Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18056/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Patricia Boyce

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Gurleen Thethi

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Patricia Boyce, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Agent

HEARD By Teleconference: Monday, December 15, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Patricia Boyce, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Monday, November 17, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, B.B. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

6I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

12I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant testified that the impounded vehicle was her primary means of transportation. She explained that she is a senior citizen who sustained a workplace injury in October 2024 and is currently on modified shifts, working part-time four days per week for 4–5 hours per shift, often early mornings or late evenings. She attends physiotherapy twice a week for two to three hours per session and has regular medical appointments across the city.

14The appellant testified that since the impoundment, she has relied on taxis and public transit, which has been costly and time-consuming, requiring multiple transfers and making it difficult to arrive on time for work and treatment. She estimated taxi fares at approximately $65.00 for some medical appointments and noted that inclement weather and financial constraints have caused her to reschedule appointments. The appellant has used taxis to get groceries, and any prescriptions have been delivered to her home. The appellant testified that she has occasionally received rides from friends or co-workers.

15The appellant also testified that she cannot afford to rent a vehicle and that her daughter, who lives with her, does not own a car. She emphasized that maintaining her employment and attending WSIB-approved treatment is critical to her recovery and financial stability.

16Despite these challenges, the evidence shows that the appellant has managed to attend most physiotherapy sessions and work shifts using alternative transportation, albeit with difficulty. She also acknowledged that she has been able to obtain groceries and prescriptions through taxis or delivery services. Although the appellant described the situation as “very hard” and disruptive, the evidence does not establish that there are no reasonable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, such as continued use of taxis, public transit, or occasional assistance from friends.

17I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

18Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

19I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

20The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.