Licence Appeal Tribunal
RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before: Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 25-008149/AABS
Case Name: Virginia Voll v. Definity Insurance Company
Written Submissions by:
For the Applicant: Nicolas Jeganathan, Counsel
For the Respondent: Melinda Baxter, Counsel
OVERVIEW
1On February 26, 2026, the applicant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s preliminary issue decision released February 5, 2026 (“decision”).
2Stemming from an incident on May 7, 2024 and a request for benefits made pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”), the parties participated in a preliminary issue written hearing.
3The incident was described in the decision at paragraph 6:
On May 7, 2024, the applicant… was walking on a paved path in a park near her home. Suddenly, when she came within the vicinity of a parked van, a dog leaped out of the open window and attacked her. The dog bit the applicant’s right arm and hand and knocked her to the ground. Reportedly, the dog’s owner, who was asleep in the van when the incident occurred, woke up and removed the dog.
4The two preliminary issues before the Tribunal were:
I. Was the applicant involved in an “accident” as defined in section 3(1) of the Schedule?
II. Is the applicant barred from proceeding to a hearing as she failed to notify the respondent of the circumstances giving rise to a claim for benefits no later than the seventh day after the circumstances arose or as soon as practicable after that day?
5In the decision, the Tribunal found the applicant had not proven that the incident met the definition of an “accident”, pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Schedule. The Tribunal further determined that she did not notify the respondent of the incident within the timeline prescribed by the Schedule, nor did she provide a reasonable explanation for this delay.
6The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
7The applicant relies on Rule 18.2(b) to support her request. She is asking the Tribunal to either vary the decision, or, in the alternative, to have the matter reheard.
8The respondent asks the Tribunal to dismiss the request for reconsideration.
RESULT
9The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
10The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold, and the requesting party must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence.
11The applicant raises several alleged errors with the decision addressing the outcome of both preliminary issues. Since both issues are complete bars to the application, I find it is sufficient to focus my analysis on whether the applicant has successfully challenged the delay finding. For the following reasons, I do not find she has established an error that would engage Rule 18.2(b) as it relates to this preliminary issue.
12Section 32(1) of the Schedule provides that a person who intends to apply for accident benefits shall notify the insurer of their intention no later than the seventh day after the circumstances arose that give rise to the entitlement to the benefit, or as soon as practicable after that day. If an insured person does not comply with this time limit, they may continue with their application if they provide a “reasonable explanation” for the delay, pursuant to s. 34.
13As noted in the decision at paragraph 41, there was “no dispute that the applicant first notified the respondent of her intention to apply for accident benefits when she submitted her completed OCF-1 on December 5, 2024, seven months after the incident.” Therefore, the Tribunal turned its attention to assess whether the applicant had a “reasonable explanation” for the delay. After considering the applicant’s two explanations, namely, the difficulty she had understanding her legal options after the incident and the significant impact of her injuries, the Tribunal concluded that she did not meet her onus under s. 34.
14The applicant claims the Tribunal “did not meaningfully apply” the consumer protection mandate of the Schedule when assessing her explanations. Instead, she argues the Tribunal “reduced” her position to two explanations, i.e., ignorance of the law and her medical condition. According to the applicant, this summary did not account for the complicated nature of the incident, including how there was a dispute between the parties over whether it constituted an “accident”. The applicant further submits that the Tribunal focused too heavily on “delay length and documentary proof”. Finally, the applicant cites the binding ruling in Hussein v. Intact Insurance Company, 2025 ONSC 842 (“Hussein”) as a time when the Court, in her words, “excused delay in the context of a conventional motor vehicle collision”.
15I do not accept this ground for reconsideration.
16The Tribunal conducted a detailed assessment of the applicant’s claim that she had a “reasonable explanation” for the delay from paragraphs 42 – 52 of the decision. Though the applicant may claim that more attention should have been paid to the complicated nature of the incident (including the parties’ dispute over whether it was an “accident”), this argument formed a part of the factual matrix before the Tribunal. Specifically, at paragraph 43, the Tribunal summarized the applicant’s position on s. 34 as follows (emphasis added):
The applicant’s explanation for not notifying the respondent pursuant to section 32(1) is two-fold: first, she submits that most people do not understand the distinction between a tort claim, a property claim, and a claim for statutory accident benefits. It is therefore entirely unrealistic to expect an elderly layperson, knocked down and mauled by a dog leaping from a parked vehicle, to appreciate that such an event might qualify as an “accident” under the Schedule. Secondly, she submits that she was recovering from traumatic hand injuries. She acted in good faith and provided notice as soon as practicable. Her serious injuries, advanced age, and “reliance on others” constitute a credible and reasonable explanation under section 34 and pursuant to an unpublished decision of the Tribunal in Buttenham v. Northbridge General Insurance Company, 2024 ONLAT 23-008795/AABS (“Buttenham”). I note that although the applicant cites the unpublished decision in Buttenham, she did not provide a copy of her authority to the Tribunal.
17I find the applicant’s contention that the Tribunal did not “meaningfully” consider this part of her case appears to be a request to reconsider an argument addressed at first instance. As noted above, the reconsideration process is not a venue for asking the Tribunal to re-litigate one’s case.
18Further, though the applicant may disagree with what she perceives to have been an undue focus on the length of the delay and a “lack of medical documentation”, this complaint again appears to be a dispute with the Tribunal’s weighing of the evidence. Adjudicators are empowered to consider the evidentiary record as a whole, and then to assign different levels of importance to the various aspects of the factual matrix. Unless a requesting party can show that a part of this analysis was either legally impermissible or factually incorrect, these assessments will not be disrupted on reconsideration.
19I also note that the Tribunal explored a number of different factors when assessing the reasonable nature of the applicant’s explanations, including an extensive discussion about the consumer protection mandate and the prejudice facing the respondent from the delay. The s. 34 analysis was not limited to the length of the delay or the medical evidence.
20Finally, though I accept that Hussein is binding, the applicant has not explained how the Tribunal’s decision runs counter to the guidance provided by the Divisional Court. The applicant cited Hussein in his preliminary issue submissions to argue that the Tribunal must be mindful of the complicated legal situation that insured persons find themselves in following an accident, especially one as complex as the May 7, 2024 incident. Though it did not cite Hussein specifically, the Tribunal accepted this principle at paragraphs 48 and 49 of the decision:
The applicant relies on a decision of the Tribunal in Simmers v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2025 ONLAT 23-006025/AABS (“Simmers”) and submits that the Schedule exists to protect claimants who, by definition, have been injured and are often in crisis. She argues that insurers must recognize “the reality that consumers who have motor vehicle accidents are in a vulnerable position, particularly in the period immediately following the accident.” She adds that as per Simmers, the insurer must make further inquiry once notified of a possible claim.
I agree that the Schedule is consumer protection legislation, see: Davis v. Aviva General Insurance Co., 2024 ONSC 3054(“Davis”) and I acknowledge the direction provided by the Court in Davis…
21I see no error with this approach.
22Taken together, I find the applicant has not established an error that meets the standard of Rule 18.2(b) as it relates to delay. Once again, this issue is dispositive of the application, so I do not find it is necessary to address the other grounds involving whether the May 7, 2024 incident constitutes an “accident”.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
23The applicant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Craig Mazerolle
Vice-Chair
Released: May 11, 2026