Ryan Ketonen v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2026 CanLII 6205

In the matter of an appeal under Section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from an Impoundment of a Motor Vehicle pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act

Between:

Ryan Ketonen

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Jan Dymond, Vice Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Ryan Ketonen, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by Teleconference: January 15, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Ryan Ketonen (the “appellant”) appeals the 45-day impoundment of his 2014 Chevrolet Cruize (the “vehicle”) under s. 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on September 24, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Michael Charles Genovese (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while his licence was under suspension resulting from a prescribed criminal conviction

2Under s.9 of Regulation 631/98 (the “Regulation”) an appeal to the Tribunal with respect to the impoundment of a motor vehicle must be filed within 15 days after the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded. The deadline for filing in this matter was October 9, 2025. The appellant filed an appeal 35 days past the filing deadline on November 13, 2025. He subsequently filed a Notice of Motion on November 15, 2025, requesting that the Tribunal extend the time to file an appeal.

3Today a hearing via teleconference was convened to consider the appellant’s motion to extend the time to file an appeal. The appellant was self represented. Leila Pereira attended on behalf of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “respondent”).

RESULT

4The appellant’s motion that the appeal deadline should be extended to allow the appeal to be filed and heard by the Tribunal is denied. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

5Section 9 of O. Reg 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”) stipulates that an appeal under s. 50.2 of the Act, with respect to the impoundment of a motor vehicle under s. 55.1, must be filed with the Tribunal no later than 15 days after the day the vehicle was detained for impoundment.

6Under s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, the Tribunal may extend a time limitation under the Act or Regulation to file an appeal if the Tribunal is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for doing so.

7The grounds for considering an extension are articulated in Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492. On a motion to extend the time to appeal, the Court determined that the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case compels the Tribunal to conclude that granting an extension is appropriate. The factors to consider in deciding the justice of the case are:

i. the existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

ii. the length of the delay;

iii. prejudice to the other party; and

iv. the merits of the appeal.

8The analysis requires a balancing of these factors applied to the facts. No one factor takes precedence over the others. The overriding consideration is whether the “justice of the case” requires that an extension be granted.

9The appellant has the onus to demonstrate a factual foundation for the reasonable grounds to grant the extension. The appellant did not address all four factors directly; however, having considered the circumstances of the case as described by the parties’ submissions in relation to two of the four factors, namely intention to appeal within the appeal period, and length of the delay, I conclude that the justice of the case does not support an extension of the time limit for the following reasons.

Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period

10The appellant submitted that he was unaware of his right to appeal until the driver of the vehicle suggested that it might be available as means of reducing the costs of the impoundment. The appellant could not recall the date on which the driver made the suggestion but speculates it might have been about a week before the appeal was filed. As the appeal was filed on November 13, 2025, the appellant’s estimate of one week before filing would put the date on which he first intended to exercise his right of appeal on or about November 6, 2025, which is 27 days past the 15-day time limit to file an appeal.

11Section 55.1(5) of the Act requires that every officer who detains a motor vehicle shall, as soon as practicable,

(a) prepare a notice identifying the motor vehicle that is to be impounded, the name and address of the driver, the date and time of the impoundment, the period of time for which the motor vehicle is impounded and the place where the vehicle may be recovered;

(b) serve the driver with a copy of the notice; and

(c) forward a copy of the notice to the Registrar.

12Under s. 55.1(6), service of the notice on the driver is deemed to be service to the owner. The appellant acknowledges that he saw a copy of the impoundment notice issued by the police to the driver but does not recall having seen any information about a right of appeal as part of that document.

13The respondent submitted copies of a Notice to Registrar (“NTR”) sent to the appellant, stating that it was sent to the appellant by regular mail on September 25, 2026 and a Notice of Impoundment and Release (“NOIR”) dated September 25, 2026, both of which were to the appellant’s current address within the appeal period. The appellant confirmed that the address on the documents is a correct one but stated that he did not recall having received either document. He stated that normally his mother lets him know when he has mail but could not provide an explanation as to why he did not receive the NTR or NOIR.

14As a result of the appellant’s inability to recall key dates and details related to his appeal, limited efforts to determine how to appeal and lack of explanation as to why he did not receive the NTR and NOIR, I find that the appellant did not have a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period and that the justice of the case does not support an extension on the basis of a bona fide intention to appeal.

Length of the delay

15The respondent submitted that the 35-day delay is significant and that the appellant had not provided a reasonable explanation for the delay.

16I find the length of delay of 35 days from the end of the 15-day filing period to be significant .

17The appellant acknowledges that the police informed him of the impoundment on the day the vehicle was impounded which means that a total of 50 days passed between the impoundment and the date that the appellant filed his appeal. While I appreciate that the appellant’s work conditions may have constrained his ability to make inquiries, it does not explain such a lengthy delay. Furthermore, I am not satisfied by the appellant’s submissions that he was not aware of his right of appeal until early November because he did not receive/see the NTR or NOIR. While it is possible that one document might have gone astray, it is unlikely that neither document was delivered.

18As a result, I find that the justice of the case does not support an extension on the basis of the length of delay.

Prejudice to the other party

19The respondent submitted that granting an extension of the time to file an appeal would cause prejudice to the respondent because of the costs of the impoundment that could result from a favourable decision for the appellant.

20The appellant submits that he has limited financial resources and has not, to date, been able to afford to reclaim the vehicle from the impoundment facility. He submits that the driver was to cover the impoundment fees but subsequently returned to British Columbia without covering the impoundment costs.

21I am not persuaded by the respondent’s position. The right of appeal and the Tribunal’s authority to extend a timeline exist in order to afford vehicle owners an opportunity to be heard on the merits of an appeal. I find that the prospect of the respondent losing the case and attendant consequences are not, in and of themselves, prejudice. That the respondent might lose and might have to pay the costs of the impoundment is part of the statutory framework and is unaffected by the appellant’s delay in filing. Further, the fact that the respondent may be at risk for the costs of the 45-day impoundment period is outweighed by the potential prejudice to the appellant of not having the merits heard.

22I find that there is no prejudice to the respondent caused by the delay in filing, and that the balance of prejudice is to the appellant which weighs in favour of granting an extension.

Merits of the appeal

23To consider the justice of the case for an extension of the time limit based on the merits of the appeal, I must only be satisfied that there is some merit to the appeal based on the submissions before me. This is not an exercise in prejudging the hearing outcome.

24The merits of the appeal hinge on the reasons for the appeal and on what grounds the appellant believes his vehicle should be ordered released.

25The appellant is appealing on the grounds that the driver’s licence was not suspended at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded; that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to ensure that the driver had a valid driver’s licence, as well as on the ground of exceptional hardship.

26The appellant submitted that the driver’s 2002 licence suspension had been resolved and that the car should not have been impounded.

27In terms of due diligence, the appellant submitted that his own driver’s licence is suspended, and that he asked the driver whether he had a valid driver’s licence before lending him the vehicle. The appellant submitted a copy of a B.C. driver’s licence belonging to the driver in support.

28With respect to exceptional hardship, as stated in paragraph 21 above, the appellant submits that he does not have the financial resources to reclaim the vehicle.

29The respondent submitted that the appellant is able to get to work without a vehicle and does not meet the test for exceptional hardship.

30The respondent submitted that the appellant has little chance of succeeding under the grounds listed in his application and the motion should be dismissed for lack of merit.

31I find the appeal has sufficient merit to satisfy the related criterion for extension of time. The appellant’s submissions on the grounds that the driver’s licence of the driver was not suspended, that he exercised due diligence, and will suffer exceptional hardship are worthy of a hearing.

32I find there is some merit to the appeal, which weighs in favour of granting an extension.

Conclusion

33In balancing the four factors, I find that the justice of the case does not support granting an extension. While I find that the prejudice to the appellant outweighs the prejudice to the respondent, and I find there is some merit to the appeal, I find that these factors alone do not establish that the justice of the case requires an extension given my findings that the appellant did not have a bona fide intention to file within the appeal period, and that the 35-day delay was significant.

34As I find that the appellant had no bona fide intention to appeal during the statutory appeal period and that the delay in filing an appeal was significant, the motion for the extension of time for filing is denied.

ORDER

35The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.