RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Jan Dymond, Vice Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17985/MED
Case Name: Kuhn v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Written Submissions by:
For the Appellant: Brandon Kuhn, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Melissa Litrenta, Agent
OVERVIEW
1On March 27, 2026, the appellant, Brandon Kuhn, requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated March 27, 2026 (“decision”).
2The appellant filed an appeal of a decision by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”), dated October 30, 2025, to extend an ignition interlock device (“IID”) condition attached to his driver’s licence.
3On January 5, 2026, the Registrar filed a Notice of Motion (“NOM”) with the Tribunal requesting that the appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
4The NOM was heard, along with the substantive issue, at a teleconference hearing held on March 13, 2026.
5In its decision, the Tribunal found that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal, because the decision by the Registrar to extend an IID condition falls under s. 57 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”), and O. Reg. 287/08, and this decision is not appealable under s. 50(1) of the Act.
6The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
7The appellant relies on Rule 18.2(a) and Rule 18.2(b) to support this reconsideration request. Specifically, the appellant submits the following:
a) The Tribunal committed a breach of procedural fairness because the Ministry of Transportation (“MOT”) did not disclose evidence;
b) The Tribunal made a material error of law by finding that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and,
c) The Tribunal made a factual error in relying on information provided by the MOT’s third party vendor, Alcolock.
8The appellant also submits that the case demonstrates broad issues of transparency and accountability by the MOT; however, the appellant has not shown how these considerations are relevant to reconsideration of the decision; therefore, I will not address them.
9The Registrar asks the Tribunal to dismiss the request for reconsideration. It submits that the appellant has not demonstrated that the Tribunal made an error of law or fact, or committed a breach of procedural fairness.
10The appellant requests the following relief:
a) That the Tribunal reconsider its finding on jurisdiction;
b) Find that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case;
c) In the alternative, find that the process was procedurally unfair and require proper disclosure and reconsideration of the MOT’s decision;
d) Direct that the MOT produce full disclosure of all evidence and policies relied upon; and
e) Grant any further relief the Tribunal considers just.
RESULT
11The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
12The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the Tribunal’s decision that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
13As a preliminary comment, the majority of the appellant’s submissions do not connect to his grounds for reconsideration, but, instead, they address the MOT’s procedures and the basis for the MOT’s decision. I am mindful that the appellant is proceeding with this request without the assistance of counsel or a paralegal. Therefore, I will review his arguments as submitted through the lens of the criteria under Rule 18.2.
Rule 18.2(a) – The Tribunal did not commit a material breach of procedural fairness.
14The appellant submits that the MOT breached procedural fairness by failing to disclose evidence that it relied on in extending his ignition interlock condition. His submissions do not allege or address any breach of procedural fairness committed by the Tribunal.
15In order for the Tribunal to consider breach of procedural fairness at reconsideration, there must have been a breach of procedural fairness by the Tribunal (either at the hearing or in the decision) that is subject to the reconsideration request.
16I understand the appellant’s position with respect to his requests for the records on which the extension of his IIG condition was made, and his desire to have his concerns considered; however, I find that he has not established how the requested records relied upon by the MOT to extend his IIG condition are relevant to the decision on jurisdiction.
17For the reasons above, I find that the appellant has not met his onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Tribunal committed a material breach of procedural fairness.
Rule 18.2(b) – The Tribunal did not make an error of law by finding that the decision of the Registrar was made in accordance with [s. 57](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html#sec57_smooth) of the [Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html).
18I find the appellant has not established that the Tribunal made an error in law by finding that the Registrar’s authority to extend an IID condition falls under s. 57 of the Act and O. Reg. 287/08, and, as a result, is not appealable under s. 50.1 of the Act.
19The appellant submits that the Tribunal should have accepted his argument at the hearing that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear his appeal, because the decision falls under s. 32(5)(b)(i), which is appealable under s. 50.1 of the Act. This appears to be the same argument that the appellant made at the hearing. The appellant does not advance any new argument or cite any jurisprudence in support of his position that s. 32(5)(b)(i) applies.
20In their decision, the panel addressed the appellant’s argument that extension of the IID condition falls under s. 32(5)(b)(i). They provided a detailed analysis of their reasons for finding that the extension falls under s. 57 and O. Reg. 287/08.
21I appreciate that the appellant does not agree with the Tribunal’s finding; however, as stated above, reconsideration is not an opportunity to relitigate a decision that a party disagrees with. Instead, a party requesting reconsideration must show that the Tribunal erred (either legally or factually) in reaching this conclusion. Disagreement alone is not enough.
22The appellant also argues that the Tribunal failed to properly assess its jurisdiction by focusing solely on the statutory source cited by the Registrar at the hearing and should have considered the substance and effect of the decision. He cites practical impacts, including that he is not permitted to remove the IID; continuing restriction on his driver’s licence; requirement to continue on with the IID program; and continued associated costs.
23The Tribunal’s authority flows from the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. G. Its duties and powers are set out in s. 3(1), which states that it may only hold hearings and perform duties that are expressly assigned to it by or under any Act or regulation. In other words, in determining whether the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hold a hearing, the Tribunal first must look to the applicable statute. Unless specifically permitted under an Act or regulation, the Tribunal does not have the authority to consider a party’s appeal.
24The appellant does not cite any jurisprudence or authority for his position that the Tribunal has the authority to consider the effects of its decision in making a finding with respect to jurisdiction, and I find that no such allowance is provided in the Act or regulations.
25I understand the appellant’s concerns with respect to the impact that the MOT decision has on his licence status as stated in his submission and that the panel’s finding of no-jurisdiction prevents him from having his appeal heard on the merits. However, for the reasons above, I am unable to find that the Tribunal should have considered the substance and effect of the decision in its determination of jurisdiction.
26As a result, I find that the appellant has not met his onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Tribunal made an error in law such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.
Rule 18.2(b) – The Tribunal did not make an error of fact by finding that the decision of the Registrar was made in accordance with [s. 57](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html#sec57_smooth) of the [Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h8/latest/rso-1990-c-h8.html).
27The appellant submits that the decision appears to rely heavily, if not entirely, on information provided by the MOT’s third party vendor, Alcolock; however, it does not appear that the appellant is referring to the Tribunal decision that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the application. A plain reading of the appellant’s submissions suggests that his submissions are with respect to the MOT’s decision to extend the IID condition of his licence. Nonetheless, I will address his submissions with respect to the Tribunal decision.
28I have reviewed the Tribunal decision and, while there is a reference to a report of an interlock service provider in the historical review of the application, there is no reference to such a report in the reasons for the Tribunal’s decision with respect to jurisdiction. Decisions with respect to jurisdiction must be made based on the relevant statutes and regulations, and, while the appellant’s submissions with respect to the IID provider’s report might have relevance to a decision at a merits hearing, I find that they are not relevant to reconsideration of the decision on jurisdiction.
29As a result, I find that the appellant has not met his onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
30I find that the appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Jan Dymond Vice-Chair
Released: June 9, 2026

