the impoundment would be the storage fees for 18 days.

Merits of the appeal

21The appellant is appealing on the ground that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

22It is not the Tribunal’s function at this point to determine the strength of the appellant’s appeal. At this point, the appellant must show only that its appeal has some merit.

23On the basis the appellant’s testimony and submissions, I find that there is no merit to the asserted exceptional hardship ground.

24Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. To establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in s. 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative available to the impounded vehicle, with s. 10(4) of the Regulation requiring the owner to demonstrate that they have considered and inquired into every reasonable option that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any vehicle. If I find that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then the appeal will fail, and I need not consider any other requirements of the test for exceptional hardship.

25If I find there is no alternative to the vehicle, I must consider, in accordance with section 10 of the Regulation, whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle or to the public health and safety or the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. I may also at that stage consider if there would be an immediate, significant and long-lasting financial or economic loss or loss of employment or education (or an opportunity for the same) to any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle other than the suspended driver.

26Section 10(2)(a) of the Regulation specifically prohibits me from ever considering inconvenience to any person, including the Appellant.

There are reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle

27The appellant testified that he lives with his son in Blue Mountain, Ontario. According to his testimony, the appellant suffers from a medical condition that requires him to see his family doctor every month or two in Collingwood, about a 10-minute drive from his home.

28While public transit is available, it is a two kilometer walk from his home, a distance that he is unable to traverse. However, the appellant testified that his friends have been available to drive him to and from appointments and shopping. The friends also have permission from his pharmacist to deliver his prescriptions to his home. A local Circle-K convenience store is also 1/2 of a kilometer away, a distance that his son is able to walk.

29The appellant further testified that his next appointment with his family doctor is on February 10, 2026. He has not, and will not, miss any doctor appointments within the impoundment period.

30The Registrar presented evidence that, as well as the impounded vehicle, the appellant owns a 2010 Ford. The appellant testified that the vehicle is road-worthy, but he chooses not to use it as it is an Econoline and he doesn’t like driving it. His son is also unable to drive the Econoline at this point as it is not equipped with an ignition interlock device.

31The Registrar submits that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle as friends are available to drive him to appointments and to deliver food and/or pharmaceuticals. Also, the appellant has not missed any medical appointments and, as the appellant testified, 911 services are available should he encounter a medical emergency. Moreover, the appellant has a second vehicle (the Ford Econoline) which he could utilize but chooses not to.

32I concur with the Registrar. The appellant has a number of alternatives to the vehicle and, as such, I find no merit to the appeal on the ground of exceptional hardship.

Conclusion regarding the Notice of Motion for the extension of time to file an appeal

33I have concluded that the appellant did not have a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period and that there is prejudice to the Registrar in the late filing of the appeal. Most importantly, I find that there is no merit to the appellant’s appeal on the grounds of exceptional hardship. In considering the above conclusions, I find that the interests of justice are not served by granting the Motion to extend the time to file an appeal. The motion is denied.

ORDER

34The motion to extend the time to file an appeal is denied.

35The appeal is dismissed.