Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18155 MED
In the matter of an appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to suspend a licence under Section 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.
Between:
Lukasz Chatkiewicz
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
PANEL:
Dr. Peter Savage Rupinder Hans
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Lukasz Chatkiewicz, Self-represented
For the Respondent:
Melissa Litrenta, Representative
HEARD: March 31, 2026
OVERVIEW
1Lukasz Chatkiewicz (the “appellant”) appeals the decision of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) to suspend his Class G driver’s licence for medical reasons, specifically a substance use disorder, under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”).
2By letter dated January 28, 2025, the Registrar suspended the appellant’s driving privileges for a substance use disorder after receipt of two unsolicited Medical Condition Reports, both dated January 22, 2025 (the “MCRs”). The appellant appeals the suspension and asks the Tribunal to reinstate his licence.
3Having considered all the evidence and for the reasons that follow, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
ISSUES
4The issue in this appeal is whether the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.
5To resolve that issue, we will address the following questions:
i. Does the appellant suffer from a medical condition, namely a substance use disorder?
ii. If the appellant does suffer from a substance use disorder, is this likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely?
RESULT
6Having considered all the evidence and submissions and for the reasons that follow, we find the Registrar has satisfied its burden to establish the appellant suffers from a medical condition that is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely. We confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver’s licence.
ANALYSIS
The Law
7The Registrar has the authority under s. 47(1)(g) of the Act to suspend or cancel a driver’s licence for any sufficient reason.
8Section 14(1)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 enacted under the Act requires that a holder of a driver’s licence must not suffer from “any mental, emotional, nervous or physical condition or disability likely to significantly interfere with his or her ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.” Under s. 14(2)(b) of the Regulation, the Minister of Transportation may require a driver to provide satisfactory evidence that they are able to drive safely.
9Section 203(1) of the Act requires medical professionals to report a person who has or appears to have a prescribed medical condition to the Registrar, while s. 203(2) gives medical professionals the discretion to report persons who have or appear to have a medical condition that they believe may make it dangerous for a person to drive.
10Section 14(2)(a) of O. Reg. 340/94 allows the Minister of Transportation to consider the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators Medical Standards for Drivers (“CCMTA Standards”) when determining whether the requirements of s. 14(1) are met. The CCMTA Standards may be considered but are not binding on this Tribunal.
11The Registrar has the burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that one or more grounds for suspending a driver’s licence has been made out.
12Pursuant to s. 50(2) of the Act, after a hearing the Tribunal may confirm, modify or set aside the decision or order of the Registrar.
Does the appellant suffer from a substance use disorder?
13The evidence presented at the hearing established on a balance of probabilities that the appellant suffers from a medical condition, namely substance use disorder. We found the evidence from Dr. Stephen Sokolov, and Robert Kleinman to be persuasive.
14The Registrar alleges the appellant has a substance use disorder which first came to its attention after receiving two unsolicited MCRs, both dated January 22, 2025, completed by Dr. Sokolov, an emergency room psychiatrist with the Centre for Addictions and Mental Health (“CAMH”), and Robert Kleinman, a consultant with CAMH. The Registrar presented and relied upon the MCRs in support of its position. We find the Registrar’s position is well supported by the MCRs.
15Dr. Sokolov diagnoses the appellant with uncontrolled substance use disorder and notes the patient is non-compliant with treatment recommendations, and states: “cocaine – uses in his truck.”
16Mr. Kleinman states “cocaine use disorder. With patient reporting using cocaine in vehicle over several days. Denies driving while using substances.”
17The appellant acknowledges his substance use but disputes that his use is an issue. He testified he has been using cocaine for the past seven years, but his use is infrequent. He testified he only uses cocaine when going to a nightclub or a bar with his friends.
18The appellant further testified that he attended CAMH with his spouse as she took him there after he had failed to come home for several days, and she was concerned for him given the length of his absence from the familial home. He feels his spouse’s concerns regarding his cocaine use are unwarranted. He testified the last time he used cocaine was five to six months ago.
19We find the evidence presented at the hearing supports the conclusion that the appellant suffers from a substance use disorder. We give weight to the MCRs and, in particular, to the medical opinion of Dr. Sokolov which support a diagnosis of substance use disorder.
20Given the evidence before us, we find on a balance of probabilities, that the Registrar has established the appellant suffers from a substance use disorder.
Is the appellant’s substance use disorder likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a vehicle safely?
21We find that the Registrar has proven on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle of the applicable class safely.
22The Registrar argues that substance use disorder interferes with the appellant’s ability to drive safely. The Registrar relies on the CCMTA Standards, specifically chapter 15, which states substance use contributes to impairment in driving performance. Chapter 15.6.3 provide that drivers suffering from substance use disorder (alcohol and illicit drugs, such as cocaine) may be eligible for a licence if they meet the criteria for remission and/or have abstained from alcohol/drugs for a period of twelve months. The CCMTA Standards also state that earlier re-licensing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addiction specialist and/or treating physician recognised by the licensing authority, and the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program. Lastly, the functional abilities necessary for driving can not be impaired.
23The Tribunal is entitled to take the CCMTA Standards into consideration but is not bound by them.
24While the CCMTA Standards are well-reasoned and provide assistance, every case must be considered on its own facts.
25The Registrar relies upon the MCRs and the CCMTA Standards in meeting its burden and asserts both Dr. Sokolov and Mr. Kleinman concluded that there were safety concerns with the appellant’s driving, and each submitted a MCR expressing their concern. We find that the Registrar’s reliance on the MCRs is not misplaced, and we give weight to the MCRs. We note Dr. Sokolov states the appellant uses cocaine in his truck. Mr. Kleinman states the appellant reports using cocaine in a vehicle over several days. Both practitioners highlighted the appellant’s use of cocaine in a vehicle.
26We acknowledge the appellant’s testimony that he does not use cocaine while driving, he has incurred no impaired driving convictions, and his driving record is clean. He testified he has no idea the effect cocaine would have on his driving abilities. However, we give more weight to MCRs completed by Dr. Sokolov and Mr. Kleinman, both practitioners in the field of addictions and mental health, and we note both emphasized the appellant’s use of substances in a vehicle. We note both submitted a MCR expressing their concerns regarding the appellant’s ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
27Although we are not bound by the CCMTA Standards, we find them reasonable and given the evidence and submissions, we are persuaded to apply the CCMTA Standards in the circumstances of this case. The Chapter 15.6.3, provides that drivers suffering from substance use disorder may be eligible for a licence if they meet the criteria for remission and/or have abstained from drugs for a period of twelve months. Earlier re-licensing may be considered upon favourable recommendation from an addiction specialist and/or treating physician, and the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program. We find it reasonable to require the appellant to adhere to Chapter 15.6.3.
28At present, the appellant falls short of the criteria set out in the CCMTA Standards. We appreciate the appellant requires his driving privileges for his employment. However, we note the appellant testified he has been free of cocaine for five to six months, not twelve months. In addition, he has not successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program and does not have a favourable recommendation from an addiction specialist or treating physician to shorten the time period.
29Based on a careful consideration of all the evidence before us, we are satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the appellant’s medical condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.
ORDER
30For the reasons set out above, pursuant to subsection 50(2) of the Act, we confirm the Registrar’s decision to suspend the appellant’s driver licence.
Licence Appeal Tribunal
Dr. Peter Savage, Member
Rupinder Hans, Vice-Chair
Released: April 27th, 2026