Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18098/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Tomas Brant

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

AMENDED DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Emily Morton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Tomas Brant, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Steven Grootenboer, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Monday, December 29, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Tomas Brant, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Tuesday, December 9, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, Terry Fenemore (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while their driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits them from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2In his Notice of Appeal, the appellant appealed on the grounds that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not under suspension, nor was it subject to a condition described in paragraph 2 of subjection 55.1.(1) (interlock ignition device), and that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension nor subject to an ignition interlock device condition. The appellant also appeals on the basis that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(b.1) of the Act, whether the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1);

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); and

iii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1)

6I am not satisfied that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

7Though the appellant indicated in his Notice of Appeal that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle was not suspended at the time the vehicle was detained, there was no evidence at the hearing that the driver’s licence was suspended. The Registrar did not allege that the drvier’s licence was suspended and this was not relevant to the issues in the appeal. The issue was whether the driver’s licence was subject to the condition in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1) of the Act, which provides:

Where a police officer or officer appointed for carrying out the provisions of this Act is satisfied that a person was driving a motor vehicle on a highway in one of the following circumstances, the officer shall detain the motor vehicle that was being driven by the person:

2. In contravention of a condition, imposed for a prescribed reason on his or her driver’s licence under a conduct review program under section 57, that prohibits him or her from driving a motor vehicle that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device.

8The Registrar filed as evidence the Extended Driver Record Search (the “Record”) of the driver of the motor vehicle, which was current to December 19, 2025. The Record indicates the driver is subject to a mandatory ignition interlock condition, beginning on August 1, 2025 and ending on August 1, 2028. The Registrar submits the Record is sufficient evidence that the driver was subject to the relevant condition at the time the vehicle was detained to be impounded. The appellant did not lead any evidence to challenge the Record, nor did he make any submissions about the reliability of the Record. Nor did he make any other argument or lead any other evidence as to why the driver was not subject to the condition in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1) of the Act. I am satisfied that the Record led by the Registrar establishes the fact the driver was subject to this condition. Therefore, I find the appellant has not met the burden of proving that the driver was not subject to the condition in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1) of the Act at the time the motor vehicle was detained to be impounded.

The appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1)

9I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1).

10In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

11Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

12The appellant gave evidence that he permitted the driver to borrow the motor vehicle on December 9, 2025. The appellant testified that he knows the driver quite well, as the driver is the father of two of the appellant’s stepchildren, and lives around the corner from the appellant and his family. The appellant testified the driver had recently faced some hardship, including a physical injury that limited his mobility, and for that reason the appellant agreed to loan the driver the motor vehicle to run a brief local errand. The appellant testified that he did not ask the driver if his licence was in good standing, or subject to conditions, nor did he ask to see the driver’s physical driver’s licence. The appellant also testified he did not contact the Ministry of Transportation or conduct an online search to verify the status of the driver’s licence. The appellant testified that he had taken the driver to the Drive Test centre in the summer for the driver to pick up a new licence, and as the driver did not mention at the time that there were any conditions on his driver’s licence, the appellant assumed this meant there were no conditions.

13The Registrar filed as evidence a sample of an Ontario driver’s licence that indicates the driver is subject to the condition in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). The sample indicates there is a restriction/condition “I” and on the reverse side, indicates the restriction/condition is that an interlock is required. The Registrar submitted that the driver’s licence would have this indication of the condition on his driver’s licence, which would be available for anyone seeking to ascertain the status of the driver’s licence to see.

14I find that the appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). I accept the appellant’s evidence as reliable. However, based on his own evidence, he did not take any steps to confirm whether the driver’s licence was subject to a condition before he permitted the driver to use the vehicle. He gave no evidence that he asked the driver if there were any conditions, let alone asking to see his physical driver’s licence or taking any other steps to ascertain whether the licence was subject to conditions or restrictions. The basis for the appellant’s belief that the driver’s licence was not subject to conditions was the fact that, according to the appellant’s testimony, the driver did not mention in the summer of 2025 that his licence had any conditions. While due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant establish that he took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. Based on the appellant’s evidence, I find he has not established that he exercised due diligence to determine the driver’s licence was not subject to the condition in paragraph 2 of s. 55.1(1) of the Act.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

15I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

16The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

17If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

18If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

19The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

20The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

21I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

22In his submissions in the Notice of Appeal, the appellant states the impoundment causes hardship as without the vehicle he cannot drive to work in Kingston from his home in Picton. The appellant is employed as a float truck driver, and works Monday through Friday of each week. The appellant testified that the day after the impoundment, Wednesday, December 10, 2025, he was able to find a ride to work in Kingston. Thereafter, on working days, he was able to arrange transportation to and from work through a number of methods. On some days, the appellant’s supervisor permitted him to use a work vehicle to drive to and from work. On other days, his spouse drove him to work, and on others he found a ride with someone who lived near him. The appellant testified that he has not missed a day of work. In his testimony, the appellant confirmed his spouse has access to a second vehicle registered to him, and she uses this vehicle to transport their children and run household errands. He testified that their three children have not missed school, or any other significant appointment or event, as a result of the impoundment as the family has use of the second vehicle. The appellant’s evidence was that the impoundment of the vehicle has caused inconvenience to him and his spouse.

23The Registrar presented the Tribunal with the applicant’s vehicle registration information, which listed the vehicles registered in the appellant’s name which include the impounded vehicle and a second vehicle, namely a 2007 Chevrolet. The Registrar took the position that an alternative vehicle was available to the appellant and his family to meet their essential needs. In his evidence, the appellant confirmed his family uses the 2007 Chevrolet and that his spouse has been using this vehicle since the impoundment to occasionally drive him to work, and to otherwise meet the family’s needs.

24I find that based on the evidence and the appellant’s testimony, there are alternatives to the impounded vehicle. His supervisor has permitted him to use a work vehicle to get to and from work and when this option is not available, the appellant has been able to get a ride to and from work. He has not missed a day of work. While I am mindful the appellant’s testimony is that relying on one household vehicle for the period of impoundment has caused inconvenience, the availability of that second vehicle, as well as alternative means of transportation to and from work, establishes there is an alternative to the impounded vehicle. Therefore, I find the appellant has has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle and the ground of appeal based on exceptional hardship fails on this basis.

25Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

26I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1);

ii. the appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); and

iii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

26The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.