Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 24-014379/AABS
In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
Qiao Mei Chen
Applicant
and
Allstate Insurance Company of Canada
Respondent
DECISION
ADJUDICATOR: Nadia Mauro
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Maziar Mortezaei, Counsel
For the Respondent: A. Bryn Copp, Counsel
HEARD: By way of written submissions
OVERVIEW
1Qiao Mei Chen, the applicant, was involved in an automobile accident on November 28, 2023, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (including amendments effective June 1, 2016) (the “Schedule”). The applicant was denied benefits by the respondent, Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.
ISSUES
2The issues in dispute are:
Are the applicant’s injuries predominantly minor as defined in s. 3 of the Schedule and therefore subject to treatment within the $3,500.00 Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”) limit?
Is the applicant entitled to an income replacement benefit (“IRB”) in the amount of $400.00 per week from December 5, 2023, to date and on-going?
Is the applicant entitled to $2,087.05 ($3,419.33 less $1,332.28 approved) for physiotherapy services, proposed by Prime + Care Health Centre in a treatment plan (“OCF-18”) dated January 5, 2024?
Is the applicant entitled to $1,696.36 ($3,419.33 less $1,722.97 approved) for physiotherapy services, proposed by Prime + Care Health Centre in an OCF-18 dated January 5, 2024?
Is the applicant entitled to $4,374.09 for physiotherapy services, proposed by Prime + Care Health Centre in an OCF-18 dated December 18, 2024?
Is the applicant entitled to $325.00 for HST accounting report, submitted on by invoice dated March 28, 2024, by S & T Accounting?
Is the applicant entitled to $339.00 for Response letter re: IRB, submitted on by invoice dated May 21, 2024, by S & T Accounting?
Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?
Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?
3Although the Case Conference Report and Order (“CCRO”), dated February 26, 2025, indicates that the treatment plan listed under issue 4 is dated January 5, 2024, I find that the submissions and evidence of the parties confirm the treatment plan in dispute is dated February 5, 2024.
RESULT
4The applicant’s injuries are predominantly minor as defined by the Schedule.
5The applicant is not entitled to an IRB.
6The expenses incurred under the treatment plans for a chiropractic and physiotherapy services, dated January 5, 2024, and February 5, 2024, are payable pursuant to s. 38(11) of the Schedule, plus interest.
7The applicant is not entitled to the treatment plan for physiotherapy services dated December 18, 2024, the HST on the accounting report, dated March 28, 2024, “the response letter re: IRB”, dated May 21, 2024, or an award.
ANALYSIS
Minor Injury Guideline
8I find that the applicant has not met her onus to demonstrate that her accident-related impairments warrant removal from the MIG.
9Section 18(1) of the Schedule provides that medical and rehabilitation benefits are limited to $3,500.00 if the insured sustains impairments that are predominantly a minor injury. Section 3(1) defines a “minor injury” as “one or more of a sprain, strain, whiplash associated disorder, contusion, abrasion, laceration or subluxation and includes any clinically associated sequelae to such an injury.”
10An insured may be removed from the MIG if they can establish that their accident-related injuries fall outside of the MIG or, under s. 18(2), that they have a documented pre-existing condition combined with compelling medical evidence stating that the condition precludes recovery if they are kept within the confines of the MIG. The Tribunal has also determined that chronic pain with functional impairment or a psychological condition may warrant removal from the MIG. The burden of proof lies with the applicant.
11The applicant submits she has suffered physical and psychological injuries that warrant removal from the MIG.
a) Physical Injuries
12I find that the applicant has not met her evidentiary onus to demonstrate that she suffers from physical injuries warranting removal from the confines of the MIG.
13As a result of the subject accident, the applicant submits that she has suffered from post-traumatic headaches, ongoing neck, back, shoulder and right wrist pain, and carpal tunnel syndrome. The applicant relies on clinical notes and records (“CNRs”) of physicians Dr. Benjamin Ong and Dr. Jiun-An Lai; Disability Certificate (“OCF-3”) completed by chiropractor, Dr. Pawan Jit, dated January 5, 2024; and s. 44 report of physiatrist, Dr. Abdul-Wahab Khan, to support that she has been consistently diagnosed with the same or similar injuries.
14I have reviewed the evidence relied upon by the applicant and find that her physical injuries are predominantly minor. While the CNRs of Dr. Ong and Dr. Lai support the applicant attended with accident-related physical complaints, and both practitioners report “MSK pain” on a few occasions, neither Dr. Ong nor Dr. Lai diagnose non-minor accident-related injuries.
15I am also not persuaded that the OCF-3 completed by Dr. Jit supports a non-minor physical injury. Dr. Jit lists accident-related physical injuries as cervicalgia, injury of muscles and tendons of the rotator cuff of shoulder, low back pain, headache, dizziness and giddiness. The applicant has not directed me to evidence or authority to support these types of injuries are non-minor.
16Furthermore, Dr. Khan opines that the applicant’s injuries are consistent with sprain/strain injuries that would be considered a predominantly minor injury as defined by the Schedule. The applicant has not pointed me to any other objective medical evidence or expert opinion opining that she has a non-minor physical injury.
17As such, I find that the applicant has sustained physical injuries that fall within the definition of a minor injury.
b) Psychological Injuries
18The applicant has not provided any medical evidence of significance to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that she suffers from a psychological impairment that would warrant removal from the MIG.
19I am not persuaded that Dr. Lai diagnosed the applicant with post-accident psychological impairments including mood, stress, and PTSD as submitted by the applicant. It is true that “review of psychological impacts include mood, stress, PTSD, need/appropriate psychotherapy related to MVA” is listed under physician review on the “Invoice Inquiry” of Steeles & Midland Medical/Cardiac Centre, signed by Dr. Lai on May 1, 2024. However, I find that this not a diagnosis with respect to the applicant’s accident-related impairments, rather a general statement related to and part of a what comprises a “physician review” on the invoice breakdown. I have reviewed the CNRs of Dr. Lai and find that the applicant did not make any complaints of accident-related psychological impairments, nor did Dr. Lai recommend psychotherapy in any of the attendance notes.
20I also give little weight to the OCF-3 completed by Dr. Jit, with respect to the applicant’s alleged psychological impairments, as the applicant has not pointed me to any other medical evidence that corroborates the complaints of nightmares, malaise and fatigue, sleep disorder (unspecified), and anxiety disorder (unspecified) found within the OCF-3. There is also no explanation to support the inclusion of these symptoms within the OCF-3.
21As such, I am persuaded by the s. 44 psychology report of psychologist, Dr. John W. Lee, dated April 17, 2024, wherein Dr. Lee opined the applicant “does not present with any accident-related psychological conditions”. Dr. Lee further opined that the applicant “does not suffer from a psychological impairment related to the motor vehicle accident that requires formal treatment or assessment interventions."
22Given the foregoing, I am not satisfied that the applicant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that she sustained a psychological impairment as a result of the subject accident.
Conclusion
23For the reasons set out above, the applicant has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that she is suffering from physical injuries or a psychological impairment that would warrant removal from the MIG.
Income Replacement Benefits
24In her submissions, the applicant, narrows the scope of her claim for entitlement to IRBs to $308.11 per week from December 6, 2023, to November 28, 2025.
25The parties agree that the respondent made a lump sum IRB payment to the applicant in the amount of $3,710.12 on July 11, 2025 for the period between December 6, 2023 and December 31, 2024. The applicant is seeking interest at a rate of 1% per month, compounded monthly pursuant to the Schedule on this lump sum. The applicant is further seeking IRBs in the amount of $308.11 per week from the period of January 1, 2025 to November 28, 2025.
26Given the submissions of the parties, I will narrow the scope of my decision with respect to the quantum of IRBs for the period between December 6, 2023 to December 31, 2024, plus interest, and the applicant’s entitlement for IRBs for the period between January 1, 2025 and November 28, 2025.
Entitlement to IRBs from January 1, 2025 to November 28, 2025
27To receive payment for an IRB under s. 5(1) of the Schedule, the applicant must be employed at the time of the accident and, as a result of and within 104 weeks after the accident, suffer a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of that employment. The applicant must identify the essential tasks of their employment, which tasks they are unable to perform and to what extent they are unable to perform them. The applicant bears the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that they meet the test.
28The applicant submits that at the time of the accident, she was employed as a full-time sales associate and cashier at a grocery store, and as a result of the accident, she was unable to return to work. The applicant further submits that prior to the accident, she was also self-employed as a personal care masseuse. The applicant submits that although she returned to her self-employment position shortly after the accident, she returned on modified duties and reduced hours.
29The respondent submits that the applicant has not met her burden to prove that she suffers a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her employment as a result of the accident. The respondent submits that it terminated the applicant’s further entitlement to IRB based on the s. 44 insurer examination reports of physiatrist, Dr. Abdul-Wahab Khan, dated April 17, 2024, and psychologist, Dr. John W. Lee, dated April 17, 2024. The respondent submits that it mistakenly overpaid the benefit and should have maintained the termination of IRBs effective April 22, 2024, based on the s. 44 reports.
30I find that the applicant has not put forward contemporaneous evidence that supports a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her employment. Specifically, the applicant’s submissions do not identify what the essential tasks of her pre-accident employment were, or how she is unable to complete them due to accident-related impairments. The applicant has also not directed me to contemporaneous evidence that would substantiate a finding that the applicant continued to suffer from a substantial inability to perform her employment tasks. Despite the applicant providing a copy of an employer’s confirmation form (“OCF-2”), dated March 25, 2024, included as part of the S&T Accounting Report, I find that the OCF-2 also does not identify what the essential tasks of her pre-accident employment were, or how she is unable to complete them due to accident-related impairments.
31I am also not persuaded by the applicant’s reliance on the CNRs of Dr. Ong and Dr. Lai, because in my view, complaints of pain alone are not sufficient to satisfy the test for IRBs. While I acknowledge that the CNRs note the applicant to have shoulder, neck, wrist, and arm pain, the CNRs do not evidence a medical opinion from the applicant’s treating practitioners that would speak to an inability to engage in the essential tasks of her employment. The applicant has not pointed me to any medical opinion or evidence that speaks to a substantial inability to perform employment tasks.
32Taken together, on a balance of probabilities, I find the evidence does not establish the applicant’s entitlement for an IRB for the period between January 1, 2025 and November 28, 2025.
Quantum of IRBs for the period of December 6, 2023 to December 31, 2024
33I find that the applicant is not entitled to an IRB payment in the amount of $308.11 per week for the period of December 6, 2023 to December 31, 2024.
34As noted above, on July 11, 2025, the respondent paid a lump sum IRB payment to the applicant in the amount of $3,710.12, for the period between December 6, 2023 and December 31, 2024. The IRB payment was made for the period of December 6, 2023 to December 31, 2023 in the amount of $267.55 per week, and January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2024 in the amount of $51.97 per week.
35The applicant submits that she is entitled to IRBs in the amount of $308.11 per week, relying on the Income Replacement Benefits Accounting Report of S&T Accounting, dated March 5, 2024.
36I am not persuaded that the applicant is entitled to an amount greater than was paid for IRBs by the respondent for the period between December 6, 2023, and December 31, 2024. The calculations made by S&T Accounting are limited to financial records, inclusive of post-accident employment and self-employment income, up to March 2024. The report of Davis Martindale Chartered Professional Accountants, dated July 10, 2025, relied on by the respondent was completed based on financials into 2025. The applicant does not make submissions with respect to why the S&T Accounting report should be preferred over the report of Davis Martindale. As such, I find that the report of Davis Martindale is more comprehensive and provides a more accurate calculation of the quantum payable for IRBs, taking into account the applicant’s post-accident employment and self-employment income.
Interest on the lump sum payment of $3,710.12
37Section 36(4) of the Schedule states that within 10 business days after the insurer receives the application and completed disability certificate (OCF-3), the insurer shall pay the specified benefit, provide notice explaining why the insurer is not paying the benefit or advise the insured of the requirement for an examination under s. 44, or send a request under s. 33.
38Section 33(1) requires the insured to provide the insurer with any information reasonably required to assist the insurer in determining the applicant’s entitlement to a benefit. According to s. 33(6), the insurer is not liable to pay a benefit in respect of any period during which the insured person fails to comply with s. 33(1).
39The applicant submits that while the respondent calculated and paid $3,710.12 in IRBs, it failed to calculate or pay interest on overdue benefits. The applicant submits that she is entitled to interest at a rate of 1% per month, compounded monthly, per the Schedule. The applicant submits that the respondent was in possession of all requested documentation by May 2024, however, failed to pay the IRB for months.
40The respondent submits that since the IRB was overpaid, no interest is payable.
41A brief summary of the applicant’s application for IRBs and the insurer’s response is as outlined below:
On or about January 19, 2024, an OCF-3 completed by chiropractor, Dr. Pawan Jit, dated January 5, 2024, was submitted to the respondent for consideration.
On or about March 27, 2024, an IRB Report was completed by S&T Accounting.
An Explanation of Benefits (“EOB”), dated April 9, 2024, was sent to the applicant seeking a s. 33 request for documents that Davis Martindale, the respondent’s accounting firm, required to calculate the IRB quantum.
EOB dated April 22, 2024, was sent to the applicant providing reasons for stoppage of IRBs due to the s. 44 Insurer Examination Reports.
On or around May 1, 2024, January 8 and 27, 2025, the respondent made additional s. 33 requests for the documents that David Martindale required to calculate the IRB quantum.
On or around July 10, 2025, Davis Martindale provided a Supplementary Report identifying its calculated quantum of IRBs.
EOB dated July 11, 2025 was sent to the applicant indicating that per the Supplementary Report of Davis Martindale, dated July 11, 2025, she was entitled to an IRB payment of $3,710.12 for the period of November 29, 2023 to December 31, 2024.
42Neither party has directed me to evidence that would confirm when the respondent received the documentation it requested under s. 33 of the Schedule. While the applicant submits that the respondent was in possession of all requested documents by May 2024, relying on letter correspondence of S&T Accounting, dated May 17, 2024, I find that the letter correspondence of S&T Accounting indicates it had only provided some of the requested documentation. I find that the Davis Martindale supplementary report dated July 10, 2025, identifies a number of additional documents that it relied on in making its calculation, including a number of those requested under s. 33 of the Schedule. The applicant has not directed me to evidence that supports this documentation was otherwise provided to the respondent prior to July 10, 2025, pursuant to s. 33(1) of the Schedule. Consequently, I find that the respondent was not required to pay IRBs for the period in which it did not possess the documents it required pursuant to s. 33(6) of the Schedule.
43As such, I find that the applicant has not met her onus in establishing that the IRB lump sum payment was overdue, such that interest is payable pursuant to the Schedule.
IRB Report and Response Letter
44I find that the applicant has not met her onus in demonstrating entitlement to the remaining balance of the IRB report and response letter.
45Section 7(5) of the Schedule states that the insurer is not required to pay more than a total of $2,500 for the preparation of one or more reports under subsection (4) in respect of an insured person.
46The IRB report, completed by S&T Accounting, dated March 27, 2024, was invoiced in the amount of $2,825.00, and was partially approved for $2,500.00.
47The response letter, completed by S&T Accounting, dated May 17, 2024, was invoiced in the amount of $339.00.
48Although the applicant concedes that under s. 7(5) of the Schedule, the insurer is not required to pay more than $2,500.00 for an accounting report, the applicant submits that these expenses were reasonable and necessary. The applicant submits that if the insurer had adjusted the file in a prudent and fair manner, within a reasonable time, she would not have been forced to incur the additional expense for $339.00 for the response letter. The applicant further submits that the respondent failed to respond to the IRB claim until the initiation of the within application, and therefore, should be entitled to the outstanding costs of the accounting reports in the amount of $664, plus interest.
49I agree with the respondent, that the maximum payable for an accounting report pursuant to s. 7(5) of the Schedule is $2,500.00. Section 7(5) clearly states that the maximum payable is for one or more reports. In my view, despite the applicant obtaining a letter at the cost of $339.00, this expense is not required to be paid by the respondent because the applicant had already exceeded the maximum payable under the Schedule. Similarly, the respondent is not required to pay the remaining $325.00 for the IRB report, because this would exceed the maximum payable under the Schedule.
50As I have found the applicant is not removed from the MIG, I find that I am not required to review the treatment plans in dispute to determine if they are reasonable and necessary.
51However, the applicant submits that for all the OCF-18s in dispute, the respondent failed to discharge its statutory obligations pursuant to the Schedule, providing insufficient explanations for all denials.
Section 38(8) and 38(11) of the Schedule
52Sections 38(8) and 38(11) of the Schedule set out strict notice requirements for insurers responding to treatment plans and specific consequences if they fail to comply. Section 38(8) requires an insurer to inform an insured person within ten business days after it receives an OCF-18 which goods, services, assessments, and/or examinations it agrees to pay for, and which it does not, as well the medical and other reasons why it considered any of the goods and services to not be reasonable and necessary.
53If an insurer fails to comply with its obligations under s. 38(8), the following consequences set out in s. 38(11) of the Schedule are triggered:
The insurer is prohibited from taking the position that the insured person has an impairment to which the MIG applies.
The insurer shall pay for all goods, services, assessments, and examinations described in the treatment and assessment plan that relate to the period starting on the 11th business day after the day the insurer received the application and ending on the day the insurer gives a notice described in subsection (8).
a) The EOB dated January 29, 2024
54I find that the EOB dated January 29, 2024 is non-complaint with s. 38(8) of the Schedule.
55The applicant submits that the OCF-18, dated January 5, 2024, for physiotherapy and chiropractic services, was submitted on January 19, 2024, in the amount of $3,419.22, and partially approved for $1,722.92 on February 29, 2024. The applicant submits that the respondent was non-complaint with s. 38(8) of the Schedule, because the respondent must have responded within ten business days after receipt of the treatment plan.
56The respondent submits that it received the treatment plan on January 19, 2024, and provided a response within ten days, on January 29, 2024.
57The EOB, dated January 29, 2024, for the treatment plan for physiotherapy and chiropractic services, dated January 5, 2024, states the following:
“Please be advised that there is insufficient funding from your $3500 minor injury limit.
Minor injury is defined as a sprain, strain, whiplash associated disorder, contusion, abrasion, laceration or subluxation and any clinically associated sequelae in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).
To date, we have not been provided with any compelling medical evidence documented by your family/attending physician to support that your pre-existing medical condition would prevent you from achieving maximum medical recovery within the minor injury framework.”
58The applicant also provides an EOB, dated February 28, 2024, for the subject treatment plan. The EOB dated February 28, 2024, states the same reasons as in the EOB dated January 29, 2024.
59The evidence supports that the respondent did provide a response to the applicant, on January 29, 2024, within the ten days required pursuant to s. 38(8) of the Schedule. However, while I appreciate that the respondent indicated in its EOB that the applicant’s injuries are considered to be within the MIG, some or partial compliance with the Schedule is not enough. I find that both of the respondent’s EOBs do not reference the specific CNRs or medical records that it would require, nor the specific injuries that are “minor” that it considered when rendering its decision.
60In my view, simply referring to the “medical evidence” without providing a single reference, is not sufficient to allow an unsophisticated person to make an informed decision to either accept or dispute the decision at issue. This also does not serve the Schedule’s consumer protection goal.
61Given the foregoing, I find that the respondent’s EOBs are non-compliant with s. 38(8) of the Schedule. Consequently, pursuant to the provisions set out in s. 38(11), I find that the respondent is liable to pay all expenses that were incurred by the applicant under the treatment plan, dated January 5, 2024, for physiotherapy and chiropractic services, between the 11th business day after the plan was submitted until the day the respondent cured its deficient notice. If the respondent did not cure its deficient notice prior to this hearing, the applicant may incur these expenses, and provided they are properly invoiced, the respondent is thereafter liable to pay these expenses. To be clear, it is no longer open to the respondent to cure the denials that I have found deficient: Aviva v Suarez, 2021 ONSC 6200 at paras. 35-36.
b) The EOB dated February 15, 2024
62I find that the denial letter dated February 15, 2024, is non-compliant with s. 38(8) of the Schedule.
63The EOB, dated February 14, 2024, for the treatment plan for physiotherapy services, dated February 5, 2024, states the following:
“Further to our correspondence dated xxx, [sic] we have denied your previous OCF-18s for goods and services for the basis that we do not have compelling medical evidence to support that you suffer from a non minor injury.
As per the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, a “Minor injury” is defined as a sprain, strain, whiplash associated disorder, contusion, abrasion, laceration or subluxation and any clinically associated sequelae. This term is to be interpreted to apply where a person sustains any one or more of these injuries.
It has now been over 2 months since the date of the accident and as we have yet to receive any compelling medical evidence documented by your family/attending physician that you suffer an injury other than a minor injury or to support that your pre-existing medical condition would prevent you from achieving maximum medical recovery within the minor injury framework.”
64As I have found above, some or partial compliance with the Schedule is not enough. I find that the respondent’s EOB does not reference the specific CNRs or medical records that it would require, nor the specific injuries that are “minor” that it considered when rendering its decision. Furthermore, in this EOB it is not clear what correspondence the respondent is referring to, as the date is omitted.
65Given the foregoing, I find that the respondent’s EOBs are non-compliant with s. 38(8) of the Schedule. Consequently, pursuant to the provisions set out in s. 38(11), I find that the respondent is liable to pay all expenses that were incurred by the applicant under the treatment plan, dated February 15, 2024, for physiotherapy services, between the 11th business day after the plan was submitted until the day the respondent cured its deficient notice. If the respondent did not cure its deficient notice prior to this hearing, the applicant may incur these expenses, and provided they are properly invoiced, the respondent is thereafter liable to pay these expenses. To be clear, it is no longer open to the respondent to cure the denials that I have found deficient: Aviva v Suarez, 2021 ONSC 6200 at paras. 35-36.
c) The EOB dated January 2, 2025
66I find that the EOB, dated January 2, 2025, is complaint with s. 38(8) of the Schedule.
67The EOB, dated January 2, 2025, for the treatment plan for chiropractic treatment in the amount of $4,374.09, dated December 16, 2024, states the following:
“Please be advised that your S44 Physiatrist Insurer’s Examination dated April 4, 2024 diagnosed you with uncomplicated soft tissue injuries and concluded that your injuries are considered minor.
As such, we are unable to approve this plan as presented.”
68Unlike my findings above, I find that the respondent’s EOB complies with s. 38(8) of the Schedule, because in this letter, the respondent provided a medical reason, that being the opinion of the s. 44 physiatrist assessor. As such, I find that the respondent’s denial was clear and sufficient such that an unsophisticated person could make an informed decision to either accept or dispute the denial. The applicant may disagree with the stated reasons, however, that does not render a denial invalid.
69As such, I find that the EOB dated January 2, 2025, is complaint with s. 38(8) of the Schedule. Therefore, the treatment plan dated December 16, 2024, is not payable.
Interest
70Interest applies on the payment of any overdue benefits pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule.
Award
71The applicant sought an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664. Under s. 10, the Tribunal may grant an award of up to 50 per cent of the total benefits payable if it finds that an insurer unreasonably withheld or delayed the payment of benefits.
72Although I found that the respondent did not comply with s. 38(8) of the Schedule for issues 3 and 4, I find that its conduct did not rise to the level that would substantiate the applicant’s request for an award despite finding that the denial letter did not meet the standard of notice required by the Schedule. This is because I find that the respondent’s non-compliance with s. 38(8) to be an incorrect adjusting decision, rather than conduct that was “excessive, imprudent, stubborn, inflexible, unyielding, or immoderate” that I would deem to warrant an award.
73The respondent is therefore not liable to pay an award.
ORDER
74I find that:
The applicant’s injuries are predominantly minor as defined by the Schedule;
The applicant is not entitled to an IRB;
The expenses incurred under the treatment plan for a chiropractic and physiotherapy services, dated January 5, 2024, are payable pursuant to s. 38(11) of the Schedule, plus interest.
The expenses incurred under the treatment plan for physiotherapy services, dated February 5, 2024, are payable pursuant to s. 38(11) of the Schedule, plus interest.
The applicant is not entitled to the treatment plan for physiotherapy services dated December 18, 2024;
The applicant is not entitled to $325.00 for HST accounting report;
The applicant is not entitled to $339.00 for Response letter re: IRB; and
The respondent is not liable to pay an award.
Released: April 30, 2026
Nadia Mauro
Adjudicator