RECONSIDERATION ORDER
Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair, Delegate
Tribunal File Number: 18474/MVIA
Case Name: Lorraine Asselstine v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
For the Appellant: Lorraine Asselstine, Appellant
OVERVIEW
1On May 7, 2026, the appellant submitted a request for reconsideration with respect to the Tribunal’s decision dated April 30, 2026 (“decision”).
2The appellant had appealed the impoundment of her vehicle under s. 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”). In the decision, the Tribunal confirmed the Registrar’s impoundment.
3Pursuant to s. 17(2) of the Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 5, the Executive Chair has delegated to me authority to deal with such matters.
4The Tribunal’s power to reconsider as set out in Rule 18.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”) is a discretionary power. It provides that the Tribunal may reconsider any decision that finally disposes of an appeal if the request for reconsideration is made within 21 days of the date of the decision.
5I find the appellant’s request relates to a decision that finally disposed of an appeal, and that it was filed within the 21-day deadline. Since she has met the procedural requirements for filing a reconsideration request under Rule 18.1, I will consider the merits of her request under Rule 18.2.
ANALYSIS
6For the following reasons, I find the appellant has not established any grounds for granting reconsideration under Rule 18.2. As such, her request for reconsideration is dismissed.
7I did not find it necessary to ask for responding submissions from the Registrar.
8The criteria for granting a reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2. To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
9The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-argue their position where they disagree with the Tribunal’s decision. The requestor—in this case, the appellant—must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
10On her Request for Reconsideration form, the appellant indicated that she is seeking reconsideration under Rule 18.2(c).
11To trigger Rule 18.2(c), a party must meet all three parts of the following test:
There is “evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision”;
This evidence “could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it”; and,
This evidence “would likely have affected the result”.
12Along with her Request for Reconsideration form, the appellant included a document from the Ontario Court of Justice that indicates a charge laid against her son had been withdrawn on May 4, 2026. This charge related to “driving a motor vehicle not equipped with an approved ignition interlock device”.
13The appellant also provided submissions that stated there was confusion over whether an interlock device could be removed from the impounded vehicle. The charge related to the removal of this device was laid against her son in March 2026, but it was eventually withdrawn when he attended court on May 4, 2026.
14Since the impoundment relates to this now withdrawn charge, the appellant argues in her submissions:
My son has been paying for his mistake for years. He has drove for 3 years with the interlock device which is not free. He paid for a lawyer and his fines. He is back on track in life and having the truck impounded now for something that is not his fault is very discouraging to say the least.
This entire situation was no fault of ours. The truck remains impounded. We do not feel as though we should have to pay to get the truck out and frankly I can not afford it. The rising cost of gas, groceries and everything is already too much.
The Alcolock system should match up with MTO’s system, and the device should never have been removed. The system is broken and we should not be expected to pay the price of this.
15I am sympathetic to the financial struggles the appellant has laid out in her submissions. I am also mindful of the fact that she is navigating this reconsideration process without the assistance of a lawyer or a paralegal. However, it is the appellant’s onus to show she is entitled to reconsideration under Rule 18.2, and I find she has not met this onus.
16I accept that she has met the first two parts of the Rule 18.2(c) test. Briefly, her son’s charge was not withdrawn until after the Tribunal’s decision was released, so I am satisfied that the court document she included with her reconsideration request is new evidence that “could not have been obtained previously”.
17However, I do not find she has shown that this new evidence “would likely have affected the result”. By not meeting this third part of the Rule 18.2(c) test, she has not met her onus.
18As noted in the decision at paragraph 10, a party seeking to appeal an impoundment based on financial or economic loss must meet certain criteria set out in s. 10(3) of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”). One of these requirements is for the party appealing the impoundment to show “no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available”.
19At paragraphs 15 – 21 of the decision, the Tribunal conducted a review of the alternative vehicles that are available to the appellant, namely, her mother’s vehicle and her husband’s vehicle. Since the appellant had not demonstrated that there was “no alternative to the impounded vehicle”, the Tribunal concluded she had not met the test under s. 10(3) of the Regulation.
20The Tribunal’s analysis was summarized at paragraph 21 of the decision:
Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation, and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.
21This “no alternative to the impounded vehicle” finding was central to the Tribunal’s confirmation of the impoundment. As such, I find the appellant’s new evidence about her son’s withdrawn charge would not likely have affected this finding, and, by extension, the result of the decision.
22Though I understand that the appellant believes this new evidence shows the process that was used to impound her vehicle was flawed, she has not explained how this new evidence affects the Tribunal’s finding that she could still use her mother’s vehicle and her husband’s vehicle. This finding allowed the Tribunal to dismiss her appeal, and so—by not challenging this part of the decision—I find she has not shown how this new evidence meets the third part of the Rule 18.2(c) test.
23I also note that the son’s misunderstanding about the removal of the interlock system was considered by the Tribunal at paragraph 18 of the decision: “The respondent submits, that the misunderstanding with respect to the removal of the ignition interlock device is irrelevant to the grounds of exceptional hardship. I agree.”
24By not meeting all three parts of the Rule 18.2(c) test, I find the appellant has not met her onus under Rule 18.2. On this basis, the appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ORDER
25The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Craig Mazerolle Vice-Chair, Delegate
Released: May 12, 2026