Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18031/LLCA

In the matter of an appeal from a Notice of Proposal to Revoke a Cannabis Retail Operator Licence, under the Cannabis Licence Act, 2018, S.O. 2018, c. 12, Sched. 2

Between:

2812768 Ontario Inc.

Appellant

and

Registrar, Cannabis Licence Act, 2018

Respondent

MOTION DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bernard Trottier

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Mani Kaur, Director

Abhinav Yadav, Agent

For the Respondent:

Elizabeth Maishlish, Counsel

Heard by Videoconference: May 4, 2026

OVERVIEW

12812768 Ontario Inc. (the “appellant”) appeals the Notice of Proposal to Revoke a Cannabis Retail Operator Licence, dated November 10, 2025 (the “NOP”), under s. 11 of the Cannabis Licence Act, 2018, S.O. 2018, c. 12, Sched. 2 (the “Act”). The Registrar under the Act (the “Registrar”) takes the position that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant will not act as a cannabis retail operator in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honestly or in the public interest, and therefore pursuant to s. 11 and s. 14(1) of the Act, the Registrar proposes to revoke the appellant’s retail operator licence.

2The appellant’s grounds of appeal are set out in its Notice of Appeal dated November 23, 2025, and in its Amended Reasons for Appeal dated February 2, 2026.

3A 3-day videoconference hearing on the appeal is scheduled to commence on June 29, 2026.

MOTION

4On April 17, 2026, the Registrar served and filed a Notice of Motion seeking an order to remove Abhinav Yadav (“Yadav”) as the appellant’s representative in this proceeding.

5At the Motion hearing, the Registrar raised a preliminary issue that Yadav should be barred from representing the appellant at the Motion hearing.

RESULT

6I allowed Yadav to appear as the appellant’s representative for the Motion hearing.

7I order that Yadav be removed from appearing as the appellant’s representative any further in this proceeding.

ANALYSIS

Applicable statutes and regulations

8The Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (the “Rules”) and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (the “SPPA”) apply to this proceeding.

9Under Rule 24.1, a party may be self-represented, or they may have a representative. Under Rule 2.20, representatives are required to be authorized under the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8 (the “Law Society Act”) to represent a party in a proceeding, and they must comply with the applicable Law Society of Ontario (“LSO”) guidelines and rules of professional conduct.

10Under s. 23(3) of the SPPA, a tribunal may exclude from a hearing anyone, other than a person licensed under the Law Society Act, appearing on behalf of a party or as an adviser to a witness if it finds that such person is not competent properly to represent or to advise the party or witness, or does not understand and comply at the hearing with the duties and responsibilities of an advocate or adviser.

Background and timeline

112812768 Ontario Inc. was licensed under the Act as a cannabis retail operator on July 12, 2021. Mani Kaur, Dushyaant Bhatti and Mahak Sharma are listed as the shareholders and directors of the appellant.

12A case conference on this matter was held on February 3, 2026. Mani Kaur (“Kaur”) appeared on behalf of the appellant. Kaur requested an adjournment on the ground that she needed to obtain legal counsel. On consent, the adjournment was granted.

13A second case conference was held on February 23, 2026. This case conference was adjourned to permit the appellant’s counsel to review the record and to be present at the case conference.

14A third case conference was held on April 7, 2026. Kaur appeared on behalf of the appellant, without a legal representative. At this case conference, the parties set procedural matters for the hearing, including particulars on the hearing duration, exchange of documents, witness lists and hearing briefs, and they reviewed rules for interpreters, court reporting and legal representation.

15On April 13, 2026, the appellant served and filed a Declaration of Representative (“DOR”), naming Yadav as the appellant’s legal representative.

Preliminary issue: Yadav may represent the appellant for the Motion hearing

16At the Motion hearing, the Registrar raised a preliminary issue that Yadav should be precluded from appearing as the appellant’s representative at the Motion hearing. The Registrar submitted that the Tribunal has the authority to remove and/or restrict representation. The Registrar submitted, further, that Kaur has no language barrier to comprehend the proceeding. The Registrar argued that it would be inconsistent to allow Yadav to represent the appellant at the Motion hearing, but to disallow him from appearing at the hearing on the NOP.

17Kaur, on behalf of the appellant, stated that Yadav is an employee, consultant and authorized agent of the appellant. She stated, as well, that Yadav is her partner in a conjugal relationship in a shared home.

18Kaur submitted that the appellant filed a duly signed DOR that was accepted by the Tribunal. She submitted, further, that she has not retained external legal counsel for financial reasons. She argued that Yadav should be allowed to represent the appellant at the Motion hearing as a matter of procedural fairness.

19Under Rule 3.1, the Rules will be interpreted liberally to facilitate a fair, open and accessible process, and to allow effective participation by all parties, whether they are self-represented or have a representative. I find that excluding Nadav from the Motion hearing, a priori, without first hearing submissions from Nadav, would not be consistent with the intent of Rule 3.1.

20I allowed Nadav to represent the appellant on the narrow matter of the Motion hearing, and I heard his submissions.

Grounds for the Motion

21The Registrar submits that Yadav should be removed from representing the appellant in this proceeding based on the following four factors:

1. The administration of justice may be undermined;

2. Yadav is likely to be called as a necessary and material witness in the NOP hearing;

3. Yadav has a direct personal interest in the litigation; and

4. Yadav does not meet the definition of “representative” under the Rules.

Administration of the justice system

22The Registrar submits that professional safeguards, under the Law Society Act, mitigate the risks that the administration of justice may be undermined. The Registrar argues that Yadav owes no professional duties to the Tribunal and is not subject to professional duties of conduct under the Law Society Act.

23The Registrar argues, citing Karas et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen et al., 2011 ONSC 5181 (“Karas”), that the overarching test to be applied on a motion to remove a representative is whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires the removal of the representative. In Karas, the Superior Court concluded that removal is appropriate when the representative is likely to be called as a necessary and material witness, or the representative has a direct or personal interest in the litigation, including but not limited to pecuniary interest.

24The Registrar argues, further, that removal motions require the balancing of competing interests, citing Sokoloff v. Mahoney, 2018 ONSC 7223 (“Sokoloff”) where the Superior Court found that integrity of the justice system is the paramount consideration. The Registrar argues that competing values, such as the appellant’s choice of representative, carries less weight because Yadav is not a representative under the Law Society Act.

25The appellant argues that Karas and Sokoloff are not relevant in this matter, because these cases concern removal of lawyers from the record. The appellant argues that the principles in Karas and Sokoloff do not apply to unlicensed representatives acting under statutory exemption.

26The appellant argues, further, that removal of a representative is an exceptional remedy, and that the Registrar’s request for relief is disproportionate. The appellant argues that removal of the representative would effectively convert a statutory entitlement to representation into a discretionary privilege, which would be inconsistent with the intent of the applicable legislation.

27I find that the appellant has not directed me to any part of the Superior Court’s decisions in Karas and Sokoloff that indicates that the principles regarding the removal of a representative apply only to lawyers, and that they do not apply to unlicensed representatives. I find that it would be an absurd outcome if the Court intended unlicensed representatives to be exempt from the underlying principles regarding the integrity of the justice system.

28I find that removal of a representative is not an exceptional remedy, and the Rules, the Law Society Act, the SPPA and other statutes all direct me on where and when it is within my authority to grant the requested relief. Although the appellant argues that it has a statutory entitlement to choose its representative, it must direct me to the specific statutes upon which it says that entitlement is based.

29For these reasons, I will consider the other three factors raised by the Registrar in determining whether the Registrar’s motion should be granted.

Yadav is likely to be called as a necessary and material witness

30The Registrar submits that it intends to call Yadav as a witness in this proceeding, with relevant, material evidence including the appellant’s decision-making process in improperly removing and failing to destroy cannabis from its retail stores, and the appellant’s financial issues and constraints.

31The Registrar submits, further, that the courts have recognized that fairness concerns arise where one party must cross-examine a non-party witness who participated fully in the proceedings. The Registrar argues that permitting Yadav to act as the appellant’s representative undermines the Registrar’s ability to test Yadav’s material evidence through cross-examination. For these reasons, the Registrar argues that permitting Yadav to represent the appellant undermines procedural fairness.

32The Registrar argues that if Yadav is allowed to act in the dual role of witness and advocate, his testimony as a witness becomes reactive, because it would be influenced by the evidence and arguments advanced during other parts of the hearing. The Registrar argues that allowing Yadav to hear all other witness’s testimony would undermine the integrity of the proceeding. The Registrar argues that Yadav’s testimony would be “impaired” by his being an advocate, citing Sokoloff at para. 63, that

The court's concern of a lawyer appearing as a witness is that (i) there may be a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client and (ii) the administration of justice can be impaired by a conflict between the lawyer's obligations of objectivity and detachment which are owed to the court and the lawyer's obligation to his or her client to present evidence in as favourable a light as possible

33The appellant submits that s. 23(3) of the SPPA permits a tribunal to exclude a representative where the individual is not able to properly represent or advise a party. It submits that s. 23(3) of the SPPA does not prohibit representation where an individual may also be a witness.

34The appellant submits, further, that the Tribunal routinely manages situations where individuals have overlapping roles, by limiting participation and sequencing evidence during testimony, according to the circumstances.

35The appellant argues that there is no prejudice to the Registrar if Yadav represents the appellant, because the Registrar would retain its ability to cross-examine Yadav, challenge his evidence and make submissions regarding credibility. The appellant argues that the concerns regarding integrity of the justice system and prejudice to the parties are speculative, and that the remedy of removal of Yadav is not warranted.

36I find that the Registrar’s concern is valid, regarding the potential dual role of Yadav as both a witness and advocate. Both Karas and Sokoloff held that removal of a representative is appropriate when the conflict between these roles would impair the administration of justice, and I find no reason to derogate from this principle. I find that the submissions before me indicate that Yadav would be a necessary and material witness at the hearing, and it would jeopardize the integrity of the proceeding for him to appear as both a witness and advocate.

37I find, further, that the appellant’s general assertions on hearing management, that the Tribunal could manage the conflict of interest by limiting participation and sequencing evidence during testimony, not compelling. With Yadav as the sole representative, it would not be possible for a hearing adjudicator to limit Yadav’s participation. Also, because the onus lies with the Registrar to demonstrate its case, it is required to present its evidence first. In that scenario, Yadav would hear the Registrar’s evidence and cross-examine witnesses before giving his own testimony. I find that the appellant’s proposed remedy, reversing the order of testimony, is not an appropriate or proportional solution to the conflict of interest posed by the appellant. I do not find that the appellant’s choice of representative overrides the Tribunal’s ability to conduct the proceeding in a procedurally fair manner.

38I find that, although s. 23(3) of the SPPA permits a tribunal to exclude an unlicensed representative because they are not competent, it does not follow that a tribunal must allow a representative in all other circumstances. I find that I must review statutes other than the SPPA to determine where and when a representative should be removed.

39For the reasons above, I find that Yadav’s potential dual role as witness and advocate requires that he be removed as a representative.

Yadav has a direct personal interest in the litigation

40The Registrar submits, citing Karas, that representatives are removed for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests, including situations where the representative and a party have an intimate personal relationship.

41The Registrar submits that Yadav is personally and financially connected to Kaur. The Registrar argues that Yadav’s close personal relationship with Kaur creates a reasonable apprehension that Yadav’s judgment as a representative is influenced beyond that of an independent advocate.

42The appellant submits that self-represented appellants have a financial interest in the outcomes of legal matters, yet they are entitled to represent themselves. The appellant argues that employees of corporations are also entitled to represent corporations under the Rules and LSO by-laws, even though they have a pecuniary interest in the proceeding. The appellant argues that if financial interest were sufficient to disqualify representation, corporations would be effectively barred from relying on internal representatives, contrary to the intent of the statutes regarding representation.

43The appellant submits, further, that the Registrar has not put forward any improper conduct or inability on the part of Yadav to represent the appellant. The appellant argues that the existence of a personal relationship is insufficient evidence to remove a representative.

44Under Rule 2.20, a “representative” is defined as a person who acts for a party in a proceeding and is authorized under the Law Society Act to represent a party in such a proceeding. Under s. 26.1(7)(a) of the Law Society Act, a non-licensed person may provide legal services only when permitted under LSO by-laws. Those by-laws stipulate the following exceptions for unlicensed representatives:

1. Under By-Law 4.30.1, an in-house legal services provider who is employed by a single employer; and

2. Under By-Law 4.30.5, a family member who provides legal services for and on behalf of a related person, within the meaning of the Income Tax Act (Canada), and who does not expect and does not receive any compensation, including a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, for the provision of the legal services.

45Under s. 251(2) of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp.), “related persons” are:

1. individuals who are connected by blood relationship, marriage or common-law partnership;

2. a corporation and a person who controls the corporation;

3. a corporation and a person who is a member of a related group that controls the corporation; and

4. A corporation and any person related to a person who controls the corporation.

46I find that Yadav does not meet the definition of an in-house legal services provider who is employed by a single employer. In the Motion hearing, the appellant submitted that Yadav is an “agent”, a “consultant” and an “employee” of the appellant, but the appellant did not submit that Yadav is employed solely by the appellant. Therefore, I find that he does not meet the exemption under By-Law 4.30.1.

47I find that Yadav meets the definition of a “related person” under to By-Law 4.30.5. In this matter, Yadav is a family member who is requesting to provide legal services to a corporation (2812768 Ontario Inc.) and a person (Kaur) who is a member of a related group that controls the corporation.

48However, I find that Yadav would expect to receive a direct or indirect gain or reward for the provision of his legal services, as the intimate partner of a shareholder and director of the appellant. Because I find that Yadav would receive direct or indirect gain or reward from the outcome of the proceeding, I find that that he does not meet the exemption for unlicensed representatives under By-Law 4.30.5.

49For the reasons above, I find that Yadav’s personal interest in the litigation precludes him from representing the appellant in the proceeding.

Yadav does not meet the definition of “representative” under the Rules

50The Registrar submits that the appellant’s DOR relies on the exemption to Rule 2.20 for employees and agents to provide legal services without compensation. I found above that Yadav does not meet the requirements under Rule 2.20 and the LSO by-laws to qualify as a representative.

51The Registrar submits, further, that s. 26(7) of the Law Society Act is explicit in setting out the exemption that a person who is not licenced by the LSO may provide legal services only if the LSO by-laws permit the person to provide legal services in Ontario.

52The appellant submits that the Rules expressly permit employees and agents of a corporation to act as representatives without a licence, providing they are not offering services for compensation.

53The appellant submits, further, that the duty of procedural fairness requires that a party be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present its case, without requiring licensed legal counsel. The appellant argues that unnecessary restrictions on its ability to choose its representation undermines fairness and accessibility before the Tribunal.

54I found above that Rule 2.20, and LSO By-Laws 4.30.1 and 4.30.5, permit employees, agents and family members to represent a party only in specific circumstances, but that Yadav’s circumstances do not meet those criteria.

55I find that the Registrar has demonstrated that Yadav does not meet the definition of a “representative” under the Rules, the Law Society Act and the LSO by-laws. I find, further, that the duty of procedural fairness is met when the parties have been provided the opportunity to direct me to the appropriate statutes and case law in helping me arrive at my decision in this matter.

Conclusions

56I find that the removal of a representative is within my authority and that it applies to both licensed and unlicensed representatives.

57I find that Yadav’s potential dual role as witness and advocate requires that he be removed as a representative.

58I find that Yadav’s personal pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests in the litigation preclude him from representing the appellant in the proceeding.

59I find that Yadav does not meet the definition of a representative under the Rules, the Law Society Act and the LSO by-laws.

ORDER

17I order that Yadav be removed as a representative of the appellant.