RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Ulana Pahuta, Adjudicator
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-008951/AABS
Case Name: Fatemeh Goodarzi v. Allstate Insurance Company of Canada
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Kalim Khan, Counsel
For the Respondent: Alexei Batten, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On March 11, 2026, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated February 18, 2026 (“decision”).
2In this decision, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not entitled to an income replacement benefit (“IRB”), interest or an award, and that the respondent was entitled to an IRB repayment in the amount of $442.10.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The applicant relies on Rule 18.2(b) to support her request for reconsideration. She is asking the Tribunal to vary the decision to find that she is entitled to IRBs and to find that the respondent is not entitled to any IRB repayment.
5The respondent requests that the applicant’s request for reconsideration be dismissed.
RESULT
6The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
8I find that the applicant has not established grounds for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 18.2(b).
9The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred in law in finding that the respondent was permitted to rely on its insurer’s examination (“IE”) assessment reports to deny her ongoing IRBs. The applicant argued at the initial hearing that the respondent’s IE reports were void ab initio, and therefore, it did not have any medical basis on which to deny ongoing IRBs. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s argument that the consumer protection principles outlined in Tomec v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 882 necessitate an interpretation of s. 44(5) of the Schedule that IEs that were obtained by deficient s. 44(5) notices were improperly procured, and therefore, insurers should not be able to rely on them to deny an insured person’s claim.
10At paragraph 26 of the decision, the Tribunal found that:
Although I am bound by the Tomec decision, I find that Tomec does not promote an interpretation of the Schedule that would result in adding a significant consequence that is not contained within it. I am not bound by other decisions of the Tribunal, and I do not agree with the reasoning in Taksali that if an insurer’s notice is non-compliant with the Schedule, then the resulting IEs should not be considered. The applicant has not directed me to a provision in the Schedule stating that an insurer is not entitled to rely on an IE report made pursuant to a s. 44 notice that was non-compliant with s. 44(5). I find that, if the legislature intended for that to be a consequence, it would have been included within the Schedule. Further, I note that since the applicant did attend at the IEs, s. 55(1) does not apply. For these reasons, even if I were to find that the respondent’s IE notice did not contain sufficient medical and other reasons, it would not change the outcome for the applicant. I would still consider the IEs (although the lack of a compliant notice might go to weight), and the applicant would not automatically be entitled to an IRB.
11The applicant argues that this finding is irreconcilable with Tomec, as well as the principles of statutory interpretation and legislative intent. She submits that, in Tomec, the Court of Appeal found that the two-year limitation period set out in s. 51(1) of the 1996 version of the Schedule could not be interpreted as a hard limitation, as it is subject to discoverability. The applicant argues that there is no reference to “discoverability” in the Schedule. Therefore, the Tribunal’s finding that Tomec does not support “adding a significant consequence” not contained in the Schedule is incorrect.
12I do not agree with the applicant that the Tribunal’s decision is irreconcilable with the statutory interpretation principles set out in Tomec. I agree with the applicant that Tomec sets out that the Schedule is remedial, consumer protection legislation, and it should be read harmoniously with the scheme of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I..8, and the intention of the Legislature. However, I do not agree with the applicant that the application of these principles necessitates a finding that an insurer’s non-compliance with s. 44(5) of the Schedule results in the corresponding IE being void ab initio.
13I agree with the respondent that the application of the principle of discoverability in Tomec was not “adding a significant consequence” that was not contained in the Schedule. Rather, the Court of Appeal determined that the well-established principle of discoverability applied to the limitation period set out in s. 51 of the Schedule, as it applies to other limitation periods that are tied to the cause of action. In my view, this is significantly different than the Tribunal’s finding at paragraph 26, namely, that the applicant’s position about the impact of a non-compliant notice was not supported by the Schedule, and that “if the legislature intended for that to be a consequence, it would have been included within the Schedule.” I do not find that this conclusion was irreconcilable with Tomec, nor do I find it amounts to an error in law.
14The applicant further raises the general argument that allowing insurers to rely on improperly obtained IEs is incompatible with the broadly construed consumer protection purposes of the Schedule. In support of this argument, the applicant relies on Taksali v. Aviva Insurance Company, 2023 CanLII 96347 (ON LAT), a decision cited at the initial hearing. I find that these reconsideration grounds are effectively an attempt to re-litigate arguments that were not successful at the hearing. This is not a proper use of the reconsideration process. In the decision the adjudicator provided clear reasons to explain why she reached her conclusion at paragraph 26, and I do not find the applicant’s reconsideration submissions establish that they constitute an error in accordance with Rule 18.2(b).
15In reconsideration, the applicant relies on a recent Tribunal decision, Bisnauth v. Jevco Insurance, 2025 CanLII 129060 (ON LAT), where the Tribunal did not accept the position that an insurer was permitted to rely on conclusions from IEs that had been improperly requested, given the nature of the consumer protection legislation at issue. The respondent has similarly relied on a recent Tribunal decision, Malone v. RSA Insurance, 2025 CanLII 518 (ON LAT), where the Tribunal found that there already was a consequence for an insurer’s failure to provide adequate notice of an IE assessment: i.e., that the insured does not need to attend the IE. The Tribunal found that this is the consumer protection function built into the Schedule.
16Both parties have cited recent Tribunal decisions in support of their respective positions, and yet I find that, while the reasoning in the decisions may be instructive, they are not binding. Further, I find that these decisions restate similar reasoning and arguments already raised by the parties at the initial hearing, and on reconsideration. I find that at paragraphs 22 to 26 of the decision, the adjudicator addressed the applicant’s arguments and provided clear reasons why she did not accept the reasoning in decisions such as Taksali. The reasons provided by the adjudicator were persuasive, and the applicant has not established that the adjudicator erred in law in this approach.
17Accordingly, I find the applicant has not established a ground for reconsideration based on Rule 18.2(b).
CONCLUSION & ORDER
18The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Ulana Pahuta
Adjudicator
Released: May 15, 2026