Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18586/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under section 55.1(1)2 of the Act.

Between:

Karran Sankar

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Michael Beauchesne

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Karran Sankar, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD by teleconference: Friday, May 8, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Karran Sankar (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Friday, April 17, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Chunilall Angad (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in subparagraph 55.1(1)(b). The appellant also submits that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

1. Pursuant to section 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); and

2. Pursuant to section 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below, the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar (the “respondent”) to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to section 55.1 of the Act, the appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he satisfies one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in section 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1)

6I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (Sault”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

8Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that he took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that he is properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

9In his Notice of Appeal (“NOA”), the appellant submits he allowed the driver to operate the impounded vehicle because he “assumed” that the driver’s licence was in good standing. The appellant attributed this assumption to observing the driver operating a different vehicle when he arrived at the appellant’s residence to perform renovations. During his testimony, the appellant agreed his NOA submissions were accurate and that he relied upon them to support his position.

10I am persuaded that the appellant’s assumption about the licensing status of the driver falls short of the Sault standard and is not consistent with taking reasonable care in that context. The appellant testified that he was “mortified” when he reviewed the driver’s abstract produced by the respondent, emphasizing that it “looks bad” on him for allowing the driver to operate the impounded vehicle. His NOA submissions similarly convey that as a practicing insurance broker for more than three decades, he is “quite familiar” with the Act and would not knowingly allow someone to operate his vehicle without a valid driver’s license. But while I understand the appellant is remorseful about the circumstances that gave rise to his vehicle impoundment, it remains that he did not exercise due diligence by taking reasonable care as set out in Sault. I find this is confirmed in his testimony during cross-examination, where the appellant acknowledged he did little other than assume the appellant’s driver’s licence was “OK.” The appellant testified that he asked the driver if he was “OK to drive,” and that he received an “affirmative” response. In my view, this is a vague question that does not qualify as a reasonable attempt to determine the driver’s licensing status and falls short of the due diligence required by the Act. Further, the appellant agreed he did not take any other actions to validate the licencing status of the driver, such as availing himself of the driver’s licence search tool on the Ministry of Transportation (“MTO”) website; checking in with Service Ontario; asking about an ignition interlock condition, or even asking to see the driver’s licence of the driver instead of relying only on his representation. I find the appellant’s testimony—that asking to see the driver’s licence would not have changed the outcome because police told him the driver was using a licence that did not have the ignition interlock condition on it—is of little probative value as the officer did not appear at the hearing to provide testimony.

11At the conclusion of the hearing, the appellant contested the reasonableness of these actions, adding that there was “no way of knowing the driver had all these things on his record without me obtaining an abstract.” However, I find the Act does not require the appellant to review the driving record of the driver. In this case, it required only that the appellant exercise due diligence in attempting to determine whether the driver’s licence of the driver was subject to an ignition interlock condition. And in my view, this information was available to the appellant without obtaining an abstract at the time he agreed to allow the driver to operate his vehicle.

12While the appellant asked the Tribunal to consider his own driving record (i.e., to show he is law-abiding), his profession, and his community involvement, I find these factors weigh little on the legal test as set out in the Act. And in any event, the appellant did not lead evidence to corroborate his driving record, profession, or community activities.

13When I take all this evidence together on a balance of probabilities, I find the appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1) of the Act.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

14I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

15The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate

any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

16If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal based on exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

17If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

18The Tribunal is generally precluded by section 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, section 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

19The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

20I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

21The appellant testified, during cross-examination, that since his vehicle was impounded, he has been able to coordinate his family’s transportation needs by sharing his spouse’s vehicle. While he explained that he has had to modify his work schedule—and that his daughter’s university classes are the main stressor for transportation planning—I find this amounts to mere inconvenience and not exceptional hardship. This is not to diminish the difficulties conveyed by the appellant. I accept that it is not an easy thing for the appellant to get his spouse and daughter to and from their work and classes, respectively, on the two days of the week he presently schedules for off-site client visits. However, I am persuaded that these difficulties fall short of constituting exceptional hardship because it remains that the appellant has not shown he has no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

22Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

ORDER

23The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.