Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17923/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Diane Hnatiuk

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

AMENDED DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Gurleen Thethi

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Diane Hnatiuk, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

HEARD By Teleconference: Monday, December 15, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Diane Hnatiuk, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Tuesday, October 28, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, K.K. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the following grounds:

i. that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and

ii. that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and,

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was not stolen

6I am not satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

7In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

8In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

9The appellant testified that she never gave the driver of the vehicle permission to use her vehicle and that she did not know her personally. The appellant testified that her car was stolen as she received a call from the OPP notifying her of the impoundment. She stated that she had lent the vehicle to her son who occasionally used it to commute to work.

10On cross-examination, the appellant confirmed that her son had access to the keys and had stayed at the driver’s residence on the day of the impoundment. She acknowledged that she did not know how the driver obtained the keys, whether her son gave the driver permission to use the vehicle, or the nature of their relationship.

11The appellant did not press charges or report the vehicle as stolen to the police, and the officer who notified her of the impoundment did not indicate that the vehicle was stolen. These facts are significant because they do not establish that the driver took the vehicle without consent or that she intended to deprive the appellant of it. It is conceivable that the driver may have obtained the vehicle through the appellant’s son, who had regular access to it, and there is no corroborating evidence of theft beyond the appellant’s assumption. As the onus is on the appellant to establish that the vehicle was stolen, the appellant had to persuade me that it was more likely than not that the vehicle was stolen, and I am not persuaded of that fact based on the evidence before me.

12I find that the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

13I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

14The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

15If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

16If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

17The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

18The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

19I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

20The appellant testified that she and her husband are retired. The appellant further testified that she primarily used the impounded vehicle for personal errands and transporting her granddaughter to school. She explained that during the impoundment period, her husband’s truck was available and was used for groceries, prescriptions, medical appointments, and occasionally for transporting her granddaughter. However, the appellant stated that she personally could not drive the truck because it was too large for her to maneuver in city traffic and parking lots. She emphasized that this caused inconvenience and emotional distress but acknowledged that her husband was able to assist with transportation needs during the impoundment.

21The appellant did not identify any other alternatives she explored, such as public transit, rides from family or friends, or delivery services, nor did she provide evidence that these options were unavailable or unreasonable. Based on her testimony, while the impounded vehicle was her preferred vehicle, the evidence shows that another vehicle was available and used to meet essential needs.

22I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

23Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

24I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and,

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

25The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.