RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-004554/AABS
Case Name: Semi Murtonen v. TD General Insurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Jun Ki Lee, Counsel
For the Respondent: Kamil Podleszanski, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On March 10, 2026, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision released February 17, 2026 (“decision”).
2Stemming from an accident on December 9, 2022 and a request for benefits made pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”), the parties participated in a written hearing. In the decision, the Tribunal found the applicant was not removed from the Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”), and, as a result, there was no need to assess the disputed medical benefits based on reasonableness and necessity. The Tribunal further dismissed the requests for an income replacement benefit (“IRB”) and interest.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The applicant selected Rule 18.2(b) and Rule 18.2(c) on her Request for Reconsideration form. In reply, the applicant limited the scope of her reconsideration request to the IRB and interest. She is asking the Tribunal to either issue an order finding she is entitled to these two issues, or, in the alternative, she is seeking to have this part of the dispute sent to a rehearing.
5The respondent asks the Tribunal to dismiss the request for reconsideration.
RESULT
6The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold, and the requesting party must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence.
8The Rule 18.2(c) arguments impact some of the grounds raised by the applicant under Rule 18.2(b). As such, I am addressing these arguments first.
Rule 18.2(c) – Evidence Not Before the Tribunal
9I find the applicant has not established any grounds for reconsideration based on Rule 18.2(c).
10To trigger Rule 18.2(c), a party must meet all three parts of the following test:
There is “evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision”;
This evidence “could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it”; and,
This evidence “would likely have affected the result”.
11The applicant lists several pieces of new evidence in support of her request for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(c):
a. The applicant’s catastrophic impairment reports (dated March 7, 2025);
b. The respondent’s catastrophic impairment reports (dated August 27, 2025);
c. The applicant’s removal from the MIG (via letters from the respondent dated September 5 and October 6, 2025); and,
d. The respondent’s approval of the disputed TMJ assessment treatment plan (via a letter dated October 29, 2025).
12The applicant mainly highlights findings from the respondent’s experts that her level of functioning is significantly impaired. According to the applicant, these findings are at odds with the conclusions reached by the Tribunal in the decision.
13Though I accept that this evidence was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, I am not satisfied that the applicant has shown that this evidence “could not have been obtained previously”. Aside from the fact that the applicant’s initial written hearing submissions were filed on April 24, 2025 (i.e., almost two months after her catastrophic reports were completed), the decision was not rendered until February 2026. In fact, when it came to the removal from the MIG and the approval of the TMJ assessment, the applicant was instructed by the case conference adjudicator to inform the Tribunal right away (at paragraph 21 of the case conference report and order): “If the parties resolve the issues in dispute, the applicant shall immediately advise the Tribunal in writing.”
14I understand that the applicant has no control over how long the respondent will take to complete its reports, nor can she predict when it will make a determination about the issues in dispute. However, once she had evidence in her possession that she believed was central to the case, it was imperative that she took prompt steps to try and put these new documents before the Tribunal. At the very least, she should have immediately informed the Tribunal that certain issues were no longer in dispute.
15Overall, the applicant has not met the test under Rule 18.2(c).
Rule 18.2(b) – Errors of Fact or Law
16The applicant raises several alleged errors with the IRB denial. I do not find any of these arguments trigger Rule 18.2(b).
17First, the applicant claims the Tribunal’s finding that she could perform “medium physical demand” tasks is contradicted by her “lived reality, as she forced to close her farm-to-table business”. Similarly, the applicant adds that the new records noted above, namely, the IE reports, confirm that her ability to work her pre-accident job has been significantly impacted.
18I do not find this submission is an error that would trigger Rule 18.2(b). Though the applicant may disagree with the Tribunal’s assessment of her capacity to perform her pre-accident employment, this argument is better understood as a disagreement with the Tribunal’s weighing of the evidence. As noted above, this is not a proper use of the reconsideration process. Unless a requesting party can show that the Tribunal’s analysis was legally impermissible (or that it made a factual error), these evidentiary assessments will not be disrupted.
19Further, though the applicant referred to the parties’ catastrophic impairment reports as corroboration for her IRB claim, she has not established grounds under Rule 18.2(c) to admit these reports into the hearing.
20The applicant also challenges the Tribunal’s choice to discount the findings from her psychiatric assessor, Dr. Seif. Specifically, the applicant claims the Tribunal focused too heavily on the lack of an in-person interview in concluding that this report merited less weight. Moreover, the Tribunal failed to grapple with how this assessor performed the same psychometric testing as the respondent’s assessor, Dr. Ricci, yet the two experts reached markedly different diagnoses. According to the applicant, the Tribunal’s approach runs afoul of Sahedeo v. Pafco Insurance Company, 2023 ONSC 2542 (“Sahedeo”), and Lara v. Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2024 CanLII 126933 (ON LAT) (“Lara”).
21I do not accept this ground for reconsideration. The Tribunal addressed the weight assigned to Dr. Seif’s report at paragraphs 13 – 18:
Dr. Seif assessed the applicant as detailed in a report dated September 18, 2024. It is noted that Dr. Seif did not meet with the applicant. The applicant met virtually with Mr. D. Ross (registered social worker) who interviewed the applicant and administered the psychometric testing. Dr. Seif then made her diagnosis based on the results of the testing and a review of the notes taken by Mr. Ross.
Firstly, I put little weight on the report of Dr. Seif because, contrary to the applicant’s submissions, she is not the applicant’s treating psychiatrist. In fact, there is no evidence before the Tribunal that Dr. Seif has ever met with the applicant.
In the report, Dr. Seif does not identify any of the essential tasks of the applicant’s self-employment or give any explanation as to why she is unable to perform them.
Rather, Dr. Seif simply writes:
[The applicant] has been unable to continue developing her organic farm-to-table business, which is located on the family’s farm. Physical and mental disability has affected her work performance, resulting in the closure of her business. The unknown time of her recovery hinders her ability to project a long-term back-to-work re-entry plan for either self-employment and employment.
Secondly, this contrasts with the opinion of Dr. Ricci who assessed the applicant on October 11, 2023. Dr. Ricci found that the applicant did not meet the criteria for an accident-related psychological diagnosis. Dr. Ricci states that it [is] her opinion that the applicant does not suffer a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her pre-accident employment.
As Dr. Seif has never met the applicant, I give greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Ricci who personally assessed the applicant. I find that, on the balance of probabilities, the applicant has not proven a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her pre-accident self-employment due to a psychological injury sustained in the accident.
22Though the applicant may claim that more attention should have been paid to the methodological overlap between the assessors (as well as the disparity between their diagnoses), this submission is, again, a request to re-weigh the parties’ evidence. The Tribunal reviewed the methodology used by Dr. Seif, and it provided clear reasons to explain why it found this opinion was less persuasive than Dr. Ricci’s report. I further note that the lack of an in-person interview was only one of the reasons provided for this evidentiary assessment. The Tribunal also took issue with how Dr. Seif did “not identify any of the essential tasks of the applicant’s self-employment or give any explanation as to why she is unable to perform them”.
23Turning to the case law, I do not find these decisions assist the applicant. First, not only did the Divisional Court ultimately uphold the Tribunal’s handling of the parties’ evidence in Sahedeo, but the applicant is relying on this case to suggest that the Tribunal did not “grapple with” Dr. Seif’s report. As the quotation above demonstrates, the Tribunal reviewed the report and explained why it assigned this opinion less weight.
24Then, aside from the fact that Tribunal decisions are not binding, the applicant is citing Lara to support the position that “noted objections to file-review methodology go to weight, not admissibility”. There is no indication that the Tribunal barred Dr. Seif’s report from the hearing record.
25Finally, the applicant challenges the respondent’s argument on reconsideration about quantum. As the entitlement findings from the decision remain undisturbed, I do not find it is necessary to address the parties’ dispute over the IRB quantum.
26In sum, the applicant has not established any error that meets the standard of Rule 18.2(b).
CONCLUSION & ORDER
27The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Craig Mazerolle
Vice-Chair
Released: June 17, 2026