Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18022/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Irene Miller

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

AMENDED DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Gurleen Thethi

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Irene Miller, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Ian Sookram, Agent

HEARD By Teleconference: Monday, December 8, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Irene Miller, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Tuesday, November 11, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, K.A.R. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while their driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits them from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension, and that the impoundment will cause exceptional harship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1)

6I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

8Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

9The appellant testified that the driver of the vehicle was her daughter, who had not driven for almost two years while waiting for her licence. The evidence indicates that the daughter’s licence had previously been suspended due to an impaired driving conviction under the Criminal Code. The appellant acknowledged that she was aware of this conviction but assumed her daughter had regained full driving privileges after completing the “Back on Track” program and receiving a licence in the mail.

10On cross-examination, the appellant admitted that she did not verify the licence status with the Ministry of Transportation or confirm whether any conditions, such as an interlock requirement, remained in effect. She further testified that she looked only at the photo on the physical licence and relied on her daughter’s statements without making any inquiries about restrictions or conditions prior to lending her the vehicle. Despite knowing about the prior suspension, the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the licence was valid and unrestricted. Simply relying on possession of a licence and verbal assurances does not meet the standard of due diligence required under the Act. Therefore, this ground is not satisfied.

11I find that the appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

12I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

13The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

14If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

15If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

16The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

17The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

18I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

19The appellant, who is 86 years old, lives with her daughter and testified to significant inconvenience following the impoundment, including difficulty attending medical appointments and challenges with mobility. The appellant’s testimony shows that she has access to public transportation, albeit with some difficulty, and has used taxis when necessary during the impound period. The appellant also owns another vehicle, although testified that it is currently inoperable and cannot be repaired due to financial constraints. The appellant’s daughter does not own a vehicle. The appellant testified that a neighbour has occasionally provided rides, though the appellant does not ask often to avoid imposing, and there are no other friends or family available to assist. With respect to groceries, the appellant testified that her daughter will walk to a nearby grocery store to obtain essentials.

20Although the appellant has had to cancel some medical appointments and finds taxis costly, the availability of public transit, taxis, and occasional assistance—even if inconvenient or expensive—means the statutory threshold of “no reasonable alternative” has not been met. The Tribunal is precluded from considering inconvenience, and the evidence demonstrates that reasonable alternatives exist.

21Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

22I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1);

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

23The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.