Beatrice Richards v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2026 CanLII 4109

Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18152/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Beatrice Richards

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bernard Trottier

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Beatrice Richards, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Stephen Grootenboer, Agent

HEARD:

January 16, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Beatrice Richards (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on December 28, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Quran Richards (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension, and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(b) of the Act, whether the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

Background

6The appellant lives in Brighton, in Northumberland County. The appellant testified that she is separated from her husband, who lives in the basement of her home, and who was driving the appellant’s vehicle on the day of the impoundment. The testified, further, that her elderly parents live with her along with her 16-year-old son.

7The appellant testified that she works weekdays in Courtice, Durham Region, at a respiratory clinic that is 96 km driving distance each way.

The driver’s licence of the driver of the vehicle was suspended

8I am not satisfied that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

9The appellant testified that she did not know that her husband’s licence was suspended when he drove her vehicle. She testified that she and her husband were estranged and that he did not tell her of any licence suspension.

10The respondent submitted a Ministry of Transportation of Ontario (“MTO”) extended driver record search document that indicated that the driver’s licence of the driver was suspended on January 23, 2025, following an impaired driving conviction, and that the licence was suspended until January 7, 2026.

11I find that the appellant’s lack of knowledge that her husband’s licence had been suspended does not satisfy the ground for appeal to release the vehicle under s. 50.2(3)(b) of the Act. I find that the appellant has not established that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

12I am satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

13The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation states that to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

14If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

15If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

16The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) of the Regulation from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

i. will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

ii. will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

17The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

18I am satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

19The appellant submits that the impounded vehicle, a 2017 Nissan Rogue, is her only vehicle with an active registration. Although the MTO Registrant Identification Number (“RIN”) search, provided as evidence by the respondent, indicated the registration of a 2007 Mitsubishi, the appellant testified that the Mitsubishi was no longer in her possession.

20The appellant testified that her vehicle is her only viable means to commute to work. The appellant testified that the only public transit alternative for her commute would be a taxi to the Via station in Trenton, a Via train to Oshawa, and then another taxi to her work in Courtice. She argues that that this method of commuting would not be financially viable, as her daily transportation costs would consume her daily earnings.

21The appellant testified that she was on vacation until January 2, 2026. She testified that, for the week of January 5 to 9, 2026, she rented a vehicle, which consumed most of her earnings. She testified that, for the week of January 12 to 16, 2026, she took a leave of absence from her job. She testified that, under the terms of her employment at the clinic in Courtice, she can take up to 10 days of absence per year, and anything more than that would result in termination.

22The respondent submitted a RIN search for the driver, that indicated he had two vehicles registered to his name, a 2008 Cadillac and a 2010 Ford Mustang. The appellant testified that the Cadillac was in a rear-end collision last year, that it was missing its trunk, and that it was not road-worthy. She testified that the Mustang was operable, but that because of her current marital dispute, her husband would not be willing to make the vehicle available to her. She submitted, also, that the Mustang had a manual transmission that she could not drive, because she had not learned to drive a manual transmission vehicle safely.

23The appellant testified that her elderly parents have a vehicle that has not been used since the summer, because it required extensive repairs, and that it did not have winter tires. The appellant testified that her parents’ vehicle was not road-worthy, and that to make it road-worthy would require her to go further into debt. The appellant testified that her parents could not pay for the repairs or for winter tires because they had limited means on fixed income.

24The respondent submitted that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle, including renting a vehicle (as the appellant did for a week), taking vacation and leaves of absence (as the appellant did since the impoundment), borrowing her husband’s vehicle and learning to drive a vehicle with a manual transmission, and having her parents’ vehicle repaired and purchasing winter tires. For these reasons, the respondent argues that the appellant has not demonstrated that every reasonable option has been considered that could adequately mitigate the alleged hardship.

25I find that the appellant has demonstrated that commuting by train or with a rented vehicle are not financially viable alternatives to the impounded vehicle, because the daily transportation costs would consume much, if not most, of her daily earnings.

26I accept the appellant’s argument that she cannot take vacation and/or leaves of absence for the rest of the 45-day impoundment period, and that she would need to commute to work to maintain her employment and to provide for her family.

27I accept the appellant’s argument that she could not rely on obtaining her estranged husband’s Mustang in the near term to commute to work, and that she could rely on him to provide lessons on driving a vehicle with a manual transmission. It is beyond my authority to intervene on making orders regarding a marital dispute.

28I accept the appellant’s submissions that her parents’ vehicle is not road-worthy in the near term. I accept the appellant’s submissions that her parents’ vehicle had not been driven since last summer. The appellant did not provide submissions on the age of the vehicle, the extent of the repairs required to make the vehicle road-worthy, and the cost of acquiring winter tires. The appellant testified that she did not drive her parents’ vehicle in the three weeks since the beginning of the impoundment period, choosing the expensive alternative of renting a vehicle instead. For this reason, I accept the appellant’s argument that her parents’ vehicle is not a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle, and that making it road-worthy would be akin to acquiring another vehicle. In this type of matter, I do not find that acquiring another vehicle is a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle.

29For the reasons above, I find that the appellant has established that there is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle.

Threat to heath, safety, the environment or property

30The appellant submits that she requires her vehicle to take her mother to medical appointments to see her family physician in Whitby and to see specialists in Oshawa. The appellant submits these appointments are about a one-hour drive from their home in Brighton. The appellant testified that no medical appointments have been missed since the start of the impoundment.

31The respondent submits that, because no appointments have been missed and the appellant has not provided evidence that future appointments could not be rescheduled until after the impoundment period, the appellant has not demonstrated that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle.

32I agree with the respondent, and I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle. Therefore, I turn to whether the there is financial or economic loss, or loss of employment, under s. 10(3) of the Regulation.

Financial, Economic, Employment or Education Losses

33The appellant alleges that the impoundment will cause financial or economic loss, and potential loss of employment. In particular, the appellant alleges that the alternative costs of commuting, without the impounded vehicle, would consume her earnings, and that further absences from work would result in her losing her employment.

34The respondent took no position on the appellant’s financial, economic or potential employment losses.

35I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(b) of the Regulation, the appellant’s economic loss will be immediate and significant, because without her vehicle, she cannot make sufficient earnings to provide for her family. I am satisfied that the loss will be lasting, because she risks losing her employment if she takes any more leaves of absence.

36I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(c), the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, namely the appellant herself.

37I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(d)(i), persons other than the driver will suffer as a result of the impoundment, namely the appellant and her family.

38I am satisfied that, under s. 10(3)(d)(ii), that the impact of the loss will not be a result of a financial or employment loss by the suspended driver.

39For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined in the Regulation.

Conclusion(s)

40I find that:

i. There is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

ii. The economic loss will be immediate, significant and lasting.

iii. The impact of the loss will be upon persons ordinarily transported by the vehicle.

iv. The impact of the loss will be upon a person other than the driver.

v. The impact of the loss will not be a result of financial or employment loss of the suspended driver.

41For these reasons, I find that the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

42The Tribunal orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.