RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before:
Jeremy A. Roberts, Vice-Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number:
25-003550/AABS
Case Name:
Feng Tong Guan v. Co-operators General Insurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant:
Vanessa Liang, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Julianne Brimfield, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On March 30, 2026, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated March 9, 2026 (“decision”).
2The parties participated in a one-day videoconference hearing. In the decision that followed, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not entitled to the treatment plans in dispute, interest, or an award.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The applicant argues that the Tribunal made errors of law or fact such that it would have likely reached a different conclusion had those errors not been made. Furthermore, the applicant argues that there is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision which would likely have affected the result.
5The respondent submits that the applicant has not satisfied the grounds for a reconsideration.
6The applicant requests that the decision be varied to find that she is entitled to the treatment plans in dispute and interest. There were no submissions from the applicant regarding the award claim.
RESULT
7The applicant’s request for reconsideration is denied.
ANALYSIS
8The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
Rule 18.2(b) – I find that the Tribunal did not make an error of fact or law such that it would have likely reached a different result had the error not been made
9I find that the Tribunal has not made an error of law or fact such that it would have likely reached a different result had the error not been made, because the applicant failed to meet the high threshold required for a reconsideration request.
10The applicant argues that multiple errors of law or fact were made in the decision, including: (1) interpreting s.25 too narrowly; (2) applying the wrong test by focusing on duplication, rather than on whether each assessment was reasonable and necessary; (3) failing to clarify the specific issues advanced; (4) imposing an unduly high threshold for the endocrinology assessment; (5) inconsistently rejecting distinct assessments and fees; and (6) failing to address interpretation costs as a separate, necessary expense. Overall, the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to uphold the remedial nature of the SABS.
11The respondent argues that the applicant’s submissions amount to nothing more than an attempt to re-litigate the matter. It argues that the applicant failed to prove that the treatment plans were reasonable and necessary, and she failed, in several instances, to provide evidence to support her submissions.
12I find that the Tribunal did not make an error of law or fact such that it would have likely reached a different result, because it accurately defined the tests, analyzed the evidence, and made findings based on that evidence. Firstly, the applicant’s reference to the SABS being consumer protection legislation does not include a reference to a specific error that she believes was made in this regard. The mere fact of stating that the SABS is consumer protection legislation without concrete examples suggesting that the Tribunal did not uphold this standard does not carry weight. Secondly, I find that the applicable legal framework for the reasonable and necessary test was properly outlined in paragraphs 17-19 & 49. The applicant has not provided any legal authorities that state that duplication cannot be considered as part of the reasonable and necessary test and, in fact, the Tribunal has consistently found that duplication of treatment or an assessment can undermine the reasonableness and necessity of a plan. I also reject the premise that the Tribunal failed to assess the individualized portions of the treatment plan, as the decision clearly separates the component parts into different headings with specific analysis (for example, paragraph 31 where the Tribunal outlines the component parts of the plan that the applicant is seeking)
13Equally, I see no evidence in the decision that the test thresholds applied to the applicant were unduly high, or that improper tests were utilized for assessments, fees, or interpretation costs. For example, as it relates to the endocrinology assessment, the Tribunal laid out the reasonable and necessary test in paragraph 17, indicated the onus in paragraph 18, and further elaborated on guidance from the SABS on considering assessments in paragraph 19. The Tribunal then applied that test to the evidence in paragraph 23, making a finding that the assessment was not reasonable and necessary as a result of evidence the Tribunal found compelling regarding the applicant’s potentially pre-existing diabetes. Disagreement with that finding does not amount to it being an error of fact and the reconsideration is not an opportunity to relitigate the case.
14Nor do I accept the argument that the Tribunal was too narrow in its interpretation of the tests under s.25. As noted above, the legal tests were properly identified. Moreover, the Tribunal provided analysis and findings with reasons in detail in paragraphs 23-26, 38-41, 45-47, 52-53, 57, & 63-64. In fact, on the specific issue of interpretation costs, the Tribunal specifically referenced the authority in the FSRA guidelines in paragraphs 61-62, and the panel provided their reasons for why they followed this authority in paragraph 63.
15Additionally, even if there were errors of law or fact, the applicant failed to make submissions as to how these errors would have likely led to a different result, which is the second part of the reconsideration test under Rule 18.2(b). In this case, I find that the applicant’s arguments amount largely to an attempt at re-litigation of the evidence. No evidence was provided which suggested how the errors enumerated would have likely led to different results.
Rule 18.2(c) – I find that the result of the original hearing would not have been affected by the introduction of new evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision
16I find that the result of the original hearing would not have been affected by the introduction of new evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, because the new evidence presented by the applicant could reasonably have been obtained prior to the original hearing.
17To trigger Rule 18.2(c), a party must meet the following three-part test:
There is “evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision”;
This evidence “could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it”; and,
This evidence “would likely have affected the result”.
18The applicant argues that had the Tribunal had access to the Internal Medicine Assessment (dated June 3, 2025); excerpts of her prior testimony regarding a lack of diabetic symptoms; and information regarding common costs for interpretation, that the results of the hearing would have been altered. According to the applicant, this evidence related to the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment plans in dispute.
19The respondent argues that none of the evidence provided by the applicant qualifies as “new”, because it could have been obtained by her for the hearing at first instance.
20I find that the applicant has not met the test for reconsideration outlined in Rule 18.2(c), because the evidence listed by the applicant could reasonably have been obtained prior to the previous hearing by the applicant. In considering the three new pieces of evidence, none of these items meet the standard of “could not have been previously obtained” prior to the scheduled hearing, which took place on December 16, 2025. The medical report is dated 6-months prior to the hearing and would have therefore been available. The applicant could have at any time provided the information referenced in the testimony, but she did not do so. Finally, the information about the interpretation costs was publicly available and could have been obtained at any time prior to the original hearing.
21Given that none of this evidence satisfies the test detailed above, I find that the applicant has failed to establish a basis for reconsideration on the grounds of Rule 18.2(c).
CONCLUSION & ORDER
22The applicant’s request for reconsideration is denied.
Jeremy A. Roberts
Vice-Chair
Released: June 8, 2026