Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18536/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the "Act") from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Bradley Butler

Appellant

And

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bruce Stanton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Bradley Butler, self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent of the Registrar

HEARD: By Teleconference

April 24, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Bradley Butler, (the "appellant"), appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Act. The appellant's motor vehicle was impounded on Sunday, March 29, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, (J.M. the "driver") was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension, and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4The impoundment is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension

6I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 ("R. v. Sault Ste. Marie"), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

8As noted by the Tribunal in paragraph 8 of Horst v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2022 CanLII 106454 (ON LAT), the Tribunal has consistently interpreted due diligence to mean that the owner has taken reasonable steps in the circumstances to ascertain whether the licence was under suspension. Accordingly, although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver's own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

9The appellant testified that the driver is a good friend of his, and his son's. The driver visits at their residence from time to time and he is also a casual employee of the appellant's construction business. He testified that the keys to the vehicle were accessible in the residence on the day of the impoundment.

10The appellant only learned that the driver had borrowed the vehicle to pick up his girlfriend after being awoken from a sleep. He testified, however, that he did not consider the driver had stolen the vehicle.

11The appellant testified that, at the time of the impoundment, he did not know that the driver's licence was suspended. He recalled that, approximately one year prior to the impoundment, the driver displayed his licence card from the next room, attesting that he had driving privileges. He had also seen him display his driver's licence at the casino, for identification purposes. He testified that he did not examine the licence card.

12Importantly, the driver did not seek permission to use the vehicle on the day of the impoundment. It appears that the appellant was given no opportunity that day to make further inquiries of the driver's credentials prior to him borrowing the vehicle. Although the appellant believed the driver had driving privileges, he presented no evidence that the driver had permission to use the vehicle, or that he had driven it in the past.

13The respondent submits that the appellant viewed but did not examine the driver's licence card and took no additional steps to establish that he had a licence. The respondent's evidence reveals that the driver's licence is a "G1", which means that he must be accompanied by a licensed driver when he is behind the wheel.

14As noted above, the test for due diligence in R. v. Sault St. Marie anticipates that a person would take all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

15Considering that the appellant had seen the driver display his driver's licence and use it for identification purposes, that driver was a friend of the family and an employee of the appellant's construction business, that there is no indication the driver had even casual use of the vehicle, and the driver did not seek permission to use vehicle on the day of the impoundment, it is reasonable under the circumstances that the appellant had not pursued a greater degree of inquiry about the driver's licence.

16The appellant is, however, relying on the due diligence ground in seeking an order from the Tribunal for the release of the vehicle from impoundment, which means he must establish that he took deliberate, reasonable steps to confirm the driver's driving privileges. In this case, the appellant's knowledge of the existence of driver's driving privileges can best be characterized as "believing it to be true". He may have had little reason, if any, to question the driver's licence status, but there is no indication he took any steps to verify the driver's licence beyond a glance at the licence card from the next room about a year ago, or when he produced it for identification at the casino. I find that level of inquiry of the driver's licence status falls below the reasonable care threshold set out in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie.

17I find that the appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

18I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the "Regulation").

19The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

20If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

21If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

22The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver's licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

23The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

24I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

25The appellant testified that since the impoundment of his vehicle, a 2012 Volkswagen Jetta, he has been using his truck for work and picking up household needs. He testified that his son, who lives with him, has a disability and he prefers to use the Jetta for transporting his son due its lower profile and ease of access. He testified that his son has attended 3 medical appointments since the impoundment. He used a taxi service to transport his son to 2 of those appointments and his daughter, who also lives in Brantford, assisted in transporting him to the 3rd appointment. The appellant testified that he is paying for transportation services, as needed, while the Jetta is impounded.

26I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Since the impoundment, he has relied on his work truck, taxi services and his daughter's assistance for alternative transportation means as needed.

27Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation, and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

28I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in accordance with the Act and Regulation in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension; and

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

29The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.