Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18591/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Samantha E. Mitchell

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Dagmara Szczudlo

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Samantha E. Mitchell, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard By Teleconference May 5, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Samantha E. Mitchell, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Sunday, April 26, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Jacob McLeary (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

6I am satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant submits that the impounded vehicle, a 2018 Chevrolet, is her only vehicle with an active registration. Although the MTO Registrant Identification Number (“RIN”) search, provided as evidence by the respondent, indicated the registration of a 2008 Nissan, the appellant testified that she is no longer in possession of the car because it “literally caught fire and blew up” while she was driving home from work.

14The appellant testified that the driver of the impounded vehicle was her boyfriend, and she did not know that his licence was suspended prior to the traffic stop. Prior to the impoundment, she paid rent to live with her boyfriend and his family in Bradford, Ontario. The relationship ended because of the impoundment, and she was asked to leave the house. The appellant testified that she moved in with her mom on May 1, 2026 because she lost her job and could not afford to pay rent.

15Continuing her testimony, the appellant stated that having a car was a condition of her employment as a travelling Personal Support Worker (“PSW”). She worked 8 hours per day, Monday to Friday, alternating weeks and was required to drive to multiple locations throughout the day to provide care services to various clients. The appellant testified that she saw between 12-15 clients per day and spends 1-2 hours per client. During cross-examination, she clarified that there was a set number of clients per day as well as add-on clients. The appellant lost her job when she notified her employer that she no longer has access to a car.

16Finally, the 23-year-old appellant testified that her mom is financially supporting her now because she “can’t afford anything”. During cross-examination, she stated that her mom and stepdad share a car, and it is not feasible for her to drive her parents to work and borrow the family car. She explored public transportation alternatives, however, given the nature of her work, taking an Uber or public transportation is also not feasible because she spends limited amounts of time at multiple locations per day and the expense is prohibitive.

17The respondent submitted that the impoundment occurred lawfully because as per the Extended Driver Record Search, the driver was driving with a suspended licence. The appellant has access to other alternatives such as taxis, rideshare, public transit in Barrie or can rent a car for the period of the impoundment. The respondent argues that there is no risk to health or safety to the person ordinarily transported by the vehicle because only the appellant uses the vehicle to attend work as a personal support worker. The respondent argues that the request for impoundment be confirmed by the Tribunal.

18On a balance of probabilities, I find that the appellant met her onus to show that commuting by public transportation to a travelling PSW job with multiple clients per day in different locations is not a viable alternative.

19I find that the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

Threat to heath, safety, the environment or property

20The appellant has not alleged that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

Financial, Economic, Employment or Education Losses

21The appellant alleges that the impoundment caused a loss of employment or an employment opportunity. In particular, the appellant alleges that she lost her job as a travelling PSW due to the impoundment because having access to a car is a condition of her employment and she no longer meets that requirement.

22The respondent took no position on the appellant’s financial, economic or potential employment losses other than that the appellant was notified by her employer that she can reapply for her position once she regains access to a car.

23I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(c), the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, namely the appellant.

24I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(b) of the Regulation, the appellant’s economic loss was immediate, significant and lasting, because the appellant lost her job several days after the impoundment and because of this loss, moved back home with her parents. This loss will continue as long as the appellant is without a vehicle as accessibility to a vehicle is not only paramount to but also a requirement of employment as a traveling PSW.

25For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion

26I find that:

i. There is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle;

ii. There is an immediate, significant and lasting economic loss; and

iii. The impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, namely the appellant.

27For these reasons, I find that the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

28The Tribunal Orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.

Released: May 14, 2026

__________________________

Dagmara Szczudlo

Adjudicator