Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17698/HTA

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act and to downgrade a licence pursuant to s. 32(5) of the Act.

Between:

Yogesh Monga

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Emily Morton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Yogesh Monga, appellant Gurinder Pal Multani, paralegal

For the Respondent:

Alexander Qanbery, student-at-law

HEARD: By Teleconference December 16, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Yogesh Monga (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) to suspend his Class A driver’s licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), and from the decision of the Ministry of Transportation (“MTO”) to downgrade his Class A licence to a Class G licence, pursuant to s. 32 of the Act.

2In a letter to the appellant dated September 2, 2025, the Registrar suspended the appellant’s driver’s licence, pursuant to subsection 47(1) of the Act for a period of 90 days, commencing September 4, 2025.

3In a letter dated October 10, 2025, the MTO advised that the suspension of the appellant’s driver’s licence would end on October 14, 2025, and that his driver’s licence would be downgraded to a Class G(Z) also on October 14, 2025.

4Following the hearing, I reserved my decision. For the reasons that follow, pursuant to s. 50(2) of the Act, I set aside the suspension. I dismiss the appeal from the downgrade for lack of jurisdiction.

5I also issued a confidentiality order with respect to certain documents presented at the hearing.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Confidentiality Request

6The Registrar requested, pursuant to Rule 13.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (the “Rules”), an order to limit public access to documents in the Registrar’s Submissions, which was made Exhibit One at the hearing. The documents are found at pages 6, 9, 10 and 11 of Exhibit One and consist of two pieces of correspondence from the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) to the MTO. The Registrar submits these pages contain information that pertains to an ongoing criminal investigation and that release of the information could compromise the ongoing investigation.

7The appellant did not object to the Registrar’s request for an order under Rule 13.1 limiting public access to pages 6, 9, 10 and 11 of Exhibit One.

8The Tribunal’s adjudicative records are generally open to the public, in accordance with the open court principle and s. 2(1) of the Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sch. 60 (“TARA”). As public access to adjudicative records is protected by the s. 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms right to free expression, restrictions on access are exceptional. However, s. 2(2) of TARA provides that the Tribunal may order that all or part of an adjudicative record be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public if the Tribunal determines that matters contained in the record are of such a nature that the public interest or the interest of a person served by avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be available to the public. Section 2(2)(a) of TARA identifies public security as a reason to make a confidentiality order. Rule 13.1 of the Rules echoes the TARA principles.

9The Supreme Court of Canada in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, (“Sherman”) held that the following requirements must be met before placing limits on the open court principle:

a. court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest

b. the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and

c. as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effect.

10I find that the Registrar has established that the public interest in public security warrants an order under Rule 13.1 to limit public assess to the identified pages of Exhibit One. While I recognize the strong presumption in favour of the openness of tribunal proceedings, I find the identified pages describes information about persons of interest and investigative techniques in an ongoing criminal investigation. The information describes an investigation that is broad in scope and pertains to issues related to the integrity of tests used to licence drivers on Ontario’s roads and highways. I find that it is in the public interest to limit public access to these records. I order pages 6, 9, 10 and 11 of Exhibit One be excluded from the public record.

Disclosure Motion

11The appellant brought a motion for disclosure from the respondent. Following submissions and exchanges with counsel for the appellant, the appellant abandoned the motion.

Motion to add Licence Downgrade as an Issue on Appeal

12The appellant filed a motion to add the issue of the downgrade of his Class A licence as an issue on this appeal. The respondent’s position is that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the decision to downgrade the appellant’s licence as the decision was taken by the Minister pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act, a provision from which there is no right appeal from the Tribunal under s. 50(1) of the Act. For the reasons given below, I find the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the downgrade.

Mootness

13I find the issue of the suspension is not moot. At the outset of the hearing, I found, following receipt of the parties’ submissions, that the issue of the suspension of the appellant’s driver’s licence was not moot, even though the suspension had ended prior to the hearing of the appeal. The appellant submitted the suspension continues to have a practical effect on his interests as the fact of the suspension is reflected on his driving records, which impacts his employment. The respondent took the same position with respect to the possible mootness of the suspension issue on the appeal.

ISSUES

14The issues in the hearing are:

i. Has the Registrar established sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence pursuant to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act?

ii. Has the Minister established sufficient reason to downgrade the appellant’s driver’s licence pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act?

RESULT

15Having considered all the evidence and submissions, and for the reasons that follow, I set aside the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence. I dismiss the appeal form the decision to downgrade the appellant’s Class A driver’s licence for lack of jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

Issue One: Suspension

16I find the Registrar has not satisfied the burden to establish sufficient reasons to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

17The Registrar has authority under subsections 47(1)(b) and (g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason not referred to in subsections 47(1)(d), (e) or (f) of the Act. Subsection 47(1)(g) provides:

47(1) Subject to section 47.1, the Registrar may, by order, suspend or cancel,

b) a driver’s licence;

on the grounds of;

g) any other sufficient reason not referred to in clause (d), (e) or (f).

18The Registrar submits the sufficient reason it relies upon is public safety. It submits that the evidence it relies on establishes that the reliability of driving test the appellant took to obtain his Class A licence is undermined as there is evidence before the Tribunal the driving examiner who conducted the appellant’s Class A road test participated in a bribery scheme where he received money in exchange for providing the appellant with a favourable test result. The Registrar relies on subsection 31(a) of the Act which provides:

31 The purpose of this Part is to protect the public by ensuring that,

a) the privilege of driving on a highway is granted to, and retained by, only those persons who demonstrate that they are likely to drive safely;

19The Registrar relied on documentary evidence at the hearing. The Registrar filed a letter dated August 19 2025 from the Ontario Provincial Police Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) advising an official at the MTO it had “reasonable grounds” to believe that approximately 250 individuals “may have fraudulently obtained their Class ‘A’ commercial driver’s licence,” and attached a list of the individuals. The only other context given in the letter for the statement there are “reasonable grounds” to believe the named individuals had fraudulently obtained their Class A licences is that the SFO had initiated an investigation following a complaint from the MTO about “potential bribery related to the examination process” for these licences.

20The Registrar submits that the examination process for driver’s licences is a cornerstone of ensuring the mandate in section 31(a) is met. In the Registrar’s submission, the sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s licence is linked to the statutory mandate to grant the privilege of driving only to those who have demonstrated they can drive safely. If there is evidence that the integrity and reliability of the results of a driver’s licence examination is undermined by dishonesty in the process, it cannot be said that the privilege of driving had been granted to a person who demonstrated they are likely to drive safely. The Registrar submits that the identification of the appellant as a person the SFO has “reasonable grounds” to believe had obtained his licence dishonestly, apparently in a manner related to “potential bribery” in the examination process, provides the sufficient reason to suspend his licence.

Evidence

21As well as the letter of August 19, 2025 the Registrar relies on correspondence it sent the applicant on September 2, 2025 advising him his driver’s licence had been suspended for 90 days as the MTO “has reason to believe that your Class A Ontario driver’s licence was obtained as a result of your dishonesty during the Class A testing and/or training process.” In the Registrar’s submission, the letter permits me to draw an inference that the appellant was one of the approximately 250 individuals identified in the August 19, 2025 letter from the SFO.

22The Registrar relies on a memorandum from the SFO to another official at the MTO dated October 7, 2025. This evidence post-dates the decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence, but I have considered it as evidence that amplifies the factual basis for the sufficient reason the Registrar maintains it had to suspend the appellant’s licence.

23The October 7, 2025 memorandum provides further detail about the investigation into the alleged bribery scheme referred to in the August 19, 2025 letter. It states that investigators discovered a communication from a driving instructor to a former MTO driving examiner that transmitted, on November 4, 2022, an image of the appellant’s driver’s licence. That image was shared by the driving examiner who received it from the driving instructor to another driving examiner, also on November 4, 2022. The driving instructor then shared an image of the appellant’s driving exam confirmation for November 4, 2022 with the first driving examiner, though there is no information that was passed on to the second driving examiner. The investigators confirmed the second driving examiner, who investigators determined received the image of the appellant’s driver’s licence, was the examiner of record for the appellant’s Class A licence road test which took place on November 5, 2022 and which the appellant successfully completed.

24The SFO memorandum states the SFO has “grounds” to believe the examiner of record was “complicit in the identified bribery scheme.” It states the SFO had determined that the transmission of information about applicant’s taking the driving test by text message was the method by which those participating in the fraud ensured applicants were examined by “complicit” driving examiners.

25Though the October 7, 2025 SFO memorandum states that the SFO has “grounds” to believe that individual identified as the appellant’s examiner of record was “complicit” in a bribery scheme in which money was exchanged for favourable test results. It does not set out what the basis for the “grounds” and does not provide any information as to what dishonesty or fraud occurred during the road test and in its result.

26The Registrar did not call a witness at the hearing to provide evidence on what formed the basis for the “grounds” or “reasonable grounds” for belief, set out in the documents from the SFO, that the appellant and others acted with dishonesty when the appellant successfully completed his road test for his class A licence on October 14, 2023.

27The appellant filed documentary evidence including an affidavit setting out evidence about his personal circumstances and the work he did to obtain his Class A licence, records from his truck driving school including a transcript of grades, and the confirmation of his road test. The appellant gave oral evidence at the hearing.

28The appellant testified that after he came to Canada in 2021 he obtained his G licence in June 2022 and then enrolled with a truck driving and forklift school to train to obtain his Class A licence. He successfully completed the Air Brake (Z) Endorsement course and the Mandatory Entry Level (MELT) program. He then successfully passed his road test and obtained his Class A licence. In cross-examination, the appellant confirmed the name of the driving school he attended but said he does not remember the names of any of the instructors. He does not recall giving his driver’s licence to an instructor on a date proximate to his Class A road test. Finally, he confirmed in his evidence he had no knowledge of a bribery scheme and was not a participant in a bribery scheme with respect to his Class A road test.

29The appellant’s affidavit and oral evidence was that he did not work in the trucking industry, but is a driving instructor. His role is to instruct student drivers seeking to obtain their Class G licences. He testified that he took the MELT training. He testified his truck driving school booked the road test. He gave the school his name and driver’s licence and they booked the test for him. He testified he did the A road test by driving the truck himself. On the day of the road test when he first met the examiner. He did not give anyone a bribe. After he received the Sept 2 letter he could not drive and took the bus. He confirmed in his evidence that he is able to continue to work as an instructor for students preparing for G2 and G licencing requirements, now that the Class G licence suspension has ended.

Analysis

30I find that ensuring the public’s safety on highways is a “sufficient reason” for suspending a driver’s licence for the purposes of section 47(1)(g) of the Act. One of the fundamental purposes of the Act is to ensure the public’s safety on highways: Adam Giffen v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation), 2013 ONSC 7461 at para. 33. I also find that well founded concern with the integrity and reliability of examinations used to evaluate whether a person can “demonstrate that they are likely to drive safely” as required by section 31(a) of the Act can provide a “sufficient reason” to suspend a driver’s licence.

31However, I note that on an appeal of the suspension to the Tribunal under section 50(1) of the Act, the Registrar bears the burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that there was a sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence. Evidence must be clear, convincing and cogent to satisfy the balance of probabilities test: F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 at para. 46 (“McDougall”). I must “scrutinize the relevant evidence with care to determine whether it is more likely than not” that there was a sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence: McDougall at para. 49.

32I must ground my decision in the evidence that is before me. When I consider the statements in the August 19, 2025 letter on which the Registrar relies, I find it does not permit me to draw an inference that, on a balance of probabilities, there was sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence based on the concern about the reliability or integrity of the process through which he obtained the licence. The information in this letter is limited to statements there are “reasonable grounds” to believe 250 individuals “may” have fraudulently obtained their licences. There is no elaboration whatsoever of the basis for these grounds of belief, beyond a statement that there is an ongoing investigation based on a complaint about “potential bribery” in the Class A testing process. Taking this letter, which was the basis for suspending the appellant’s driver’s licence on September 2, 2025, on its own, I find it provides no information as to what the “reasonable grounds” held by the SFO consisted of, and how it was that the appellant along with approximately 250 other people had fraudulently obtained their licence. It is a conclusory statement that I find does not meet the burden of establishing the sufficient reason identified by the Registrar to suspend the appellant’s licence actually existed.

33Even when I consider the October 17, 2025 memorandum as further evidence as to what constitutes its basis to believe to believe the appellant obtained his licence fraudulently, I find the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities is not met. The memorandum describes a process through which a driving instructor contacted a driving examiner with the MTO and passed along an image of the appellant’s driver’s licence on three dates in 2023, and then an image of his temporary driver’s licence on October 14, 2023. This information, according to the memorandum, was then passed on to the examiner of record for the appellant’s road test, which took place on the date and time passed along by the driving instructor to a different driving examiner. With respect to the road test itself, the memorandum states only that there are ”grounds” to believe this examiner of record was “complicit” in the bribery scheme.

34The Registrar effectively asks me to draw the inference that because the SFO had “grounds” to believe the examiner of record was “complicit” in a bribery scheme that the reliability results of the appellant’s test are undermined to extent that the requirement in section 31(a) of the Act is not met. I must draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, not engage in conjecture and speculation. Even if I take as true the facts that there was a bribery scheme where money was exchanged for favourable test results for Class A road tests, I cannot safely draw the inference that the appellant’s test results themselves were undermined by the scheme. There is no evidence beyond a bald statement of “reasonable grounds” that the appellant himself participated in the alleged scheme. The statement that there are “grounds” to believe his examiner of record was “complicit” in this scheme is not a sufficient factual basis for me to draw the inference that the road test result is unreliable or marred by dishonesty in how the test was conducted. There is no articulation of what the “grounds” for this belief are, and whether the grounds themselves are reasonable, which even then would not necessarily satisfy me on the requisite standard of proof on a balance of probabilities the Registrar had met its burden. I find the evidence relied on by the Registrar is not sufficient for me to draw the inference it was more likely than not that public safety was compromised by an unreliable road test given to the appellant on November 15, 2022.

35For these reasons, when I scrutinize the evidence relied on by the Registrar with care, I find that it is not sufficiently clear or cogent to meet the balance of probabilities test. It is comprised of a number of conclusory statements about the SFO having “grounds” or “reasonable grounds” to believe the appellant’s driving examination was conducted in circumstances of dishonesty. The most pivotal aspect of the evidence – that the actual examiner of record conducted the test dishonestly – is comprised only of a conclusory statement the investigators have only “grounds” to believe this individual was involved in the bribery scheme. I find this conclusory statement, with no explanation for the “grounds” is not sufficient to permit me to find it is more likely than not this was the case. Therefore, I find the Registrar has not demonstrated to the requisite standard there was a sufficient reason to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

Issue Two: Downgrade

36The Registrar’s representative at the hearing, who also confirmed he was authorized to act on behalf of the Minister of Transportation, submitted the Minister took the decision to downgrade the appellant’s Class A licence pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act. The appellant submits that notwithstanding the representation at the hearing, the Minister could have also made the decision under s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act. The significance of this distinction is, as explained further below, there is a right of appeal from a decision taken under s. 32(b)(b)(i) of the Act but not s. 32(5)(b)(i). If I find the Minster made the downgrade only pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii), as the Minister’s representative submits was the case, I have no jurisdiction under s. 50(2) of the Act to make an order confirming, varying or setting aside the order.

37The relevant provisions of the Act provide:

32(5) The Minister may require an applicant for a driver’s licence or an endorsement or a person who holds a driver’s licence to submit to the examinations that are authorized by the regulations at the times and places required by the Minister and to meet other prescribed requirements, and the Minister may,

b) in the case of a person who holds a driver’s licence,

i. impose the conditions authorized by the regulations, remove any conditions or endorsements or change the class or classes of driver’s licence held by the person, in accordance with the results of the examinations and other prescribed requirements, or

ii. where the applicant failed to submit to or successfully complete the examinations or fails to meet the other prescribed requirements, refuse to issue a driver’s licence to the appellant.

50(1) Ever person aggrieved by a decision of the Minister made under subsection 32(5) for which there is a right of appeal, pursuant to a regulation made under clause 32(14)(n) or an order of the Registrar under clause 47(1)(b), may appeal the decision or order to the Tribunal.

38Further, I note that section 25.1 of O. Reg. 340/94 made under the Act states:

25.1 A decision made by the Minister under subclause 32 (5) (b) (i) of the Act is prescribed as a kind of decision a person may appeal under section 50 of the Act

39The Minister takes the position that because the appellant’s licence was downgraded pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. He submits that the right to appeal a Minister’s decision made under s. 32(5) of the Act is set out in s. 50(1) of the Act which provides that every person aggrieved by a decision of the Minister made under s. 32(5) for which there is a right of appeal pursuant to a regulation made under s. 32(14)(n) may appeal the decision to the Tribunal. The Minister argues that there is no regulation made under s. 32(14)(n) of the Act which creates a right to appeal a decision made by the Minister under s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, the Minister argues that there is no right of appeal of its decision to downgrade the appellant’s licence under s. 50(1) of the Act.

40The appellant does not disagree the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to decide and appeal if the Minister’s decision to downgrade his licence was made under s. 32(5)(b)(ii). Rather, he argues that the Minister must have actually made the decision to downgrade the licence pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the act, which the parties agree is a decision from which there lies a right of appeal under s. 50(1) of the Act. The appellant points to three unrelated cases decided by different adjudicators of the Tribunal where, in similar factual circumstances, the Minister indicated the decision to downgrade the appellant’s licence in those case was made under s. 32(5)(b)(i): Sharma v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17760; Kaur Brar v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17745 and Sidhu v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17747. The reasons in each of these cases state that the Minster relied on s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act when it made a decision to downgrade an appellant’s licence. The Sharma and Kaur Brar decisions, in which the Tribunal provided full written reasons, both involved similar factual circumstances that surrounded the decision to downgrade the appellant’s licence in those cases as are present here.

41The Registrar in turn relies on three recent decisions of this Tribunal (Singh v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17642; Singh v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17612; Singh v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2025 ONLAT HTA 17650). In each of these cases, the Minister relied on s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act to downgrade the appellant’s licence. In each case, the Tribunal held it did not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of a downgrade taken under this subsection of the Act.

42The respondent further submits that on a plain reading of s. 32(5), subsection (ii) is the apposite subsection under which to downgrade the appellant’s driver’s licence in the circumstances alleged by the Minister. He submits that the language “where the applicant failed to or successfully complete the examinations” applies to the circumstances of this case, as the Minister’s position is that the applicant’s test result was illegitimate as a result of the bribery scheme and thus vitiated, making it a failure to successfully complete an examination as contemplated by s. 32(5)(b)(ii). The appellant submits the Minister must have acted under s. 32(5)(b)(i), as that provision contemplates changing the class of a driver’s licence in accordance with the results of the examinations.

43In addition to these submissions, I raised with the parties the effect of the statement in the October 10, 2025 letter sent to the appellant by the Ministry advising him of the downgrade which reads “[y]ou have a right to appeal the decision to downgrade your driver licence to the Licence Appeal Tribunal, pursuant to subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.” The respondent’s representative submitted the addition of this sentence is a clerical error. The appellant’s representative did not make submissions that were responsive to this this point.

44I decide that I must accept the Minister’s representative’s submission that the decision to downgrade the appellant’s licence was made under s. 32(5)(b)(ii). The wording of that subsection of the Act applies, in part, to a situation where an applicant has failed to successfully complete an examination. That is distinct from s. 32(5)(b)(i) where the Minister takes an action on a driver’s licence in accordance with the results of an examination. It is the respondent’s position, as set out above in the analysis pertaining to s. 47(1)(g) of the Act, that the applicant, in effect, did not successfully complete the examination on November 15, 2022 as its process and result were tainted by a fraudulent scheme. This is a rational basis for the Minister to take the position that s. 32(5)(2)(ii) of the Act was applied when deciding to downgrade the appellant’s licence. While the appellant has supplied cases where the Minster indicated a decision to downgrade a licence was made under s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Act, these decisions do not set out reasons for why this the appropriate, or only, subsection to base a downgrade of a driver’s licence based on a concern about the the reliability of examination results.

45As for the clerical error in the October 10, 2025 letter, I find that the Minister cannot create a right of appeal for an appellant where neither the legislation nor the regulation do so. Either the Legislature does so by amending the Act, or the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council does so by regulation pursuant to s. 32(14)(n). The Minister is neither the Legislature nor Lieutenant Governor sitting in council with the provincial Cabinet led by the Premier.

46As I have found that the Minster downgraded the appellant’s driver’s licence pursuant to s. 32(5)(b)(ii) of the Act, it follows that I do not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that decision under 50(1) of the Act. There is no Regulation made under s. 32(14)(n) that creates a right of appeal form this subsection. This ground of appeal is therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

ORDER

47Pursuant to Rule 13.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules I make an order excluding pages 6, 9, 10 and 11 of Exhibit One filed in this proceeding from the publicly accessible record.

48The appeal from the decision to downgrade the appellant’s driver’s licence is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Released: January 19, 2026

__________________________

Emily Morton

Adjudicator