Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18768/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Linda Pope

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Jeffery Campbell

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Linda Pope, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

Heard by teleconference:

June 18, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Linda Pope (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her 2025 Infiniti QX60 (the “Infinity”) under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on June 7, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, the vehicle was being driven by her son, P.W., while his driver’s licence was under suspension due to a criminal conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue to be determined is:

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

result

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5The representative of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) presented documentary evidence, specifically a Notice to Registrar, which established that the appellant is the registered owner of the vehicle and that the vehicle was stopped while being driven by P.W. whose licence was suspended due to a Criminal Code conviction. I am therefore satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.

6For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an Appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the Appellant.

The impoundment of the vehicle will not result in exceptional hardship in accordance with s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act

7I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under the Act and O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”).

8The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

10If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

11The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am satisfied that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant lives in Caledonia, Ontario, with her three children, her partner, and her two children. She testified that she is employed as a nurse, a role that requires her to drive approximately 70 kilometres to her workplace, as well as to travel to patients’ locations. She further testified that, beginning three days after the impoundment of the Infiniti (as she initially needed access to her wallet, which was inside the vehicle), she has relied on a rental vehicle for work-related travel and to obtain essential items for her family, including groceries and prescription medications.

14The appellant also has a medical appointment in Hamilton in July during the impoundment period. She expects to also use the rental vehicle for that purpose.

15The appellant testified that her children travel to school by bus. She further testified that, although there is another vehicle registered in her name (a 2013 Lincoln), it is used by her partner for work during daytime hours.

16The Registrar submits that as the appellant has the use of a rental vehicle, the appellant has an alternative to the Infiniti. Also, the children have not missed school as they transported to and from school by way of the school bus.

17I agree with the Registrar. While the cost of the rental vehicle may understandably impose a burden on the appellant, its availability nonetheless constitutes an alternative to the Infiniti. Accordingly, I find that an alternative to the impounded vehicle exists.

18Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

CONCLUSION

19I find that the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

20The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Jeffery Campbell

Vice-Chair