Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18179/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Christine Reid

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR: Bernard Trottier

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Christine Reid, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Leila Pereira, Agent

Heard by teleconference: January 19, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Christine Reid (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on January 3, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Tyler Hallett (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the ground that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issue in dispute is whether, pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the Registrar is ordered to release the impounded vehicle.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The impoundment will cause exceptional hardship

6I am satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

7The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation states that to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

8If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

9If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

10The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) of the Regulation from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

i. will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

ii. will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

11The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternatives to the impounded vehicle

12I am satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

13The appellant is the owner of a 2010 Dodge Ram pickup truck (“the vehicle”) that was impounded. She lives in the community of Novar within the District of Parry Sound, and is the mother of seven children, aged 5 to 22 years. One of the appellant’s sons now lives in Burlington, and a daughter now lives in North Bay. The appellant has a daughter, aged 16 years, who developed epilepsy in May of 2025, and who lives at home with the appellant.

14The appellant works as a mental health counsellor in the community of Emsdale, also in the District of Parry Sound, about 12 km from where she lives. The appellant testified that she works 12-hour shifts at the clinic. The appellant lives with an adult housemate who looks after the minor-aged children when the appellant is at work. The normal routine for the appellant’s work commute is for the housemate to give the appellant a ride to work, and then the housemate returns home so that there is a vehicle at the home to look after day-to-day household needs, to shuttle the children as required, and to have a vehicle in the event of an emergency. The housemate then picks up the appellant at the end of the workday.

15On the day of the impoundment, the driver was driving the vehicle. The appellant testified that the driver is the father of one the appellant’s children. The appellant testified that the driver was not permitted to borrow the vehicle, but she made no further submissions on how he obtained the keys. The respondent submitted evidence that the driver’s licence of the driver was suspended on the day of the impoundment, and the appellant accepted that evidence.

16Since the impoundment, the appellant has been able to commute to work by obtaining rides from a co-worker. The appellant testified that there is no public transit between Novar and Emsdale. The appellant testified, further, that she has not considered taxi service to and from work, because Novar and Emsdale are small communities and that she was not aware of any available taxi service, and if available, it would be prohibitively expensive.

17The appellant’s mother lives in Magnetawan, about 50 km from Novar. The appellant testified that her mother, with her own vehicle, has been helping with household needs such as groceries and children transportation since the impoundment. The appellant testified, however, that her mother has been spending most of her time with the appellant’s father in Burlington, more than a 3-hour drive away, because her father recently suffered a stroke and needed care and support. The appellant testified that, since the impoundment, her mother split her time between Burlington, Novar and Magnetawan and could only provide occasional support to the appellant.

18The respondent submitted a Registrant Identification Number search of vehicles owned by the appellant with active plate registrations, which identified a 2013 Nissan and a 2016 Hyundai as active registrations. The appellant testified that the 2013 Nissan was not operable and needed a new engine, and that she had hit an animal with the 2016 Hyundai, and it was also not operable.

19The appellant testified that her main concern was the health and safety of her 16-year-old epileptic daughter. The appellant testified that her daughter’s epilepsy is a condition that arose less than a year ago, and they are still trying to determine how to keep her safe in the event of a seizure. She testified that her daughter’s epilepsy appears worse due to the cold weather, and for that reason she was currently attending school only two days per week. She testified that she has taken her daughter to the nearest hospital in Huntsville, about 17 km away, about 10 times since the onset of her condition. The appellant testified that her daughter has had three seizures since the impoundment, which they have addressed by providing her with epilepsy “rescue” medication. The appellant testified that the longest seizure since the impoundment was 11 minutes long.

20The appellant testified that she wanted her vehicle to be able to respond in the event of a medical emergency for her daughter. The appellant acknowledged that there are 911 services out of Huntsville, but she argued that she was not confident that their response times would be sufficient given the distance and the unpredictable timing and unknown triggers of seizures, as they have discovered in the recent cold weather.

21The respondent submits that the appellant has alternatives to the impounded vehicle to attend to daily needs, including rides from her co-worker for commuting, and rides from her mother and friends for getting groceries and other essentials. The respondent submits that 911 services are available in the event of a medical emergency, and that Novar is sufficiently close to Huntsville should the need arise. For these reasons, the respondent argues that the appellant has not demonstrated that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any economic loss or threats to the affected persons. The respondent argues that, based on the transportation alternatives that are available, the impoundment should be confirmed in accordance with the Act and the Regulation.

22I find that the appellant has established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. I accept the appellant’s submissions that transit and taxis are not a reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle for commuting between Novar and Emsdale. I find that, while the appellant can rely on a co-worker to commute, the co-worker cannot be expected, reasonably, to provide rides to the appellant every day throughout the impoundment period in the event of her own health problems or scheduling challenges.

23I find that the appellant has established that, while her mother can provide some level of support for obtaining essentials, she cannot be relied upon to support the transportation needs of the appellant and her children for the duration of the impoundment, be it for day-to-day work, educational, social and recreational needs, or for emergencies that might arise.

24For these reasons, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, there is no reasonable alternative to the impounded vehicle.

Threat to heath, safety, the environment or property

25I am satisfied that the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of a person ordinarily transported by the vehicle.

26The appellant testified that her epileptic daughter’s condition arose less than a year ago, in May of 2025, and that she has required 10 hospital visits since then. She testified that, for the three seizures that her daughter has had in the 2.5 weeks since the beginning of the impoundment, the appellant and her housemate have treated her with medication, and they have not called 911. The appellant argues that, because their daughter’s epilepsy is a new condition, she is afraid that a more difficult seizure might not be treatable with medication alone, and that she might require an urgent hospital intervention.

27The appellant made no submissions on the performance of first responders in the District of Parry Sound District or the District of Muskoka, where Huntsville is located. She also made no submissions on the time required for a possible intervention.

28The respondent made no submissions on the treatment options for the daughter’s epilepsy.

29I accept the appellant’s testimony that her epileptic daughter’s condition is recent and evolving, as evidenced by the three seizures in the last 2.5 weeks. While the appellant did not submit medical evidence regarding the degree of risk associated with the seizures, and the response time required to treat the seizures, I accept that a rapid medical intervention might be required. I find that the daughter’s epilepsy has not attained medical stability where the family would always know the appropriate treatment.

30I find that, although the first responders in the area might be proficient, there is an increased risk to the appellant’s daughter in not having a vehicle.

31For the reasons, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, there is a potential threat to the health and safety of the appellant’s daughter, and that it is in her interest that the appellant have access to her vehicle.

Conclusions

32I find that:

i. the appellant has established that she has no alternative to the impounded vehicle;

ii. the impoundment will result in a threat to the health and safety of persons ordinarily transported by the vehicle; and,

iii. the appellant has established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

33The Tribunal orders that the Registrar shall release the impounded vehicle.