Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18486/MED

An appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.

Between:

Alexander Gillam

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dr. Isla McPherson, Member

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Alexander Gillam, Appellant

For the Respondent: Stephen Grootenboer, Agent

Held by teleconference: May 4, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Alexander Gillam (the “appellant”) appeals from the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (“Registrar”) to suspend his Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) after the Registrar received medical information from a physician documenting that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that may affect his ability to drive safely.

2The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason. Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Act (the “Regulation”) states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with their ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Registrar may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.

3The Registrar takes the position that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely substance use disorder, that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely and that this provides sufficient reason to suspend his licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act.

4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the Act. He agrees he has been diagnosed with substance use disorder but denies that he suffers from a medical condition which interferes with his ability to drive safely.

5Pursuant to section 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify, or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.

6The Open Court Principle was reviewed at the outset of the hearing.

ISSUES

7The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

8To resolve that issue, I will address the following questions:

i. Does the appellant suffer from substance use disorder?

ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

9The Registrar bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the answer to each of the above questions is “yes.”

RESULT

10Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, I find that the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish that the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely and I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

ANALYSIS

Does the appellant suffer from substance use disorder?

11The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely substance use disorder.

12The Registrar stated that the appellant first came to the Registrar’s attention when an unsolicited Medical Condition Report (MCR) was submitted dated July 1, 2022, by Dr. O, Emergency physician. Dr. O reported the appellant suffered from an uncontrolled substance use disorder due to crack cocaine.

13In response to receiving this information, the Registrar suspended the appellant’s licence and requested the completion of a Substance Use Assessment Form. This form was completed three years later by family physician Dr. R, dated October 31, 2025. Dr. R documented the appellant suffered from severe substance use disorder due to illicit substances, had been abstinent for 6-12 months and had completed a treatment program. Dr. R added a narrative comment that he supported the reinstatement of the appellant’s licence. The Registrar reinstated the appellant’s licence in a letter dated November 10, 2025.

14In follow up to this suspension, the Registrar requested an updated Substance Use Assessment Form three months later in a letter dated February 14, 2026. This form was completed by Dr. R on March 3, 2026. Dr. R reported the appellant suffers from severe substance use disorder due to illicit substances, had been abstinent less than 6 months and had completed a supervised treatment program and continued to receive care.

15Following receipt of this information, the Registrar suspended the appellant’s driver’s licence. The appellant subsequently submitted several narrative letters from his family members, his employer and Dr. R. The Registrar responded to this information with the requirement that the appellant remain abstinent from drugs for a period of six months prior to reinstatement.

16The appellant testified that his position is that he does suffer from substance use disorder and has for thirty years. However, there have been significant amounts of recovery. He testified there had been a couple of slips in the past few years, but his drug use had not been out of control.

17Under cross-examination from the Registrar, the appellant testified that the main substance he has had a problem with is crack cocaine, and he last used this drug a little over two months before the hearing. He testified it was only for a couple of hours, was regrettable, and it was the first time he had done that in a long time. He testified he immediately sought assistance from his physician.

18The medical evidence establishes that the appellant has been diagnosed with substance use disorder due to illicit substances. The appellant does not dispute that he has a substance use disorder due to crack cocaine use.

19Based on the information available, I find that the Registrar has established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from substance use disorder.

Is the appellant’s medical condition likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?

20I find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

21The Registrar submitted that severe substance use disorder can and will interfere with the safe operation of a motor vehicle, and that the Registrar took the appropriate action in suspending the appellant’s driver’s licence.

22The Registrar submits that their position is supported by the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers [2025] (the “CCMTA Standards”). The Registrar submits that the CCMTA Standards are written by physicians and experts across the country and used as guidelines to assess medical fitness as it pertains to driving.

23Within the CCMTA Standards, the Registrar relies on Chapter 15. This chapter describes substance use disorders in general and the concerns with driving safely. This chapter cites that psychotropic drugs contribute to impairment in driving performance, and a study by the Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse found approximately 35% of people killed in accidents in Canada had drugs in their system. Chapter 15 of the Standards further documents that psychotropic drugs impair cognitive functions, and a driver cannot compensate for the effects of psychotropic drug use.

24Specifically Standard 15.6.3 states that drivers would be eligible for a licence if they:

i. Meet the criteria for remission and/or has abstained from the substance for 12 months.

ii. Earlier re-licensing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addictions specialist and/or treating physician recognized by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program.

iii. The functional abilities necessary for driving are not impaired.

iv. Where required a road test or other functional assessment shows that the functional abilities for driving are not impaired.

25The Registrar submits that given the medical evidence, their decision to suspend the appellant’s licence and request a longer period of abstinence is reasonable and supported by the law and the national medical standards. The Registrar submits that the appellant has a risk of experiencing withdrawal and that using substances impairs behaviour and decisions towards others including whether he may be safe to drive. The Registrar submits that the evidence supports that the appellant has a condition that will interfere with his ability to drive safely.

26Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but is not bound by them.

27The appellant asked the Registrar if his condition has interfered with safely operating a motor vehicle over the past thirty years. The Registrar responded that if the appellant was asking if he had driving infractions on his record related to substance use, then he did not.

28The appellant argues that his medical condition will not impair his ability to drive safely. He testified that he has never driven under the influence and would never drive under the influence. He testified there is discrimination that he drives under the influence. He testified this decision hasn’t taken into account the facts, only checked boxes and is not helpful for his recovery or sobriety. He has now lost his job, can’t pay taxes, can’t get to meetings and can’t be a service to society.

29He testified that his driver’s licence helps him get to meetings. He currently attends Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and has submitted a letter from his sponsor which attests to his regular attendance at meetings. He testified he has submitted letters of support from three family members, and these family members would not have supported him unless his concerns were valid. He testified he has submitted a letter of support from Dr. R as well as his employer, although he has since lost his job.

30Under cross-examination the appellant testified that he had initially sought treatment for substance use in 1999 and it has been 27 years since he wanted to be off drugs and has worked hard to try and achieve this. He testified that he has attended many programs over the years, both inpatient and outpatient. He describes last attending a treatment program approximately six months earlier. He described being sober for a period of months followed by a slip and then a further period of sobriety. He describes attending AA meetings as there is not a program of Narcotics Anonymous or Cocaine Anonymous in his area.

31The appellant was asked regarding his driving practices and testified he works in construction and needs to drive to various sites. He testifies that since losing his licence he was incurring massive costs by using an uber to travel between construction sites, and he was not fast enough, and he has since lost his job. He testifies he used to help other people travel to AA meetings, and the loss of his licence has been damaging to his recovery. The appellant was asked how he traveled to AA meetings between 2022 – 2025 when his licence was suspended previously, and he responded he stopped going to meetings and took a hiatus off of work to focus on his recovery during this time.

32The appellant submitted a document with several sequential written letters in support of his position. There is an unsigned letter from Dr. R stating he has been the appellant’s physician since 2007; the appellant and had been sober for two months as of April 13, 2026, and he did not feel the appellant was a threat to himself or others while operating a motor vehicle and should qualify to have his licence reinstated. A second letter is written by the appellant’s sponsor dated April 20, 2025, and describes the appellant attends AA on a regular basis and keeps in daily contact with his sponsor. A third letter is written by a work supervisor dated April 10, 2026, and describes the appellant as professional, diligent and fully alert in work-related settings. He describes the appellant is clear-headed, reliable and capable of performing his duties and did not see a reason why he would pose a risk to himself or others while operating a motor vehicle. A fourth letter is from the appellant’s father dated April 11, 2026, and describes his father’s business achievements. It further documents the appellant has grown in the past two years moving away from addiction and becoming employed with a construction company. His father documents his participation in AA and commitment towards recovery which will reach two months on April 17 and states the appellant has never operated a vehicle under the influence of any substance. The last letter is dated April 9, 2026, and is from his mother who confirms he has attended AA meetings regularly for almost a year, and prior to the past two months and apart from one slip he was sober for almost six months. She documents he does not drink at family gatherings and has never been stopped for a DUI, reckless driving, and has never had a car accident. Within these supportive letters, the reported duration of sobriety is not entirely consistent, with differing dates provided by Dr. R and the appellant’s father as to when he achieved two months of abstinence.

33I recognize that all these letters are submitted as one long written document, with one letter following the next, sometimes with unrelated letters on the same page. For example, the letter from the appellant’s prior employer starts on the bottom half of the page containing the letter from the appellant’s sponsor. It was also noted that the singular document was not saved as a PDF and could still be modified when opened.

34I further noted that the letter from Dr. R that was included in this singular document with the other letters and was unsigned. The appellant was questioned why Dr. R’s letter was submitted in this format, as it is unexpected to see an official letter from a physician that is unsigned and not saved in a secure format that would prohibit modification. The appellant responded that Dr. R’s letter should be signed, and he had just printed and scanned all the documents.

35The appellant submitted a separate letter from his brother dated April 10, 2026, describing he has suffered from addiction for many years but never stopped seeking help and the last year has been positive with sustained motivation for change. The letter documents he attends AA meetings and is seeking support from his sponsor and has recently achieved employment. He supports the appellant’s licence reinstatement and has not known him to be a risk on the road.

36I have considered the appellant’s position that his substance use disorder will not impact his ability to drive safely. I have also considered that the appellant has engaged with treatment programs and support services over many years and continues to participate in AA and follow up with Dr. R. However, despite these efforts, the evidence demonstrates repeated relapses, including a recent relapse shortly after reinstatement of his licence. I further note there is no persuasive medical evidence from a treating physician or addictions specialist confirming that the appellant’s severe substance use disorder is presently in stable remission or otherwise adequately controlled for the purposes of driving safely.

37I have considered that the appellant has submitted a supportive letter attributed to Dr. R. However, I assign this letter little weight. The letter is unsigned and was submitted within a modifiable document containing several unrelated letters. In these circumstances, I am unable to reliably verify the authenticity of the document. I also note that the letter provides only a brief conclusory opinion supporting reinstatement without meaningful explanation of the appellant’s relapse history, sustained periods of sobriety or treatment programs.

38I have also considered the letters from the appellant’s sponsor, prior employer and family members. I accept that these individuals are attempting to support the appellant and describe positive efforts toward recovery and employment. However, I assign these letters limited weight regarding the issue of medical fitness to drive. None of the authors identify themselves as healthcare professionals. Further, none of the letters specifically discuss or even mention the crack cocaine use, or recurrent illicit drug use. Instead, several of the letters focus primarily on AA participation, alcohol abstinence, or the absence of prior impaired driving charges or collisions. As a result, it is unclear whether the authors fully appreciate the nature and extent of the appellant’s substance use disorder. I also note that the appellant’s sponsor, who is writing from a position of being directly involved in the appellant’s recovery, does not provide any support for his licence reinstatement.

39I have considered the appellant’s position that he has never driven while under the influence of drugs and accept that the extended driver abstract filed by the Registrar in evidence does not disclose any impaired driving convictions. This is considered within the context that the appellant has not been driving in recent years as his licence was under suspension from 2022 – 2025. I further note that while the current medical suspension appears on the driver abstract, the prior medical suspension from 2022 – 2025 does not. As a result, I place limited weight on the abstract as a complete indicator of the appellant’s driving history. Regardless, the issue is not whether the appellant has previously driven while impaired, but whether his medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely in the future. In this regard, I accept the evidence in the CCMTA Standards that psychotropic substances, which would include crack cocaine, can impair driving performance and cognitive functioning, including judgement and behaviour, and that drivers cannot compensate for these effects. The absence of impaired driving does not eliminate the risk associated with a severe substance use disorder characterized by repeated relapse.

40I also place significant weight on the timing of the appellant’s most recent relapse. The evidence establishes that the appellant’s licence was reinstated on November 10, 2025, following a period of reported abstinence and treatment participation. However, the appellant testified that he resumed crack cocaine use three months later. I find this chronology significant because it demonstrates that despite treatment engagement, ongoing support, and recent reinstatement, the appellant’s substance use disorder remains insufficiently controlled, which I find increases the likelihood that his condition could significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

41Although not bound by the CCMTA Standards, they can be considered when making the decision for the reason that these Standards are the result of a lengthy and intensive process to provide medical standards based on the best evidence available and with a focus on functional ability to drive rather than exclusively on medical diagnoses. I am persuaded to apply them here. My review of the evidence shows that none of the conditions recommended for relicensing outlined in the CCMTA Standards have been met.

42I appreciate that substance use disorders are chronic relapsing disorders that often require long term pharmacological and psychosocial interventions to prevent relapse, and the appellant has a demonstrated history of several relapses. For these reasons, I agree with the CCMTA Standards that require a treatment program be completed to consider early reinstatement. While the appellant has testified that he is currently involved in AA to support his recovery, there is no medical evidence or testimony that he has completed any program since his latest relapse.

43Given the history of illicit drug use for three decades, the history of repeated relapses even after completion of treatment programs, no evidence or testimony of completing a full treatment program since the latest relapse, and no medical evidence from a treating physician that confirms his recovery from having a severe substance use disorder nor any credible physician support for reinstatement of his driver’s licence, I accept and apply the CCMTA guidance that having a period of abstinence is reasonable. With only a quarter of the period of abstinence outlined in the CCMTA Standards elapsed, I find this insufficient to set aside the suspension.

44As such, for the reasons cited, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

Conclusion

45I find that the Registrar has discharged the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely substance use disorder, and that condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.

ORDER

46For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, I confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.

Released: June 2, 2026

__________________________

Dr. Isla McPherson, Member