Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 25-001857/AABS
In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
Ann Dombroskie
Applicant
and
Belair Insurance Company Inc.
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR:
Melanie Malach
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Meral Kesebi, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Shivani Mehta, Counsel
HEARD:
By way of written submissions
OVERVIEW
1Ann Dombroskie, the applicant, was involved in an automobile accident on February 18, 2022, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). The applicant was denied benefits by the respondent, Belair Insurance Company Inc., and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
2The preliminary issues to be decided are:
i. Was the applicant involved in an “accident” as defined in section 3(1) of the Schedule?
ii. Is the applicant barred from proceeding to a hearing as they failed to notify the respondent of the circumstances giving rise to a claim for benefits no later than the seventh day after the circumstances arose or as soon as practicable after that day?
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
3The issues in dispute are:
i. Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?
ii. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?
RESULT
4The applicant was not involved in an “accident” as defined in s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
ANALYSIS
The applicant was not involved in an “accident” as defined in s. 3(1) of the Schedule
Background
5The applicant submits that she was a pedestrian on February 18, 2022, when she was struck by a snowplow which caused her to suffer physical injuries.
6In the applicant’s statement dated October 16, 2023, the applicant reported that on February 18, 2022, she was driving home from a church, when she encountered accumulated snow on the street. To circumvent the snow pile-up, the applicant pulled into a mini mall parking lot, where she saw a man operating a “skid steer Caterpillar plow”. She parked her car and walked over to the snow-plow operator to ask him to remove the snow obstructing the road. She then started walking back to her vehicle. Before reaching it, she turned around and was struck by the corner of the plow’s shovel and fell forward. In her statement, the applicant confirmed that she believed the actions of the snow-plow operator were intentional.
7The police were called to the scene. A Victim Report classified the incident as an assault and identified the weapon as a “motor vehicle”.
8The applicant claims that she was struck by an “automobile” pursuant to the Schedule. She further submits that she was involved in an “accident” as defined in s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
9The respondent submits that the vehicle involved in the subject incident does not meet the definition of an “automobile” and the incident does not constitute an “accident” within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
Definition of an “automobile”
10Section 3(1) of the Schedule defines an “accident” as “an incident in which the use or operation of an automobile directly causes an impairment.
11The definition of “automobile” is not set out in the Schedule. The leading authority for determining whether a vehicle is an “automobile” is set out in Grummett v. Federation Insurance Co. of Canada 1999 CanLII 15103 (ON SC) (“Grummett”). Grummett was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Adams v. Pineland Amusement Ltd. et al, 2007 ONCA 844 (“Adams”) and is the basis for what is now commonly referred to as the Adams test. To qualify as an “automobile” under the Adams test, one of the following three components must be met:
i. Is the vehicle an “automobile” in ordinary parlance?
ii. If not, then is the vehicle defined as an “automobile” in the wording of the insurance policy?
iii. If not, then does the vehicle fall within any enlarged definition of “automobile” in any relevant statute?
Previous Tribunal Decisions
12The applicant submits that the Tribunal should categorize a snowplow as an “automobile” under s. 3(1) of the Schedule because it previously granted accident benefits to pedestrians struck by a snowplow. (See: Stavely v. Western Assurance Company, 2024 CanLII 67358 (ON LAT) (“Stavely”).
13The respondent in its Reply submissions states that the applicant’s reliance on Stavely for the proposition that the Tribunal has previously “granted access” to accident benefits where the vehicle was a snowplow is misplaced. The respondent submits that the issue before the Tribunal in Stavely was not whether the vehicle involved met the definition of an “automobile” under the Schedule. The respondent submits that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make determinations on issues not before it and was not asked to undertake an analysis as to whether the snowplow was an “automobile”.
14The applicant in her Sur-Reply submissions states that the absence of a dispute in the Tribunal decision in Stavely illustrates that snowplows are treated and considered automobiles for the purpose of the Schedule.
15I note that I am not bound by previous Tribunal decisions. In addition, I agree with the respondent that the issue before the Tribunal in Stavely was not whether a snowplow is an “automobile”. The issue was entitlement to accident benefits. As the Tribunal in Stavely was not tasked with the determination of whether the snowplow was an “automobile” and no analysis of this issue was undertaken, I find that this decision is not relevant to the subject matter.
Ordinary Parlance
16The respondent submits that in ordinary parlance, a skid steer Caterpillar snowplow equipped with steel-tracked wheels and a front shovel attachment would not be described as an “automobile”. The respondent submits that the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow is a heavy-duty industrial machine designed and used for snow removal, landscaping and construction, not for the transport of persons or goods on public roadways. Its use and context are entirely consistent with that of landscaping equipment – not an automobile. The respondent relies upon the Tribunal decision in Carpenter v. Intact Insurance Company, 2025 CanLII 118795 (ON LAT) (“Carpenter”), where the vehicle involved was a Caterpillar 930K, with rubber tires, a driver’s seat, and was capable of highway travel, with capable speeds of up to 40 km/hour. The Tribunal considered all of these facts to be persuasive in determining that the purpose and function of the Caterpillar at the time of the accident was to behave like an “automobile”. The respondent submits that this is contrasted with the current facts where the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow had steel tracks instead of rubber wheels and was in the process of removing snow in a private parking lot, not operating on a public roadway, with its shovel up, as was the case in Carpenter. The respondent argues that unlike in Carpenter, the applicant has not submitted any evidence identifying or describing the specific skid steer Caterpillar snowplow involved in the incident to establish that it is an “automobile” within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
17The applicant submits that the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow is an “automobile” in ordinary parlance. She relies upon the decision in Carpenter, where the critical inquiry is the “purpose and function” of the automobile. The applicant submits that the primary purpose and function of the snowplow is driving and mobility, as its ability to plow snow is contingent on its ability to drive. She further submits that Carpenter stands for the proposition that the third-party treatment and impression of an automobile may be persuasive in designating it as such. She argues that the consistent use of the term snowplow in the police file and the respondent’s log notes supports the finding that it is an “automobile”.
18The respondent submits in its Reply submissions that labeling a vehicle a snowplow does not satisfy the legal test in Adams. The respondent submits that there are numerous types of snowplows – including attachments to heavy-duty trucks, pick up trucks, tractors, skid steers and even ATVs. The mere use of the term snowplow provides no meaningful evidence as to the vehicle’s type, purpose, or function in ordinary parlance. The respondent submits that as seen in Carpenter, the Tribunal undertook a detailed factual analysis of the evidence before it when determining whether the vehicle at issue was an “automobile” in ordinary parlance. The respondent argues that the applicant has not adduced any evidence to support a finding that the snowplow can be considered a vehicle in its ordinary parlance.
19The applicant in her Sur-Reply submits that while the Tribunal in Carpenter benefitted by knowing the make and model of the automobile, the factual circumstances of the within Application are different. She submits that after she was struck and injured, she was unable to identify the snowplow involved. She argues that in circumstances such as these, the Schedule as consumer protection legislation ought to provide leniency and flexibility for applicants who are unable to source the vehicle that struck them.
20I find that in determining whether the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow is an automobile in ordinary parlance, it is essential to consider the purpose and function of the vehicle, based on the decision in Grummett. The Court in Grummett determined that a race car in that case was not an automobile, as it was designed for competitive racing and not designed for ordinary vehicular traffic on highways or city streets. The Court stated that a race car does not have brake lights or doors, and they cannot carry passengers except the driver. The Court concluded that the design of the race car is for competitive racing and for no other purpose.
21I find that while the applicant submits that the purpose and function of the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow is driving and mobility, as its ability to plow snow is contingent on its ability to drive, this on its own is not sufficient to support a finding that the subject skid steer Caterpillar snowplow is an “automobile”. I find that the applicant has not provided evidence or discussed the elements of the subject skid steer Caterpillar snowplow that supports its purpose is driving and mobility. In Grummett, the Court discussed the factors of no brake lights, no doors, and the fact that the race car could not carry passengers except the driver. I find that the applicant has not discussed any of the factors of the subject skid steer Caterpillar snowplow that makes it designed for driving and mobility.
22In addition, I find that Adams looks at “ordinary parlance” which generally speaks to the purpose and function of the vehicle within the context of being capable of the transportation of passengers on streets and highways. In this case, the skid steer Caterpillar was equipped with a snowplow and was operating with the intention of clearing snow in the parking lot and there is no evidence provided that it was intended to carry passengers or goods on typical roadways.
23The applicant relies upon the decision in Carpenter. However, I note that this decision was overturned by the Divisional Court based on a procedural fairness defect. The Divisional Court also declined to substantively interpret whether a Caterpillar is an “automobile”, so this decision cannot be relied upon. I further find that this decision is distinguishable from the matter before me. In Carpenter, the adjudicator referred to the product specifications of the Caterpillar as factors that persuaded her that the purpose and function of the Caterpillar at the time of the accident was to behave like an automobile. In the matter before me, I agree with the respondent that the applicant has not provided any evidence as to the features of the subject skid steer Caterpillar snowplow. The applicant has not provided any product specifications, photographs or any information about features of the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow to support that it was designed for ordinary vehicular traffic. While the applicant argues that she could not provide these details because she could not identify the specific snowplow that hit her, I find that the applicant did identify the specific type of snowplow in her Statement dated October 16, 2023 where she identifies the vehicle as a yellow and black skid steer Caterpillar plow equipped with a large front shovel or plow attachment and steel tracks, operating at the time of the incident to clear snow from a parking lot. I further find that if the applicant submits that she did not know the type of vehicle that actually hit her, this would further support that there is a lack of persuasive evidence which prevents me from determining whether the purpose and function of the subject skid steer Caterpillar snowplow at the time of the accident was to behave like an automobile.
24For the reasons outlined above, I find that the applicant has not proven on a balance of probabilities that the subject skid steer Caterpillar snowplow is an “automobile” in ordinary parlance.
Defined as an Automobile by the insurance policy
25The respondent submits that with respect to the second branch of the Adams test, the applicant has not adduced any evidence that the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow is defined as an “automobile” within the meaning of any insurance policy.
26I agree with the respondent that there is no evidence that a skid steer Caterpillar is considered an “automobile” within the meaning of any insurance policy. The applicant did not make any submissions on this prong of the test, and I therefore find that the on a balance of probabilities that the skid steer Caterpillar is not defined as an “automobile” in the wording of any insurance policy.
Automobile based on enlarged definition of any relevant statute
27The respondent submits that with respect to the third branch of the Adams test, the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow does not fall under any enlarged definition of “automobile” under any relevant statute or regulation. The respondent argues that the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow meets each element of the ‘road building machine’ definition set out in the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“HTA”), and is further confirmed by Ontario Reg. 398/10 to be a prescribed ‘road-building machine’ – namely a tracked trailer or loader, equipped with a snowplow attachment. The respondent argues that the HTA’s definition of motor vehicle expressly excludes road-building machines. The respondent relies upon the Court of Appeal decision in Morton v. Rabito, 1998 CanLII 5865 (ON CA), where the Court held that a backhoe was not an “automobile”, but rather was expressly described as a ‘road building machine’ under the HTA.
28The applicant submits that with respect to the third branch of the Adams test, that a snowplow fits into a relevant, enlarged definition of “automobile”. She relies upon the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 (“Insurance Act”) which defines an “automobile” to include a “self-propelled vehicle”. The applicant submits that a snowplow fits within this definition, as the snowplow was moving when the applicant was struck. The applicant submits that the respondent’s reliance on the HTA is incorrect as the HTA defines a “motor vehicle”, not an “automobile”.
29The respondent in its Reply submissions submits that neither a snowplow nor a skid-steer automatically qualifies as an automobile simply because it is self-propelled. It argues that the applicant has not established that the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow was legally required to be insured under a motor vehicle liability policy at the time of the accident. Therefore, the enlarged statutory definition does not apply in this case. The respondent refers to the Court of Appeal decision in Adams, where the Court held that the governing definition of “automobile” is set out in s. 224(1) of the Insurance Act. Under that provision, a vehicle that is neither an automobile in ordinary parlance, nor specifically defined to be one under the policy of insurance, will only be considered to be an automobile if it is required to be insured under a motor vehicle liability policy.
30The applicant in her Sur-Reply submissions argues that the respondent relies on sections of the HTA that were not cited or utilized by Adams. The applicant argues that the Court of Appeal in Adams did not rely on the s. 1(1) definition of “motor vehicle” and the respondent did not provide an argument for why such a definition is appropriate.
31The Court of Appeal in Adams concluded that the governing definition of an “automobile” was that set out in s. 224(1) in Part VI of the Insurance Act. Section 224(1) defines “automobile” as:
(a) A motor vehicle required under any Act to be insured under a motor vehicle liability policy; and
(b) A vehicle prescribed by regulation to be an automobile.
32The Court of Appeal stated that it is common ground that s. 224(1)(b) is inapplicable. Under s. 224(1)(a), a vehicle that is neither an automobile in ordinary parlance nor specifically defined to be one under the policy will be an “automobile” if it is required to be insured under a motor vehicle liability policy.
33The Court of Appeal then stated that s. 1(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.25 (“Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act”), defines “motor vehicles” as having the same meaning as the HTA. The HTA includes in its definition of “motor vehicle” in s. 1(1), any vehicle that is “propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power”. The Court of Appeal concluded that a go-kart is a motor vehicle propelled otherwise than by muscular power. However, the question boiled down to whether a go-kart is required to be insured under a motor vehicle liability policy. The Court of Appeal concluded that as the go-kart did not require motor vehicle insurance at the time and the circumstances of the accident, therefore it was not an “automobile” and was not included in the enlarged definition of “automobile” in any relevant statute.
34Therefore, applying the reasoning in Adams, I find that even if the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow was a “self-propelled” vehicle as argued by the applicant, as it did not require motor vehicle insurance at the time of the incident, it is not an “automobile” and does not fall within the enlarged definition of “automobile”.
35I find that the statutory definition of a ‘motor vehicle’ in section 1 of the HTA is relevant to the subject matter. Section 1, defines a ‘motor vehicle’ as follows:
an automobile, a motorcycle, a motor assisted bicycle unless otherwise indicated in this Act, and any other vehicle propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power, but does not include a street car or other motor vehicle running only upon rails, a power-assisted bicycle, a motorized snow vehicle, a traction engine, a farm tractor, a self-propelled implement of husbandry or a road-building machine.
36I therefore do not accept the applicant’s submission that reliance on the HTA is incorrect as the HTA defines a “motor vehicle”, not an “automobile”. The HTA specifically defines a motor vehicle as including an automobile.
37The HTA defines a ‘road building machine’ as a “self-propelled vehicle of a design commonly used in the construction or maintenance of highways”. The HTA – Ontario Regulation 398/16 expands on this definition. Section 2(1) of the Regulation provides that for the purposes of the definition of ‘road-building machine’ in subsection 1(1) of the Act, a snow blower or snowplow is included as a class of vehicles.
38I agree with the respondent that the skid steer Caterpillar plow squarely falls within this prescribed class. I find that this is supported by the applicant’s own evidence in her Statement dated October 16, 2023, where she identifies the vehicle as a yellow and black skid steer Caterpillar plow equipped with a large front shovel or plow attachment and steel tracks, operating at the time of the incident to clear snow from a parking lot. I therefore find that the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow meets each element of the definition of a ‘road building machine’ which is further confirmed by Ontario Regulation 398/16 to be a prescribed ‘road building machine’, namely a tracked trailer or loader, equipped with a snowplow attachment.
39I find that as a snowplow is listed as an exemption in the HTA under a ‘road-building machine’, and because it is further distinguished as an exemption under HTA Ontario Regulation 398/16, that the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow does not meet the requirement of falling under the enlarged definition of an automobile or a motor vehicle.
40For the reasons outlined above, I find that the applicant has not proven on a balance of probabilities that the skid steer Caterpillar snowplow is an “automobile”, and as such the applicant was not involved in an accident as defined in s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
Compliance with s. 32 of the Schedule
41As I have concluded that this incident does not meet the definition of an “accident, it is not necessary for me to consider the second issue in dispute of whether the applicant is barred from proceeding to a hearing for failing to notify the respondent of the circumstances giving rise to a claim for benefits no later than the seventh day after the circumstances arose or as soon as practicable after that day.
ORDER
42The applicant was not involved in an accident as defined in s. 3(1) of the Schedule.
43The Application is dismissed.
Released: May 26, 2026
Melanie Malach
Adjudicator