Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18561/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Frank White

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Jeffery Campbell

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Frank White, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Martin He, Representative

Heard by teleconference:

May 13, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Frank White (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of his 2023 Argo (the “Argo”) under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on Saturday, April 10, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, the vehicle was being driven by his son, Richard White, while his driver’s licence was under suspension due to a criminal conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue to be determined is:

i. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

result

4The Tribunal orders the Registrar of Motor Vehicles that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5The representative of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) presented documentary evidence, specifically a Notice to Registrar, which established that the appellant is the registered owner of the vehicle and that the vehicle was stopped while being driven by Richard White whose licence was suspended due to a Criminal Code conviction. I am therefore satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.

6For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an Appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the Appellant.

The impoundment of the vehicle will not result in exceptional hardship in accordance with s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act

7I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under the Act and O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”).

8The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T] owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

10If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

11The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

12The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

13I am satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

14The appellant resides with his wife in Dunnville, Ontario, where he is retired and works part-time. He testified, and the Registrant Identification Number (RIN) Summary confirms, that he owns a 2007 Ford F-150 and a 2002 Chevrolet Blazer. He further testified that he and his wife use these vehicles to attend appointments and obtain groceries and other necessities. The RIN Summary also indicates that the appellant owns a 2012 Yamaha TW2 motorcycle. I find that these vehicles represent reasonable alternatives to the Argo for the appellant and his wife. However I must also consider whether there are alternatives to the Argo for others who are ordinarily transported by the vehicle.

The Argo

15The appellant testified that the Argo is a six-wheeled all-terrain vehicle kept at his son’s residence in Cache Bay, Ontario, where his son, Richard White, the driver, resides with his wife. He stated that Richard, his wife, and her daughter, who lives on a nearby farm, all live “off the grid.” The Argo is used for purposes including snow removal, transporting hay to feed horses on the farm, and hauling firewood for heating. The appellant further testified that Richard, his wife, and her daughter have limited financial resources and subsist on disability benefits. The appellant’s testimony makes it clear that, although he does not personally operate the Argo, both Richard and his wife’s daughter do.

16The appellant testified that there is no alternative to the Argo, which he described as essential to Richard’s and his stepdaughter’s livelihood. He stated that he is unaware of any rental options for such a specialized vehicle and, in any event, neither he nor the three individuals in Cache Bay could afford a rental if one were available. The appellant also testified that he does not have the resources to pay for a rental. Although the appellant provided no documentary evidence regarding his financial circumstances (or those in Cache Bay), I have no basis to doubt his testimony, as I found him to be frank and credible when responding to questions on other aspects of the hearing.

17I am satisfied that, given the specialized nature of the Argo and the financial limitations of the appellant or the individuals in Cache Bay, there is no reasonable alternative to that vehicle.

18However, I am not satisfied that the statutory requirement of losses to a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, as defined in the Regulation, has been met.

Financial, Economic, Employment or Educational Losses

19There is no evidence before me that any of the three individuals use the Argo for medical purposes or to obtain groceries or other basic necessities. The appellant’s testimony instead indicates that the Argo is used primarily in connection with maintaining their properties and obtaining supplies for the farm. Although the appellant testified that Richard’s wife’s daughter sells eggs produced by the farm’s chickens, there is no evidence that the Argo is required for the production or sale of those eggs, nor did the appellant testify that there would be a significant loss of income resulting from the loss of the Argo during the impoundment period.

Conclusion

20Although I am satisfied that there is no reasonable alternative to the Argo, given its specialized nature and the difficulty of replacing it, I am not persuaded that its impoundment creates a risk to the health or safety of a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle. Nor is there testimony or evidence of any immediate, significant, and lasting financial, economic, or educational loss resulting from its impoundment. I also note that I am precluded from considering any loss to Richard, as he was the driver of the Argo at the time of the impoundment.

21In the circumstances, I find that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that the impoundment of the Argo will result in exceptional hardship within the meaning of the Act and the Regulation.

22In light of this finding, the impoundment of the Argo is confirmed.

ORDER

23The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Jeffery Campbell

Vice-Chair