Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18461MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended.

Between:

Gary Cooper

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Bruce Stanton

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Gary Cooper, self-represented

For the Respondent:

Martin He, agent of the Registrar

HEARD: By Teleconference

Friday, April 24, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Gary Cooper, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle, a 2019 Honda Pilot, was impounded on Thursday, March 19, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, K.D-H. (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver's licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension, and that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship.

ISSUES

3The issues in dispute are:

i. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(c) of the Act, whether the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension; and

ii. pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(d) of the Act, whether that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

RESULT

4For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

5For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The appellant has not established that they exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension

6I am not satisfied that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

7In considering what actions might amount to due diligence, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R 1299 (“R. v. Sault Ste. Marie”), describes due diligence as taking all reasonable care and the actions a reasonable person would have taken in the same or similar circumstances.

8Although due diligence does not require perfection, it does require that the appellant must establish that they took reasonable actions to determine that the driver was properly licensed rather than simply assuming that to be true. In general, the driver’s own representation that they are properly licensed is not sufficient to establish that due diligence was taken.

9The appellant testified that he was aware that the driver’s licence had been suspended. He described the event that he believed resulted in the driver being charged driving with blood alcohol in excess of 08. The appellant testified that he is a project superintendent for a road and highway construction business and the driver is administrative assistant who does billings and invoices. He typically interacts with the driver 3 to 5 times per week. He had tasked the driver to attend to a construction site to organize traffic cones when she was detained by police for impaired driving. He testified that, since the time of the conviction, she had been carpooling with other employees to get to work.

10The appellant testified that he assumed the driver’s licence had since been reinstated.

11The appellant testified that he keeps the Honda Pilot parked at the driver’s residence because she lives in Thunder Bay, closer to his workplace. The appellant lives approximately one hour from Thunder Bay, about halfway between there and the town of Nipigon. He stated that having the vehicle in Thunder Bay made it more convenient for him to access the vehicle for personal transportation purposes (he uses a company pick-up truck while on the job) and for other employees to use it for carpooling needs in the winter.

12The appellant testified that in the early hours of the day of the impoundment, the driver fled her residence for fear of her safety after a violent altercation with her partner and she used the Honda Pilot to do so. The appellant testified that the driver has her own vehicle, a Chevrolet Equinox, but believes it was not in service and useable at the time. He testified that the driver did the right thing to use the vehicle to get to a safe place and he does not fault her decision to take the vehicle.

13I find that although the circumstances of the driver’s use of the vehicle are compelling, the appellant has not established that he took any actions to determine the validity of the driver’s licence. The appellant stated that he assumed the driver had a licence, he trusted her, and as far as he knew, she was driving her own vehicle, the Equinox. It appears that the appellant was content to leave the Honda Pilot, and its keys, at the driver’s residence and he assumed, without any direct knowledge, that her driving privileges had been reinstated.

14I find that the appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension.

The impoundment will not cause exceptional hardship

15I am not satisfied that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship as that term is defined under O. Reg. 631/98 under the Act (the “Regulation”).

16The Regulation sets out the criteria that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining whether the appellant has established that the impoundment will cause exceptional hardship under the Act. According to the Regulation, the Tribunal must first determine whether no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available. Subsection 10(4) states that in order to show that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle:

[T]he owner must demonstrate that every reasonable option has been considered and inquired into that could eliminate or adequately mitigate any threat or loss to the person, including using another vehicle and making arrangements to do without any motor vehicle during the impound period.

17If the owner fails to prove that no alternative to the impounded vehicle is available, then the appeal on the basis of exceptional hardship will fail and the Tribunal need not consider the remaining factors set out in the Regulation related to exceptional hardship.

18If the owner establishes that there is no alternative available, the Tribunal must then consider whether the impoundment will result in a threat to the health or safety of any person ordinarily transported by the vehicle, a threat to public health and safety, or a threat to the environment or property of a community in whose service the vehicle is ordinarily used.

19The Tribunal is generally precluded by s. 10(2) from considering financial or economic loss, loss of employment or an employment opportunity, or loss of education or training or an opportunity for education or training. However, s. 10(3) provides that the Tribunal can consider these things if the owner demonstrates the following:

(a) no alternative to the impounded motor vehicle is available;

(b) the loss will be immediate, significant and lasting;

(c) the impact of the loss will be upon a person ordinarily transported by the motor vehicle; and

(d) the impact of the loss,

(i) will be upon a person other than the person whose driving while his or her driver’s licence was under suspension resulted in the impoundment of the motor vehicle, and

(ii) will not be a result of a loss by the suspended driver of the type set out in clause (2) (b), (c) or (d).

20The Tribunal can never consider whether the impoundment will result in inconvenience to a person.

Alternative to the impounded vehicle

21I am not satisfied that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

22The appellant testified that he keeps the Honda Pilot at the driver’s residence so that it is accessible to him for personal trips, as required, and for licensed employees to help with carpooling his construction crews. He testified that he has 130 employees to organize and direct. When he uses the Honda Pilot, he leaves the company truck at the driver’s residence. He stated that he typically uses the Honda Pilot for trips to Manitoulin Island and other personal trips.

23The appellant testified that he uses the company truck for work and commuting to and from his home approximately one hour’s drive from Thunder Bay. He testified that he also uses the company vehicle to pick up household needs (groceries, materials, pharmaceuticals) when it can be done in conjunction with work-related trips.

24The appellant testified that he recently picked up his Chevrolet Tahoe from his second residence on Manitoulin Island and has since been using the Tahoe for personal trips and transportation needs while the Honda Pilot is impounded.

25I find that the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle.

26Since the appellant has not established that there is no alternative to the impounded vehicle, exceptional hardship has not been established in accordance with the Act and the Regulation, and I need not consider the remaining factors for determining exceptional hardship.

Conclusions

27I find that:

i. the appellant has not established that he exercised due diligence in attempting to determine that the driver’s licence of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time it was detained in order to be impounded was not then under suspension;

ii. the appellant has not established that the impoundment will result in exceptional hardship.

ORDER

28The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.