Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18058/MED
In the matter of an appeal under subsection 50(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence pursuant to Section 47(1) of the Act.
Between:
Liya Tang
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
PANEL:
Kailey Minnings, M.D., Adjudicator
Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Liya Tang, Self-represented
For the Respondent:
Melissa Litrenta, Representative
HEARD: December 31, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Liya Tang (the “appellant”) appealed the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar” or the “respondent”) to suspend her Class G licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “HTA”) as set out in the Registrar’s letter dated November 20, 2025, (“suspension letter”) after the Registrar received a medical condition report dated November 13, 2025 from Dr. Zhenni Wang, psychiatrist, which indicates that the appellant has a psychiatric illness, schizophrenia. The suspension letter states that the licence suspension is based on mental health condition.
2Pursuant to s. 203(1) and (2) of the HTA and s. 14.1(1) and (3) of O. Reg. 340/94 (the “Regulation”), Dr. Wang as a physician is required by law to report to the Registrar any person 16 years of age or older who in the physician’s opinion has or appears to have a prescribed medical condition, functional impairment and visual impairment, and is also permitted to report any person, in his discretion, who has or appears to have any other such condition or impairment that may make it dangerous for the person to drive.
3Section 14(1)(a) of the Regulation states that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from any physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with his or her ability to safely drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that he or she is able to drive safely.
4The appellant appeals the suspension under s. 50(1) of the HTA. In summary, the appellant’s grounds for appeal stated in her Notice of Appeal are that Dr. Wang never mentioned she would suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence, Dr. Wang “took revenge” on her due to the appellant’s complaints “to court and physician board”, about Dr. Wang contacting her neighbours and Dr. Wang “breached Canadian law and slandering my reputation everywhere”. The appellant also needs her driver’s licence for employment.
5The appellant requests that the suspension be set aside.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES:
Appellant’s Oral Motion for a Confidentiality Order
6The Tribunal’s December 19, 2025 Case Conference Report and Order indicates that the appellant may seek an order from the Tribunal to anonymize her name in Tribunal documents and decisions related to this appeal and, it was explained that this request for anonymization would be made at the hearing.
7At the beginning of the hearing, the appellant brought an oral motion seeking a confidentiality order from the Tribunal anonymizing her name in the Tribunal’s file. The appellant did not file a Notice of Motion or any documentary evidence in support of her request for anonymization.
8In support of her request for anonymization the appellant testified that she wants to keep this appeal private because she does not know what she is going to do about Dr. Wang, has taken other proceedings against Dr. Wang, and wants it to be clear in this hearing that she does not agree with Dr. Wang’s report and the fact that Dr. Wang spoke with her neighbours.
9The Registrar has no objection to the appellant’s anonymization request.
10There were no members of the public present at the hearing. Neither party had requested permission from the Tribunal to record the hearing. The appellant did not request an order limiting public access to the hearing.
11We view the appellant’s motion as the appellant requesting an order limiting public access to the Tribunal’s adjudicative records, and an order anonymizing the Tribunal’s decision and a publication ban.
12Our decision on this motion was reserved so that the hearing could proceed on the scheduled date. We indicated that our decision on the motion would be included in our written decision on the merits of the appeal. This is our decision on the motion and the reasons for it.
13For the reasons set out below, we deny the appellant’s motion for a confidentiality order. We are of the view that an order limiting public access to the Tribunal’s adjudicative records, an order anonymizing the Tribunal’s decision, and a publication ban in whole or in part is not warranted.
Confidentiality Order: The Law
14The Tribunal’s adjudicative records are generally open to the public, in accordance with the open court principle: see Toronto Star v. AG Ontario, 2018 ONSC 2586 (“Toronto Star”). For proceedings commenced on or after June 30, 2019, s. 2(1) of the Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act (“TARA”) also requires that adjudicative records be made available to the public. Adjudicative records include the notice of appeal, the evidence and submissions in the proceeding, the Tribunal’s decision, along with the other documents listed in s. 1(2) of TARA.
15As public access to adjudicative records is protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, restrictions on access are exceptional. Pursuant to s. 2(2) of TARA, the Tribunal may order that all or part of an adjudicative record be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public if the Tribunal determines that:
a. matters involving public security may be disclosed; or
b. intimate financial or personal matters or other matters contained in the record are of such a nature that the public interest or the interest of a person served by avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be available to the public.
16Rule 13.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”) is consistent with TARA and permits the Tribunal to restrict public access to the adjudicative record on the same grounds.
17The test established by the Supreme Court of Canada for ordering publication bans (“Dagenais/Mentuck”) provides further guidance when considering whether to override the principle that tribunal proceedings should be open to the public: Toronto Star at paras. 89-93; R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76 at para. 32; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 1994 CanLII 39, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. The test was recently recast by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 (“Sherman Estate”). The Court held that a person seeking to limit the open court presumption must establish that:
(1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
(2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and
(3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.
18In Sherman Estate the Court recognized that privacy can be an important public interest under the discretionary test where it can be demonstrated that protection of human dignity is at risk. Where one’s dignity is impaired, the impact on a person is no longer theoretical, but can have real consequences on psychological or physical well-being. The justice system suffers when its processes inflict harm such as this, and thus steps must be taken to avoid it: Sherman Estate at para. 72.
19Dignity may be undermined where the information reveals something sensitive about the person as an individual, as opposed to generic information that reveals little about who they are as a person. The information sought to be protected must be sufficiently sensitive that it strikes at one’s “biographical core”—it must consist of intimate and personal details about the person, their lifestyle or their experiences. The Court in Sherman Estate highlighted some examples of information that have been recognized by courts in the past as being sufficiently sensitive, including information about stigmatized work, sexual orientation and subjection to sexual assault or harassment. It also agreed that detailed information about family structure and work history could, in certain cases, constitute sensitive information that requires protection: Sherman Estate at paras. 35, 75-79
20The Court also noted that it will never be sufficient to raise a recognized interest on its own. The person seeking to limit the open court principle must also demonstrate a serious risk to that interest. Moreover, the threshold is high and context-specific—in order to preserve the integrity of the open court principle the public interest in dignity will only be found to be seriously at risk in exceptional cases. Disadvantage, embarrassment, or distress caused by openness will typically be insufficient on their own to interfere with the openness of proceedings: Sherman Estate at paras. 56, 62-63, 79, 84.
21Where information is found to be sufficiently sensitive to strike at one’s “biographical core”, a court must then ask whether a serious risk to the interest is made out in the specific context of that case. In determining this, the court may consider, among other factors: (1) the extent to which the information would be disseminated without a confidentiality order, including a recognition that we live in an electronic age in which information may be easily disseminated; (2) the extent to which the information is already publicly available; and (3) a consideration of both the gravity of the feared harm and its probability of occurring, based on the totality of the circumstances: Sherman Estate at paras. 79-84.
22The same principles apply to requests to anonymize the names of the parties, or requests for publication bans. Normally, the Tribunal’s decisions include the names of the parties to the proceeding, in accordance with the open court principle: see Toronto Star v. AG Ontario, 2018 ONSC 2586. Tribunal hearings are generally open to the public in accordance with the open court principle. Central to the open court principle is access by the press: Toronto Star v. AG Ontario, 2018 ONSC 2586 at para. 4. To depart from the open court principle through anonymizing the names of the parties or by way of a publication ban requires satisfying the test described in Sherman Estate, s. 2(2) of TARA, and Rule 13.1 of the Rules.
ANALYSIS
No Order Granted Limiting Public Access to the Tribunal’s Adjudicative Records
23Here the appellant’s request is based on her personal desire for privacy because she has taken other proceedings against Dr. Wang in addition to this appeal to the Tribunal, and she wants it to be clear in this hearing that she does not agree with Dr. Wang’s report and the fact that Dr. Wang spoke with her neighbours.
24In considering whether all of part of an adjudicative record should be treated as confidential and not disclosed to the public, we have considered the criteria in s. 2(2) of TARA and find that the appellant’s motion does not meet the test. Specifically:
a. This appeal does not involve matters of public security.
b. Although some of what the appellant is seeking to remove from scrutiny is personal health information and this may be qualitatively different from a driving record, the onus is on the appellant to bring forward evidence and make submissions that this information should be removed from scrutiny.
In Khan v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 848, at paras. 10-14 the Divisional Court recently said:
“[10] In Sherman Estate, at para. 73, the Supreme Court held that “[p]rotecting individuals from the threat to their dignity that arises when information revealing core aspects of their private lives is disseminated through open court proceedings is an important public interest for the purposes of the test.” The Supreme Court further stated that “[v]iolations of privacy that cause a loss of control over fundamental personal information about oneself are damaging to dignity because they erode one’s ability to present aspects of oneself to others in a selective manner”: Sherman Estate, at para. 79. Patient health information, which is ordinarily confidential, strikes at the biographical core of an individual and is “sufficiently sensitive” to warrant the order sought: Sherman Estate, at para. 35.
11The confidentiality of patient records and of individuals’ personal information (including health information) is an important public interest. The importance of maintaining confidentiality of health records is enshrined in legislation, such as the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c.3, Sched. A (“PHIPA”), which permits disclosure of personal health information (including OHIP numbers) only in limited circumstances. Confidential patient health information strikes at the biographical core of an individual and is sufficiently sensitive to warrant the order sought: Sherman Estate, at para. 35….
14Accordingly, I am satisfied that court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest.”
25Here, there is a lack of evidence brought forward by the appellant concerning her human dignity. Accordingly, we find that the appellant’s human dignity is not at risk. The appellant brought forward no evidence that this appeal involves intimate financial or personal matters of such a nature that the public interest or the interest of a person served by avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be available to the public.
26The appellant’s personal information, including her driving record, reveals nothing sensitive about her as an individual and reveals little about who she is as a person except that she appears to have a mental health condition which Dr. Wang is concerned about, a concern which the Registrar shares at this time, and which has resulted in the suspension of her driving licence at this time. We have no evidence before us of stigmatized work, sexual orientation, subjection to sexual assault or harassment. We have no evidence about the appellant’s family structure and/or work history that requires protection. As the Court has noted, it is never sufficient to raise a recognized interest on its own but a serious risk to that interest must be demonstrated. Disadvantage, embarrassment or distress caused by openness will typically be insufficient to interfere with the openness of a proceeding.
27Here, we find no evidence brought forward by the appellant of information that is sufficiently sensitive to strike at her “biographical core”.
28We are of the view that the appellant’s desire for privacy because she has taken other proceedings against Dr. Wang in addition to this appeal to the Tribunal, and she wants it to be clear in this hearing that she does not agree with Dr. Wang’s report and the fact that Dr. Wang spoke with her neighbours does not outweigh the public interest in openness in this case. It is clear in this hearing from the appellant filing an appeal to her driver’s licence suspension that the appellant does not agree with Dr. Wang’s report and that Dr. Wang spoke with her neighbours. Any other proceedings the appellant has taken against Dr. Wang in other forums is not within the control of the Tribunal.
29Further, even if any of the appellant’s personal health information is sensitive, we find that limiting public access to the substance of the information that forms the basis for the Tribunal's decision would not be in the public interest.
No Order Granted Anonymizing the Tribunal’s Decision
30Although the Registrar has no objection to the appellant’s anonymization request, this does not end our analysis.
31For the reasons set out above, and based on our factual finding that the appellant’s human dignity is not at risk, we find that an anonymization order should not be granted because the appellant’s specific privacy interest in this case does not outweigh the public interest in openness.
No Order Granted Imposing a Publication Ban
32For the reasons set out above, and based on our finding that the appellant’s human dignity is not at risk, we are of the view that the appellant’s request does not meet the test for publication band set out in Dagenais/Mentuck. Specifically:
(1) a publication ban is not needed to prevent serious risk to the proper administration of justice;
(2) reasonable alternative measures would not prevent the risk; and
(3) benefits of the publication ban outweigh the public interest in openness.
ISSUES
33The issue currently in dispute is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely mental health condition, that is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
34This requires us to address the following questions:
i. Does the appellant suffer from mental health condition?
ii. If so, is this likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely?
RESULT
35For the reasons set out below, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the HTA, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
ANALYSIS
The appellant suffers from medical condition, specifically mental health condition
36Although the appellant denies that she suffers from a medical condition, specifically mental health condition, we find that the appellant suffers from a mental health condition for the following reasons.
37Dr. Wang’s report dated November 13, 2025, filed by the Registrar diagnoses psychiatric illness due to schizophrenia.
38The appellant’s family physician Dr. Sydney Chinagorom completed a Mental Health Assessment dated December 20, 2025 diagnosing anxiety and depression.
39The appellant’s mother Cuihua Bao testified that the appellant has a history of mental health condition and that Ms. Bao has acted as her substitute decision maker.
40The appellant admitted in her testimony that she was admitted to hospital for mental health treatment in October and again in November, 2025. During her October admission, she was started on Invega however she developed side effects. During the November admission, her treatment was changed to Abilify. As a physician duly licenced to practice medicine in Ontario, Dr. Minnings is aware that Invega refers to paliperidone and Abilify refers to aripiprazole, and that both of these are in the atypical antipsychotic class of medications. She takes notice of these facts pursuant to s. 16(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (the “SPPA”).
41The appellant testified that she has been adherent to the prescribed medication, which is now prescribed by her family doctor, and that Dr. Chinagorom will be referring her to a psychiatrist in January, 2026.
42After considering the appellant’s own admissions, the testimony of Ms. Bao, and the medical information filed by the Registrar and the appellant, we find that it is more likely than not that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, specifically mental health condition at this time.
The appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely
43We find that the appellant’s medical condition, specifically mental health condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely at this time for the following reasons.
44There is ample evidence in Dr. Wang’s Mental Health Assessment and other medical records and information filed by the Registrar that the appellant’s mental health condition adversely affects her abilities necessary to drive a motor vehicle safely. Dr. Wang’s report indicates that the appellant left the hospital on November 13, 2025 “off treatment and left the hospital against medical advice. Spoke to neighbours who noted she was driving while psyc”.
45Although the appellant and her mother Cuihua Bao, testified that the appellant is a good driver and needs her driver’s licence and Ms. Bao testified that when the appellant does not feel she should be driving, the appellant gives her car keys to Ms. Bao, we find that Ms. Bao appears to have little insight into the appellant’s medical condition and its effect on whether her medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely.
46Ms. Bao testified that Dr. Wang’s diagnosis was made because the appellant made Dr. Wang angry and called her a “bitch” and that the appellant’s mental health condition is “not that serious” even though she also testified that she has been the substitute decision maker for the appellant.
47It is clear from her testimony that Ms. Bao is aware of the appellant’s history of mental health issues. Ms. Bao testified that she took the appellant to the hospital for treatment after the appellant’s father died in 2021, and she was treated and prescribed medication which the appellant took for about two and one-half years. Although she testified that she disagrees with Dr. Wang’s diagnosis of psychiatric illness due to schizophrenia, Ms. Bao testified that the medication prescribed by Dr. Wang, is “magic” and the appellant is better now because she no longer “talks to herself”, gets angry, has mood disorders, is no longer suicidal as she was in 2021, no longer calls Ms. Bao “bitch”, and the appellant is now “positive, calm and friendly”.
48The hospital record of discharge filed by the Registrar establishes that the appellant was discharged from the hospital on November 13, 2025.
49Dr. Wang’s report dated November 13, 2025 states the following about the appellant: “Schizophrenia, off treatment and left hospital against medical advice. Spoke to neighbours who noted she was driving while psyc”.
50This indicates to us that the appellant has poor insight into her medical condition and is non-compliant with treatment.
51As a result, we are unconvinced that the appellant has the insight and understanding of her medical condition to be able to judge whether she can safely operate a motor vehicle.
52The Registrar relies on the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers (the “CCMTA Standards”), particularly s. 14.6.1 in support of its submission that the licence suspension should be confirmed by the Tribunal. Section 14(2)(a) of the Regulation allows the Registrar to consider the CCMTA Standards when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The Tribunal may take the CCMTA Standards into consideration, although they are not binding on the Tribunal.
53Section 14.6.1 of the CCMTA Standards provides that a driver who has been diagnosed with psychiatric disorder may be considered eligible for a driver’s licence if the condition is stable, the driver has sufficient insight to stop driving if the condition becomes acute, the functional abilities necessary for driving are not impaired, a treating physician supports a return to driving and the conditions for maintaining a licence are met including remaining under regular medical supervision and compliance with prescribed medication or other recommended treatment.
54In this particular case, although we are not bound by the CCMTA Standards, we find the above-described requirements to be reasonable. Here, the appellant’s condition does not appear to be stable from the medical reports filed and the appellant’s description of her two hospitalizations in October and November, 2025. In October, the appellant testified that her neighbours called the police who took her to the hospital for treatment. In November, the appellant testified that there were forms filed to keep her involuntarily in the hospital for treatment which she had to challenge at a hearing in order to be able to leave.
55The appellant’s family physician Dr. Chinagorom completed a Mental Health Assessment dated December 20, 2025 diagnosing anxiety and depression which he states is “improving with ongoing symptoms….condition has remained stable/unchanged for 3-6 months”, and answered “no” to the questions “Has the patient been hospitalized two or more times in the last 12 months due to their mental illness” and answered “no” to the question “Does the patient exhibit impaired cognition, attention, or judgement”. We find this assessment to be unreliable in view of the evidence of the two hospitalizations in the two months preceding Dr. Chinagorom’s assessment, and the report of Dr. Wang, a specialist in mental health. We give greater weight to the report of Dr. Wang because she is a specialist in mental health and treated the appellant during the time she was admitted to the hospital.
56Further, Dr. Chinagorom does not express any opinion on the appellant’s capacity to drive a motor vehicle safely and instead records what the appellant has told him: “Patient says she feels better, her anxiety and depressive symptoms are improving on Abilify medication – no suicidal thought or self harm. Patient is stable.”
57Neither of the appellant’s physicians have indicated that the appellant has sufficient insight about her mental health condition and its impact on her ability to drive safely, or given any written indication that they support her return to driving at this time.
58The appellant testified that she will be referred by Dr. Chinagorom to a psychiatrist and anticipates that she will be seeing that physician in the upcoming months. This tends to indicate that the appellant’s mental health condition is still being investigated at this time.
59The Registrar’s submission that the appellant’s driver’s licence should remain suspended at this time is supported by the Medical Condition Report of Dr. Wang, as well as the CCMTA Standards and the appellant’s testimony about her two recent hospitalizations, the appellant’s current prescribed medication, and ongoing investigation of her mental health condition. We agree with the Registrar’s submissions.
60We are satisfied that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive safely at this time.
61We find on the basis of the medical evidence provided that the Registrar has met the burden of proof in this case on a balance of probabilities.
Conclusion
62We find that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, specifically mental health condition, and that this is likely to significantly interfere with her ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
ORDER
63For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the HTA, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
Released: January 12, 2026
__________________________
Dr. Kailey Minnings
Adjudicator
_________________________
Avril A. Farlam
Vice-Chair