RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Before:
Jan Dymond, Vice Chair
Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number:
18133/MVIA
Case Name:
Jennifer Dagenais v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Written Submissions by:
For the Appellant:
Jennifer Dagenais, Self-represented
For the Registrar:
Leila Pereira, Agent
OVERVIEW
1On February 23, 2026, the appellant requested reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision dated February 2, 2026 (“decision”).
2In the decision, the Tribunal found that the appellant was barred under s. 50.2(4) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (“Act”) from appealing the impoundment of the subject motor vehicle on the grounds of exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d), because there had been a previous impoundment of a vehicle owned by the appellant. The Tribunal, therefore, did not consider the appeal on the grounds of exceptional hardship. As there was no other appeal ground advanced, the Tribunal confirmed the impoundment of the subject motor vehicle.
3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:
a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;
b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or
c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.
4The appellant is relying on Rule 18.2(b) and Rule 18.2(c) to support this reconsideration request. Specifically, the appellant submits that, based on new information that has come to the appellant’s attention, the impoundment order was improperly issued.
5The Registrar opposes the reconsideration request.
6The appellant requests that the Tribunal determine that the impoundment was not legally authorized based on the actual nature of the suspension.
RESULT
7The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
ANALYSIS
8The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.
Rule 18.2(b) – The Tribunal did not make an error of law or fact
9I am not satisfied that the appellant has shown the Tribunal made an error of law or fact, pursuant to Rule 18.2(b).
10The appellant submits that the Tribunal made an error in fact by finding that the impoundment under appeal (i.e., the 2025 impoundment) was the second impoundment of her vehicle, because the impoundment under appeal was not legally authorized.
11Section 50.2(4) of the Act states that s. 50.2(3)(d), i.e., the ground of exceptional hardship, does not apply if there was a previous impoundment under s. 55.1 with respect to any motor vehicle then owned by the same owner.
12In her hearing testimony, the appellant confirmed that the same vehicle that is subject to the 2025 impoundment was previously impounded, and that she was the owner at the time of the previous impoundment. Her reconsideration submission relates to the 2025 impoundment only. She submits that she should not have been denied the ability to appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship because the 2025 impoundment was improperly ordered. She submits that the driver’s licence of the driver was not at the time suspended for a Criminal Code conviction. The appellant submits that this licence suspension is an administrative suspension resulting from a failure to complete a mandatory Back-on-Track program and, therefore, should not have been subject to s.55.(4) of the Act.
13The Registrar submits that the appellant has not identified an error of law or facts made by the Tribunal that would have altered the decision. They submit that the evidence they presented to the Tribunal confirmed that s. 55.1(3) of the Act was the reason for the current impoundment, and that the appellant did not challenge the reason in any way at the time of the hearing.
14The Registrar’s hearing evidence included a Notice of Impoundment confirming that the subject vehicle belonging to the appellant was impounded on December 17, 2025 for 45 days because of a Criminal Code-related suspension of the driver’s licence of the driver. The Registrar also submitted the driving record for the driver confirming that his licence was suspended in November of 2010 because of a Criminal Code conviction.
15I find that the Tribunal did not make an error of fact because I find the Tribunal’s decision to have been based on the facts and documentary evidence that was before it at the time of the hearing, i.e., the appellant’s testimony confirming a prior impoundment, and the Registrar’s documentary evidence confirming that the driver’s licence of the driver was under suspension at the time of the 2025 impoundment. The appellant’s arguments appear to be a disagreement with the weighing of the evidence done by the Tribunal in first instance; however, disagreement alone with evidentiary findings is not sufficient to trigger reconsideration.
16As a result, I find that the appellant has not established grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(b).
Rule 18.2(c) – The appellant has not established grounds for reconsideration based on evidence that was not before the Tribunal
17I find that the appellant has not met the test under Rule 18.2(c).
18To trigger Rule 18.2(c), a party must meet the following three-part test:
a. There is “evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision”;
b. This evidence “could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it”; and,
c. This evidence “would likely have affected the result”.
19The appellant submits that the driver was not subject to an active Criminal Code driving prohibition at the time that the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded. Rather, she submits that all court-ordered driving prohibitions had expired years earlier, and that the driver’s licence status on the date in question resulted from non-completion of the Back-on-Track remedial program, which she submits is an administrative licence reinstatement requirement imposed by the Registrar under the Act and Regulations. She submits that this should be considered as a different issue not addressed in the decision, i.e., whether the 45-day impoundment was legally authorized.
20The appellant submits what appears to be an unofficial extracted summary of the driver’s Statement of Driving Record in support of her argument.
21The Registrar submits the appellant has not provided any new evidence that could not have been obtained prior to the hearing. They submit that the Registrar’s hearing submission package was reviewed at the hearing, including the driving record of the driver and the specific section of the Act that allowed the officer to impound the vehicle. The Registrar submits that the appellant did not question the authority of the impoundment, nor did she ask clarifying questions of the impoundment at the hearing.
22The appellant submits that, although she had access to the driver’s driving record, she did not understand the legal distinction between a Criminal Code prohibition and an administrative suspension at the time of the hearing and that, therefore, the underlying basis for the impoundments may have been incorrect.
23I find that the reconsideration request is not based on new evidence that could not have been obtained previously by the party seeking to introduce it. The appellant’s reconsideration submissions state that she had raised questions about the nature of the suspension with the Tribunal prior to the hearing. The Tribunal file confirms that the appellant sent emails to the Tribunal and the Registrar on January 7, 2026 noting that she had reviewed the Registrar’s documentary submissions and it appeared to her that the suspension was in place because of non-completion of a remedial program and fines. She had the opportunity to provide evidence at the hearing but did not do so, nor was any documentary evidence submitted with her reconsideration submissions other than the driving record summary that appears to have been prepared by the appellant based on the driving record submitted by the Registrar and, therefore, new evidence that could not have been produced at the time of the hearing.
24For the reasons above, I find that the appellant has not met the test under Rule 18.2(c).
25Further, I find that, even if I were to accept the appellant’s argument that this is new evidence, it would not likely have made a difference to the outcome. The Tribunal’s authority under s. 50.2(4) of the Act is limited to determining whether or not a previous impoundment of a vehicle owned by the same owner occurred. It does not include whether an impoundment was legally carried out, and the appellant did not cite jurisprudence that would allow the Tribunal to make that determination.
26Whether the driver’s licence of the driver was under suspension for a Criminal Code conviction might have been grounds for appeal under s. 50.2(3)(d), where the question of whether the driver’s licence was under suspension due to a Criminal Code conviction could have been argued. However, the appellant did not appeal under that ground. As a result, I find that the arguments advanced in the appellant’s reconsideration request amount to an attempt to re-litigate her position.
27For the reasons above, I find the appellant has not established grounds for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(c), because she did not demonstrate that there is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, which she could not have obtained previously, and that would likely have affected the result.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
28The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.
Jan Dymond
Vice-Chair
Released: May 6, 2026