Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18604/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Lisa Locke

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

VICE-CHAIR: Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Lisa Locke, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Martin He, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Tuesday, May 12, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Lisa Locke, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Thursday, March 19, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Joseph Goulden (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension

6I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

8Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

9In this case, the appellant was told by the driver at some time before the date of the impoundment that he had a licence although she could not say specifically when that was. The driver is someone the appellant knows through meeting him in the shelter system and she has known him for a few years. Other than this, the appellant took no steps to determine the driver’s licence status.

10As I noted, due diligence requires more than simply assuming that the driver is properly licenced based on their own verbal assurances. In this case the appellant did not take any action, even as simple as asking to see the licence to determine if it was valid. In my view this is not sufficient to establish due diligence.

11I find that the appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

12I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

13The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

14If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

15If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

16The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

17The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

18I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

19The appellant testified that she normally uses the vehicle to attend medical appointments and to complete her daily errands such as obtaining food from various locations and other errands. She is not employed but may be looking for work at some point in the future.

20While the car was impounded, the appellant has completed her usual activities by taking the bus and walking. Some of her usual activities are within walking distance and others can be done using the city buses. The appellant did not argue that there are significant activities that she is unable to do by using alternative means of transportation.

21The appellant did say that having a vehicle is a source of independence for her and it has been quite difficult and inconvenient having to go without a vehicle since hers was impounded. I sympathize with this concern but that is not a consideration that is open for me to consider given the definition of alternative contained in the Regulation.

22I also, unfortunately, cannot consider the cost of the impoundment itself. The impoundment has ended and in my view the Act is worded in such a way that the costs of the impoundment itself is not a factor that I am permitted to consider in determining exceptional hardship particularly where it has not been established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

23Again, while I am sympathetic to the difficulties the impoundment, and particularly the cost of the impoundment, has caused, this is not something that I am able to consider when making my determination.

24I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

25Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

26I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

27The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.