Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18070/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Claude Pelletier

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Emily Morton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Claude Pelletier, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Pereira, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Tuesday, January 20, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Claude Pelletier, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of their motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Monday, November 24, 2025. At the time of the impoundment, his son Christopher Joseph Pelletier (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded; and,

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was not stolen

6I am not satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

7In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

8In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

9The appellant testified that his son took the vehicle on November 24, 2025 without his knowledge or permission. He testified that his son had taken the car without his permission in the recent past. Though the appellant could not recall specific dates, he testified his son had taken the vehicle without permission on at least two prior occasions between July and November, 2025. The appellant testified that, on these prior occasions, he told his son he was not to do this, and expressed his frustration to his son.

10The appellant testifies that he lives alone in a room in a house and keeps his car keys on a ring with his house keys. He testified that he keeps this set of keys in a known location in his room. When asked, the appellant testified he did not change the practice of where he stored the key to the vehicle to prevent his son from once again taking the vehicle. The appellant testified that he keeps his vehicle in a street parking area very close to his residence, and had not changed the place he parks his car in the months leading up to the impoundment.

11The appellant testified he learned the vehicle had been impounded on November 24, 2025 when a person who was with his son at the time the vehicle was detained in order to be impounded contacted him. He testified he did not hear directly from the police. The appellant testified he did not report the vehicle stolen as a result of his son taking it on November 24, 2025. He testified that he would not report his son to the police as he would not report a family member to the police, and because his son has had prior dealings with the police and he did not want him to get into further trouble.

12The appellant testified that he was aware, as of November 24, 2025, that his son was subject to a driver’s licence suspension.

13I find the appellant’s testimony does not persuade me that it is more likely than not that the vehicle was stolen at the time it was impounded. The appellant testified his son had taken the vehicle without permission in the relatively recent past, and though he expressed frustration over his son doing so, the appellant did not change his practices with respect to where he kept his vehicle or the key to the vehicle. I find that though the appellant was aware of his son’s periodic practice of taking the vehicle, he did nothing to ensure this would not happen again.

14Further, I find the appellant has put forward no evidence that the driver intended to deprive the appellant of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily. The evidence was that on the prior occasions his son had taken the appellant’s vehicle, he had returned it. On November 24, 2025, the vehicle was not returned was as it was impounded. Based on this evidence, I find I am not satisfied there was an intention on the part of the driver to deprive the appellant of permanent or temporary use of his vehicle at the time of the impoundment.

15I find that the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

16I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

17The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

18If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

19If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

20The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

21The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

22I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

23The appellant testified that he lives in the Kingston area and has been able to take public transit to attend to the necessaries of life. He does not currently work, and is supported by government benefits and pensions. He gave evidence that he had cancer surgery in July of 2025 and needs to attend monthly check-ups appointments as a result, which are very important to him. He testified that before the impoundment, he drove himself to the medical appointments, and that as a result of the impoundment he has missed one such appointment as a friend who had volunteered to drive him had rescheduled. The appellant testified that it is very inconvenient to take public transit to his doctor’s office, though he was able to describe the public transit route to get there in detail.

24The impoundment ended on January 8, 2026. The appellant testified he does not have funds to pay the costs associated with the impoundment, and thus, has not retrieved his vehicle. He testified he does not have another source to pay the impoundment fees, and in particular, that his son who is currently unemployed cannot pay the fees on his behalf.

25I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. The vehicle is no longer impounded because of an order made under s. 50.2 of the Act. The appellant could retrieve the vehicle but testified he cannot because he has insufficient funds to pay the fees. In any event, the appellant’s evidence did not persuade me that it is more likely than not that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. The appellant lives in Kingston and in his evidence described his ability to use public transit. While I accept the appellant’s evidence this alternative is inconvenient, that does not change the fact it is a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle. The appellant does not work and can rely on public transit to do things such as obtain groceries and attend medical appointments. The appellant also gave evidence that occasionally a friend in the community has offered to drive him to a medical appointment. I find these are alternatives to the impounded vehicle.

26Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusion

27I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

28The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.