Avtar Chhina v. Registrar, Trust in Real Estate Services Act, 2002, 2026 CanLII 4122

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before:

Craig Mazerolle, Vice-Chair

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number:

16521/TRESA

Case Name:

Avtar Chhina v. Registrar, Trust in Real Estate Services Act, 2002

Written Submissions by:

For the Appellant:

Avtar Chhina, Appellant

For the Respondent:

Maya Sabharwal, Counsel

OVERVIEW

1The appellant filed a request for reconsideration form and supporting submissions on November 25, 2025 in respect of the Licence Appeal Tribunal’s (“Tribunal”) decision released on November 5, 2025 (“decision”).

2Following a videoconference hearing on September 25, 2025, the Tribunal issued a decision ordering the Registrar, Trust in Real Estate Services Act, 2002 (“Registrar”) to carry out the Notice of Proposal (“NOP”) to revoke the appellant’s registration as a salesperson. Specifically, the Tribunal found the Registrar had established that his past conduct afforded reasonable grounds for belief that he will not carry on business in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty. It further found that adding conditions to his registration would not be sufficient to protect the public interest, so a full revocation of his licence was required.

3Of note, the hearing was originally scheduled to take place on May 28, 2025. The appellant was granted an adjournment during this initial attendance. The hearing adjudicator did not seize herself, so a different adjudicator conducted the September 25, 2025 hearing. This second adjudicator issued the decision.

4The grounds for a request for reconsideration are found in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (“Rules”). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or committed a material breach of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made; or

c) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

5The appellant is relying on all three criteria to support his request.

6The respondent is asking for the appellant’s request to be dismissed.

RESULT

7The appellant’s request for reconsideration is granted.

8Pursuant to Rule 18.4, the decision is cancelled. The parties’ dispute will be sent to a rehearing before a new adjudicator.

ANALYSIS

9The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 involves a high threshold. The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position where it disagrees with the Tribunal’s decision, or with the weight assigned to the evidence. The requestor—in this case, the appellant—must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2.

10To support his request, the appellant raises concerns with the Tribunal’s procedural choices, as well as the Real Estate Council of Ontario’s (“RECO”) handling of his file. I will focus my analysis on the appellant’s successful grounds under Rule 18.2(a).

Rule 18.2(a) – Material Breach of Procedural Fairness

11The appellant claims the Tribunal breached his right to procedural fairness by having different adjudicators involved in the proceeding. Specifically, he claims that, even though there was “significant discussion… about my medical and personal condition” at the initial, adjourned hearing, a different adjudicator was assigned to the September 2025 hearing date. The appellant argues that the second adjudicator “did not have that firsthand context” of his medical condition and personal circumstances from the adjourned hearing. Highlighting his status as a self-represented party, the appellant claims the Tribunal breached his right to procedural fairness by ignoring this important context.

12Though the Tribunal will not step in and present a party’s case, certain allowances may be made for self-represented parties. The Canadian Judicial Council’s Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons (September 2006) provides helpful guidance for adjudicators in these cases. In particular, the Council directs decision-makers to consider the following principles when managing a hearing with a self-represented party:

Judges have a responsibility to inquire whether self-represented persons are aware of their procedural options, and to direct them to available information if they are not. Depending on the circumstances and nature of the case, judges may explain the relevant law in the case and its implications, before the self-represented person makes critical choices.

In appropriate circumstances, judges should consider providing self-represented persons with information to assist them in understanding and asserting their rights, or to raise arguments before the court.

Judges should ensure that procedural and evidentiary rules are not used to unjustly hinder the legal interests of self-represented persons.

13While a decision-maker must never abandon their impartiality, access to justice may require providing self-represented parties with options and information about their legal rights, especially if the substantive merit of the case is at risk of being clouded out by mere technical failings. So long as this assistance does not amount to the Tribunal “entering the fray”, an adjudicator may consider providing self-represented parties with additional context and guidance about the process.

14The appellant disputes the lack of any reference to his medical condition or emotional state in the decision, personal circumstances he discussed at length during the adjourned hearing in May 2025. A summary of these submissions and evidence can be found at paragraph 10 of the adjournment order (dated June 11, 2025):

I took into consideration the letters provided by the appellant’s treating physicians which provide particulars on his medical condition and a time frame for when he would be able to properly participate in a hearing. I note that Dr. Garg has stated that the appellant is feeling extreme stress and is unable to attend his office for 8 to 10 weeks. Dr. Naqvi states that the appellant is under cardio-respiratory investigations that should be completed in two to three months and that he should not be subjected to stressors. I note the appellant was upset while making his submissions and spoke directly about the stress he is under and his fear of worsening his health. He indicated that he was in no emotional or physical state to properly participate in the hearing.

15As this quotation demonstrates, there was a detailed review of the appellant’s personal circumstances during his first attendance before the Tribunal. These same submissions do not appear to have been made during the September 2025 hearing when the parties were arguing about the merits of the NOP appeal.

16The Tribunal is not required to piece together arguments that a party could have made, but chose not to. However, considering the significant focus that his personal circumstances played during the May 2025 attendance, I find a self-represented party would have reasonably assumed this information would form part of the factual matrix that the Tribunal would then go on to consider when assessing the NOP appeal. Faced with this assumption, procedural fairness required the Tribunal to ensure that the appellant understood this earlier evidence would only be considered as part of the NOP appeal if he explicitly raised it during the September 2025 hearing.

17Additionally, since a licensee’s personal circumstances play a key role in determining whether conditions are sufficient to protect the public interest (as opposed to a full licence revocation), there was a heightened need for these procedural safeguards. In other words, as his livelihood was directly impacted by this part of the decision, a greater level of procedural fairness was required: see Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), at paragraph 25.

18In sum, the Tribunal had a heightened obligation to ensure that the self-represented appellant understood how to navigate this important proceeding. Part of this obligation included ensuring that he understood that evidence from the adjourned hearing in May 2025 would only form part of the substantive analysis of the NOP if it was again raised during the September 2025 hearing. From my review of the decision, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal met this obligation. As a result, the appellant has demonstrated a material breach of procedural fairness.

19The respondent disputes the appellant’s position, claiming he could have presented information about his personal circumstances at the September 2025 hearing. Regardless of whether this opportunity existed, this argument does not adequately address my findings regarding the reasonable nature of the appellant’s assumption that his earlier arguments and evidence would be considered by the second adjudicator. Put another way, if the appellant assumed that his arguments and evidence from the adjourned portion of the hearing would be considered by the adjudicator hearing the NOP appeal, it was not unreasonable for him to find there was no reason to speak about his personal circumstances for a second time.

20Taken together, I find the appellant has established grounds for reconsideration based on Rule 18.2(a).

Rule 18.4 – Cancelling the Decision and Ordering a Rehearing

21Since the appellant has established a ground for reconsideration, I must now determine what the appropriate remedy is under Rule 18.4.

22The appellant is seeking several forms of relief: an order setting aside the decision and permitting him to resume work as a registrant; an order requiring RECO “to correct the public-registrar entry” and to “disclose all internal precedents involving withdrawn charges”; and a recognition that he has “served more than six months of de facto suspension”. In the alternative, the appellant is asking for a rehearing.

23I find the most appropriate remedy under Rule 18.4 is to cancel the decision and order a rehearing. Considering the nature of the procedural fairness breach, a fresh hearing will allow the parties to explore what impact the appellant’s personal circumstances may have on the NOP appeal.

24The appellant is also asking the Tribunal to make orders preserving his rights to file an appeal and application for judicial review with the Divisional Court. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the Divisional Court’s processes.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

25The appellant’s request for reconsideration is granted.

26Pursuant to Rule 18.4, the decision is cancelled. I am ordering the appellant’s appeal to be addressed through a rehearing before a new adjudicator.

27A case conference will be scheduled within 30 days of the release of this reconsideration decision so that the Tribunal may issue procedural and administrative directions as necessary for the conduct of the rehearing.

Craig Mazerolle

Vice-Chair