Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18044/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Scott Babin

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Kevin Kovalchuk

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Scott Babin, Appellant

Dara Saunders, Paralegal

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

Lat Observer:

Steve Clarke

HEARD: By Teleconference Thursday, December 11, 2025

1Scott Babin, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Monday, October 13, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, J.V. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence, due to a criminal conviction. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded, that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

3 Section 9 of O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that an appeal to the Tribunal under section 50.2 of the Act with respect to the impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act shall be commenced by filing with the Tribunal a notice of appeal, together with the fee established by the Tribunal within 15 days after the day the vehicle was detained under subsection 55.1 (1) of the Act.

4On November 26, 2025, the appellant filed a Notice of Motion to be heard prior to the commencement of the hearing to extend the 15-day deadline to file a Notice of Appeal set out in s.9 of the Regulation.

5The vehicle was detained on October 13, 2015. The Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) was filed on November 26, 2025.

6The respondent opposed the motion.

7The appellant submitted that rotating postal disruptions that were occurring in October and November 2025 resulted in inconsistencies in mail delivery. The appellant testified that he received the Notice of Impoundment (“NOI”) in and around November 22, 2025. This was the first notice he had been given with respect to the details of the impound. He sought legal advice and retained counsel who filed a NOA on November 26, 2025.

8Included with the appellant’s Notice of Motion was a Google Search page titled “postal strike October 2025, dated November 26, 2025”. The page reads inter alia: “October -November 2025: The rotating strikes caused inconsistencies in mail delivery across Canada, leading to frustration for both businesses and consumers.

9The respondent submitted that the appellant’s daughter was with the driver J. V. at the time of the impoundment and that J.V. would have received a NOI setting out the details of the impoundment at the time the vehicle was impounded. The respondent submitted that because no steps were taken between October 13, 2025, and October 28, 2025, by the appellant to appeal the impoundment the extension of time to file the NOA should not be granted.

10I recognise that s.55.1(5)(b) of the Act requires that every officer who detains a motor vehicle under this section shall as soon as practicable, serve the driver with a copy of the Notice of Impoundment. Further, s. 55.1(6) states that service of the Notice of the Impoundment on the driver of the motor vehicle under clause (5) (b) is deemed to be service on and sufficient notice to the owner of the vehicle.

11However, s. 55.1(7) also allows that the Registrar may provide notice of the impoundment to the owner of the motor vehicle by mailing it to them at the last address for them appearing on the records of the Ministry.

12I find therefore that the deeming provision of s. 55.1(6) is capable of being rebutted by the fact that the Registrar may provide notice of impoundment to the owner of the motor vehicle by mail.

13The appellant’s daughter was estranged from the driver J.V. at the time of the impoundment and although she was in the car with J.V. at the time of the impoundment her evidence was that she was not given a copy of the NOI by the driver.

14I accept her evidence that she was not given a copy of the Notice of Impoundment by the driver.

15I accept the appellant’s evidence that he did not receive the Notice of Impoundment until in and around November 22, 2025, when he received it by mail.

16I find that the evidence of the appellant and his daughter, Ms. Babin has rebutted the deeming provision of s. 55.1(6) of the Act.

17All of the above will be made clearer in the body of this decision. For now, I will only deal with the motion to extend time for service.

18After a brief recess to consider the motion, I returned with my reasons.

19 Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O.1999, Chapter 12, Schedule G (“LAT Act”) states:

Despite any limitation of time fixed by or under any Act for the giving of any notice requiring a hearing by the Tribunal or an appeal from a decision or order of the Tribunal under section 11 or any other Act, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief, it may.

a) Extend the time for giving the notice either before or after the expiration of the limitation of time so limited; and

b) Give directions that it considers proper as a result of extending the time.

20In the case of Manuel v. Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492 (Div. Ct.), (“Manuel”), the Divisional Court held that in making a determination as to whether to grant an extension of time the LAT ought to consider the following factors:

a) The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

b) The length of the delay;

c) Prejudice to the other party;

d) The merits of the appeal.

21The Divisional Court held that the overriding consideration is whether the “justice of the case” requires that an extension be granted.

22I find that based on the appellant’s testimony he had a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period. I accept the appellants submissions that he did not receive a NOI from the driver. I accept the appellant’s submissions that there were ongoing postal disruptions in October- November 2025. Once he became aware of the NOI in and around November 22, 2025, he took steps to retain legal counsel and file a NOA on November 26, 2025. The appeal was filed within one month of the date upon which it should have been filed (October 28, 2025). I do not find this to be a lengthy delay.

23With respect to prejudice, I find that the appellant would be prejudiced if they were not allowed an extension of time. It was the appellant who was without his vehicle during the impoundment period and was the one incurring impoundment fees.

24As will be seen later in these reasons the appeal did have merits and was not frivolous.

25I find that fairness dictates that the appellant be allowed to bring this appeal given his evidence that due to the ongoing postal disruptions he only received the NOI on or about November 22, 2025, well after the time for bringing an appeal had passed.

26I therefore allow the appellant’s motion to extend the time for bringing of this appeal pursuant to section 7 of the LAT Act and the principles set out in Manuel.

ISSUES

27The issue(s) in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded;

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;

iii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

28For the reasons set out below, I find that the vehicle was stolen, and the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

29Prior to the commencement of the hearing, I made an Order excluding witnesses.

ANALYSIS

30For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was stolen

31I am satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

32In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

33In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

34The appellant testified that he loaned the impounded vehicle to his daughter Jennifer Babin on a long-term basis, on the understanding she would be the only person allowed to drive that vehicle. He further testified that to his knowledge his daughter abided by that understanding the entire time that she had the vehicle.

35Ms. Babin testified that she had been in a previous relationship with the driver of the vehicle. They had a child together. She dated him from 2017 to 2021 during which time she was subjected to severe physical and mental, domestic abuse. She characterised her relationship with the driver as “very volatile” and further testified that she was afraid of him.

36The appellant testified that the driver was “vicious” and almost drove his daughter to a nervous break down.

37Ms. Babin left the driver in 2021 and went to work for a drilling company outside the Province of Ontario. She left their son with the driver’s sister. While she was away at work, the driver broke into her apartment on numerous occasions and stole things such that the locks had to be replaced. She returned to Ontario in 2023, but the driver’s family refused to provide her with any pictures or updates with respect to her son because they blamed her for the driver going to jail for domestic abuse. Her evidence was that once she returned home, she had to contact the driver to get pictures of and updates about, their son. Starting after her return in 2023 she would occasionally meet the driver at a Tim Hortons coffee shop or a restaurant to obtain pictures/videos of their son or, to get updates about their son.

38On the night of October 12, 2025, between 9:30 and 10:00 PM the driver contacted her to tell her that he had updated pictures of their son to give her. She told him that he could bring the pictures to her apartment as Tim Hortons would be closed at that time. She also testified that since they broke up, the driver had been taking medication and was a lot calmer so she trusted that he could come over to her apartment, give her the pictures of their son, tell her about him and part, amicably. She expressed regret for letting him come to her apartment that evening.

39The driver did come to her apartment by taxi and brought her pictures of their son. He did not ask her to use her car, that night. He had never asked to borrow her car before. Later after the driver had left, Ms. Babin went to go out with a friend. She then noticed that her car keys were missing, and her car was gone.

40She normally kept her keys in her purse and kept her purse hanging on a hook by the door.

41Her evidence was that after she noticed that her car was missing, she sent the driver numerous text messages, but he did not respond. Ms. Babin called a friend to come and get her and the two of them drove around various locations in Picton looking for her car. They could not find her car, but she finally was able to contact the driver by text message. He asked her where she was (she was then outside of Picton) and told her he would come and pick her up, which he did. When he arrived, she asked him for the keys, but he would not get out of the driver’s seat. Her evidence was that she did not want him to leave with her car, so she got into the passenger’s seat. As they were travelling to Picton, she was telling him to pull over because it was her father’s vehicle, and she knew that no one else was to drive the vehicle except for her. The driver was ignoring her requests. Ultimately, they were stopped by a R.I.D.E. spot check by police. It was at that time the vehicle was impounded.

42She was asked why she did not report the vehicle as stolen earlier or tell the police at the R.I.D.E. stop that the car had been stolen. Her response was that she was afraid of retaliation from the driver, given his past history of domestic abuse.

43I find that the appellant has established that the motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

44The vehicle was taken without the appellant’s consent nor Ms. Babin’s, and I find that the driver intended to temporarily deprive Ms. Babin of the vehicle.

45Ms. Babin had no reason to believe that the driver would go into her purse that evening to take the keys to her vehicle in order for him to take the vehicle. The driver did not ask to take the vehicle that evening, nor had he ever taken the vehicle before.

46I find that she did not encourage the driver to take the vehicle, nor did she acquiesce in the driver taking the vehicle.

47Furthermore Ms. Babin took all steps that were reasonably prudent to retrieve her vehicle that evening, from the driver who had taken the vehicle. I accept her explanation that given her past history with the driver she was afraid of retaliation from the driver if she reported the vehicle as stolen.

48Because I have decided to release the vehicle on the ground that it was stolen at the time it was impounded, I need not determine whether the other grounds have been established.

Conclusion

49I find that the appellant has established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded. As such it is not necessary to consider the other grounds for appeal.

ORDER

50The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.

Released: January 27, 2026

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