Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18555/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Between:

401 Auto RV Canada Inc.

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR:

Rupinder Hans

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Brandi-Lyn Gould, Representative

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: April 30, 2026

OVERVIEW

1401 Auto RV Canada Inc. (the “appellant”) filed a motion for an order granting an extension of time to file an appeal pursuant to section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”) from the 45-day impoundment of a 2019 Ford motor vehicle (the “vehicle”). The appellant’s vehicle was detained in order to be impounded on March 19, 2026 by the police. At the time it was detained, Steven Lacoursiere (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while his licence was suspended as a result of a Criminal Code conviction.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

3The appellant filed the Notice of Appeal on April 15, 2026, which is thirteen days after the 15-day appeal period prescribed by Section 9 of Ontario Regulation 631/98 (the “Regulation”). The respondent Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) opposed the motion for an extension of time. The Registrar also brought a motion submitting that the appellant lacked standing to bring the appeal as it was not the owner of the vehicle at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded as required under s. 50.2(1) of the Act. The Registrar sought a dismissal of the appeal.

4First, I must decide the appellant’s motion for an order granting an extension of time to file an appeal pursuant to section 50.2 of the Act. If I grant the appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file the appeal, then I must make a determination on the Registrar’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.

ISSUES

5The issues in dispute are:

i. Whether the appeal deadline should be extended to allow the appeal to be filed and heard by the Tribunal?

ii. Does the appellant have standing to appeal the impoundment of the vehicle?

RESULT

6The appellant’s motion to extend the deadline for the filing of the appeal is denied. As I have denied the appellant’s request for an extension of time to file the appeal, I do not make any determinations on the Registrar’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.

ANALYSIS

A. Should the appeal deadline be extended?

7I find that, on the balance of probabilities, the justice of the case does not favour the granting of an extension of time to file an appeal and the appeal deadline is not extended.

8Pursuant to s. 9 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) issued under the Act, an appeal of a long-term impoundment is required to be filed within 15 days after the day the vehicle was detained.

9In the appellant’s case, the vehicle was impounded on March 19, 2026. The appeal deadline was April 2, 2026. The appellant submitted its appeal on April 15, 2026, thirteen days late.

10Under the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act s. 7, the Tribunal may extend the deadline if the Tribunal is satisfied there are “reasonable grounds” for doing so.

11Determining whether there are reasonable grounds for an extension is not an exact formula. Pursuant to Manuel v. Registrar, Motor Vehicles Dealers Act 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492 (Div. Ct.), the Tribunal must consider the following factors in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to grant an extension of time:

a. The existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

b. The length of the delay;

c. Prejudice to the other party; and

d. The merits of the appeal.

12The analysis requires a balancing of these factors applied to the facts. No one factor takes precedence over the others. The overriding consideration is whether the “justice of the case” requires that an extension be granted.

13The onus is on the appellant to establish that there are reasonable grounds for granting the extension.

Bona Fide Intention to Appeal within the Appeal Period and Length of the Delay

14I can not conclude that the appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal before the expiration of the appeal period. I find the length of the delay is not significant.

15The appellant submits that it did not learn of the impoundment within the appeal period, and learnt of it three days later. On or about February 14, 2026, the appellant, a dealership, sold the vehicle to the driver. On or about April 5, 2026, the appellant contacted the driver after he missed the first payment for the vehicle with TD Auto Finance, and he advised the vehicle had been impounded. Upon learning of the impoundment, the appellant submits it acted in good faith and took immediate steps to investigate and clarify the impoundment details. Further, that any delay was related to becoming aware of the impoundment after the appeal period had expired through no fault of its own. I note that after the appellant became aware of the impoundment on April 5, 2026, it filed the appeal on April 15, 2025. This is ten days later. During that time, the appellant investigated the impoundment, and made efforts to cancel the retail deal and transfer ownership back to itself. I find the length of the delay in filing an appeal is not significant.

16For the purposes of determining whether the appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal before the expiration of the appeal period, the period of time that I am reviewing is the 15 day appeal period prescribed by the Regulation, and I find there is no indication the appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal within that period as it did not know the vehicle had been detained in order to be impounded. The appellant submits it first became aware the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded on April 5, 2026. This is three days after the 15-day appeal period prescribed by s. 9 of the Regulation had expired. Consequently, the appellant did not have the opportunity to take any steps towards filing an appeal, or contemplate any steps before the expiration of the appeal period, and did not have a bona fide intention.

17I am not satisfied that the appellant had a bona fide intention to appeal within the required time period, and I find that the length of delay was not significant.

Prejudice to the other party

18The Registrar advised that there is prejudice given that the 45 days impoundment period is almost complete. The appellant acknowledged the impoundment period is almost complete.

19I find that there is some prejudice to the Registrar with the late filing. The Registrar would benefit from a hearing without delay. I took this factor into consideration.

The merits of the appeal

20To consider the justice of the case for an extension of time limit based on the merits of the appeal, I must only be satisfied that there is some merit to the appeal based upon the evidence before me. This is a relatively low test. This is not an exercise in prejudging the hearing outcome. With respect to the merits, I find the appellant does not have an arguable case.

21The appellant raised one ground of appeal, namely that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

22I note the Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

23If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

24The appellant submits it invested money to recondition the vehicle and it is decaying while impounded. The appellant submits it will lose resale value for the vehicle, and it is unsure of the vehicle’s condition, and what needs to be done to safely resell the vehicle. The appellant will likely need to invest additional sums of money to recommission the vehicle and will need to pay the impoundment fees.

25While I am mindful that the appellant is losing money during the impoundment period, I note the appellant acknowledges that it has as many as 75 motor vehicles that it owns and that are available to it during the impoundment period. I find the appellant has alternative forms of transportation available to it during the impoundment period.

26Overall, on a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish its case on a balance of probabilities but only that its version of events, if believed, could result in the impoundment being overturned. I am not satisfied the appellant met this low threshold considering that there are many alternatives to the impounded vehicle available to the appellant.

27In summary I find that, in balancing the four factors, the justice of the case does not support an extension of the appeal deadline.

ORDER

34The appellant’s motion to extend the deadline for the filing of the appeal is denied. The appeal is dismissed.

Released: May 21, 2026

__________________________

Rupinder Hans

Adjudicator