Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18594/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Jade Hunt-Miller

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Jade Hunt-Miller, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Martin He, Agent

Heard By Teleconference May 5, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Jade Hunt-Miller, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Friday, April 24, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Tommy Tonge, (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

6I am satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

No alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle as it relates to the transportation of the appellant’s 2-year-old son.

13The appellant submits that the impounded vehicle, a 2015 Chev Equinox, is her only vehicle with an active registration. Although the MTO Registrant Identification Number (“RIN”) search, provided as evidence by the respondent, indicated the registration of a 2019 Mazda, the appellant testified that the Mazda was written off and she was not aware that it is her responsibility to notify the Ministry of Transportation that the car is no longer in her possession.

14The appellant filed a six-page affidavit dated May 1, 2026 in advance of the hearing and appended six exhibits labeled A to I to support the affidavit as follows:

i. Exhibit A, Plate portion of vehicle registration for impounded 2015 Chevrolet Equinox;

ii. Exhibit B, Notice of Impoundment;

iii. Exhibit C, Proof of Insurance 2015 Chevrolet Equinox;

iv. Exhibit D, Letter from a childcare centre confirming daycare enrollment for toddler son who attends Monday to Friday;

v. Exhibit E, Letter of employment from appellant’s employer;

vi. Exhibit F, Email(s) from appellant requesting confirmation of employment;

vii. Exhibit G, Google Map ‘Home to work walking, not including childcare drop-off’;

viii. Exhibit G, Google Map ‘Public transportation from home to daycare’;

ix. Exhibit G, Google Map ‘Walk after daycare drop-off to work’;

x. Exhibit H, One way Taxi fare for $16.00;

xi. Exhibit H, Uber Find a Trip/No available ride share drivers; and

xii. Exhibit I, Google Map ‘Public transportation to groceries’.

15The appellant testified that the driver of the impounded vehicle was the unemployed father of her 2-year-old child and that she was aware that his licence was suspended. The appellant testified that she made an exception to allow the driver to use her car in connection to a potential employment opportunity because he lost his job in November 2025 and as a result, she is the sole income earner in the home.

16The appellant testified that she is also the primary caregiver of her son who is dependent on her for daily care and transportation to his daycare. She relies on Exhibit D to show that her son is enrolled full-time in the toddler program and attends Monday through Friday. Her son attends regular appointments with a local doctor as well as at a Children’s Hospital in Toronto. As a result of the impoundment, the appellant cannot transport her son to daycare, and he is temporarily being cared for at home by his unemployed father while she walks to work.

17Continuing her testimony, the appellant stated that she lives in Penetanguishene, a small town where public transportation options are limited and do not allow her to consistently meet her daily work and childcare obligations. She does not have family nearby to assist and currently walks 5.1 km to arrive at work before her 8:15 a.m. start time as depicted in Exhibit G, Google Maps summary showing the route between her home and work.

18Finally, the appellant testified that she explored public transportation alternatives; however, given the infrequency of public transportation and her early start, she and her toddler would have to leave home at 6:20 a.m. to complete daycare drop off and arrive at work on time. She relies on Exhibit G showing Google Maps summaries of the public transportation options available to her in Penetanguishene. The appellant also testified that taking taxis, renting a car, and using grocery delivery services are financially prohibitive given her family circumstances.

19The respondent submitted that the impoundment occurred lawfully because as per the Extended Driver Record Search, the driver was driving with a suspended licence and requires an ignition interlock device on reinstatement. The appellant has access to other alternatives, has been able to meet her daily needs, and has not missed any medical appointments. The respondent argues that the request for impoundment be confirmed by the Tribunal.

20I find that the appellant demonstrated that commuting by public transportation in her small town with a toddler is not a viable alternative. I also find that the appellant demonstrated that using taxis, rideshare applications, and renting a vehicle are not financially viable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, because the daily transportation costs would consume a significant portion of her bi-weekly earnings after rent obligations are met.

21I find that the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle as it relates to the transportation of the appellant’s 2-year-old son. Based on the evidence presented, the appellant considered and inquired into reasonable options that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to herself. I am satisfied that the appellant made adjustments for the duration of the impoundment and walking is her alternative to the impounded motor vehicle. Although this is an alternative for the appellant, it is not a suitable alternative to a person ordinarily transported by the impounded vehicle, her two-year-old son.

22I accept the appellant’s argument that her son is unable to attend daycare due to the impoundment and that his father must focus on finding employment and not on providing interim childcare. Unfortunately, the impact of parental decisions is borne by a 2-year-old child who is unable to attend day care, participate in structured early childhood learning, and to play with other children. I agree that there is no suitable alternative to transport the appellant’s son to daycare. As a result, I will now consider criteria outlined in s. 10(3).

Threat to heath, safety, the environment or property

23The appellant has not alleged that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

Financial, Economic, Employment or Education Losses

24The appellant alleges that the impoundment will cause financial or economic loss and endanger her ability to maintain employment. In particular, the appellant testified that she is the sole income earner supporting a young child and she is still on probation with her employer until the end of June 2026. Her position requires regular attendance and punctuality which are impacted by the impoundment.

25The respondent took no position on the appellant’s financial, economic or potential employment losses.

26I am not satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(b) of the Regulation, the appellant’s economic loss will be immediate and significant, because despite not having access to her vehicle, the appellant walks to work to avoid losing her employment. I am satisfied that the toddler’s loss of not going to day care as a result of the impoundment was immediate and significant because a suitable alternative to transport him there is not available.

27I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(c), the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, namely the appellant’s 2-year-old son.

28I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(d)(i), persons other than the driver will suffer as a result of the impoundment, namely the appellant’s 2-year-old son who suffers a loss of early-childhood education by not attending day-care.

29I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(d)(ii), that the impact of the loss will not be a result of a financial or employment loss by the suspended driver as he was already unemployed at the time of the impoundment.

30For these reasons, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, there is an immediate and significant loss to the appellant’s son, and that it is in his interest that the appellant has access to her vehicle.

Conclusion

31I find that:

i. There is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle;

ii. The impact of the educational loss will be immediate and significant upon a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, namely the appellant’s 2-year-old son;

iii. The impact of the loss will be upon a person other than the driver; and

iv. The impact of the loss will not be a result of financial or employment loss of the suspended driver.

32For these reasons, I find that the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

33The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.