Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18578/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Maurizio Bommarito

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Jeffery Campbell

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Maurizio Bommarito, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Martin He, Representative

Heard by teleconference:

May 7, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Maurizio Bommarito (the “Appellant”) appeals the impoundment of his 2027 Ford Focus the “vehicle”) under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The vehicle was impounded on Saturday, April 11, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, the vehicle was being driven by the C,W. while his driver’s licence was under suspension due to a criminal conviction.

2The Appellant appeals on the grounds that he exercised due diligence and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues to be determined are:

i. Whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension and/or subject to an ignition interlock conditions pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act.

ii. Whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship, under s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

result

4The Tribunal orders the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to release the vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5The representative of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) presented documentary evidence which established that the Appellant is the registered owner of the vehicle and that the vehicle was stopped while being driven by C.W whose licence was suspended due to a Criminal Code conviction. I am therefore satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded.

6For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an Appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the Appellant.

The impoundment of the vehicle will result in exceptional hardship in accordance with s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act

7Section 10 of O. Reg. 631/98 (the “Regulation”) sets out the criteria and factors that I must consider in determining whether exceptional hardship will result from an impoundment. To establish exceptional hardship, the first requirement set out in s. 10(1) of the Regulation is that there is no alternative available to the impounded vehicle, with s. 10(4) of the Regulation requiring the owner to demonstrate that they have considered and inquired into every reasonable option that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any vehicle. If I find that there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle, then the appeal will fail and I need not consider any other requirements of the test for exceptional hardship.

8If it finds there is no alternative to the vehicle, the Tribunal must consider, in accordance with section 10 of the Regulation, whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle or to the public health and safety or the environment or property of a community in whose service the motor vehicle is ordinarily used. The Tribunal may also at that stage consider if there would be an immediate, significant and lasting financial or economic loss or loss of employment or education (or an opportunity for the same) to any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle other than the suspended driver.

9The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

10The Appellant resides in Kingston, Ontario, where he is employed as a driver for a local trucking company. Following a winter layoff during which he received employment insurance benefits, he was expected to resume work on May 1. He informed his employer that his vehicle was temporarily unavailable for commuting but expected it would be ready soon. He testified that his employer advised that if he was unable to return to work, his position would have to be filled.

11The Appellant testified that he does not have any vehicle other than the one that was impounded. While options like rental cars, Uber, and taxis are available, he cannot afford them. Public transit is available in Kingston, but he is unsure whether it operates before 6 a.m., when he is usually required to start work. In addition, transit would only take him part of the way, requiring him to walk about 1.5 miles to reach his workplace. He also noted that although he is usually informed of his schedule the day before, he is sometimes called in to work on short notice.

12With respect to his personal needs, the Appellant has used transit to obtain groceries twice since the impoundment and to do his laundry once.

13The Registrar submits that the Appellant has alternatives to the vehicle in the form of rental and ride-sharing options as well as public transit.

Conclusion regarding exceptional hardship

14While I agree with the Registrar that rental vehicles, taxis, and ride‑sharing services are available, they cannot be considered reasonable alternatives where they are financially out of reach for the Appellant. As for public transit, I am not persuaded that it offers a practical solution. Even if service begins before 6:00 a.m., the Appellant would still be required to walk approximately 1.5 miles from the nearest stop to his workplace. More significantly, the Appellant’s need to respond to last‑minute calls to work further undermines the reliability of transit as a viable option.

15Having regard to the foregoing, and in accordance with the Act and the Regulation, I find that the Appellant has no reasonable alternative to the use of his vehicle. I am satisfied that the continued impoundment would result in immediate, significant, and enduring economic, financial, and employment hardship. Accordingly, I conclude that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship within the meaning of s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act.

16In light of this finding, it is unnecessary to consider whether the Appellant exercised due diligence pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act.

ORDER

17The Tribunal orders that the Registrar to release the vehicle.

Jeffery Campbell

Vice-Chair