Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17929/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act
Between:
Patricia Thomson
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
VICE-CHAIR: Kevin Kovalchuk
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Patricia Thomson, Self-represented
John Mulder, spouse of appellant
For the Respondent:
Leila Pereira, Representative
LAT Observer:
Steve Clarke
Heard: December 11, 2025
HEARD: December 11, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Patricia Thomson, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Saturday, October 18, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, J.M. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence due to a criminal conviction. A notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.
2The appellant appeals on the grounds that that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.
ISSUES
3The issue in dispute is:
i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
RESULT
4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
5Prior to the commencement of the hearing, I made an order excluding witnesses.
ANALYSIS
6For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.
The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship
7I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).
8The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
9If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.
10If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.
11The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:
(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;
(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;
(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and
(d) the impact of the loss,
(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and
(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).
12The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.
Alternative to the impounded vehicle
13I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
14The appellant testified that both she and her husband are retired. She also testified that during the impoundment period friends and neighbours drove her and/or her husband to the grocery store, doctor’s appointments and to pick up prescriptions.
15The appellant also testified that her driver’s licence expired in February of 2023 and has not since been renewed. She testified that she wants to renew her driver’s licence but has been unable to do so because she requires a birth certificate which she has so far, been unable to obtain.
16John Mulder, her husband, testified that his driver’s licence has been under suspension since January of 2023.
17In addition to finding that the appellant had transportation alternatives to the impounded vehicle I also find that even absent the vehicle impoundment neither the appellant nor her husband could have legally driven the appellant’s vehicle since February of 2023, and would have to rely on alternate transportation prior to the impoundment.
18I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
19Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.
Conclusion
20I find that:
i. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
ORDER
21The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
Released: January 21, 2026
__________________________
Kevin Kovalchuk
Vice-Chair

