Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18525/MVIA
In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act
Between:
Julie Holden
Appellant
and
Registrar of Motor Vehicles
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATORS:
Gary Harvey, Member Michael Beauchesne, Member
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Julie Holden, Self-represented
For the Respondent:
Martin He, Representative
Heard by teleconference:
April 17, 2026
OVERVIEW
1Julie Holden (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Tuesday, April 7, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Kyle Holden (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.
2The appellant appeals on the grounds that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension. As well, the appellant submits that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.
ISSUES
3The issues in dispute are:
Pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension; and
Pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
RESULT
4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
ANALYSIS
5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act are satisfied. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.
The appellant has not established that she exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension
6We are not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.
7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.
8Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant establish reasonable actions were taken to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.
9We are satisfied that the vehicle was validly impounded. The Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “Registrar”) presented evidence that establishes the vehicle was stopped by police while it was being driven by the driver, whose licence was suspended due to a prescribed Criminal Code conviction.
10We find the appellant’s testimony provided little evidence of exercising due diligence to determine the driver’s licence of the driver was not under suspension at the time her vehicle was detained for impoundment. The appellant confirmed that the driver was her adult son, and she further testified that she was aware his driver’s licence had been suspended “about five years ago.” In fact, the driver record search obtained on April 14, 2026, by the respondent shows the driver’s licence was suspended “indefinitely” in September 2022 for failing to provide a breath sample. Despite this, the appellant testified that she did not enquire as to whether the suspension had ended before allowing her son to drive the vehicle on the day it was impounded. Rather, the appellant offered that the last time she recalled discussing the status of the driver’s licence with her son was “two to three years ago,” and that her son must have misled her at that time because he either said he had a valid driver’s licence, or had omitted telling her he did not have a driver’s licence. The appellant alternately maintained that it “never crossed her mind” that five years later her son would not have a driver’s licence.”
11This evidence is unpersuasive because it is vague, inconsistent, and does not demonstrate the appellant took reasonable actions to determine her son was properly licensed instead of simply assuming his representations to be true. As such, we afforded it little weight. Rather, we find a reasonable person who knew that the driver’s licence of the driver had earlier been suspended would not simply rely on the driver’s own representation that he is properly licensed—notwithstanding that he is a family member.
12The appellant’s reliance on assumptions and representations was underscored during cross examination when the appellant testified that she never asked to see her son’s driver’s licence before permitting him to drive the motor vehicle. And despite having to run her son’s wallet out to him because he forgot it in the house upon leaving to drive the vehicle the day it was impounded, she testified that she did not verify his driver’s licence was in the wallet—she merely assumed it was there.
13When we consider this evidence together on a balance of probabilities, we find the appellant’s efforts to exercise due diligence amounted to assumptions and a reliance on the driver’s representations, which fall short of meeting the grounds at section 50.2(3)(c) of the Act.
The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship
14We are not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).
15The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) of the Regulation states that to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:
The owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.
16If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.
17If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.
18The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) of the Regulation from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:
No alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;
The loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;
The impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and
The impact of the loss,
(i) Will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and
(ii) Will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).
19The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.
Alternative to the impounded vehicle
20We are not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.
21The appellant did not demonstrate that she had considered and enquired into every reasonable option to her impounded vehicle. While she testified that there is no taxi or Uber service in her area, she later explained that she knew this because “it is a very small town.” In our view, this qualifies as an assumption that shows the appellant did not enquire into every reasonable transportation option as the Regulation requires.
22We further find the appellant discounted the assistance of other family members as a reasonable transportation option based on speculation and a reluctance to ask others for help, which falls short of meeting the requirements of the Regulation. The appellant testified that while she has a different son who lives an hour away, she is an “independent person” who does not want to burden him because he is busy with his job and raising his own children. During cross-examination, the appellant testified that this son could help her “if he has the time,” and subsequently conceded that she was “sure he would come up and help his parents.” We find this evidence establishes that the appellant has not demonstrated this family member is unable to assist with her transportation needs because, in our view, her testimony acknowledges he would most likely be able to provide help if asked. This weighs against the appellant’s position that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship because she did not persuade us that obtaining help from family member is not a reasonable option to her impounded vehicle.
23As well, the appellant testified that while rental vehicles are available in her area, they are not a reasonable option because she cannot afford the fees. We did not place full weight on this evidence for several reasons. First, the appellant confirmed she receives a regular pension income from the government. Further, when asked if the driver could help pay for a rental car during cross-examination, the appellant testified that she “does not think this is an option” despite confirming that he was paying to maintain the vehicle prior to it being impounded. Third, the appellant’s testimony did not persuade us that she had even looked into the cost of a rental vehicle that would suit her needs before concluding it was not affordable. When we consider this evidence together on a balance of probabilities, we conclude the appellant has not demonstrated that renting a car during the impoundment period is not a reasonable option based on affordability.
24For the reasons set out above, we find the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle. Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.
Conclusions
25We find that:
The appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then subject to the condition described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1); and
The appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.
ORDER
26The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.
Released: April 24, 2026
__________________________
Gary Harvey
Adjudicator
_________________________
Michael Beauchesne
Adjudicator