Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18340/MED

In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”), from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Jose Pavao

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Dr. Kailey Minnings, MD

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Nelson Pavao, Representative Jose Pavao, Appellant

For the Respondent:

Stephen Grootenboer, Representative

HEARD: May 13, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Jose Pavao (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend their Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received a report from a treating healthcare provider that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect his safety to drive.

2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend his licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He denies that he suffers from alcohol use disorder and denies that he suffers from a medical condition which interferes with his ability to drive safely.

5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

ISSUES

6The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

7To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant suffer from alcohol use disorder?

ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

8The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”

RESULT

9Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from alcohol use disorder?

10The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder.

11The Registrar’s position is supported by a medical report that was sent to them by emergency room physician Dr. Moffatt at St. Joseph’s Health Centre. The report is dated February 16, 2026 and indicates that the appellant has alcohol use disorder.

12The appellant denies that he suffers from alcohol use disorder. He testified that he typically consumes a few beers or one glass of wine with lunch, but that he has not been diagnosed with or treated for alcohol use disorder.

13During the appellant’s testimony it became evident that he could not recall if or why he had attended the emergency room at St. Joseph’s Health Centre in February of 2026. He stated that he did not know why an emergency room physician concluded that he has alcohol use disorder, that he was not under the influence of alcohol when he had visited the hospital, and that he did not receive treatment for any alcohol-related problem.

14Mr. Nelson Pavao, the appellant’s son, appeared at the hearing as the appellant’s representative and interpreter. He submitted that the emergency room visit in question occurred on February 14, 2026 and that it was for an ulcer on the appellant’s foot. He submitted that the appellant was treated over the course of a couple of days for a foot ulcer and a heart arrhythmia.

15The appellant’s Notice of Appeal, which was written by Mr. Nelson Pavao on behalf of his father, indicates that the appellant was dealing with a number of stressors in early 2026 and that he “began to spiral and drinking heavily.” When asked at the hearing, the appellant testified that he had been drinking more than usual for about one week leading up to February 14, 2026, but he could not recall the amount of alcohol that he had been drinking or the week in question.

16I place more weight on the opinion of the emergency room physician that the appellant has alcohol use disorder than on the appellant’s testimony that he does not. A physician working in an emergency room would have the training, expertise and experience required to recognize the signs and symptoms of alcohol use disorder, to diagnose the condition, and to treat its complications. I find the appellant’s testimony unreliable as he was unable to remember his hospital visit or the amount of alcohol he had been consuming leading up to the visit. The statements made by the appellant’s representative are unsworn and untested and I place little weight on them.

17I find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from alcohol use disorder.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

18I find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

19The Registrar argues that alcohol use disorder interferes with the appellant’s ability to drive safely in that alcohol use can significantly interfere with and impair the functions necessary for driving including judgement, reaction time, alertness and motor coordination.

20The Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [February 2021] (the “CCMTA Standards”), Chapter 15.6.3, which states that all drivers suffering from substance use disorder, including alcohol, may be eligible for a licence if they meet the criteria for remission and/or have abstained for twelve months. It also states that earlier re-licencing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addiction specialist and/or treating physician recognized by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program.

21Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but are not bound by them.

22The Registrar also points to the appellant’s extended driving record, which includes past offences for driving under the influence of alcohol.

23The appellant denies that his alcohol use impacts his ability to drive safely. He testified that he has a clean driving record for the past 40 years with no tickets, charges or accidents and that he has remained abstinent from alcohol since February 14, 2026.

24The appellant testified that he has not submitted additional information regarding his alcohol use from a treating healthcare provider because he was not aware he needed to do so. Mr. Nelson Pavao submitted that the appellant did approach his family physician to complete the Substance Use Assessment form, as requested by the Registrar, but that the family doctor advised that the appellant would need to complete an alcohol treatment program first.

25Under cross examination, the appellant admitted that he has driven under the influence of alcohol, but that it was more than 40 years ago.

26Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but are not bound by them.

27I find the CCMTA standards reasonable, and I have considered them here. It is concerning that there is medical documentation indicating that the appellant has alcohol use disorder and although remote, there is evidence of driving while intoxicated. The appellant’s testimony at the hearing was unreliable and at times inconsistent. The statements made by the appellant’s representative were not subjected to cross examination and I assign little weight to them.

28At minimum, further information to better delineate the appellant’s alcohol use and diagnosis and functional impact (i.e., the Substance Use Assessment form) is required. If a severe alcohol use disorder is confirmed, I agree that a period of abstinence, treatment, and a favourable recommendation from a treating physician are prudent and reasonable requirements for a return to driving and is in keeping with road safety.

29I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

Conclusion

30I find that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely alcohol use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

31For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.